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ABSTRACT

This dissertation reveals how religious factors affected the development of the
Korean War. Much prior research has analyzed the causes and nature of the Korean War,
in part because of the war’s impact upon later events, from the Cold War to the presentday geopolitical standoff. Though the war has been much-studied, religious factors have
rarely been included in these analyses. This de-emphasis of religion may be a justifiable
simplification in general war historiographies, but not in the specific case of Korea. This
current study uncovers the unique role of religion in Korean-American relations and in
Korean culture and politics, prior-to-and-during the time of the Korean War.
The Korean War ushered in a time of intimate collaboration between state and
non-state actors, unparalleled in American diplomatic and military history. Because
American missionaries had been working among Koreans for many years, they possessed
the language skills, human connections, and geographical knowledge that the US military
lacked. From the early days within the Pusan Perimeter through the late period at
P’anmunjom, American missionaries were highly visible on the frontline, at the
negotiation table, and in the POW camps. They were also important to the battle of
propaganda. Their letters and reports aroused sympathy in America for the Korea people.
In addition to the contributions of American Missionaries, the effect of Korean
Christians was an equally important factor to the shaping of the conflict. Churches were
rather influential within Korean society; clergymen were active in Korean politics; and
many of the top politicians were Christians. Christianity was a major obstacle to
Communist control of the North and subversive activities in the South. With the
assistance of foreign funding, churches were transformed by the ravages of war into an
important source of charitable assistance for millions of impoverished refugees.
Although this study looks at religious factors in general, the discussion focuses
primarily on Protestant churches and Protestant missionaries. These Protestant churches,
of all religious institutions in Korea, exerted an influence far disproportionate to their percapita membership. Similarly, these Protestant missionaries, of all religious actors, had
significant influence upon the American military and upon the American public. In
particular, the majority of missionaries who stayed behind and worked effectively with
the Korean government and US military were from the American Presbyterian missions.
They took the initiative on relief efforts and set the standard for others to follow.
This dissertation makes an important contribution to religious history as well. In
the process of assessing the impact of Christianity upon the Korean War, this dissertation
begins by examining Christianity’s development within Korea, primarily from the arrival
of American missionaries in the late Choson period. Christianity is found to have had a
strong impact upon Korea’s social development, internal politics, and foreign-relations.
The Christian community was an important part of the independence movement against
Japanese control. When one considers that South Korea has emerged today as one of the
most Christianized of nations, that every elected Korean president has been a Christian,
and that Korea now sends out more missionaries than any nation besides America, then
the historical value of such a study of into Christianity’s origins becomes clear.
xii
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INTRODUCTION

More than fifty years after the signing of the Korean Armistice (1953), the Korean
peninsula continues to be one of the most contentious areas of the globe and a regular
subject of the evening news. Under the dictatorships of Kim Il-sung and his son Kim
Jong-il, North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) has become
one of the most isolated countries in the world.

After experiencing rapid economic

growth in the 1960s and 1970s, the North’s economy began declining in the 1980s. The
food crisis in North Korea began, according to the report by the United States Institute of
Peace in August 1999, when the country received “a sharp reduction in heavily
subsidized food, equipment, and crude oil from the Soviet Union and China in the early
1990s.” 1 Then, in 1995, the country suffered a severe nationwide famine due to a
prolonged period of successive floods and droughts coupled with severe soil depletion
caused by long period of intensive farming and deforestation.2 Nevertheless, despite its
constant food shortage and lack of foreign aid, North Korea successfully tested a nuclear
bomb on October 9, 2006. Today, North Korea poses a great challenge to the security of
Northeast Asia and creates serious diplomatic problems for the United States.
Standing in sharp contrast, South Korea (the Republic of Korea, ROK) has broken
the chains of military dictatorships and emerged as a model of democracy in Asia. It has
1 Andrew Natsios, “The Politics o f Famine in North Korea,” United States Institute o f Peace Special Report
51 (2 August 1999): 1, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990802.html.
2 Ibid.
3 With North Korea’s nuclear program threatening the stability of the region, the United Nations Security
Council imposed new economic sanctions pressing Kim Jong-il to abandon his nuclear program.
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become fully integrated into the world market economy and developed into an exportoriented industrialized nation. From the 1980s onwards, South Korea has been regarded
by economists as one of the “Four Little Dragons” - the four strongest growing
economies - in Asia.4 Since its economic and political stabilization, South Korea has
hosted two Asian Games (Seoul in 1986, and Pusan in 2002),5 the Olympic Games in
1988, and the World Cup in 2002 (co-host with Japan). South Korea is now one of the
Top Ten Athletic Nations of the world.6 Changes in its religious demographics have
been just as profound. South Korea is currently the second largest Christian missionary
sending nation in the world, after the United States. The South Korea of today is hardly
recognizable as the same country that stumbled out of the rubble of the Korean War with
the larger portion of its population in abject poverty and most of its natural resources
permanently cut off to the north.
The two Koreas represent two strikingly different models of political and
economic development. To understand the two Koreas of today, one must look to the
origins, nature, and development of the Korean War. Historians generally agree that a
civil conflict among Koreans was inevitable in the aftermath of Japan’s defeat, due to the
political struggles between leftists and rightists.7 But the scope, nature, and meaning of
the war would have been completely different without foreign intervention.

Outside

influences were primarily responsible for the emergence of two separate Korean nations.
The origins of the war were inextricably linked to the global Soviet-American political
4 The Four Little Dragons are South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
5 South Korea was supposed to host the 1970 Asian Games but had to drop the plan because o f a security
threat from North Korea.
6 In 1984, South Korea rose to be one o f the top 10 gold medal winners in the Olympic Games and
continued to keep its position, except during the Sydney Games in 2000. In addition, from 1986 onwards,
it replaced Japan as the second gold medal winner in the Asian Games, except for the Hiroshima Games in
1996.
7 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 71.
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and ideological rivalry that was intensifying at the same time as the Korean peninsula
was liberated from Japanese colonial rule.
Originally, the United States pursued a policy of gradual disengagement, letting
the Koreans work out their political differences and restore stability in the peninsula; but
the consolidation of the Cold War, the sense of national prestige, and public pressure
arising out of anti-communist hysteria would not allow the Truman administration to
fully withdraw from Korea. Concerns over America’s strategic position in East Asia, the
security of Japan, and the fear of Soviet expansion elsewhere prompted the Truman
administration to actively defend South Korea when war broke out in June 1950.
American intervention under the banner of the United Nations, followed in turn
by Chinese involvement, prolonged the war and led to the destruction of nearly all major
infrastructures on the peninsula. Gradually, both North and South Koreans lost control
over the course of the Korean War, as foreigners began to take larger roles in the fighting
and truce talks. From 1950 to 1953, a large number of foreigners from every inhabited
continent participated in the war. Most were soldiers, but some were civilians - mainly
UN officials, relief workers, educators, medical workers, and missionaries. While the
majority of the soldiers returned home after the war, most of the civilian workers stayed
behind to take charge of reconstruction programs.
This study is an effort to investigate the role of a particular group of foreigners,
American missionaries and their American supporters, and especially their religious ideas
and activities before, during, and after the Korean War period. It attempts to facilitate a
new understanding of the origins and development of the division of Korea, which had
been a unified and independent country with more than a thousand years of recorded
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history. Because of the influence of American missionaries, Christianity emerged as an
important theme in the ideological struggle of the Cold War. Missionary activities and
relief efforts attracted great interest in the US home front that transformed the
understanding of the Korean War from a mere police action for collective security to a
religious crusade with strong humanitarian connotations.

Moreover, the war gave

missionaries the golden opportunity to reassert a leadership role in Korean churches that
marked a growth of religious and cultural exchange between the two allies. It was also a
key factor that elevated the impact of Christianity on Korean political, economic, social,
and religious life that eventually changed Korea from a Confucian-Buddhist society to a
Christian dominated society.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE KOREAN WAR
Historians across five decades have investigated who started the war. Journalists
such as I. F. Stone and Melvin B. Voorhees presented the earliest analysis of the Korean
War. Rather than giving any definite answers to the origins of the war, their publications
set the stage for historical debates in the years to come.

Stone’s book, The Hidden

History o f the Korean War, was met with an almost complete press blackout and boycott
when it was first published in 1952. The author introduced “a conspiracy theory” that the
South Korean government, and probably Chiang Kai-shek and General Douglas
MacArthur, had foreknowledge of the surprise attack by the North Koreans on June 25,
1950. Nevertheless, Stone alleged, they all remained silent in order to bring the United
States into the Korean conflict. This theory later became the backbone of the revisionist
interpretation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Traditionalists, who agreed with the government’s interpretation, rejected this
theory. They assigned most of the blame to the Soviet Union, arguing that Stalin was
ultimately behind the surprise attack. Adam B. Ulam suspected that Stalin might have
intended to divert the increasing U.S. military pressure in Europe after the formation of
NATO.8 Raymond L. Garthoff stressed the Soviet misperception of U.S. intentions due
to Dean Acheson’s National Press Club speech on January 12, 1950 and Truman’s
inaction in saving the Nationalists in China.9 Others suggested that Stalin might have
planned the Korean War to trap Communist China into political isolation.10 Based on
these arguments, traditionalists, such as A. Doak Barnett and Harold Hinton, argued that
by taking China as its junior partner the Korean War was part of the Soviet Union’s grand
strategy to “communize” Asia.11
Concerning American involvement, traditionalists put forward the credibility
argument that, since South Korea was basically an “American creation,” President
Truman had no choice but to stand behind his allies in facing the Communist challenge.
Military personnel and diplomats, such as General Matthew B. Ridgeway and Dean
Acheson, also presented their stories to echo the government perspective, supporting the
President’s decision to intervene in Korea and later to fire General MacArthur.12
According to Hakjoon Kim, a leading contemporary Korean War historian, missionaries

8 Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II (New York: The Viking Press, 1971),
167-169.
9 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1965), 72.
10 Edgar Snow, The Other Side o f the River: Red China Today (New York: Random House, 1962), 654655; see also, Wilbur Chafee, ‘T w o Hypotheses o f Sino-Soviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the
Korean War,” Journal o f Korean Affairs 4 (October 1976-January 1977): 10-11.
u See A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper, 1961). See also Harold Hinton,
Communist China in World Politics (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).
12 See Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We M et the Challenge; How All-Out Asian War Was
Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today’s War Objectives Must Be Limited (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1967); also see Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971).
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and their children who had worked in Korea also contributed greatly to the initial analysis
of the war in the 1950s and 1960s.13 Philip West called this stage of historiography the
“heroic phase” where “historians dwell on the sins of the enemy and the virtues of their
friends.” 14 Research efforts were mainly concentrated on issues such as the TrumanMacArthur controversy,15 Chinese intervention,16 domestic political problems,17 and the
idea of limited warfare. Only a few, such as Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, questioned the
motives of American intervention.18
In the 1970s and 1980s, America’s failure in Vietnam sparked a new wave of
revisionist efforts to reinterpret the origins of the Korean War. Edward Friedman and
Mark Selden were among the early group of revisionists who criticized the traditionalist
interpretation.19 Rather than viewing American intervention as a forceful reaction to
Communist aggression, revisionists believed that strong anti-revolutionary and anti
nationalist drives governed American overseas expansion.
Bruce Cumings took the lead in exploring Korean motivations, using many new
documents and microanalyses of key Korean provinces to support his arguments in The
Origins o f the Korean War (1981). He concluded that the conflict was in fact a civil war,
or even an internal revolution. Border clashes between the North and the South had
13 Hakjoon Kim, “Trends in Korean War Studies: A Review of the Literature,” in Korea and the Cold War:
Division, Destruction, and Disarmament, ed. Kim Chull Baum and James I. Matray (Claremont, CA:
Regina Books, 1993), 10.
14 Philip West, “Interpreting the Korean War,” American Historical Review 94 (Feb 1989): 81.
15 John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1959).
16 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1960); Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean
War and its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
17 Ronald J. Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study
(Philadelphia, PA: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1968).
18 Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits o f Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
19 See Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., Am erica’s Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American
Relations (New York: Pantheon, 1971).
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already claimed more than one hundred thousand lives prior to June 25, 1950.20 In his
second volume published in 1990, Cumings further argued that due to Acheson’s
hegemonic guidance and global vision, American leaders refused to accept the Korean
War as an internal struggle between two political entities in Korea and intervened with
the selfish hope to expand and sustain the world market system. 21

Cumings’

interpretation became the most influential revisionist study of the subject. Under his
leadership, the revisionists challenged the traditional orthodox heroic interpretations by
exposing the United States’ self-interest and its ignorance of Asia’s political and social
conditions. The historiography of the Korean War entered into its “academic phase,” as
Philip West suggested, noting that “the study of the conflict [moved] from melodrama to
tragedy.”22
Cumings’s view, however, was challenged by Dutch scholar Erik van Ree’s study
on the Soviet occupation of North Korea, Socialism in One Zone (1989).

By using

memoirs of Soviet officials in Korea, Van Ree pointed out that the Soviet Union had
direct control over its occupation zone, playing a far more dominant role than Cumings
had described. Although the Soviet Army did not establish a formal military government,
Van Ree argued, it ruled over the northern section just as the American Army in the south
did 23 Van Ree observed that the prominent political position of rightists in the city of
P ’yongyang threatened the plan of having a Communist dictatorship in the north, forcing
the Soviet Union to seek a coalition with the Christian nationalists.

20 Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, V ol.l, Liberation and the Emergence o f Separate
Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).
21 Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, Vol.2, The Roaring o f the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
22 West, 81.
23 Erik van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford, New York, &
Munich: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989), 112.
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While traditionalists generally assumed that the Chinese intervened according to
Stalin’s world conquest scheme, revisionists discussed the rationale behind Chinese
intervention.

Earlier in the 1960s, Allen S. Whiting rejected the traditional Chinese

conspiracy theory and argued that instead of following Soviet direction, Chinese
Communists acted according to their own military and political concerns when an
impending American victory in North Korea became a threat to their national security.24
His ideas were widely shared by other revisionists in the 1980s, thinking that even if the
Chinese had known North Korea’s intention to attack, they could find no evidence of any
active Chinese involvement in the process.

Chen Jian, however, put forward more

complicated arguments in the 1990s, pointing out that rebuilding China as a great power
in Asia was Mao Zedong’s real political ambition behind Chinese intervention.
Therefore, despite the fact that the Soviet Union broke its promise to provide air support
in early October 1950, Mao was determined to go ahead anyway in order to drive the
American imperialists from Korean soil.
Inspired by Cumings’ in-depth analysis of Korean internal conditions, historians
began to combine Cumings’ ideas of the origins of the Korean War with the international
aspects of the conflict.

New syntheses came out in John Merrill’s and Burton I.

Kaufman’s studies. They both agreed that the Korean War was a great power struggle
between the two superpowers locked in a civil conflict.26 Callum A. MacDonald further
regarded the war as a multi-dimensional struggle. Since the revisionists employed more

24 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York:
Macmillan, 1960).
25 Jian Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making o f the Sino-American Confrontation (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
26 See John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins o f the War (Newark, DE: University o f Delaware Press,
1989) and Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986).
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original sources from both American and foreign archives, historians began to discuss the
Korean War in more general terms and to include Chinese and Korean materials in their
analyses. Some looked specifically at North Korean factors, arguing that the internal
power struggle among Communist leaders in the North sparked the march to the South.
Robert Simmons explained that Kim Il-sung was determined to occupy South Korea in
order to strengthen his position as “national liberator” in the power struggle against his
Communist rival Pak Hon-yong.27
William Stueck, however, did not agree with the revisionist assumption that Stalin
was ignorant of the attack.28 By using Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs, Stueck reasoned
that Stalin not only had full knowledge of the planned invasion, but also had control over
Kim Il-sung’s action.

Without Stalin’s approval, Kim could not have taken any

aggressive actions. U.S. intelligence documents also confirmed Soviet domination of the
North.
The opening of Soviet archives in the early 1990s further strengthened Stueck’s
argument and unleashed a new phase of debate.

As a result, Cumings’ revisionist

interpretation came under constant fire. Some Korean historians, such as Jin-chull Soh
and Youngho Kim, challenged the revisionist arguments, blaming the Soviet Union as
“the chief architect” behind the attack.29 According to James I. Matray, a new consensus
among western historians concerning the origins of the Korean War has prevailed in

27 Robert Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, P ’ydngyang, Moscow and the Politics o f the Korean
Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1975).
28 See William Stueck, “The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War,” World Politics 28 (July
1976): 622-635.
29 Jin-chull Soh, “A Review on the Causes of Korean War In the Light o f ‘New Documents,’” Korean
Observer 31 (Autumn 2000): 345-377; see also Youngho Kim, “International Dimensions o f the Korean
War,” Korean Journal 38 (Winter 1998): 130-146.
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recent historiography.30 Historians from both sides of the debate up to this point were
more willing to accept the importance of domestic factors, as well as to recognize the
international dimensions of the conflict. A recent synthesis The War fo r Korea, 19451950: A House Burning (2005) by Allan R. Millett, who has written several books on the
Korean War, argued that “the two Koreas may have been the accidental product of the
Soviet and Allied rush to liquidate the Japanese imperial presence, but they also
represented the political expression of two different visions of a modern Korea, built on
the wreckage of the colonial experience and the resistance to Japanese imperialism in all
its forms.” 31

He believed that the Korean War was inevitable because “the

revolutionaries would have fought one another in some form even if not a single
American or Russian soldier had set foot in Korea.”32
Although the origins of the war seemed to be getting clearer, the discussion of the
Korean War was far from over. More in-depth research work is needed to analyze the
development of the Korean War, especially issues such as atomic diplomacy, voluntary
repatriation of POWs, and particularly, the role of Syngman Rhee towards the end of the
war. Edward Keefer, John Gaddis, McGeorge Bundy and Roger Dingman have tried to
assess the effectiveness of atomic diplomacy in bringing the war to an end. Due to a lack
of solid evidence from the Chinese side, however, it was hard to determine the level of
usefulness of Eisenhower’s atomic pressure on China. Surprisingly, what the historians
and practitioners discovered was that Truman came closer to using nuclear weapons than

30 James I. Matray, “Revisiting Korea: Exposing Myths o f the Forgotten War, Part 1,” Prologue Magazine
34 (Summer 2002): 1.
31 Allan R. Millett, The War fo r Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2005), 5.
32 Ibid.
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his Republican successor.

-3-3

The threat of using the atomic bomb against China was in

fact far less effective than the Eisenhower administration had claimed. Dingman further
argued that the war ended not due to Eisenhower’s nuclear threats, but mainly due to
Moscow’s success in convincing Beijing and P ’yongyang to accept the principle of non
repatriation of prisoners of war after Stalin’s death.34 This analysis of how the war was
ended shed new light on the crucial role of Stalin throughout the Korean War period. A
clear conclusion of how the war was ended, nevertheless, has not yet been reached.
Meanwhile, the impact and the legacy of the Korean War have also been
examined by other historians as well. Nancy B. Tucker regarded the Korean War as a
crucial turning point in the development of Sino-American relations.35 Lawrence S.
Kaplan pointed out that without the Korean War, the importance of NATO would have
-i/r

been downplayed.

Walter LaFeber agreed and observed that the Korean War gave the

Truman administration an opportunity “to develop new American policies around the
globe.”37 In particularly, “the six months between June and December 1950 rank among
the most important of the Cold War era,” LaFeber pointed out, because the United States
adopted an offensive approach rather than being content with mere “containment.” The
war in Korea was used “to create a new framework for global affairs.”

33 Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” International Security 13 (Winter 19881989): 50-91. See also Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions o f the
Korean Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
34 Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” 50-91. Dingman’s research also supported by
Appu K. Soman, Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and
China, 1950-1958 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 58-100.
35 Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy,
1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
36 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, KY: University
Press o f Kentucky, 1984).
37 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 111.
38 Ibid., 111-112, 116. LaFeber’s arguments were also supported by Thomas G. Paterson, J. Gary Clifford,
and Kenneth J. Hagan’s book American Foreign Policy: A History, 3rded. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Health
and Company, 1991).
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However, historians have not thoroughly assessed the impact of the Korean
conflict on the home front. As the United States had come so close to using the bomb
during the war, the fear of a coming nuclear holocaust induced enormous pressure on
American society as well. Paul Boyer and Alan Winkler examined the impact of the
nuclear threat on changing the American mind set and way of life permanently.39 H. W.
Brands further pinpointed the way in which American officials sought to exaggerate
Soviet power in order to create a “devil” for Americans to fight.40 In the end, the specter
of an enemy searching both at home and abroad haunted American social development in
the post-Korean-War decades.
As Michael Hunt introduced religious themes in his cultural analysis of American
foreign policy in the late eighties,41 religion began to draw attention in the academy.
Historians have recently begun to look at the role of religion in the general development
of the Cold War. Following the trend, SHAFR (Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations) organized a conference on the role of ideology in the Cold War. In
his conference paper about religion and U.S.-South Asian relations, Andrew J. Rotter
pointed out that “the sense of religious mission carried into the Cold War.”42
While this argument might not necessarily apply to every struggle throughout the
Cold War, the religious factor had a unique role in the Korean War. What is lacking in
the Korean War historiography is the sense of the continuity of missionary influence in
Korean-American relations. Since the presence of American missionaries in Korea was a
39 See Paul Boyer, By the Bom b’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn o f the Atomic
Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985). See also Allan Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety about
the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
40 H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993).
41 Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).
42 Andrew J. Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian Relations, 19471954,” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall, 2000): 596.
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major factor in American involvement in Korean affairs since the 1890s, to overlook the
role of missionaries during the Korean War is to ignore a major element of American
containment policy on the peninsula.

Evidence shows that the participation of

missionaries in the war shaped the nature, perception, and development of the overall war
efforts. It is ironical that the press in the 1950s gave more coverage to the presence of
missionaries than did historical texts in the decades to come.

It is not historically

accurate to ignore the essential role of religious groups that were deeply affecting the
public sentiment and opinion towards American foreign policy. Therefore, this research
effort aims to explore the background of missionary activities in Korea and to put these
missionaries and their supporters back into their proper context as influential players in
the historical developments of the Korean War through documenting their actions and
examining their influence throughout the war period.

A CULTURAL APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
In 1950, East Asian historian John K. Fairbank strongly advised that the US
government ought to make full use of non-state actors to achieve its foreign policy
objectives in Asia. He pointed out that “American individuals, whether in business or in
social services, with all their variety of talents and the multiplicity of organizations which
they represent, [were] the apostles of the democratic idea.” Thus, Fairbank argued, “to
keep them out of Asia [was] to tie one hand behind us.”43 In order to enhance America’s
competitiveness against Communism in Asia, Fairbank suggested that the US
government should arrange more private American contact with Asian governments and

43 John K. Fairbank, ‘T he Problem of Revolutionary Asia,” Foreign Affairs 29 (October 1950): 112.
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expand programs for educational and cultural exchange.44 Along lines similar to
Fairbank’s reasoning, the availability of a number of experienced American missionary
veterans and well-established Christian institutions in Korea would, in fact, prove to offer
a convenient vehicle for state and non-state partnerships during the post-World-War-II
and Korean-War period, when the US government was not capable of carrying out its
political and military objectives without civilian help.
Because of Fairbank’s influence upon the study of East Asia and China-American
relations, the role of missionaries as effective non-state actors in the conducting of
foreign relations during the late nineteenth century is a well-recognized factor in the
study of diplomatic history, although less work has been done to extend this analysis into
the Korean War period. Missionaries functioned not only as evangelists, but also as
educators, social workers, and medical providers. They were important promoters of
“cultural diffusion,” transmitting western ideas, customs, and religious beliefs into other
parts of the world. Through their churches, schools, hospitals, and circulated printed
materials, missionaries did more than preach; they set up new institutions that brought
vital, sometimes even revolutionary, changes to the native populations. As historians
Kenneth Scott Latourette and James E. Wood, Jr. have observed, the influence of
Christianity, Christian workers, and Christian institutions often served as “catalysts for
change” that “was far out of proportion to the relatively small number of people
involved.”45
In Korea, missionary activities were responsible for the rapid growth of Korean
Christianity throughout the twentieth century. Starting in 1905 when Japan controlled
44 Ibid.
45 James E. Wood., Jr., “Editorial: Religion, Revolution, and Nationalism in Asia,” Journal o f Church and
State 14 (Winter 1972): 9.
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Korea, the church, which was seen as an advocate for Korean nationalism, began to gain
popular support. The process of cultural diffusion initiated by Protestant and Catholic
missionaries never completely stopped, even after the Japanese annexation of Korea in
1910. Missionaries continued to carry out their work despite the many pressures and
restrictions that Japan imposed upon them.

Because a large number of them were

Americans, their missionary work and sympathetic attitude toward Korean independence
generated a pro-American sentiment within Korean society.

After a four-year

interruption because of World War II, individual missionaries began to return to South
Korea in 1946.

American missionaries, in particular, experienced an unprecedented

expansion of their personal influence during and after the Korean War period.
This research contributes to the historiography of the Korean War by drawing
upon primary sources from various church, government, and public archives in the
United States and South Korea to analyze the influence of these religious institutions and
their activities during the war period and the years leading up to it. By doing so, it not
only adds new materials to the study of the war, but also sheds new light on the
development of Korea-American relations and the growth of Christianity in South Korea.
There are three levels of analysis in this study. First, it traces the development of
indigenous Korean Christianity, and evaluates its political impact upon Korea. Second, it
investigates the role of American missionaries in Korea, particularly those who remained
during the Korean War period.

Third, it examines the impact of missionaries and

American churches on official US policy towards Korea. These three levels of analysis,
however, are interdependent and inseparable from each other.
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In the pioneering stage, Korean Protestant churches, unlike their counterparts in
China and Japan, enjoyed a high level of autonomy as a side effect of the lack of mission
funding and missionary personnel.

But later events would reverse this autonomy.

Intense Japanese persecution of the church, followed by the death of many prominent
Protestant leaders before and during the Korean War produced a leadership vacuum. In
response, missionaries were called upon to provide assistance. They began to exercise a
greater influence on the preservation and reconstruction of Korean churches.

Their

guidance at this crucial time ensured the survival and continued growth of Christianity in
South Korea.
Missionaries gained another sort of influence as well.

With the Korean War

dominating the headlines, missionaries found themselves in the spotlight.

Korean

political and religious leaders, lacking communication channels or resources of their own,
would seek out missionaries to give voice to their causes before the American people and
the western world, hoping to gain political support and foreign assistance to revive and
rebuild their war-torn country and religious institutions.
Meanwhile, American churches also turned to these missionaries for information
and advice.

As a result, with solid support from their home churches, individual

missionaries and the overall missionary activities not only shaped the development of
Korean Christianity, but also influenced the views of American policy-makers in
Washington and American civilian officials and military generals stationed in Korea.
The Korean War, therefore, marked an unparalleled intimate collaboration between state
and non-state actors in American diplomatic history. It not only maximized American
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political, economic, social, and cultural influence in Korea, but also led to the exceptional
growth of Christianity in postwar South Korea.
On the whole, missionary activities accomplished what foot soldiers and
diplomats alone could not achieve: a sentimental connection between South Korea and
the United States. Through religious publications (magazines and pamphlets), mission
reports, circulated letters, personal testimonies, documentary movies, and radio
broadcasts, missionaries and religious groups connected the war zone to the American
home front.

They described the extensive war damages and unprecedented human

suffering caused by the war.

Because of the missionaries and their sponsoring

denominations’ tireless efforts to promote relief for Korea, Americans church-goers and
the general public felt a stronger personal responsibility for the Korean people and the
rebuilding of their country.
Though religion played a significant role in developments within both America
and Korea during the war period, it would be too simplistic to suppose that the religious
community spoke with one voice. While American churches might band together for
relief programs, the church community was composed of many people with varied
political ideologies and opinions on foreign affairs. This complexity of the religious
factor in shaping US foreign policy was shown in the relationship between
missionary/church activities and the official direction of American policy in fighting the
Korean War. On the one hand, the religious interests and humanitarian concerns of the
American churches and missionaries helped to justify American intervention in Korea
and fed the popular sentiment of religious anti-Communism in the United States. But on
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the other hand, religious interests promoted the desire for peace and the idea of fighting a
“limited war.”
On another occasion, when General Douglas MacArthur and South Korean
President Syngman Rhee wanted to expand the war by using atomic weapons, some
Protestant Church leaders in the United States cautioned Truman against starting a third
world war. It so happened that the more liberal elements of the church held many of the
key offices in various missionary organizations and inter-denominational agencies,
thereby strengthening their influence over the Truman administration. Yet, missionaries
in the fields of China and Korea, Protestant fundamentalists, and the American Catholic
Church all held deeply anti-Communist sentiments and tended to rally behind General
MacArthur and President Rhee in advocating a tougher stance.
To demonstrate the role of religion in the Korean War, this dissertation divides its
discussion into two major parts.

Part one consists of four chapters on the role of

missionaries and religion on Korea and U.S.-Korea relations prior to the outbreak of the
Korean War, whereas part two contains another four chapters on the influence of
religious actors (missionaries, church leaders, evangelists, and individual lay Christians)
on US military and relief efforts dining the war period.
Chapter 1 describes long-established American religious interests in Korea since
the 1890s and explains how missionary activities affected the rise of modem Korean
nationalism. The religious factors of the Korean War were deeply rooted in the influence
of religion on Korean nationalism. Famous Korean nationalists, such as An Ch’ang-ho
(1878-1938), Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), and Cho Man-sik (1882-1950), were mostly
Christian educators who favored a non-violent approach to secure Korean independence
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after Japan colonized Korea in 1910. When Christians, together with other nationalist
groups, eventually rose up to support Korean independence during the March First
Independence Movement in 1919, missionaries reported Japanese atrocities to their
Mission Boards, seeking to mobilize public opinion at home to support their Korean
brethren. Although their efforts failed to bring forth any immediate political support for
Korean independence from the West, these activities became the prologue to the potential
political and social influence of American missionaries and the Korean Christians on
post-liberation Korea when the peninsula was under the shadow of Communist
domination.
Chapter 2 analyzes religious factors and political developments in the northern
zone. The end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945 brought forth an intensive postwar
power struggle between two opposing groups of nationalists. For the convenience of
accepting the Japanese surrender by Russian and American troops, Korea was divided
along the 38

Parallel.

The Allied occupation in the two separate zones intensified

domestic competition. In the north, the power of domestic Communists was not strong
because only a few Communist organizations of significance existed before 1945.
Instead, Christians were more influential and a coalition with different political groups
was necessary to form a new government.

Cho Man-sik’s new government in

P’yongyang, however, was cut short due to his anti-trusteeship position and his
unwillingness to compromise with the Soviet officials. As soon as Cho was kept under
house arrest, Kim Il-sung rose to power and began a new land reform program at the
expense of the capitalists, landlords, collaborators, and Christians. Many fled south in
order to escape Communism.
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Chapter 3 analyzes the role of Christianity in the political development of the
southern zone.

Political competition between leftists and rightists, as well as among

different rightist factions caused serious instability below the 38th Parallel. While the
Christian population in the north was shrinking, the Christian community in the south
was growing in numeric strength and political influence. The role of Christianity was
strengthened when individual American missionaries began to return to Korea by taking
up positions in the American Military Government (AMG). Because of their ability to
speak some amount of English, or even, in some cases, because of their relationship with
missionaries, Korean Christians found many job opportunities in the military government.
From 1946 to 1949, Christians gradually moved from the political periphery to the
political center, taking up important roles in the formation of a separate regime in South
Korea. With the support of the Christian community, refugees, and rightists, Syngman
Rhee emerged as the victor in South Korean politics.
Chapter 4 discusses the role of religion in US foreign policy prior to the outbreak
of the Korean War. Most cultural historians agree that Christianity was a key factor in
the formation of American nationalism,46 anti-Communism, and a uniquely American
Cold War culture.47 The formation of an American “civil religion,” according to
religious historian Donald Swift, was one of the important characteristics of how the US
differentiated itself and its role in the world from that of the Soviet Union.48 Religious
beliefs and values were essential in shaping the American perception of and response to

46 See John Fousek, To Lead the Free World (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press,

2000 ).
47 See Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996).
48 Donald C. Swift, Religion and the American Experience (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998), 261.
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the Soviet Union.49 President Harry Truman carefully defined the Cold War contest
through a religious lens. He emphasized the importance of religious freedom in western
democracy and hoped to build a western religious alliance to counter the Communist
threat in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

In addition, American churches (both

Catholic and Protestant) had vast religious interests in East Asia, especially in China,
Japan, and Korea. Church leaders wanted the United States to keep the door to China
open, to transform postwar Japan, and to assist Korea in obtaining its independence.
Taking advantage of the American religious climate, Syngman Rhee’s publicity team in
Washington tried to mobilize public support for economic and military aid to South
Korea through religious channels. Missionaries in Korea also offered their assistance by
urging their American patrons to continue their support for the freedom of Korea.
Chapter 5 first traces political and diplomatic conditions in the Korean peninsula
in the months prior to the Korean War and examines the role of religious interests in
justifying an American military intervention to save South Korea.

The civil conflict

between the North and the South intensified between 1948 and 1950. Frequent border
clashes made the 38th Parallel a very dangerous boundary. Both the United States and the
Soviet Union restrained their client states from launching an all out attack against their
enemy.

The situation, however, began to change in early 1950.

The Soviet Union

reversed its policy and decided to support Kim U-sung’s military unification strategy.
In the south, Syngman Rhee’s government pressed for more military and
economic aid from the United States, but very little aid actually materialized. Meanwhile,
for the first time since its creation, Rhee’s government succeeded in taking control of the

49 Dianne Kirby, “Religion and the Cold War - An Introduction,” Religion and the Cold War (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, Ltd., 2003), 1.
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guerrilla-infested Cholla regions, minimizing the impact of Communist subversive
activities. Tension along the 38th Parallel, however, continued to mount. Mixed signals
of a potential all-front attack from the North clouded the political atmosphere in Seoul.
In the midst of uncertainty and fear, the South Korean Christian community organized a
multi-city evangelical crusade. Political and religious visitors from the United States
brought hope and assurance, but all these efforts were dashed on June 25, 1950 when the
North Korean army finally launched a full scale surprise attack along the 38th Parallel.
Seoul fell within days and all American civilians were ordered to evacuate to Japan.
While the future of South Korea depended on the reactions of the United States
government, the future of the Korean churches depended on the decisions of individual
missionaries.
Chapter 6 describes the activities of American missionaries in the war zone and
evaluates their contribution to the overall war effort. Sixteen Presbyterian missionaries,
who volunteered to stay behind, offered their services to the US military and organized
relief efforts to assist the refugees.

Later, some who had evacuated returned by re-

enlisting themselves as civilian chaplains, medical officers, intelligence officers, and
interpreters. Their language skills and knowledge of the Korean terrain were invaluable
assets for the US Army.

They participated in General MacArthur’s famous Inch’on

Landing and the battle for the liberation of Seoul. Meanwhile, with limited resources,
civilian missionaries within the Pusan Perimeter organized private relief efforts to assist
refugees. Throughout the war, their letters and reports on the war provided information
that was crucial for the American churches to organize a successful nationwide relief
effort.
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Chapter 7 discusses the work of missionaries among North Koreans and examines
their efforts in preserving and expanding the influence of Christianity in South Korea.
When the tide of the war turned in favor of the UN side, the United States decided to
cross the 38th Parallel. Following the troops, missionaries marched to North Korea. In
P’yongyang, Chinnamp’o, Wonsan, Hungnam, and Seoul, missionaries helped hundreds
and thousands of Christian refugees in their efforts to flee south. In addition, they also
assisted in the establishment of a Christian-dominated Chaplain Corps for the South
Korean Army that placed Christianity in a key position to further political and social
expansion in the postwar years.
Chapter 8 examines the influence of American church leaders on Truman’s
Korean War policy and assesses the importance of religious factors upon the POW issue.
Because of China’s intervention, the war turned into a military stalemate along the 38th
Parallel. Different opinions on how to fight the Korean War deeply divided the US
government. In the United States, the war grew more and more unpopular as the prospect
of victory grew less and less. But truce talks snagged over the issue of the repatriation of
the prisoners or war (POWs). American missionaries worked among the refugees and the
Communist POWs.

The conversion of these Communist soldiers brought a serious

problem to the US government, however, because many of the newly converted prisoners
refused to be repatriated back to North Korea or Communist China. The United Nations
POW camps suddenly became a new war zone between pro-Communist and antiCommunist prisoners.

Delivered through the missionaries, anti-Communist prisoners

presented petitions signed in their own blood to the US government and the American
public.

The idea of granting ex-Communist soldiers voluntary repatriation inspired
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President Truman to seek a “psychological victory” in Korea. His (and Eisenhower’s)
insistence on voluntary repatriation prolonged the war for an additional two years.
The role of religion in U.S. foreign policy has usually been subtle or invisible, but
throughout the Korean War, because of missionary activities, religion emerged as a key
factor in redefining American war aims. When Eisenhower accepted the Republican
nomination for president in 1952, he said, “You have summoned me... to lead a great
crusade - for freedom in America and freedom in the world.”50 Obviously, the battle for
freedom in Korea was in the mind of the presidential candidate. The idea of leading a
crusade, so common in the American terminology of the 1950s, signifies the influence of
religion upon American ideology in the early Cold War decades.

50 Quoted in Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian Relations, 19471954,” 596.
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PARTI:
Christianity in Korea and U.S.-Korean Relations
Before the Korean War
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CHAPTER 1
Christianity and the Rise of Modern Korean Nationalism

INTRODUCTION
Historian Walter B. Jung pointed out in his book, Nation Building: The
Geopolitical History o f Korea, that “Korea’s precarious endeavors in defending the
national identity in the early periods and the division of the nation into two parts at the
outset of the cold war era can be comprehensible only through an adequate understanding
of the dynamics of the regional geopolitics.”1 How did geopolitics relate to Christianity,
the rise of Korean nationalism, and the Korean War? There are three aspects of analysis
needed to untangle this complex relationship.
The first geopolitical consideration is Korea’s relationship with its neighbors.
The location of Korea has a vital strategic value to its neighbors, particularly China and
Japan. By taking control of Korea, it would increase the security and the expandability of
its controller (or conqueror). In order to survive, Korea had, for centuries, balanced these
surrounding powers. The history of collaboration and conflict between Korea and its
neighbors during the late Choson period illustrated this geopolitical condition.
The second aspect of geopolitics is Korea’s relationship with the West. Korea,
unlike much of East Asia, was slow to attract the attention of the industrialized nations.
It was never colonized by a Western imperial power. Nevertheless, the powers of Europe
and America did gradually come to recognize Korea’s value to their own political,
1 Walter B. Jung, Nation Building: The Geopolitical History o f Korea (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, Inc., 1998), v.
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economic, and cultural aspirations. Their desires for political influence, their hope to
extend commercial activities, and their responsibility to protect their missionaries and
shipwrecked seamen motivated the Western powers to send more gunboats to the Korean
coast. Imperialism in East Asia also destabilized the geopolitics of the entire region. The
West’s imposition of an unequal treaty system upon China contributed to the decline of
the Manchu (Qing Dynasty) empire thereby, in turn, weakening Korea’s ability to keep
Japan and other nations at bay.
The third aspect of geopolitics is Korea’s internal condition.

As Korea’s

independence became endangered by the escalation of foreign aggression, it stirred up
new nationalistic feelings among the people. The first American missionaries arrived in
the midst of this unpredictable period of change. Their activities served as a catalyst and
a navigator that not only facilitated the process of transformation, but also to a great
extent directed it according to their own ideas. Their vision for Korea influenced the
long-term development of Korean society. Christianity emerged as an important political
and ideological force to be reckoned with by anyone who would rule Korea.

KOREA AND ITS NEIGHBORS IN EAST ASIA
Located on the far eastern end of the Asian continent, the two Koreas of today
now border China and Russia to the northwest by two rivers (the Yalu and Tuman) and
face the islands of Japan to the southeast, across 112 miles of water known as the Korean
Strait. Throughout most of its history, however, Korea did not border Russia. This
border was established in 1860, after China ceded the maritime region east of the Ussuri
River to the Czar under the Treaty of Beijing (Peking), which enabled the Russians to
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reach the Tuman River and to construct a naval base in Vladivostok. Prior to its contact
with Russia and other Western powers, China and Japan were the major forces that
affected the stability and development of the Korean peninsula.
Korea’s Relations with China and Japan before the Choson Dynasty
Though many Western observers of the early twentieth century perceived Korea
as a weak tributary state of China or as a poor victim of its powerful neighbors, more
recent research by both Korean and Japanese historians have revealed that Korea
maintained its own high level of civilization. In some areas of technological achievement
and cultural heritage, Korea was completely independent of and different from China.
Far from always being under the control of its neighbors, Korea greatly influenced the
development of the Yayoi culture and the formation of a new Yamato state in ancient
Japanese history.

In fact, throughout its long history, Korea not only retained its

independence (most of the time), but also preserved its identity, culture, language, and
customs. This identity as a people was the strong force that kept the nation united in the
midst of its neighbors.
In its lengthy history of contact with the Han Chinese and other powerful tribal
groups of northeastern Asia, Korea had successfully resisted the political and territorial
expansion of China. Except for a brief period when the Han emperor, Wudi, set up four
provinces in the northern part of Korea in 108 B.C., Koreans remained in full control of
the peninsula.

Korean independence was hard fought.

The Chinese emperor, Sui

Yangdi, invaded Korea in 598 A.D., with one million troops, but was decimated. Korea
also repulsed the Tang emperors’ multiple attempts at conquest.

2 See Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story o f a Phoenix (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 23-36.
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The military strength of Korea could not, however, stand against the powerful
Mongol invasion of 1234. Once subjugated, Khubilai Khan (1215-1294), immediately
forced Korea to participate in the expeditions designed to conquer Japan in 1274 and
1281. Both attempts, however, failed because Mongol forces were was not experienced
in fighting sea battles.

In 1592, three hundred years after the Mongol assault, the

Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598) decided to invade Korea as part of
his plan to take over the Middle Kingdom (China). He sent 150,000 troops, under the
command of Konishi Yukinaga (1555-1600), a devoted Japanese Catholic,3 across the
Korean Strait and launched a surprise attack on Pusan. Among Konishi’s troops, there
were about 18,000 Christian warriors. Father Gregoria de Cespedes, a Spanish priest,
was also sent to minister to the troops.4 Seoul was lost within the first twenty days and
the king fled first to Pyongyang and then to the northern border city of Uiju.
Despite suffering great initial losses, the Korean navy, under General Yi Sun-sin’s
leadership, was able to seize control of the sea, dividing the Japanese forces from their
homeland. In 1598, the Korean militia, with Chinese assistance, successfully pushed the
Japanese army back to its own shores after six years of grueling war.5 The war came to
an end when Hideyoshi died in 1598. Hideyoshi’s invasion completely devastated the
Korean peninsula, caused great suffering to the Korean people, and further weakened the
Choson Dynasty, marking the beginning of its long decline. When the Manchu rose to

3 Konishi Yukinaga brought with him a Spanish Jesuit, Gregorio de Cespedes, to minister to the Japanese
Christian warriors. See Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story o f a Phoenix (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1997), 109.
4 W. J. Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,”
in K orea’s Response to the West, ed. Yung-Hwan Jo (Kalamazoo, MI: The Korea Research and
Publications, Inc., 1971), 43.
5 Lee, Korea and East Asia, 98-107.
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power, Korea was left with little strength to defend itself against its invasion in 1637 and
opted to serve the Manchu and end its relations with Ming China.
Chosdn’s Diplomacy
In order to survive between these two potentially aggressive neighbors, Korea
adopted the diplomacy of sadae (‘serving the great’) toward China and kyorin
(‘neighborly relations’) toward Japan.6 In dealing with China, Korea paid tribute in order
to obtain an informal defensive alliance against Japan. In dealing with Japan, Korea
skillfully established an equal-footing, ceremonial relationship.

Korea would send

occasional “communication envoys” to Edo (Tokyo), and carefully controlled the trading
activities in designated trading ports.

According to Japanese historian Takemichi Hara,

the Korean government tried throughout the Choson Dynasty to “bar all intercourse” of
any non-official activities between Korea and its two neighbors, hoping to maintain peace
and to minimize contact that might jeopardize the survival of the nation.8 Thus, it began
a rigid foreign policy that would earn Korea the nickname, “the Hermit Kingdom.”
According to the traditions of the tributary system, the Korean king would send
tribute to China once a year. He was to send the best of native Korean products, such as
gold, ginseng, and celadon art works, to offer to the Chinese Emperor. In return, the
Chinese would give them a large amount of Chinese goods as “gifts” from the emperor to
bring back to their king. Historians regarded these sorts of annual exchanges as bilateral
trading activities under the control of the two governments.9 The tributary relationship

6 Takemichi Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century
Korea,” Modern Asian Studies 32 (May 1998): 392.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Warren I. Cohen, East Asia A t the Center: Four Thousand Years o f Engagement with the World (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
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between Korea and China served as a political and military alliance to guard against their
potential common enemies. In this way, Korea not only enjoyed full independence, but
also enhanced its national security and strengthened its economy.
Christianity Entered Korea through Tributary Missions
Try as the government might to be a “Hermit Kingdom,” outside influences could
not be totally avoided. Those Koreans who were sent on the tributary missions to China
brought back with them not only goods, but also new ideas. Korean leaders wanted to
maintain national peace and security by keeping foreigners at bay. But once Korean
emissaries stepped on Chinese soil, they were out of the control of the Korean court.
During the months when the members of the missions stayed in Beijing, they usually
crowded into bookstores, searching for the latest Chinese publications.10 They also
visited the Nan-t’ang (South Church), where Jesuit priests, who served in the Manchu
court as directors of the Imperial Board of Astronomy, lived. These Catholic priests
would give them both scientific and religious materials (books about “the Lord of
Heaven”) printed in Chinese.

11

Nan-t’ang thus served as a tiny window for the Korean

visitors to have a glimpse of the mysterious Western world.
"When all these materials were brought back to Korea, a small group of officials
and scholars that belonged to the sirhak (Practical Learning) school would read them
with great interest.12 Some of these officials were also members of the tributary missions
who were experts in Chinese literature and language. Through these written materials,

10 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 43.
See also Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,”
393.
11 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 43;
Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 393.
12 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 393.
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Catholicism gained its first convert, Li Sung-hun, the son of a senior member of a
tributary mission.13 By the time a Chinese Catholic priest, Chou Wen-mo, was sent by
the bishop of Beijing to Korea in 1794, there were already four thousand converts waiting
eagerly for his arrival.14
Catholicism, however, aroused new social conflicts between its converts and the
traditional Korea society, because the Korean Catholics were instructed to abolish the
practice of ancestral worship.15 Fearful of the subversive nature of Christianity, tensions
began to build and anti-Catholicism fomented among conservative officials and the
gentry.
‘Shinyu’ Persecution
The growth of the Korean Catholic Church came to an abrupt end a few years
later during a political power struggle at the Korean court. Some of the Catholic converts
were high officials under King Chong-jo (1777-1800). When the king died in 1800, the
political rivals of these converts found an easy excuse to stir up trouble for them. The
Queen Regent, the young king’s mother, having a personal dislike of Catholicism, saw an
opportunity to assert her political power. She issued an edict in 1801, which was called
the year of Shinyu by Koreans, to exterminate those who persisted in the “evil teaching,”
which referred to Catholicism. When the Chinese priest tried to stop the persecution by
turning himself in, the Korean government immediately beheaded him without getting
permission from the Manchu court.
The wrath of the Queen Regent and her supporters against Catholicism was
further intensified when a secret letter to the Bishop of Beijing was found in the
13 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 44.
14 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 393-394.
15 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

possessions of a young Catholic scholar, Hwang Sa-yong. The letter, written on a thin
piece of silk, described the persecution of Korean Catholics, the power struggle inside the
Korean court, the victimization of Korean converts by opportunistic officials, the unjust
execution of the Chinese priest, and the desire for foreign intervention to stop the horrible
persecution. The request for a Chinese annexation of Korea and the suggestion that
European gunboats be sent to protect Korean Catholics served not only to justify the
court’s charge of treason, but also to confirm the court’s fear of the subversive nature of
Christianity.16
In order to avoid any diplomatic problems over the hasty execution of the Chinese
priest, and so as to have a free hand to exterminate all Christian elements, the Queen
Regent sent a distorted report to the Manchu emperor, explaining the death of the
Chinese priest. Upon hearing the report, the Manchu emperor praised the young Korean
king’s efforts to exterminate the evil bandits in his country, but he refused to
acknowledge that the source of Korean Catholicism was China.

The emperor only

ordered his border officials to return all Korean-Catholic fugitives back to Korea.
Diplomatic Crisis Caused by the Execution of French Priests
Since Koreans could not completely control border traffic and the Chinese
emperor refused to give any help to cut off the source inside China, Catholicism survived
the Shinyu purge and regained its strength within two decades, despite the harsh
conditions imposed by the Korean government. The success of Korean Catholicism later
caught the attention of the Catholic Church in the Western world. In the 1830s, French
priests began to arrive, disguising themselves in native clothes. They came either by
crossing the Korea-China border or by being dropped off by fishing boats along the
16 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 396-397.
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coast.

17

They were Father Jacques-Honore Chastan, Father Pierre-Philibert Maubant, and

Bishop Laurent-Joseph-Marie Imbert. As soon as the Korean government discovered
their existence, they were promptly executed by the Korean court.18
At about the same time as these Catholic priests arrived, “strange” ships were
being sighted more and more frequently along the Korean coast. Some of them, like the
Lord Amherst, a ship belonging to the East India Company, came in search of trade,
while others, such as the British ships, Alceste and Lyra, requested food provisions and
water. In most cases, the Koreans either rejected their demands for trade politely or
answered their requests for aid cordially. However, things began to change in the 1840s
following the execution of the three Catholic priests by the Korean government in 1839
and the conclusion of the First Opium War (First Anglo-Chinese War) (1840-1842).19
Korea witnessed China’s humiliating defeat when the Manchu government signed its first
unequal treaty, the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), with the British, yielding to their demands
for a large indemnity, more treaty ports, extraterritoriality for British citizens, mostfavored-nation status, a fixed tariff, ceding Hong Kong, and evangelical rights of foreign
missionaries in the interior part of China.

Since then, more hostile gunboats with

aggressive commanders soon came knocking on Korea’s door, demanding the country to
be opened for trade and evangelization.

17 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 45.
18 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 401.
19 The First Opium War started in 1840 because of the conflict caused by the illegal opium trade conducted
by British traders and the effort o f the Manchu government to confiscate and destroy opium. The British
government sent warships with a large force to revenge the destruction o f three million pounds o f opium by
Commissioner Lin Zexu. Although Lin initially succeeded in defending Guangzhou (Canton), the British
moved northward to attack other coastal towns at will. Eventually, the British took Guangzhou with
another bigger force and sailed up the Yangtze River. They also seized the Manchu government’s tax
barges, jeopardizing not only the revenue o f the imperial court, but also threatening the security o f the
interior. Fearing further loss o f money and face, the Manchu decided to seek peace. The Treaty o f Nanjing
was signed in 1842.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

In 1845, fearful of further foreign encroachments, Korea asked the Manchu
government to restrain Western powers from sailing into Korean waters. The Manchu
court tried to assist Korea, but with very limited results. In 1846, the French Admiral
Cecille brought three gunboats and presented a letter questioning the execution of the
three French priests. He left with a promise to return in a year for an answer.20
The French returned in 1847 with two gunboats under the command of Captain
Lapierre, but before they could reach Inch’on, the two ships ran aground near the
southwestern coast of the peninsula. When the Korean court received Lapierre’s called
for assistance, it immediately prepared an informal reply that included an explanation of
the Korean government’s decision to execute the priests and its desires to avoid trade
relationships with Western countries. Unfortunately, by the time the note was delivered
to Lapierre’s location, the crew had been rescued by the British and was on its way to
Shanghai.

With no other choice, the Korean government submitted a report to the

Manchu court and requested that their informal note be forwarded to Lapierre.21
Taewdn’gun’s Anti-Foreignism and Isolationist Foreign Policy
Foreign encroachment on China in the late 1850s further endangered the position
of Korea in defending itself against Western intruders. The conclusion of the Second

20 This event caused serious diplomatic concerns within the Korean court because it had never reported the
death o f the three French priests to the Chinese court and it could not answer Cecille’s request directly due
to their tributary relations with China.
21 Qiying, the governor-general o f Guangdong, passed the note to the French, but because he paraphrased it
according to his own ideas and tune, the note did not reflect the exact Korean’s tone and rationale of their
policy. To make the matter worse, the Manchu government failed to inform the Korean government of
Governor Qiying’s recommendation to treat the French courteous to avoid further incidents. Koreans,
therefore, found themselves poorly prepared diplomatically to handle new confrontations with the French
and other foreign gunboats when they appeared again in 1866. See Hara, “Korea, China, and Western
Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 409-414.
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Opium War in China (1858-1860)22 disheartened Koreans and threatened the security of
Korea. In the Treaty of Beijing (Peking) of 1860, the Manchu government agreed to cede
to Russia the maritime provinces of eastern Manchuria down to what is now Vladivostok.
These lands used to be controlled by the states of Puyo, Koguryo, and Parhae, who shared
a common ancestry with the Korean people. Koreans had tried to reoccupy them after the
fall of the Yuan Dynasty in 1388, but Ming forces had claimed the area instead. The
Manchu’s concession to Russia not only deprived Koreans of their hope of reclaiming
their ancestral land, but it brought a Western power, Russia, right up to Korea’s border.
As Russian gunboats began to appear along the Korean coast to survey the shoreline, the
Korean court took serious consideration of its security.
Meanwhile, in early 1863, the young Choson king, Ch’ol-jong, died without
leaving an heir. The second son of his third cousin ascended to the throne and became
King Kojong. Kojong was only a boy, so his father, Taewon’gun, controlled the court as
regent. Judging that the Manchus had made too many concessions to foreigners and that
the power of the Middle Kingdom was in decline, Taewon’gun decided to take a tough
stand against foreign encroachment and initiated an ambitious but extremely conservative
reform aimed at strengthening the power of the central government. One of his strategies

22 The Second Opium War was also known as the Arrow War because it broke out following the arrest of
the crew o f the Arrow, which was a British-registered, Chinese-owned merchant ship. The British used this
incident as an excuse to attack Guangzhou (Canton) and seek a new treaty to expand their interests in
China. An initial truce was concluded in 1858 when both sides agreed to sign the Treaty o f Tianjin. The
peace, however, was cut short and hostility broke out again when the Manchu officials refused to honor
their promise o f allowing the British to set up their embassy in Beijing. The joint army o f Britain and
France entered Beijing, burning the emperor’s Summer Palace to the ground. The Manchu government
finally ratified the Treaty of Tianjin, now called the Treaty of Beijing, in 1860, agreeing to open more
treaty ports, cede the Kowloon Peninsula, pay a huge indemnity, allow foreign governments to set up
embassies in Beijing, and give foreigners permission to sail freely on the Yangtze River. Following the
Treaty o f Beijing, other foreign powers also pressured China to sign treaties so that they could expand their
interests and activities in China.
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was to tighten the closed-door policy by renewed suppression of Catholicism, which had
by then gained as many as 18,000 native converts within two decades.23
In early 1866, Korea faced a national crisis.

A Russian gunboat appeared at

Wonsan, demanding the right to trade and threatening that troops were ready to cross the
northern border if Korea refused.

While the Korean court deferred the issue to the

Manchu government by citing their tributary status with China, there was grave alarm.
Taewon’gun was desperate for an effective way to resist Russian demands.
Hoping to avoid another persecution, the Catholics tried to use the crisis to their
advantage. It was suggested to Taewon’gun by John Nam, a Catholic official in the
court, and by Thomas Kim, an influential Catholic layman, that there were French
missionaries in Korea who could help in securing an alliance with England and France.24
Rumors said that Taewon’gun was interested at first, but due to the fear of offending
China and the voluntary withdrawal of the Russian gunboat, the plan was dropped.25
French Gunboats’ Attempt to Take Kanghwa Island
The Catholic revelation that there were foreign priests inside of Korea turned out
to be a terrible miscalculation. Upon their return from Beijing, Taewon’gun’s special
envoys incorrectly reported that the Manchu government planned to put all Europeans to
death.26 Now knowing that priests were hiding somewhere in the country, Taewon’gun
began to hunt them down. Within a month, ten French priests and about forty converts
were arrested and executed. Others were either hiding or mnning for their lives. News of

23 Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1946), 115.
24 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 46.
25 Ibid.; see also Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century
Korea,” 417.
26 Kang, “Early Korean Contact with Christianity and Korean Response: An Historical Introduction,” 46.
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the purge reached the commander of the French Asiatic Squadron, Admiral PierreGustave Roze, in Tianjin, China, through one of only three foreign survivors, Father
Felix Clair Ridel.27
In response, Admiral Roze took a survey trip on September 18, 1866 to plan for a
formal campaign against Korea. Before the French charge, Henri de Bellonet, could even
inform the Manchu government of the plan, seven French warships containing about 600
troops and guided by three Korean Catholics arrived at Kanghwa Island on October 16.28
Situated at the mouth of the Han River, Kanghwa was an important island for the defense
of Seoul, and had historically served as a refuge for the Koryo king during the time of the
Mongol invasion.

The security of Seoul was in jeopardy when two gunboats, la

Deroulede and Tardif, sailed up to the Han River.29
The Korean government was shocked by the development and in response sent a
strong letter to the Manchu court stating its decision to resist the French.

Chinese

officials expected Korea to be easily defeated, but the war took a surprising turn.
Although Admiral Roze captured Kanghwa, he did not have the manpower to hold the
island because the French government refused to commit more troops to fight in Korea.
Admiral Roze had no choice but to withdraw.
To express their discontent, French troops took out their anger on Kanghwa
Island. Many innocent civilians perished and national treasures were plundered by the
27 After consulting with the French charge, Henri de Bellonet, in Beijing, the French sent an angry note to
the Zongli Yamen, which was the office of foreign affair of the Manchu court, threatening to attack Korea
and dispose the Korean king, if necessary. When the Chinese refused to press Korea to open their country
and issue passports to foreign missionaries, the French decided to go to war. See Hara, “Korea, China, and
Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 418.
28 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, 117. See also Soo Bock Choi, “Korea’s response to
America and France in the decade o f the Taewongun, 1864-1873,” in Korea’s Response to the West, 110.
29 Choi, “Korea’s response to America and France in the decade o f the Taewongun, 1864-1873,” 110-111.
30 Lawrence H. Battistini, ‘T he Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” Monumenta Nipponica 8
(1952): 48.
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retreating soldiers. The departure of the French fleet, sadly, gave Taewon’gun a false
sense of security and led him to think that his isolationist and militant approach was the
proper way to deter foreign encroachment. The incident also stirred up hatred against all
Westerners and their Korean Catholic converts. Over the next four years, about eight
thousands native converts were beheaded.31
The Tragedy o f the ‘General Sherman ’
Prior to Korea’s clash with the French, an American merchant ship General
Sherman, which was headed by an English captain with a crew of mostly Malays and
Chinese, appeared along the Taedong River, heading toward P’yongyang.32 A Scottish
missionary Robert J. Thomas was also on board as an interpreter. The ship was loaded
with merchandise for trade. Because the sailors were unfamiliar with Korean weather
and waters, the ship became stranded in the sand near P’yongyang, after the flood waters
of the Taedong River receded.

Running out of food and getting no local assistance

because of the strict edict against contact with foreigners, the sailors chose to raid nearby
villages in order to survive. Their action brought down the wrath of the villagers, who
mistook them for a pirate ship. An angry mob set the ship on fire and killed all of the
crew. 33
This unfortunate incident could have given America a good excuse to join forces
with the French in attacking Korea, but Secretary of State William H. Seward decided to
resolve the crisis through peaceful means. Anson Burlingame, the American Minister to
31 Ibid., 46.
32 Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Anne Walthall, and James B. Palais, East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political
History (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 437.
33 When Kim Il-sung took power in North Korea a hundred years later, he claimed that his great
grandfather had led the mob to attack the ship. Kim Il-sung described this incident in his autobiography,
With the Century, V o l.l (North Korea: Korean Friendship Association, 2003), 10, http://www.koreadpr.com/library/202.pdf. See also Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care o f the Fatherly Leader:
North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 13.
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China, brought the case before the Chinese court, but got no answer because the Chinese
claimed that it would not interfere with the internal affairs of Korea.34 The United States,
therefore, dispatched two gunboats to Korea, the U.S.S. Wachusett, under the command
of Robert W. Shufeldt, and later, the Shenandoah, under the command of John C.
Febiger. They were sent to inquire about the General Sherman incident, and to chart the
rivers leading to Seoul to prepare for further necessary military actions.
In 1871, the United States government sent a special expedition to Korea, in the
hopes of obtaining a treaty for the protection of shipwrecked sailors. The mission was
headed by Frederick F. Low, the new American Minister to China, with the support of
Admiral John Rogers, the American squadron commander. The expedition consisted of
the flagship Colorado, the corvettes Alaska and Benicia, and the gunboats Monocacy and
Palos, carrying 85 guns, and 1,230 men.35 Five Korean Catholic converts served as
guides.
Minister Low demanded the Korean government to send high ranking officials to
conduct negotiations with him. When the Korean officials brought back the message that
Taewon’gun wanted peace but had no desire for any treaty, the Americans tried to exert
pressure by sending two gunboats sailing towards Seoul. The Korean troops on Kanghwa
Island opened fire at the American boats.
Minister Low decided to increase the pressure by destroying all of the fortresses
on Kanghwa Island. He thought to improve his position by instilling fear and respect
through a show of force. But instead, Taewon’gun proclaimed a new anti-foreign edict
with the support of the whole country. Another anti-Christian squall swept across the

34 Nelson, Korea and the O ld Orders in Eastern Asia, 120.
35 Choi, “Korea’s response to America and France in the decade of the Taewongun, 1864-1873,” 118.
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peninsula and more Catholic converts were beheaded. Seeing that negotiations were over
and that his expedition was too small to storm Seoul, Minister Low decided to
withdraw.

Taewon’gun’s policy of seclusion once again triumphed and the door of

Korea reminded tightly shut, at least for another five years.

THE OPENING OF KOREA BY JAPAN
While Western gunboats failed to intimidate Korea in opening up for trade and
evangelism, Japan made its own attempt at securing a treaty of friendship and commerce.
Like Korea, Japan had initially refused to open its door for Western traders, except the
Dutch. However, after witnessing Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s demonstration of
Western gunpower during the 1853 America Expedition to Edo, Japan gave up its
seclusion policy and signed Japan’s first treaty with the United States, the Treaty of
Kanagawa (1854), and later the first commercial treaty with the United States in 1858.
Meiji Reform and Territorial Expansion
The opening of Japan hastened the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate (16001887) and brought rapid political, economic, and social changes in Japan. The Meiji
Restoration (1868) and the ensuing progressive reform movement gradually transformed
Japanese government and society.

The new Japanese government devised effective

means to expand its central power. By both persuasion and threat, the government was
able to take the feudal lands back from the daimyo peacefully and to establish a new and
effective taxation system that enabled the central government to finance radical reform
programs modeled after the West. Meiji reforms included zealous efforts to appropriate
and adapt Western industrial technology, judicial institutions, and constitutional theory.
36 Ibid., 119-127.
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Despite Japan’s own history as a closed society, its interaction with and
admiration of the West led them to champion imperialism and territorial expansion. The
Darwinist idea of the “survival of the fittest” radically altered Japan’s foreign policy
outlook. Since the Western imperialists had imposed an unequal treaty system on Japan
using powerful gunboats, the Japanese were eager to shake off this yoke by building their
own powerful gunboats and establishing a strong army. Then they could not only hold
their enemies at bay, but also conquer their weaker neighbors.
In the decades following the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government
gradually took steps to secure its borders and to build up its military strength for
territorial expansion. Because Russia had acquired China’s maritime provinces of eastern
Manchuria down to Vladivostok in 1860, it directly threatened Japan’s interests in the
neighboring Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. In order to safeguard its northern frontier, Japan
settled the issue with the Russians in the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1875). Japan agreed
to give up its claim to Sakhalin and, in return, Russia would not challenge Japan’s
position in the Kuril Islands. Previously, in 1869, the Japanese government had smashed
the remaining Tokugawa loyalists in Ezo (Hokkaido), and, by 1886, had assumed full
control of Hokkaido by establishing three prefectures there. It then turned its attention to
securing its southern frontier by annexing the Ryukyu Islands in 1879.

Korea and

Taiwan, located to Japan’s east and south, were the next potential areas for Japanese
expansion.37
Japan’s Gunboat Diplomacy
The Korean government, under Taewon’gun, considered Japan’s compromises
with the West as a sign of cowardice, and despised Japan’s ready acceptance of European
37 Ebrey, Walthall, and Palais, East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History, 416-426.
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ideas. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan had sent several envoys to Korea (in 1868,
1867, and 1871), hoping to re-open relations. But the Korean court refused to receive the
Japanese representatives and humiliated them.38 The aggressive faction within the
Japanese government demanded an invasion of Korea in response. Yet, instead of
retaliating immediately, the Japanese government decided to wait for an appropriate time.
Their opportunity came in 1875, when the Japanese gunboat Unyo Kwan was
fired upon by Korean troops near Kanghwa Island, while surveying the coast.

In

response, Japan destroyed the attacking fort and stirred up a popular clamor for war
against Korea. With Japan’s gunboats, led by General Kuroda Kiyotaka and Count Inoue
Kaoru, holding Kanghwa Island and threatening the security of Seoul,39 Japan’s diplomat,
Mori Yurei, negotiated with the Manchu government.

He protested against Korea’s

persistent rejection of Japanese representatives and its unreasonable attack on the Unyo
Kwan. In his note to the Manchu government, Mori threatened that Korea would suffer
“an incalculable calamity” if it refused to accept Japan’s demand for a treaty of
friendship.40
In reality, Japan’s diplomacy was a ploy with two aims: to trick China into
pressuring Korea into opening its borders and to test the waters of China’s commitment
to defend Korea. Although China had never given up its suzerain claim over Korea, it
was unwilling to dictate Korea’s internal affairs or to declare its commitment to defend
Korea. China’s ambiguous position delighted the Japanese. Mori deceived the Chinese
by paying lip-service to China’s special position over Korea, even while Japan’s true
38 Battistini, “The Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” 49.
39 With a force o f three warships and eight hundred troops, the Japanese expedition was able to capture
Kanghwa Island in December 1875. See Carter J. Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History (Seoul:
Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), 200.
40 Nelson, Korea and the O ld Orders in Eastern Asia, 127-128.
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motive was to expand its own political and economic influence in Korea. Not suspecting
Japan’s true agenda, Li Hongzhang, who was in charge of the Manchu government’s
foreign affairs, instructed the Korean court to receive Japan’s mission.41
Japan’s public cry for another war of conquest against Korea, its new gunboats,
and its skillful diplomatic maneuvering had left Korea with little choice but to comply
with their demands. Vulnerable without China’s protection, and still remembering the
destruction wrought by Hideyoshi’s invasion, Korea had every reason to be fearful.
Korea’s traditional diplomacy of sadae ( ‘serving the great’) to China and kyorin
(‘neighborly relations’) to Japan was in fact on the brink of collapse. Serving China
alone was no longer useful in ensuring Korea’s independence.
When the Japanese representatives arrived in Seoul on February 6, 1876, they met
a more receptive Korean court.

King Kojong’s new wife, Queen Min, had ousted

Taewon’gun to gain control over the court. Korea was now ready to conclude a treaty.
Within a month, the Treaty of Kanghwa was signed.

Korea agreed to establish

diplomatic relations with Japan, open three ports for trade and foreign settlement, and
give Japanese the right of extraterritoriality. The treaty also allowed Japanese boats to
survey Korean coastal waters at will and granted special economic privileges to Japanese
merchants in Korea. In 1880, Japan set up its legation in Seoul.
The most important element of this treaty, however, was that Japan recognized
Korea as an independent state which enjoyed “the same sovereign rights” as Japan. It
meant that Japan ceased to recognize Korea as a tributary state of China. The treaty
paved the way for Japan to detach Korea from the suzerainty of China and to bring Korea
under its own influence instead.
41 Ibid., 129-130.
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China’s Response to the Treaty o f Kanghwa
The 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa alarmed many Manchu officials. Li Hongzhang
worried about Japan’s real intentions in Korea. These fears mounted when, in 1879,
Japan annexed the Liu-ch’iu (Ryukyu or Okinawa) kingdom.

Liu-ch’iu had been a

tributary state of both China and Japan; if Japan could swallow one Chinese vassal state,
then why not another? A look at any map would show what a tempting prize Korea
would be to an expansionist Japan. Korea had psychological as well as political value to
China because it was by then the last tributary state of the Middle Kingdom, Annam
having already fallen into the hands of the French in 1863. Losing Korea would be the
final blow to the declining prestige of the Manchu government.42
China began to look for ways to neutralize Japan’s rapidly growing influence over
Korea, and to prevent its annexation.

Li’s solution was to pit “barbarian against

barbarian.” If two great powers could be played against each other, each might keep the
other in check. A Western power had to be invited into Korea to counteract the Japanese.
But which nation should it be? Li chose the United States, because it had shown little
interest in territorial expansion in East Asia.
Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt and his Treaty
The expedition of 1871, despite its failure, had demonstrated the United States’
interest in a treaty with Korea. Japan’s success with the Treaty of Kanghwa had aroused
some US officials to contemplate making another attempt of their own. Commodore
Robert W. Shufeldt was sent by Secretary of State William Maxwell Evarts to investigate
the possibility of a new attempt. He first approached the Japanese government, seeking
their “good offices” for aid in securing a treaty with Korea. The Japanese refused, of
42 Ibid., 135.
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course, because, except for Chinese-Korean relations, they enjoyed a monopoly in Korea
and did not want to share their influence with other Western powers. By the same logic,
the Chinese were eager to assist the US. Hearing of the Americans’ rebuff by Japan, Li
Hongzhang at once invited Shufeldt to visit him in Tianjin. He promised Shufeldt that he
would persuade the Choson government to negotiate a treaty with the United States.43
In early 1882, Li Hongzhang convinced the Korean court to sign a treaty with
America.

Through the treaty, Li hoped to lure the United States into formally

acknowledging Korea as a vassal of China. Shufeldt refused to include this language in
the treaty,44 but he did promise to write a letter stating that he had requested China’s
assistance in concluding the treaty because Korea was its dependency. Shufeldt also
agreed to dispatch a letter from the Korean king to the President of the United States,
stating that the treaty was concluded with the consent of China.45 Fearing foreign
religious and cultural expansion into Korea, Li also requested that the treaty include the
provision that “the [Christian] church shall not be established,” but the American
representatives refused his proposal.46 Therefore, when the Korea-U.S. Treaty of Amity
and Commerce was finally signed in the city of Tianjin, the anti-religious provision was
omitted.47
The treaty was historically and politically significant, not only because it was the
first treaty made by Korea with a Western nation, but also because it was the first attempt
to seek American assistance in preserving Korean independence. Article I of the treaty
43 Ibid., 138.
44 Shufeldt refused because both he and the new American minister to China, John Russell Young, feared
that it might drag the United States into defending interests in Korea. See ibid., 144.
45 Battistini, “The Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” 52.
46 Kyong-man Hong, “Formation o f Korean Protestantism and Its Political Nature,” Korean Journal 23
(1983): 19.
47 Allen D. Clark, A History o f the Church in Korea (Seoul: The Christian Literature Society o f Korea,
1971), 71-72.
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stated clearly that “there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of
the United States and the King of Choson [Korea] and the citizens and subjects of their
respective Governments. If others deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government,
the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an
amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.”48
Interpreted broadly, this provision could imply that the United States recognized
Korea as an independent country rather than a dependency of China. A letter from King
Kojong to President Arthur stated that, even though Korea was a tributary state of China,
the king had always retained full sovereignty over internal and external matters, and thus,
the Korean government would carry out the provisions of the treaty completely in
accordance with international law.49
Official relations between Korea and the United States improved markedly when
the king sent an eight-man diplomatic mission to the United States under Chief Envoy
Min Yong-ik and Deputy Envoy Hong Yong-sik. In addition to cementing official ties
between the two countries, the mission’s goal was to obtain American advisers, teachers,
and loans. One official, Yu Kil-chun, stayed in the United States to attend the Governor
Dummer Academy in Massaschusetts. Upon their return to Korea, some members of the
delegation became champions of radical reform based on Western models.50
The Korea-US Treaty, according to historian Walter B. Jung, was “typical of the
time; two countries agreed to exchange diplomats, to establish consulates at trading ports,

48 U.S. Department o f State, Treaties and Conventions Concluded Between the USA and Other Powers
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889), 216.
49 Battistini, “The Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century,” 53.
50 Eckert et al, Korea O ld and New: A History, 204.
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and to treat each other based on equality.”51 It also became, in the words of Jung, “a
good precedent for other Western powers interested in establishing similar treaty
relationships with Korea.”52 Treaties with similar characteristics were signed by Korea
and other Western powers: Britain and Germany in 1883, Italy and Russia in 1884,
France in 1886, and Austro-Hungary in 1889. All of these powers agreed to recognize
Korea as an independent country.
Despite its amicability and lenient terms, the first Korea-US treaty was,
nevertheless, still an “unequal” treaty between a Western imperialist state and a weaker
nation. Foreigners enjoyed the protection of extraterritoriality and expected economic
concessions from the Korean court. It required no gift of prophesy to foresee that foreign
encroachment would eventually hurt Korean sovereignty and worsen the existing
political, economic, and social problems, unless the nation undertook substantial reform.
The Korean court was deeply divided over these changes. Most leaders argued
that unless Korea reformed itself and began modernization programs, it could not survive.
The question was, however: which model of reform should Korea follow? Some Koreans
looked to the Japanese model.53 Some looked to China. Others looked to the United
States.
As Korea begrudgingly opened its doors to the West, many of the destabilizations
that they had feared were bound to occur.

Radical political, economic, and social

transformations were on their way. The old Korea was passing away and the shape of the

51 Jung, Nation Building: The Geopolitical History o f Korea, 150.
52 Ibid.
531 used the word “saw” because many Progressives had visited Japan and were impressed by what they
saw in Meiji Japan. The first political coup d’etat initiated by pro-Japanese progressive reformers (mostly
young students from the high yangban class) in 1884 was the direct result of what they learned after
spending two years in Japan. See Se Eung Oh, Dr. Philip Jaisohn’s Reform Movement 1896-1898: A
Critical Appraisal o f the Independence Club (Lanham, MD: University Press o f America, Inc., 1995), 5.
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new Korea was not yet known. It was a tumultuous period of intense rivalries within the
Korean court and of frequent diplomatic disputes and of major military confrontations
between Choson’s neighbors. Foreigners, both diplomats and missionaries alike, did not
merely witness this fall, but contributed, directly or indirectly, to the changes that were
sweeping the nation.

PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES AND THEIR INITIAL WORK IN KOREA
The conclusion of a Korea-US treaty opened the door for foreigners to reside in
Korea, but it did not mean that missionary activities were legal according to Korean law.
Anti-foreignism, including distrust of foreign religions, remained strong across the
peninsula. Public evangelism was still prohibited, so American churches chose to begin
with medical and educational work instead of direct evangelism.

Before sending

missionaries, the Americans first obtained the Korean king’s approval to build schools
and to practice medicine.
The Arrival o f American Protestant Missionaries
In 1884, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (USA) redirected their first
missionary, Dr. Horace N. Allen, a medical worker serving in China, to Seoul.

He

arrived at In’chon on September 20. Although he was a missionary supported by the
Presbyterian Board, he also came with an official title (though no official salary) - The
Physician of the American Legation in Seoul. His diplomatic status and connections
shielded him from religious persecution and gave him legitimacy and influence in Seoul.
Being the only Western doctor available at the time, he was warmly welcomed by most
of the foreign residents, who were haunted by frequent outbreaks of strange diseases in
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this ancient city.54 Dr. Allen thereby made many friends within the diplomatic and
business circles.
A year after his arrival, various American boards of foreign missions started
sending ordained ministers and medical workers to Seoul. From the Presbyterian Church
(North) came Rev. Horace G. Underwood and Dr. Horace Herod, and from the Methodist
Episcopal (North) came Rev. and Mrs. Henry G. Appenzeller, Dr. and Mrs. W. B.
Scranton, and Mrs. Mary F. Scranton. Step by step, they began to open hospitals, build
schools, and establish churches. These two denominations cooperated closely in their
Korean evangelical work. Over the next decade, in addition to the above-mentioned two
groups, missionaries would arrive in Korea from many denominations, including
Australian Presbyterian in 1889, Canadian Baptists in 1889, Church of England in 1890,
Presbyterian (South) in 1892, Canadian Presbyterian in 1893, and Methodist Episcopal
(South) in 1896.
Missionaries and the Korean Royal Family
There is little dispute that medical service was the key to the success of American
missionary work in Seoul. Dr. Allen’s “magic” healing (from the Korean viewpoint) of
the Queen’s nephew, Prince Min Yong-ik, set the medical missionaries above all other
foreigners in the Hermit Kingdom. The prince, who had visited Washington in 1882 as a
Korean representative, was seriously injured during an attempted coup by pro-Japanese
progressive reformers.55 When Dr. Allen saved his life, he earned a high reputation for
both himself and Western medicine among the most powerful Korean officials in Seoul.

54 In Soo Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920 (New York:
Peter Lang, 1996), 18.
55 Horace N. Allen, Things Korea: A Collection o f Sketches and Anecdotes, Missionary and Diplomatic
(New York: Fleming and H. Revell, 1890), 70.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

Afterward, Dr. Allen and his missionary colleagues became the trusted friends of
the imperial family, thereby benefiting the position of all American missionaries in Seoul.
The doctor was hired as the physician to the Royal Court and was given the status of a
Korean nobleman so that he could enter the palace and see the king or his family
whenever needed. When Dr. Allen asked for a Western hospital, the king provided all
that was needed and named the hospital as Chai Chung Won (House of Civilized
Virtue).56 The king later granted permission to the Methodists as well, for a second
hospital, named Sibyongwon (Universal Relief Hospital).

Dr. Lillias Horton, a

Presbyterian medical missionary, became the Queen’s personal physician.
As the number of missionaries increased, their relationship with the royal family
also deepened.

Dr. Allen, in particular, soon became one of the most influential

foreigners in Seoul.57 Although his political views were quite different from most of the
other missionaries - and also from the American officials in Washington - his personal
influence upon the court promoted the advancement of U.S.-Korean diplomatic and
co

economic relations.
Educational Contributions o f Missionaries
In addition to offering medical services, missionaries also set up schools so that
they might teach and indirectly minister to Korean people. With the endorsement of the
56 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 19-20
57 In the next two decades o f his service in Korea, Dr. Allen emerged from being a medical missionary to
become the king’s informal adviser; and then he served Korean interests as the Foreign Secretary o f the
Korean Legation in Washington. When he returned to Seoul in 1889, he was then hired by the American
legation as its secretary and from there he was finally promoted to be the Minister o f the American
Legation in the summer o f 1897. Jongsuk Chay described him as the most involved and the most important
individual in American-Korean relations from the 1890s to 1905. See Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry,
119.
58 Dr. Allen believed that America was the nation that could save Korea and a formal Korean-American
alliance would serve the interests of both sides. He had advised the Korean king to give several important
mining grants and construction works to American business corporations. See Fred Harvey Harrington,
God, Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905
(Madison, WI: The University o f Wisconsin Press, 1944).
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king, the first school, Paejae haktang (Hall for Rearing Useful Men), was established in
1886 by Rev. Henry Appenzeller. Soon afterward, a school for young girls was founded
by Mrs. Mary F. Scranton; this school later became the famous Ewha University for
Women.59 The Presbyterians and other mission organizations in Seoul soon followed the
Methodists’ example and set up their own schools, seminaries, and eventually
universities.

Presbyterian and Methodist became the two most influential Protestant

denominations in Korea.60 In 1886, there were two mission schools. But by 1910,
American missionaries were running 1,623 schools of all categories, enrolling more than
130,000 students. These American schools accounted for about 93 percent of all foreign
mission schools.61 In fact, American missionaries established schools faster than they

59 Several famous women nationalist activists among Americans were graduates from Ewha Women’s
University, including Helen Kim and Louise Yim. Both o f them were Methodist women and Syngman
Rhee’s supporters.
60 The Anglican Church sent its first evangelist, a Japanese convert, to Korea in 1880. But it would be ten
more years before the church sent its first British missionary, Bishop John Charles Corfe. He focused his
efforts on medical work, instead o f education, with the assistance o f some Catholic priests and nuns. After
seven years, Bishop Corfe found his first Korean convert. Although Bishop Corfe arrived in Korea only a
few years later than the Presbyterian missionaries, the Anglican Church in Korea ultimately failed to
produce a native ministry. Unable to master the language or endure the harsh living conditions, Bishop
Corfe and his Anglican coworkers gradually retired from Korea. During the Japanese colonial period, the
church experienced some growth and built a beautiful cathedral in Seoul. But Anglicanism only had
marginal influence upon the Korean Christian community. When the English priests were withdrawn at the
outbreak o f World War II, the church suffered from a lack o f native leadership and funding. After World
War II, only a few Anglican missionaries returned, but funding from war-torn Britain remained scarce
throughout the Korean War and reconstruction period. A change occurred in 1956 when the new Bishop,
John Daly, adopted full self-supporting and self-governing policies for the native Church. Since that time,
the Anglican Church has begun to expand its influence in Korea. See John B. Whelan, ‘T he Anglican
Church in Korea,” International Review o f Missions 49 (April 1960): 157-163.
61 See Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910, 6. Some other sources
suggested the amount as 755 (see Table 7) or 778. (See Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern
Korean Nationalism, 65.) Chay’s data is from a Korean source which I cannot verify, but it should still be
reliable because the new research by the Korean educationists indicates that some non-mission run private
schools were actually owned by individual Christians who had connected with the churches or missions.
See Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 122.
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built churches.62
Gradually, Christian education developed into an effective means of transplanting
American ideals into young Korean minds.

Mission schools not only taught Christian

doctrine, but also provided students with a Western liberal education, including the
sciences, mathematics, the English language, and the humanities. In 1910, at least a third
of the schools in Korea were run by foreign missionaries. Even as late as 1929, after
more than twenty years of Japanese colonial control, Christian schools still graduated a
third of the high school students in Korea.64 “These schools,” historian Jongsuk Chay
pointed out, “which ranged from primary schools to colleges, not only introduced
Western culture to the Koreans, but also produced young patriots who later played an
important role in every field of Korean society.”65
These mission schools, moreover, became a direct challenge to the traditional
Confucian education, which was controlled by the yangban (the name for the highest
class of scholar-gentry in Korean society) class.

Since the beginning of the Choson

Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism66 was Korea’s official ideology and Koreans generally

62 There were about 687 Presbyterian churches and 359 Methodist churches and chapels (very primitive
churches) in Korea. Data o f the Presbyterian churches is taken from Park, Protestantism and Politics in
Korea, 33; and data o f the Methodist churches is from “Korea Conference 1910,” Annual Report o f the
Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The
Institute for Korean Church History, 2001): 380-381.
63 Daniel M. Davis, ‘T he Impact o f Christianity upon Korea, 1884-1910: Six Key American and Korean
Figures,” Journal o f Church and State 36 (1994): 795-820. Davis’ research is mainly on Henry G.
Appenzeller and the influence of Christian education on Korea.
64 Reported by C. A. Sauer, “Korea Conference,” (1929) Annual Report o f the Board o f Foreign Missions
o f the M ethodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church
History, 2001): 823.
65 Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910, 3.
66 Neo-Confucianism was a Zhu-xi style Confucianism.
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adhered to its teachings more strongly than the Chinese did.67 Most of the Korean
yangban scholars had been educated in Confucian schools in the hopes of passing the
government examination and receiving lucrative jobs in public service.
Therefore, before the 1890s, the only school available for Korean children was the
male-bastion sodang (Book Hall) in their own village. There, boys learned old Chinese
writing and Confucian classics under the guidance of their sodang master. Students were
obliged to memorize the Sohak (Elementary Learning) textbook, in order to be promoted
to a higher level and eventually acquire the status of a Confucian scholar.68 “These texts
were nothing,” said Hong Ul-su, a Korean from South Kyongsang Province who was
bom in 1905, “but Chinese history, poetry, stories about warriors and artists, you name
it.”69 Both the educational content and the teaching method served to draw the Korean
elites closer to China and to resist changes that might subvert the political, economic, and
social base. Since Japan did not begin its own educational work in Korea until after the
turn of the century, it was the Western mission schools that presented the first major
threat to the existing educational system.

Later, when Japan attempted to achieve

complete control over the colonial school system in Korea and impose the Japanese
language, these existing mission schools were a constant obstacle.
These three educational systems can be compared.

The traditional Confucian

schools emphasized the Chinese language and culture; after 1910, Japanese schools
67 Zhu Xi-style Confucianism was a form o f Confucianism that was developed by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) in
Song Dynasty in China. Zhu Xi-style Confucianism was later completely distorted by the Mongol rulers
during the Yun Dynasty in order to suppress the nationalistic or anti-foreign elements o f Confucianism.
Instead, it emphasized the familialistic elements and ritual formalism of Confucians so that the Chinese
would be kept under the M ongols’ control. See Thomas Hosuck Kang, “Changes in the North Korean
Personality From Confucian to Communist,” in The Politics o f North Korea, ed. Jae Kyu Park and Jung
Gun Kim (Seoul: ^
Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 1979), 68.
68 Ibid., 91.
69 Hildi Kang, Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2001), 37.
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emphasized the Japanese language and culture; the American mission schools, however,
did not focus on the language and culture of America. Although these subjects were
taught, the students learned just as much about the Korean language and culture. Only
the mission schools taught Korean history and used han ’gul™ Han ’gul was the Korean
alphabetic script invented by King Sejong and a group of Korean scholars in 1450 A.D. It
was one of the most perfect phonetic alphabets in the world and was very easy to learn.71
Despite its good quality and potential benefits, han’gul was never popular among
the educated yangban class, because they valued their superior position as Chinese
scholars.72 Anyone could learn han’gul, and then what would make the yangban special?
Therefore, the Confucian masters at the sodang discouraged the use of han’gul. As a
result, illiteracy was quite high during the Choson period.
Seeing the potential effectiveness of the native alphabet for teaching and
evangelism, missionaries used han ’gul widely in their mission schools and publications.
The process began when Rev. Horace G. Underwood learned han’gul through a native
Korean teacher, Song Sun-yong.

He then systemized his learning methods, and

published two important books in English on the Korean language in 1890: An
Introduction to the Korean Spoken Language and A Concise Dictionary o f the Korean
Language™ These two books helped Koreans to unify and standardize their language,
by providing a standard grammar and terminology. They became important learning
tools for both natives and foreigners. With this system, Korean students only needed
70 H an’gul was also known as Onmun. For the sake o f the yangban, the mission schools taught Chinese so
that the mission school graduates would not be looked down upon by the educated Confucian scholars, and
there was also a general need to know enough Chinese characters in order to master the materials written
by traditional and famous Korean scholars at that time.
71 See Clark, A History o f the Church in Korea, 13-14.
72 The use o f Chinese characters for official documents and for other higher level written materials was far
more popular than was the native alphabet. H an’gul was reserved only for low-grade novels. Ibid., 14-15.
73 Lillias H. Underwood, Underwood o f Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1983), 94-95.
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about two weeks to master han’gul. Some children brought their materials home and
taught their parents and siblings how to read and write han’gul. In this way, the literacy
level of the common people gradually improved. This was the most unique feature of the
contribution of missionary work to Korean society, setting the Korea experience apart
from that of other Asian countries.
The classes offered by the mission schools prepared students for the changing
national and international conditions. Mission school students were required to learn at
least three written languages: han’gul, Chinese, and English. They were also encouraged
to study their own history and acquire a basic knowledge of their historical and cultural
roots.74 Initially, these classes were criticized by the yangban as lacking scholarly value.
But slowly, the study of Korea’s own history began to arouse a Korean national
consciousness. Just as the sodang had encouraged students to admire China and thus
drew students closer to the Chinese way of thinking, the mission schools taught Western
culture and drew students closer to America.

Nevertheless, by emphasizing Korean

language and history, students at the mission schools were also encouraged to keep their
Korean heritage even while they were being exposed to a wider body of knowledge.75
The Influence o f Missionary Publications
As han’gul gradually became more popular among both the Korean youth and
churchgoers, the demand for reading materials in han ’gul steadily increased. At first, the
use of han’gul was only common among Christians, because the Korean Bible, religious

74 Later when the Japanese took over Korea, the students were forced to give up han’gul and use the
Japanese language. The colonial government did not allow any Korean history and cultural classes in order
to uproot the Korean national identity and make the Korean people loyal Japanese nationals.
75 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 68-69.
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books, and mission schools’ textbooks were mostly published in the Korean script.76 The
situation began to change when the first Korean newspaper, The Independent
(.Doklipsinmun), was published in han’gul in 1896 by Philip Jaison (SS Chae-pil), a
Korean Christian reformer returned from the United States.77
Missionaries took the lead in setting up their own religious and academic
publication businesses to propagate their religious beliefs and Western ideals.

Rev.

Henry Appenzeller, for instance, founded the Trilingual Press, allowing Paejae’s students
to work there to earn money for room, board, and tuition.78 Later, in 1895, Appenzeller
also took over Korean Repository, which was originally founded and edited by Franklin
Ohlinger, an American publisher.

Appenzeller published his own editorials in this

magazine in three languages (English, han’gul, and Chinese). The Methodists even ran
their own bookstore, The Methodist Book Comer.
Likewise, Rev. Horace G. Underwood from the Presbyterian Missions also started
his own newspaper, Yesugyo hoebo (also known as Christian News in English),
publishing articles purely in han’gul. In describing her husband’s motives for editing
Christian News, Lillias Underwood wrote that it was:
to carry counsel and comfort to the Christian church, [and] to present to laborer and
landlord, to Koreans o f country and city, a practical Christianity which interested itself in
their fields and finances, and ... brought them word o f doings in distant lands... [it]
brought to far away provincial officials ... news o f foreign countries and articles on
subjects o f interest and help; the farmer found accounts o f cotton and tobacco-raising in
other countries, improved methods of fertilization and descriptions o f better, though
simple, farm implements; the merchant found news and articles on commerce in its
columns.79

76 Clark, A History o f the Church in Korea, 15.
77 Ibid. See also Oh, Dr. Philip Jaisohn’s Reform Movement 1896-1898,19-20.
78 Daniel M. Davis, “Henry Gerhard Appenzeller: His Contribution to Korean Independence, Democracy,
and Modernization,” Tongbang hakchi 57 (1988): 211.
79 Underwood, Underwood o f Korea, 168.
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Translated Western materials could reach the minds and souls of the Korean people
through these religious publications.

Because the materials were quite popular even

among non-Christians, the demand was so large that one copy of such a publication
might possibly pass through hundreds of Korean hands.80
As these papers grew into important channels for Christian education, they
gradually shaped the Korean people’s interests and opinions regarding both national and
international issues. Meanwhile, missionaries also wrote numerous books and articles on
Korea for their English speaking audiences.81 These materials became important sources
of information on Korea for further economic, religious, and cultural interactions
between Korea and the West.

DOMESTIC DISCONTENT AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS
While missionaries were actively bringing changes to traditional Korean society,
foreign governments were also increasing their level of involvement in Korean political
affairs. The problems started in 1876, as soon as the Treaty of Kanghwa was signed. In
facing Japan’s challenge to its rights of suzerainty, the Manchu government decided to
assert greater control over the Korean court. This move eventually brought China into
direct conflict with Japan.

80 Kim, Prostestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 73-74.
81 For examples, Rev. James Scarth Gale, an independent British missionary financially supported by the
American Presbyterian Mission in Korea, wrote a variety o f books on Korean language, history, and
culture. His most famous works were Korea in Transition (1909) and History o f the Korean People (1927).
They were scholarly studies o f Korean history and culture. Other well-known books on Korea by Dr.
Horace N. Allen are Korean Tales (1889), A Chronological Index o f the Foreign Relations o f Korea from
the Beginning o f the Christian Era to the Twentieth Century (1900), and Things Korean: A Collection o f
Sketches and Anecdotes, Missionary and Diplomatic (1890). Dr. Homer B. Hulbert, a Christian educator
and a close advisor to King Kojong, wrote The Passing o f Korea (1906) to lament the loss o f Korean
independence to the Japanese imperialists.
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Power Struggle in the Korean Court
Taewon’gun, who had been out of power since 1873, planned a political
comeback in 1881. The anti-foreign faction of the Korean government, who looked to
Taewon’gun for leadership, were upset at the king’s accommodative approach to foreign
encroachment. Taewon’gun took advantage of their discontent to gain political support
from some high officials. He plotted a coup to depose his son, King Kojong, who was
under the heavy influence of his wife, Queen Min, and to replace him with another of his
sons. This plan was exposed, however, and all of his allies were purged. Only because
he was the king’s father did Taewon’gun escape punishment.82
Shortly afterwards, in mid-1882, Taewon’gun saw another opportunity.
Discontented Korean troops began rioting against the government. They had not been
paid for a year, due to corrupt officials from the queen’s family, the Min clan.
Taewon’gun secretly gave his support to these rebels and sent his trusted aides to direct
them. The soldiers seized weapons from the government armory and then attacked the
prison, where other rebels were being held.

Afterwards, they turned to destroy the

Japanese legation in Seoul and tried to kill Queen Min. Once the rebels stormed the
palace, Taewon’gun was back in power and sought to undo all of his son’s reforms. His
victory was short-lived, however, because the Japanese returned with more gunboats and
troops, demanding reparations for all the damages caused by the riot.
Chinese Intervention
This Japanese response led the Manchu government to fear that a takeover of
Korea was imminent. With the approval of King Kojong’s emissaries in Tianjin, the
Manchu dispatched a force of 4,500 troops under the command of General Wu
82 Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History, 205.
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Changqing (Wu Ch’ang-ch’ing).

It was the first Chinese military intervention into

Korean affairs since 1636. General Wu seized Taewon’gun and exiled him to Tianjin.
Queen Min, who was in hiding, quickly regained power. At that time, Japan was not
ready to confront China, due to its own domestic financial difficulties, so the Japanese
gunboats held their fire. They did, however, demand a new treaty and reparations for
damages to the legation.

To avoid war, the Korean court agreed.

The Treaty of

Chemulp’o (1882) was signed, giving Japan the right to guard its legation in Seoul.
Once they entered Korea, the Chinese forces showed no interest in leaving again.
Allied with Queen Min and her supporters in the court, Commander Yuan Shikai, who
was General W u’s chief of the military secretariat and concurrently the associate director
of Korean military affairs, grew to be the most powerful man in Seoul. He pressured the
Korean court to grant new trading rights to Chinese merchants, allowing them to travel
and conduct business freely in all Korea.

With political support from the Chinese,

conservative officials succeeded in blocking many pro-Japanese progressive reform
programs.

For nearly a decade, Yuan was in control of Seoul, using his power to

minimize Japan’s monopolistic trading position in Korea.
While the Japanese residents in Korea watched the rise of Chinese political
influence and economic competition in Korea, the Japanese government was waiting for
the right time to challenge China and assert its own domination over Northeastern Asia.
Manipulating the progressive Koreans’ anti-Chinese sentiment, Japan positioned itself as
the true defender of Korean independence and the model for the Korean reform
movement.

In 1885, taking advantage of China’s conflict with France over Annam,

Japanese officials pushed through a treaty with China in Tianjin, agreeing that both
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nations would withdraw their troops from Korea and that each should notify the other
party in advance if troops were again needed to put down disturbances in Korea.83
The Tonghak Rebellion and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)
After ten years of difficult struggle to overcome domestic opposition and another
ten years to stabilize its economy and secure its borders, the Japanese government was
finally ready to confront China. The opportunity came when the Tonghak Rebellion, the
biggest rebellion in Korean history, broke out in 1894.

Tonghak was originally a

religious movement with a strong anti-Catholic sentiment. Its founder, Ch’oe Che-u,
claimed to have received a revelation in 1860 and to have been miraculously cured of a
mysterious disease. When he began to preach his religion, which he called Ch’ondogyo
(Doctrine of the Way of Heaven), people confused it with Catholicism.

In order to

differentiate his religion from Catholicism, Ch’oe renamed his sect Tonghak (Eastern
Learning), in contrast to Suhak (Western Learning). He attacked Christianity furiously
whenever he preached. Ironically, Ch’oe was executed on the charge of being a Christian
in 1864, during the period of Taewon’gun’s nationwide anti-Catholic purge.84
Ch’oe’s teaching was carried on, however, by his young relative, Ch’oe Si-hyong.
Over the next decade, Tonghak became popular.

Its idea that “all men are equal”

attracted a number of followers among the oppressed who were tired of government
corruption and social inequality.
followers in the 1870s.

Periodic uprisings were instigated by Tonghak

In 1892, the sect had become so powerful that it openly

engineered large non-violent demonstrations at Changye and Poun, petitioning the

83 Ibid., 172.
84 R. Pierce Beaver, “Chondogyo and Korea,” Journal o f Bible and Religion 30 (April 1962): 116.
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government to remove the guilty verdict of their founder, Ch’oe Che-u, and to permit
freedom of worship, end corruption, and eliminate foreign influences.
As the rebellion spread from Kyongsang Province to the north, Seoul was
threatened.85 Doubting the strength of his own troops and fearing the loss of his throne,
King Kojong called on China for aid. The crisis quickly subsided, however, when the
government reached an agreement with the Tonghak leaders by promising toleration of
their faith and allowing them to set up administrative offices in the Cholla provinces.
The uprising was over, but the fallout of King Kojong’s premature appeal for aid
was just beginning. As soon as the request for assistance reached Li Hongzhang, he sent
1,500 Chinese soldiers to Korea without notifying the Japanese government. His action
gave Japan an excuse to stir up a war against the Chinese. Ignoring Korean requests for
both China and Japan to withdraw their troops, the Japanese army surrounded the Korean
palace in Seoul, ostensibly to protect it from the rebellion. The Japanese army then
attacked Chinese troops in the north, while their gunboats engaged the Chinese navy.
The political turmoil in Seoul and fear of Japanese domination over Korea caused
the Tonghak worshipers to take up arms again. Its specific purpose was to drive out
Japanese invaders from Korea and to remove pro-Japanese officials from the government.
With the help of Japanese troops, the Korean army successfully suppressed the rebellion.
According to the remnants of Tonghak followers, about 400,000 Koreans were killed in
the uprising, including key Tonghak leaders.86
The turmoil of war and rebellion lasted for a year.

Japan won and thereby

imposed a harsh treaty, the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), on the Manchu government.

85 Ibid., 117.
86 Ibid. See also Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History, 221.
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The Chinese were forced to acknowledge Korea’s full independence and to repudiate all
tributary ties with Korea. In addition to a substantial indemnity, Japan also demanded
that China cede the Liaodong Peninsula and Taiwan.

Through the Treaty of

Shimonoseki, Japan joined the unequal treaty system that the Western powers had
imposed on China in the mid-nineteenth century. Their victory hastened the downfall of
the Manchu government.
While Japanese troops were battling the Chinese and the Tonghak, Japan also
took control of the Korean court, pressuring King Kojong to implement a series of
progressive reforms without regard for Korean popular wishes. Pro-Chinese officials,
mostly from the Min clan, tried to resist these demands.
executed Queen Min and reinstated Taewon’gun in 1895.

In response, the Japanese
King Kojong became a

prisoner in his own palace, his life hanging on the will of his father and the mercy of the
Japanese minister. The queen’s loyalists made repeated attempts to save the king, as
Korea entered a stage of deep domestic turmoil and political uncertainty.
The Growing Russian Influence in the Midst o f Turmoil
Russia was carefully watching Japan’s moves in Northeast Asia, because it had its
own designs on this region. In 1891, the Russians began constructing the Trans-Siberian
Railway to link Moscow and Vladivostok.

Russian and Japanese interests in Korea

clashed when, in 1895, Crown Prince Nicholas expressed a desire for an ice-free port to
the southeast of Korea or on the Liaodong Peninsula.87 Russia refused to sit idly by
while Japan claimed the area due to the gains under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Joining

87 Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese, 283.
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with the French and Germans, they advised Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to the
Chinese.88
Unwilling to confront Russia militarily, Japanese leaders swallowed their anger
and gave up their claim to the peninsula. Fearing a Russian challenge to their control of
Korea, Japan proposed dividing the Korean peninsula into two protectorates along the
38th Parallel.89 Russia refused this offer, however, because they had eyes on the entire
Korean peninsula. They had cut a secret deal with the Manchu government in 1896 for a
twenty-five-year lease of the area around Lushun (Port Arthur), an important ice-free
port-city located at the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula.

The Trans-Siberian

Railway was to be linked with the Manchurian Railway, connecting Vladivostok to
Lushun. This arrangement strengthened Russia’s position in Northeast Asia. Russian
officials calculated that, once they controlled Manchuria, they could easily hold sway
over all of Korea.
Russia’s first direct challenge to Japanese control of Korea came in late 1896.
Japan’s domination of the Korean court and its murder of the queen had produced strong
anti-Japanese sentiment among the Korean population. King Kojong felt that he could
regain control of the country, if he could only escape his gilded cage. He was a prisoner
in his own palace and a puppet of his own father. His supporters could not reach him.
But there was one exception, one group who had direct access to him: the medical
missionaries. Their special status allowed them free access to the palace.
These missionaries had previously demonstrated their concern for the king’s
safety during the time of the coup against Queen Min. At that time, three American
88 Charles A. Fisher, ‘T he Role o f Korea in the Far East,” The Geographical Journal 120 (September
1954): 286.
89 Ibid., 287.
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missionaries had rushed to the palace to guard the lives of the king and the crown prince,
while the king’s second son sought refuge in the house of Rev. Horace G. Underwood.90
Now, with King Kojong fearing that his father might poison him, he would not eat any
food other than that prepared by the missionaries or ladies from the European legations.91
Then, in February 1896, under arrangement by Dr. Horace Allen, the secretary of
the American Legation at that time, King Kojong and the crown prince found their way
out of the palace, by disguising themselves as a coolie and a palace woman, and fled to
the Russian Legation.

For about a year, the king ran the country from the Russian

Legation. Dr. Allen was a top advisor. Westerners, especially Americans, received many
economic benefits during this critical period of time. Because of his efforts to expand
American economic interests in Korea, Allen’s diplomatic career also received a boost
when, in 1897, the newly-elected President William McKinley appointed Dr. Allen as the
United States Minister to Korea.
The Independence Club Movement (1896-1898)
Meanwhile, two American-educated Korean officials, Yun Ch’i-ho and Philip
Jaisohn (So Chae-pil), who had both converted to Christianity, returned from the United
States. They received the king’s approval to conduct reforms, which came to be known

90 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 55-56.
91 Ibid. See also Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese, 275-276.
92 Harrington, God Mammon and the Japanese, 288-289.
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as the Independence Club Movement (1896-1898).93 The club organized symbolic
projects for promoting Korean independence, such as the building of a great meeting hall,
Independence Hall, on the site of the old Chinese embassy, and setting up the
Independence Arch at the gate where the Chinese envoys used to be greeted.
The life of this movement was cut short, however, by Philip Jaisohn’s lack of
political skills. Since the court was still filled with many conservatives, resistance to any
radical change remained strong. Jaisohn did not foster friendships or seek understanding
among the conservatives.

Although his reform programs targeted many of the ills

plaguing the nation - an anti-corruption campaign, education reform, transportation
improvements, economic development, and the formation of a constitutional monarchy they also threatened the interests of those in power. Even King Kojong was afraid that
Jaisohn’s programs would incite a revolution and destroy his imperial reign. Finally, in
1898, King Kojong ordered the club to disband and its members to be arrested.
Although the movement came to an abrupt end and its members were dispersed,
the spirit of independence continued both inside and outside of Korea over the next four
decades. The club had also played a significant role in arousing anti-Russian sentiment
in Seoul. The Russian government at that time did not have a strong urge to annex
Korea, in spite of the pressure from expansionists led by Alexis Speyer, the new Russian

93 Yun Ch’i-ho (1865-1946) and Philip Jaisohn (1878-1938) were classic examples o f Christian officials,
who sought to enact reform. Before their conversions, both o f them were born into high-ranking yangban
families and received traditional Confucian training from a young age. Both became pro-Japanese
reformers when they were selected and sent to study in Japan by the Korean government in 1882. When the
1885 coup against the Min clan failed, they fled overseas. Both later received an education in the United
States with the help o f American churches. Both were very successful academically and both became
devout Christians. For the case o f Philip Jaisohn, see Oh, Dr. Philip Jaisohn’s Reform Movement 18961898, 5-12. For the case o f Yun Chi-ho, see Chi-ho Yun, Yun Chi-ho’s letters (Seoul: Yonsei University
Press, date o f publication unknown).
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Minister to Korea in 1897. As soon as the Russians got their ice-free port at Lushun, they
were willing to settle with Japan and recognize Japan’s special position in Korea.
In 1898, as anti-Russian sentiment ran high among Koreans due to the
Independence Club Movement, Russia voluntarily withdrew from Korea, shut down all
their economic activities in Korea and replaced Speyer.94 Because of Russia’s change of
policy and the death of Taewon’gun, King Kojong finally moved back to his palace and
declared himself the Emperor of Choson, a title symbolizing Korean independence.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5)
Russia’s retreat did not, however, prevent an imminent confrontation with Japan.
The Japanese-Russian rivalry over Korea intensified after the outbreak of the Boxer
Rebellion in 1900. The Russians took the opportunity to send a huge army to Manchuria.
When the Russians refused to withdraw after the crisis ended, the British were alarmed.
Japan used this dispute to its advantage, obtaining a secret military alliance with Great
Britain in 1902.95
Bolstered by this alliance, the Japanese took a tough stance against Russia. They
insisted that the Russians leave Manchuria. When Russia refused and instead showed
interest in re-entering Korea, Japan resorted to war. In February 1904, Japan launched a
surprise attack on Russia’s stronghold at Port Arthur. Despite Korea’s declaration of
neutrality, Japan sent its troops to Korea and imposed an agreement to allow Japan to
occupy strategic locations throughout the peninsula during its war against Russia.

94 Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese, 300-301.
95 While Japan recognized Britain’s rights and interests in China, the British acknowledged Japan’s special
interests in Korea. They agreed to assist each other if either side got involved in war against a third power.
See Eckert et al, Korea Old and New: A History, 237.
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After a year of fighting, Japan had the upper hand against Russia. Westerners,
especially President Theodore Roosevelt, were impressed by Japan’s power. Roosevelt
made a secret deal with the Japanese, known as the Taft-Katsura Agreement in July 1905,
acquiescing to Japanese control of Korea in exchange for Japanese acceptance of
American control of the Philippines. Roosevelt then stepped into the Russo-Japanese
War to mediate a peace settlement, upon the request of Japan. The Treaty of Portsmouth
was signed in September, with Russia agreeing to withdraw from Manchuria, to hand
over the lease on Port Arthur, and to cede the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan.
Nevertheless, Japan’s biggest windfall of the war was not the land taken from
Russia, but its now-unchallenged supremacy in Korea. With troops all over the country,
Japan set up the office of Residency-General in Seoul, taking a crucial step toward the
colonization of Korea. In accordance with the Taft-Katsura Agreement, the American
government did nothing, even though Emperor Kojong sent several secret emissaries to
seek American aid. It was a great disappointment to Minister Allen and some of the
American missionaries. Because of his strong protest against America’s inaction and
pro-Japanese attitude, Dr. Allen was dismissed from his position by President Roosevelt.
The Colonization o f Korea
Without any international objections, Japan declared Korea as a protectorate in
1905, after they forced Korea to sign the Protectorate Treaty. In 1907, the Japanese
demanded another treaty surrendering all prerogatives on internal affairs to the Japanese
Resident-General and disbanding the Korean defense forces. This treaty allowed the
Japanese to reorganize the Korean central administration and judicial system. Japanese
advisers who had been in the Korean government earlier became assistant ministers in
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their respective departments and gradually took over all crucial sectors of the
government.

There were, for example, more Japanese officials than Koreans in the

Departments of Finance, Justice, and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry.96 Finally, in
1910, Japan formally annexed Korea through the Treaty of Annexation. After 518 years,
the Choson Dynasty came to an end.

Korea was now a Japanese colony.

Japan

appointed Terauchi Masatake as the first Governor-General. He ruled Korea with an iron
fist from 1910 to 1916.
Annexation and the Growth o f Korean Nationalism
Since 1905, Japan’s aggression had provoked a strong nationalistic response
among Korean nationals.

While Japanese troops suppressed all peaceful protests,

radicals organized the Uibyong (the Righteous Army) in the countryside. For a time, the
demobilization of the Korean army in 1907 added strength to the Korean resistance
forces.97 But the nation had not yet experienced the full extent of Japanese brutality.
These unorganized uprisings of the early period were quickly curbed by the betterequipped Japanese police forces. The colonial government was able to pacify some of
the unemployed soldiers by incorporating them into the Japanese-controlled police force
and gendarmerie.98 As a result, the number of riots decreased from 1450 in 1908 to 147
in 1910."
Japanese rule revoked many freedoms and rights of the Korean people. Land was
systematically extorted from the peasants and handed over to Japanese overlords, who
began to stream across the strait, seeking land and jobs. The colonial government banned
96 C. I. Eugene Kim, “Japanese Rule in Korea 1905-1910: A Case Study,” Proceedings o f the American
Philosophical Society 106 (15 February 1962): 54.
97 Ibid., 57-58.
98 Ibid., 58.
99 David Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” Monumenta Nipponica 25 (1970): 160.
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political organizations and the right of assembly, and closed down most Korean
newspapers.

Yet, it was against the backdrop of such oppressive Japanese rule that

Christianity would not only experience astounding growth, but also emerge as a beacon
of nationalistic hope.

CHRISTIANITY AND KOREA’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
While some of the American missionaries were deeply troubled by Japan’s
growing influence in Korea between 1885 and the 1910 annexation, these developments
had, in the short term, unforeseen positive repercussions upon the Korean church.
Opposition to Japan diverted traditional anti-foreign sentiment away from Christianity.
In fact, for many Koreans, Christianity lost its associations with imperialism, and began
to be identified with Korean nationalism.
missionaries’ educational work.

This process had begun through the

It was reinforced by the missionaries’ actions in

protecting King Kojong and his crown prince after the death of Queen Min, which earned
them the trust of anti-Japanese Koreans and marked them as champions of Korean
independence.
As Chong-sik Lee, a leading historian of Korean nationalism, observed, “Japan,
through her conquest and rule of Korea, awakened and sustained Korean nationalism.
Japan provided the negative and yet most powerful symbol for Korean nationalism, a
national enemy.”100 Lee also recognized the influence of Christianity in this process. “A
significant number of older-generation leaders,” Lee pointed out, “were transformed in
their thought pattern and behavior through close contacts with the missionaries. Along

100 Chong-sik Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press,
1963), 275.
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with Christian ideas the missionaries brought liberal Western thought upon which much
of the Korean nationalism was nurtured. The churches produced not only spiritual
leaders, but also reformers and educators.”101 By the time Japan formally annexed Korea,
Christianity had emerged as a dynamic ideological, political, social, and religious force
that directly challenged Japan’s colonial control of Korea.
American Missionaries and Korean Nationalists
Christian education through mission schools not only improved the literacy level
of the young Korean people, but also produced a generation of Korean nationalists who
were willing to embrace Western principles and Christian beliefs. Missionaries from
America, in particular, were key players in the development of Korean Protestantism. By
the time of the Japanese annexation in 1910 there were a total of 207 Protestant
missionaries in Korea; 157 of them were Americans. There were also, by that time, more
than 1,700 Korean Protestant churches with about 160,000 members, and more than
1,600 mission schools with about 130,000 students.102
Those missionaries who were involved in education envisioned their students
becoming new leaders to modernize Korea according to Western models.103 Mission
schools became practical training grounds for students to participate in Westem-style
democracy, through various extra-curricular activities.

Students were encouraged to

conduct elections in their own organizations and to express themselves freely through

101 Ibid., 277.
102 There were 47 Catholic missionaries in Korea, but only one was American. Catholics had about 150
churches with 38,000 members. They also operated 73 schools with 778 students. See Takayoshi Matsuo
and S. Takiguchi, ‘T he Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity o f the Japan
Congregational Church in Korea,” M odem Asian Studies 13 (1979): 419.
103 Davis, “Henry Gerhard Appenzeller: His Contribution to Korean Independence, Democracy, and
Modernization,” 225.
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group discussions and debates.104 In this way, teachers in the mission schools led their
students to learn about independence, democracy, and modernization, as they advocated
American principles, the Christian faith, and the Western way of life.
Rev. Henry Appenzeller, for example, had strong aspirations to transform Korea
into an independent Protestant nation under American democratic influence and
protection so that it might serve as an outstanding example for other Asian countries to
follow.105 Since Appenzeller was a bold champion of American ideology, according to
historian Daniel Davis, who has done extensive research on the life and work of
Appenzeller, he “worked to reform Korean society in the image of United States society
... not exactly according to [the] reality of nineteenth century America, but rather,
according to the Evangelical Protestant vision for America.”106 Ella Appenzeller, Henry
Appenzeller’s wife, also confirmed that her husband intended to train Korean Christian
leaders to have the American Protestant vision of the Korean nation and the idea of
Korean independence.

107

His school, Paejae haktang, became an important meeting

place for Christian reformers, and served as a prolific breeding ground for future Korean
political leaders.
Syngman Rhee (1875-1965), the future President of South Korea, for instance,
was particularly affected by his interactions with Appenzeller during his years as a
student in Paejae. Appenzeller’s ideals found fertile ground in the mind of Rhee. While
taking classes in Paejae and at the same time working to pay his tuition and living

104 Ibid., 221.
105 Daniel M. Davis, “Building a City on a Hill in Korea: The Work of Henry G. Appenzeller,” Church
History 61 (1992): 422.
106 Davis, “Henry Gerhard Appenzeller: His Contribution to Korean Independence, Democracy, and
Modernization,” 198-199.
107 Ibid., 211.
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expenses, Rhee also actively participated in the school’s Mutual Friendship Society, a
debating club for students to express their views on Korean independence. One of his
most famous speeches was ‘T he Independence of Korea,” which he presented as the
valedictorian of his graduating class. Rhee delivered this speech in English before his
teachers and his fellow students during the commencement ceremony in June 1897.108
Rhee was arrested and imprisoned by the Korean government shortly after his
graduation, however, because he demanded the release of political prisoners.109 While in
prison, Rhee converted to Christianity with the help of Rev. James S. Gale, an
independent missionary from England. Shortly after his conversion, Rhee began his own
prison ministry, leading to the conversion of at least forty other inmates.110 He also used
his time to write editorials for his own daily newspaper, the Maiyil Sinmun, which was
widely circulated among students, intellectuals, and even the royal family,111 and later a
book, The Spirit o f Independence, which outlined his programs for Korean independence.
There were five major aspects of his political thought at this time.
First, in spite of his yangban background, Rhee attacked the corruption of the
Korean court and the ignorance of the yangban class who enslaved and exploited the
commoners for their own political, economic, and social gains. He disliked the proChinese and pro-Russian Korean officials who had frustrated the progressive reformers’
various efforts to modernize Korea since 1884.

112

108 Ibid., 218.
109 Robert T. Oliver, A History o f the Korean People in Modern Times: 1800 to the Present (Newark, DE:
University o f Delaware Press, 1993), 86.
110 Ibid., 60.
111 Lady Um, consort o f the king and mother o f Prince Lee, the second heir to the Korean thrown, was
Rhee’s faithful reader. See Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd
Mead and Company, 1954), 54, 59-60.
112 Syngman Rhee, The Spirit o f Independence: A Primer o f Korean Modernization and Reform translated
by Han-kyo Kim (Honolulu, HI: University o f Hawaii Press, 2001), 8.
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Second, Korean people needed to reform themselves, Rhee argued, and unite
together to save the nation, which he portrayed as a sinking boat in the midst of a
hurricane.113 Education, Rhee believed, was the key means to transform the nation. His
exaggerated descriptions of the political merits and economic prosperity of the United
States revealed his deep admiration of the country as a virtual paradise on earth.114 It is
not surprising that he was unequivocal in his desire to learn from America and hoped to
adopt American values and principles, though not unselectively, into the new Korean
nation.115
Third, Rhee understood that Korean independence did not mean isolation.116
Korea needed friends, but not all its Asian neighbors were trustworthy. His deep distrust
of Russian intentions was revealed through his descriptions of the aggressive behavior of
czarist Russia since the days of Peter the Great. His book’s portrayal of the barbaric
misbehavior of Russian soldiers in Manchuria and northern Korea highlighted his view
concerning Russia's presence in Korea.

117

Concerning Japan, another neighbor of Korea,

Rhee admired Japan's successful modernization efforts and the hardworking spirit of the
Japanese people, but voiced his worries about the intentions of its leaders.

1 1o

Among all

the Western powers, the British model of constitutional monarchy, Rhee suggested,
would be best suited to Korea.119 Nonetheless, it was American principles and values
that would benefit the Korean people in the long run.

A close friendship with the

American people, in Rhee's mind, was deeply desirable. Somehow this pro-American

113 Ibid.,
114 Ibid.,
115 Ibid.,
116 Ibid.,
117 Ibid.,
118 Ibid.,
119 Ibid.,

32-33.
20.
9.
54-58, 253-255.
10.
10-11.
9.
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attitude was shaped by what he personally witnessed and experienced — the benevolent
work of foreign missionaries in Korea.120
Fourth, Rhee strongly believed in the usefulness of diplomacy.

“Because a

solitary nation is vulnerable to a sudden assault by a strong power,” he explained, “many
nations unite to form a community and maintain mutual relations so that no one may
exploit another’s weakness and commit an unlawful act.”121 In particular, Rhee thought
that obtaining political support from the United States would greatly facilitate the cause
of Korean independence.122 Therefore, it was not surprising to later find Rhee working
tirelessly for three decades in Washington, despite the fruitlessness of his efforts,
lobbying American leaders to support the cause of Korean independence.
Fifth and finally, Rhee unabashedly declared his Christian faith, and expressed his
deep conviction that a Christian foundation for a new Korea was necessary in order to
bring forth any successful political, economic, and social reform. His final words for his
people in the book were:
As our nation struggles to rise up from its fall and new buds try to sprout from decayed
morass, unless we base ourselves on this religion, we may not reap true benefits even
from our contacts with the [outside] world. Even hard work in the new learning may not
be effective. Even with an emphasis on diplomacy, deep friendship may not develop.
Even an emphasis on [preserving] the nation’s sovereignty may not help in attaining a
status o f equality. Even a respect for moral obligations may not lead to constancy [in
behavior]. Even a desire to uphold the right o f freedom may suffer from ignorance o f its
bounds. We must adopt this religion as the basis fo r everything. Everyone must forget
about themselves and work for the benefit o f others. We must do our best in supporting
the nation to achieve the same level o f civilization as that of Great Britain and the United
States. Let us then meet again in the Kingdom o f Heaven.123 (Italics added)

Such a deep religious testimony from his own words should not be ignored in analyzing
Rhee’s political position, domestic policies, and diplomatic tactics in the post-liberation

120 Ibid.,
121 Ibid.,
122 Ibid.,
123 Ibid.,

257-258.
264.
265.
282-283.
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era, especially when Rhee rose to become the top political figure in Korea, having the
i •

•

means to act upon his convictions.

124

In 1904, Rhee was pardoned by the king and released from prison. Then, on the
eve of becoming a protectorate of Japan, King Kojong sent Rhee on a secret mission to
the United States to plead for American aid to support Korea’s independence by invoking
the “good offices” clause in the Amity Treaty between the United States and Korea.125
At the age of 29, with no official status and no money, Rhee sailed to the United States
with the hope of saving his country from Japan. His journey was mainly funded by
individual American missionaries, church ministers, Korean Christians, and American
Christians, whom he met along his route to Washington.126
With the help of Senator Hugh A. Dinsmore from Arkansas, who had served a
term as American minister in Seoul, Rhee was able to meet with the Secretary of State,
John Hay. After hearing Rhee’s appeal, Hay promised to do everything he could to fulfill
US treaty obligations, but the effort was to prove fruitless because Hay died shortly
afterwards.127 Rhee was later betrayed by Kim Yun-jong (Kim Yun Jung), who was a
Japanese spy in the Korean Legation in Washington. Eventually, Rhee’s efforts failed
124 Syngman Rhee (1875-1965) is the most controversial figure in Korean modem history. Even when he
was alive, there were individuals, both Koreans and Americans alike, who loved him and were willing to
assist him whole-heartedly, and at the same time, there were people who hated him and wanted him out of
the political scene. He was such a stubborn and divisive figure that he caused much debate even years after
his death. Research works from both sides were biased by several factors. People who worked with him
and wrote for him, such as Henry Chung, Robert Oliver, and Louise Yim, might be affected by the factors
o f human loyalty and personal passions. Westerners and foreign researchers who observed him from a
distance were crippled by certain degrees o f blindness due to religious differences, cultural
misunderstandings, or even language and generation gaps. To cite his book The Spirit o f Independence as
an example, it was written in such an old form of the Korean language that even contemporary Korean
native readers have difficulties in understanding his writing, not to mention those foreign researchers who
possessed limited linguistic skills. Very few had actually read his book, but yet they passed judgment on
Rhee as “experts.” Korean writers might be burdened by their ideological differences, political grievances,
and personal memories so that their analyses were also not free from bias.
125 Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 75.
126 Ibid., 76-80.
127 Ibid., 81-83.
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when the Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, who had met with Rhee cordially prior
to his mission to Japan, concluded a secret agreement with Japan that sealed Korea’s fate.
When Japan finally annexed Korea, Rhee became a political exile in Washington.
Without a country of his own, Rhee went on to get Master’s and Ph.D. degrees in
International Relations, with the help of the American and Korean churches.
An Ch’ang-ho (1878-1938), like Rhee, was another student who was influenced
by Appenzeller’s teaching while studying in Paejae and then went on to become a famous
nationalist leader at home and abroad during the colonial period. In 1899, after the end of
the Independence Club Movement, he returned to his hometown of P’yongyang and
established the first Korean-owned modem co-educational private school, Cheomjin
School (Gradual Progress School). An Ch’ang-ho believed that the new generation of
Koreans needed to be ready for leadership before Korea could obtain complete
independence.

The name of the school reflected his political philosophy of

evolutionary social change through effective education.
In 1902, An Ch’ang-ho immigrated to the United States with his wife Lee Haeryon (Helen An) and became an influential nationalist leader among Korean immigrants
in California. While working as a farm worker in a California orchard, he initiated a
social reform movement in San Francisco to guide Koreans to form a respectable
community within the United States. When he returned to Korea in 1907, he established
a nationalist organization, Sinminhoe (the New People’s Association), whose members
were mostly Protestant Christians from northwest Korea. Their goal was to bring forth a
new generation of Korean patriots through effective education.

128 Oliver, A History o f the Korean People in Modern Times, 127.
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The main rationale behind An Ch’ang-ho’s eagerness in building up Korea
through education was, in fact, rooted in his religious faith. Like Rhee, An had also
converted to Christianity and he became a Presbyterian.129 He believed that personal
regeneration was the foundation of national renewal. “Christ told the Jews,” An Changho
explained in his newspaper, Kongnip Sinmun (Independence News), in 1907, “that it was
because they were full of evil deeds and devoid of all goodness that God took their rights
from them and handed them over to others, and this surely applies to Korea today.”130
From his Christian viewpoint, since the Korean people were not good enough, they
needed to be changed.

An Ch’ang-ho envisioned that the best method was through

nationwide Christian education to achieve individual transformation.

His ideal of

national revival through personal improvement and reform was a combination of
utilitarianism and Protestant piety that was popular among Western thinkers in the late
nineteenth century.131
An Ch’ang-ho was both a writer and an eloquent speaker who attracted many
listeners and enthusiastic supporters.132 Throughout his sixty years of life he gave
countless speeches and his travels took him all over Manchuria, Japan, China, and
America. He established many organizations to propagate his political philosophy and

129 The P ’yOngyang Presbyterian Church was very influential throughout the imperial and colonial period.
The rapid growth o f the Protestant church in Korea was closely related to the successful evangelical work
in P’ybngyang. See Roy E. Shearer, “The Evangelical Missionary's Role in Church Growth in Korea,”
International Review o f Missions 54 (1965): 465.
130 Quote in Kenneth M. Wells, New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in
Korea 1896-1937 (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 41.
131 Ibid., 41.
132 In Kim Il-sung’s memoir, Kim described how excited he and his friends were when they heard that An
Ch’ang-ho was in town to give a speech. Kim was a middle school student in Manchuria at that time. See
Kim Il-sung, With the Century, V o l.l, 112. The first two volumes of With the Century were published by
Pyongyang’s Foreign Languages Publishing House in 1992. Volumes 3 and 4 came out in 1993, volume 5
in 1994 and volume 6 in 1995. Altogether, these six volumes of Kim’s autobiography gave details
information from his birth in 1912 to the late 1930s, when Kim became a guerrilla fighter in Manchuria.
Lee Wha Rang made the English version available on the web.
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acquire followers. In addition to Sinminhoe, he also established He Ungsadan (Society
for Fostering Activists), which was an influential Christian political group that built its
base in P’yongyang and enjoyed a wide following in the U.S., China, Manchuria, and
Korea.133 His associates, such as Yi Tong-hwi, Yi Kap, and Yang Ki-tak, were mostly
Christians and/or educators. His political ideas even influenced non-Christian
intellectuals, such as Yi Kwang-su, a famous nationalist writer, and Kim Song-su, a wellknown educator, both of whom patiently advocated and defended the ideas of cultural
nationalism.
The beliefs of Syngman Rhee and An Ch’ang-ho had a deep influence on Korean
nationalism.

These two friends and political-rivals-to-be led two major forms of

resistance that colored the cause of Korean independence. Both Rhee and An believed in
the importance of education, but the main difference between them was that Rhee
focused his effort on obtaining diplomatic recognition in Washington, while An did not
think that anyone could “grant” independence to Korea unless Korea was herself ready
for it. Since Korea was not ready for self government in the eyes of many Westerners at
that time, he thought it would be more beneficial to encourage gradual change through
education and industrial advancements.134 According to reports by Japanese spies in
Korea, An Ch’ang-ho had told his audience, “If we believe in Christianity then we have
no real enemy under Heaven.... The nation’s independence is up to you citizens, not the
protection of foreign peoples. God alone can be called our Protector.”135 His teaching
was open to two interpretations. Either the Koreans must equip themselves and become

133 See Wells, New God, New Nation, 129 and Oliver, A History o f the Korean People in M odem Times,
127.
134 Ibid., 132.
135 Quoted in ibid., 66.
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better than the Japanese (which did not exclude the idea of positive and beneficial
collaboration), or they might have faith in the Christian God and through selfimprovement achieve national salvation and eventual independence. Later when Korea
was liberated, An’s followers, some of them labeled as collaborators, would continue to
be important players in the ideological competition between the various factions of
Korean politics.
The experiences of Syngman Rhee and An Ch’ang-ho, together with other famous
nationalists and Christian educator, including Kim Kyu-sik, Cho Man-sik, Kil Son-ju,
Yun Ch’i-ho, Yim Yong-sin (Louise Im), and Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), reveal the
crucial role of Christianity in confronting the rapid political, social, and cultural
transformation of Korea. Japan’s intensified aggression in Korea gave rise to a new
sense of Korean identity and a new urgency for both personal and national salvation.
Because Korea was not colonized by a Western country, Korean nationalism
never took on the anti-Western flavor found in other Asian countries.

And just as

mission schools provided a temporary safe haven for the growth of nationalism among
young Koreans, Christian churches served as a convenient arena for preaching the
message of national deliverance and as a secret meeting place for anti-Japanese
nationalists. The growth of Korean Christian churches was tied closely to discontent with
the process of colonization, and it paved the way for Christians to lead the way in
planning and implementing the historic March First Independence Movement of 1919.
The Rapid Growth o f Korean Protestant Churches
Compared to other Asian countries which enjoyed higher numbers of American
missionaries and more funding (see Table 1.1 for the case of the Methodist Church),
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missionary work in Korea was generally regarded as a great success in spite of its lack of
resources.

1 'Xf t

For example, in 1898 there were only about five thousand overall Korean

Protestant converts on the peninsula, a mere fraction of the forty-one thousand in Japan.
Ten years later in 1907, however, the number of Christians in Korea had reached fortyone thousand, while Japan had increased by less than ten thousand. The Korean Church
had experienced a 720 percent growth rate, while Japan (with far more missionaries and
American church funding) experienced only a 22 percent increase (see Table 1.2).
Data provided by Rev. Horace G. Underwood concerning the conditions of all the
Christian churches in the critical years of 1905 and 1907, highlights the correlation
between political distress and church growth. Japan began colonizing Korea in 1905. In
just the next two years, the number of Korean Christian churches doubled to about 642.
More Koreans showed their interest in Christianity than ever, especially during the time
when the survival of their nation was threatened by the Japanese (see Table 1.3). The
Methodist Mission was also growing at a rapid rate, despite the fact that Korea had fewer
foreign missionaries and resources than in Japan (see Table 1.4).
It is important to note that the 41,000 Korean Christians in 1907 were not spread
thinly across the country, but were highly concentrated within certain key cities
(particularly P’yongyang) and within certain key demographics (young, educated
leaders). The proportion of Christian population against the overall population in certain
provinces was much higher than one might expect.

For instance, considering the

distribution of Korean Presbyterian churches in 1910 alone, the two northern provinces,
P’yongan Province and Hwanghae Province, where the population density was lower

136 According to the data in the Missionary Review o f the World, Korea had only 0.9 percent o f the total
number o f American missionaries in 1900. See Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry, 5.
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than the southern provinces (see Map 3), had the highest concentration of Christian
churches. This area contained roughly 53 percent of all the Presbyterian churches in
Korea. Whereas the southern part of the peninsula, Kyongsang Province where the city
of Taegu was located, had the second largest number of churches, double the number
found in Kyonggi province, where Seoul was located (See Table 1.5).
By considering the city of P’yongyang as a case for further elaboration, the
concentration of church influence becomes more apparent. P ’yongyang was the ancient
capital of the Koguryo Kingdom. For geographical reasons, it was economically and
politically connected to Manchuria. The people used to be very hostile to foreigners
before 1895.137 Due to the destruction caused by the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5,
however, the survivors became more receptive to foreign missionaries.138 As a result, the
church grew from about 80 Christian converts in 1896 to about 14,000 church attendants
in 1906. Given that the P’yongyang population in that year was around 42,000, it means
that a third of the total population in P’yongyang city attended worship services on
Sunday.139
In another case, church workers in Chongju, a city with a population of about
20,000 in North P’yongan province, boasted that they had as many church attendants as
P’yongyang.140 Although the actual data presented by the Korean churches might be hard
to verify, the point was clear: Christian influence on the local level, especially in the

137 In 1893, the Presbyterian missionaries “succeeded in buying a house, but when they attempted to occupy
it, the authorities [sic] drove them out and threw some o f the native Christians into prison.” For details see
“Soldier o f the Cross in Korea,” Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 360, Folder: Samuel A.
Moffett - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
138 Alan Carter Covell, “Korean Conversion to Christianity,” Asian & Pacific Quarterly o f Cultural and
Social Affairs 19 (1987): 32-33.
139 See Wanne J. Joe, A Cultural History o f Modern Korea: A History o f Korean Civilization (Elizabeth, NJ
& Seoul: Hollym, 2000), 538.
140 Ibid.
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northern provinces, was much higher than one might expect. Thus, it was reasonable for
the Presbyterian Foreign Mission Board Secretary Robert Speer to describe the situation
by saying, “In the north, the church has spread and penetrated as we saw nothing to
surpass anywhere else in the world. The churches are crowded: the opportunities are
unlimited.”141
Even though the Japanese colonial government tried to curb the growth of the
Korean churches after Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, Christian churches in the
northern provinces continued to grow.

In general, the further away from Seoul, the

political center, the stronger was the influence of the Christian church. While Seoul
served as the political capital of Korea, P’yongyang was growing as the Christian capital
of Korea.142 By 1934, there were twenty-five Presbyterian churches and eight Methodist
churches in the city of P’yongyang and its suburbs, and 1,000 Presbyterian churches, with
over 100,000 Christians, in the northwestern district alone.143 According to church
statistics, the estimated total membership of Korean churches was about 420,000
communicants just prior to the outbreak of World War II.144 The Japanese government’s
own figures closely match these numbers (see Table 1.6).145 Three northwestern
provinces, South P’yongan, North P’yongan, and Hwanghae (see Map 2) contained about
a quarter of the overall Christian population.

141 Quoted by Martha Huntley, Caring, Growing, Changing (New York: Friendship Press, 1984), 121.
142 A Japanese scholar in 1907 said that P ’yfingyang was the “hotbed” o f Christianity and estimated that at
least half o f its population was Christian (somehow exaggerated). See Wells, New God, New Nation, 65.
143 The Methodist data is not available. For the Presbyterian data, see William N. Blair, “Samuel A.
Moffett: On His Seventieth Birthday,” The Presbyterian (1934): 6, cutting found in Presbyterian Church
Archives, Record Group 360, Folder: Samuel A. Moffett - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
144 “Samuel Austin Moffett, D .D .” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder: Samuel A.
Moffett - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
145 The Japanese figure should be more accurate because it was a comprehensive census done by the
colonial government.
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It is important to note that the listed membership in the church only included
those who were baptized and had their names recorded as full members of the church. It
usually did not include probationers and seekers, even if they attended church regularly.
Such people were also influenced by the church or they might use the church as a
convenient place for their own political or social purposes. It would certainly be hard for
any fast growing church to discipline their members when the church workers already
had their hands full. In addition, the data for church membership only listed adults,
whereas the census data for the Korean population listed children as well. Therefore, if
the children being raised under Christian parents were properly included, the proportion
of Christians in the population would become much higher. If the students of the mission
schools were also included, the number of people who were connected to the Christian
church, would be higher still, especially in certain areas where mission schools and
private schools run by Christian leaders were particularly popular (see Table 1.7).
Reasons fo r the Rapid Growth
Why did the Korean church grow at such a fast rate? The above data suggest two
possible reasons, aside from spiritual explanations.

For one, the growth might,

paradoxically, be the result of a lack of missionary personnel and a shortage of mission
funds. When the Presbyterian missionaries saw that their home boards were slow to
respond to their requests for more workers and funding, they began to adopt a new
method of encouraging the Korean Christians to be self-supporting, self-propagating, and
self-governing.146 Native Christians were given more responsibilities and opportunities

146 It was known as the Nevius Method, designed by Dr. John L. Nevius (1829-1893) o f Shandong, China.
This method was popular neither in China nor in Japan, but flourished in Korea after Dr. Nevius visited
Seoul in 1890. It was a practical means for the struggling Korean church to grow by depending on native
methods.
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to lead and partake in the evangelical work. The positive effect, however, was quite
unexpected. As Rev. Archibald Campbell, a Presbyterian missionary who labored in
Korea during the Japanese colonial period and later during the Korean War, observed:
The million that have come to the Saviour [sic] and received Him into the hearts have not
been won by foreign missionaries. Only a few o f them [sic]. Nearly all have heard the
good news from the lips o f their own countrymen. The story goes from mouth to ear and
from heart to heart.147

In this way, there was little direct social or cultural conflict between the foreign
missionaries and the unconverted populace.

It might be noted that the Methodists

initially sent a comparable number of missionaries to Korea as the Presbyterians did, but
they did not adopt the self-propagating model, and they did not experience the same
degree of growth.
Moreover, the self-propagating method also preserved the self-determination of
church leadership, allowing individual leaders to be active in the independence
movement against Japanese colonization. In analyzing Protestant work in Korea, Rev.
Allen D. Clark, the assistant commission representative for the United Presbyterian
Mission, wrote in 1962:
The idea that these Korean churches are controlled or financed from abroad is quite
incorrect. No foreign missionary has been moderator o f the Korean Presbyterian Church
for almost 50 years, and the same is true o f other Christian bodies. This is a Korean
church at work in its own communities.148

Rev. Clark’s idea was also strongly supported by Professor David Chung, President of
Kon’guk (Keun-kuk) University. Professor Chung argued that “the Korean Christian, not
foreign missionary and institute, played a leading role in founding the Christian Church
in the modem history of Korea.”149

147 Archibald Campbell, The Christ o f the Korean Heart (Columbus, OH: Falco Publishers, 1954), 12.
148 Allen D. Clark, “Protestant Work in Korea,” Korea Journal 2 (1962): 9.
149 David Chung, “Christianity in Modern Korea,” Koreana Quarterly 5 (1963): 138.
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A second reason for the success of mission work was probably political. The
most exceptional growth happened during the years of 1905 to 1907, when Korea was
losing its national independence as a Japanese protectorate. In the case of China and
India, the loss of independence had driven native people to be more anti-foreign and
violently opposed to missionaries; but this was not the case in Korea. Not only was mass
violence against foreigners rare, but the people were also rather tolerant of the presence
of Westerners.150 This was because Koreans perceived Japan as their chief enemy, not
the United States or other Western countries.
According to diplomatic historian Jongsuk Chay, ever since the first
establishment of relations, Koreans generally held a favorable view of Americans.151
Together with American diplomats and businessmen, missionaries contributed to the
building of this good image.152 In 1898, there were a total of 118 Westerners residing in
Seoul, about thirty-five of whom were missionaries (see Table 1.8). 153

These

missionaries were active in the Korean community. They traveled from the cities to the
countryside, appearing in villages to preach, teach, hand out leaflets, or sell books. Some
women from the yangban class were invited to the homes of the missionaries and
socialized with them.154 These informal, but personal, contacts were very important to
maintaining the influence of the growing church.

150 There were individual attacks against certain missionaries, but the people in general were quite
respectful to foreign missionaries. No missionary, except Ethel Underwood in 1949, lost his or her life in
Korea due to any violent attack. Underwood was killed by two gunmen. They were not actually looking
for her, but for one of her female guests.
151 Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry, 14.
152 Ibid.
153 Samuel H. Moffett, “The Westerner,” in First Encounters: Korea 1880-1910 ed. Peter A. Underwood
(Seoul: Dragon’s Eye Graphics, 1982), 36.
154 Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT:
EastBridge, 2003), 20-26. See also Martha Huntley, “Presbyterian Women’s Work and Rights in the
Korean Mission,” Journal o f Presbyterian History 65 (Spring 1987): 37-48.
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When the United States refused to come to the aid of Korea after Japan declared it
a protectorate in 1905, the image of America among Koreans was likely tarnished.
Nevertheless, instead of losing members, church attendance actually grew steadily.
There were four basic reasons why.
First, turning to embrace the Christian faith was itself a revolutionary act against
the traditional imperial corruption and a rejection of Japanese colonial rule. Progressive
reformers, both in China and in Korea, generally agreed that Confucianism was a source
of weakness and decay.

In both countries, alienated, young, educated elites, and

commoners alike began to rise up against the old Confucian system and the corrupt
imperial courts. In the case of Korea, since the Christian churches insisted that each new
member make a clear break with the past, including activities such as ancestor worship,
concubinage, drinking, smoking, and gambling,155 the church provided a sense of
spiritual renewal and moral strengthening for some frustrated young Korean elites. What
made the church even more attractive was the strong anti-Japanese sentiment within the
church and among church members. For instance, as colonial exploitation intensified in
1905 and Japan prepared the formal signing of the humiliating treaty for the protectorate,
native leaders in the Presbyterian Church demanded that each church in the country
protest against the treaty by holding meetings for seven days after Thanksgiving Day.
When the treaty was signed in 1906, prayer services for the nation spread all across the
country.156
Second,

while the Protectorate

Treaty

of

1905

did

cause

grievance,

dissatisfaction, and mistrust between the Korean converts and foreign missionaries,

155 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 120.
156 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 36-37.
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things began to change when the missionaries from different denominations decided to
unite with the churches in prayer. Their efforts sparked a wave of revival meetings that
gave birth to the Great Revival of 1907. This revival began in an annual Bible-study
meeting at a Presbyterian church in P’yongyang.

It soon spread to other cities and

provinces and from one denomination to another.

Since the revival was an

unprecedented nationwide experience without any human planning or control, church
leaders regarded it as an act of the Holy Spirit to make the Korean church bom again.157
One practical result of the Great Revival was that individual Christians who had
experienced the revival turned to focus on spiritual growth and repented of their angry
feelings towards the missionaries.158 In this way, the Korean churches maintained
peaceful co-operation with foreign missionaries and preserved unity.
Third, the churches also served as a source of comfort, inspiration, unity, and
even a secret meeting place for the struggle of independence. Ch’oe Myong-sik, a reform
activist in the late Choson period, explained the importance of the Christian church in
Korean social life:
There was in the Anak district only one primary school managed by the Anak Church if
one is to name an organization representing the new cultural movement.... Christian
churches were in fact the only places where Koreans would come into contact with new
Western culture, and thus where people could readily assemble for meetings.159

Shortly after Korea became a Japanese protectorate, Korean Christians organized a
nationalist movement called either the “Movement for the Return of National
Sovereignty” or the “Movement for Encouraging Patriotism.” It aimed at awakening
Korean people’s political consciousness because they believed that a successful

157 See Clark, A History o f the Church in Korea, 154-168.
158 See Huntley, Caring, Growing, Changing, 130-150.
159 Quoted in Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 122.
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independence movement needed the support of the masses.160 Taking advantage of the
churches, Korean nationalists began to gather in churches to plot anti-Japanese activities.
Even Kim Il-sung, the Communist-leader-to-be in post-liberation North Korea,
recognized the importance of church life in the cause of Korean independence during the
colonial era. His biography asserted the importance of church activities in his early life.
His maternal grandfather, Kang Ton-uk, was an elder in a P ’yongyang Presbyterian
church in Taedong County161 and a principal of Ch’angduk Elementary School.162 Kim’s
father, Kim Hyong-jik, was a student from Soongsil (Sungsil) College in P ’yongyang.163
When his parents moved to Manchuria to escape Japanese persecution, they all went to
church faithfully each Sunday. For Kim’s father, Popyong Church was his favorite place
to meet his nationalist comrades.164 For his mother, it was a place to rest from her toils at
home.165 For Kim Il-sung himself, even though he was not a believer, it was a place he
found inspiration, friendship, and support from Rev. Son Chong-do (Son Jung Doh or
Sohn Jong-do), the pastor of a Korean church in Jirin, where Kim attended middle school
from 1925 to 1927.166
Regardless of whether Kim’s ideas concerning his parents’ faith were right or not,
his account revealed the importance of the Christian church for the underground antiJapanese activities and for the cause of Korean independence. Local churches turned out
160 Takayoshi Matsuo and S. Takiguchi, “The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary
Activity o f the Japan Congregational Church in Korea,” M odem Asian Studies 13 (1979): 420.
161 Yong-ho Choe, “Christian Background in the Early Life o f Kim Il-song,” Asian Survey 26 (October
1986): 1087.
162 Kim Il-sung, With the Century, V o l.l, 52-53. Kim wrote that the school was a relatively famous private
school. The size of the school was about 200 students, which was not a small school at all in those days.
163 Soongsil College was a famous Christian technical college in P’ydngyang. It followed the ideal of
Protestant self-reconstruction nationalism. Many political activists were graduates from Soongsil. The
admission was strictly limited to Christians and all students were required to attend Bible study lessons. See
Choe, “Christian Background o f the Early Life o f Kim Il-sung,” 1086.
164 Kim Il-sung, With the Century, V o l.l, 45.
165 Ibid., 65.
166 Ibid., 190-191.
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to be convenient places for disillusioned Koreans to gather and to find a sense of mission
and direction during the darkest hours of their nation’s history.167 It was an ideal location
and network for anti-Japanese underground activities. Wherever Koreans lived, from
Japanese controlled Korea, to Manchuria, to mainland China, to Russia, or to the United
States, the Christian population became a major group in supporting and sustaining a long
and painful struggle for regaining Korean independence.168
Before the coming of any mass movement, individual Christians had already risen
up as anti-Japanese fighters. For example, Chon Myong-un and Chang In-hwan, who
were members of the Methodist Church, assassinated the pro-Japanese Durham White
Stevens, a foreign advisor to Marquis Ito Hirobumi, in Los Angeles in 1908, and a year
later in Harbin, An Chung-gun (a Catholic) and Uh Yon-joon (a Protestant) assassinated
Prince Ito, the architect of Meiji modernization and the Japanese colonization of
Korea.169 Although such violent acts were praised by the general public and brought
excitement to the cause of independence, Christian nationalist leaders understood that it
was not an effective way to fight colonialism in the long run and it was also not
consistent with Christianity.

Instead, they hoped to achieve independence through

peaceful means.
The most famous pastor to advocate non-violence was Rev. Kil Son-ju (Sun Chu
Kil) from the P’yongyang Presbyterian church, who later became one of the thirty-three
I nr\

signers of the Korean Declaration of Independence in March 1919.

His theology was a

kind of messianic nationalism, believing that the church and individual Christians were
167 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 121.
168 For more information see Wi Jo Kang, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History o f Christianity
and Politics (New York: State University o f New York Press, 1997), 37.
169 Ibid., 38-42.
170 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 109.
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an “extraordinary group” that came to save the nation from its misery and sufferings.
The only way for the Korean people to recover their independence, Kil argued, was for
the entire country to be evangelized.

171

He often used the old stories of the Exodus and

the history of the Israelite nation, also surrounded as it was by stronger neighbors, as
examples to show the Korean people that God would also deliver them. Because he
believed in God’s will and the importance of spiritual reconstruction instead of the
violent restoration of Korean rights, he laid out the important blueprints of the Christian
principle of non-violent resistance in the struggle for regaining Korean independence.
In this way, Kil skillfully impressed upon his Korean audience that the Christian
faith belonged to their race and nation.
described only as a Western religion.

179

Christianity, therefore, could no longer be
His preaching was so popular among Korean

Christians during the colonial period that it was widely known as the “Chosen
theology.”173 As a result, people were naturally attracted to Christian teachings because
they found the gospel message directly connected to their national experiences as well as
their desires for national deliverance and freedom.174 Beginning in 1907, many of the
disillusioned —those who had taken part in the Tonghak Movement (1894), members of
the Independence Club, failed reformists, and former soldiers —all joined the church with
the hope of doing something for the country.

17c

The churches, as a result, became

“centers for the nationalist movement and [the] salvation of the nation.”

171 Ibid., 112-113.
172 Wells, New God, New Nation, 37.
173 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern Korean Nationalism, 123.
174 Kyong Bae Min, “On the Question of Understanding Korean Churches,” The Northeast Asia Journal o f
Theology 24-25 (1980): 123.
175 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 129.
176 Min, “On the Question o f Understanding Korean Churches,” 126.
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Fourth, Japan’s harsh policies against Christian churches in Korea also helped
identify Christianity with the Korean cause and contributed in large measure to the
Korean independence movement. Since Korean leaders had taken up leadership roles in
most local churches, the nationalistic tone of their preaching irritated the Japanese
government.177 In addition, the church’s foreign connections through the missionaries,
especially with the United States, worried Japanese officials. On top of all of this, the
organizational structure of the Korean church, for example its national conferences,178
and its history of effective interdenominational cooperation,179 was also regarded as a
potential threat to the colonial authoritarian control because it could harbor anti-Japanese
individuals and serve as an underground network for anti-Japanese activities.

The

Japanese Governor-General Terauchi Masatake, who had escaped a Korean assassination
attempt in 1911, told his Japanese audience in Tokyo on December 1913, “The Christian
Church is the most powerful force in Chosen. Therefore [we] must keep special watch on
the Christians there.”180

177 Missionaries generally recognized the negative implication o f this trend and tried to cope with it by
directing the church to be less politicized. Their effort was successful in keeping the church in line, but less
effective in controlling individual Christians and their personal convictions. See Yang, Reformed Social
Ethics and the Korean Church, 112-115.
178 Both Methodists and Presbyterians had their own national conferences. Missionaries and Korean
Pastors met together annually (some even more often) to discuss church business. In the case o f the
Presbyterian Church which controlled more than 80% of the Korean Christian churches, it had several
major local presbyteries that allowed individual churches to gather on a regional level. It was hard for any
authoritarian government to tolerate organizations that were not under its direct control. The colonial
government’s fear o f the potential threat of the Christian church was also the same fear that the
Communists had in 1945.
179 Since the beginning o f missionary work in Korea, foreign missionaries, regardless o f denominations,
had succeeded in working together. Different Presbyterian missions (North USA, South USA, Canadian,
and Australian) agreed to unify their effort to build one Korean Presbyterian Church. The Methodist
missions did the same. In addition, both Presbyterians and Methodists agreed to divide among them
provinces and areas so that there would be no overlapping o f work and thereby avoid unhealthy
competition. (See Map 1).
180 Sinhan Minbo, 26 February 1914. Quoted by Wells, New God, New Nation, 77.
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Consequently, the Japanese government devised many ways to weaken the
effectiveness of the Korean church. It imposed new laws to limit the curriculums of the
mission schools, and forbidding religious classes to be taught.
presence of police at all formal church meetings.

It also required the

When the Christian community

continued to expand, the Japanese government used the attempted assassination of
Governor-General Terauchi as an excuse to arrest many Christian leaders, including Yun
Ch’i-ho, a founding member of the Seoul YMCA, and Kim Ku (also known as Kim
Chang-am), an educator and an active member in Sinman-hoe.m It was the beginning of
what later became known as the Conspiracy Case of 1911-1913.182

Even American

missionaries were dragged into the trial. In the end, 157 individuals stood trial; among
them only 22 were not Christians. A total of 105 were convicted, including Yun Ch’i-ho,
who was accused of masterminding the conspiracy.183 Missionaries, Korean Christians,
Japanese lawyers, and even Japanese residents and police agreed that it was not a fair
trial, but rather a Japanese effort to threaten the Christian population and to destroy the
life of the church.184 Nevertheless, this effort failed to weaken the church. Instead, it
advanced the Christian cause by bolstering the common belief that, “To the Japanese, the
most worrisome element is the Christians. To the Koreans, the most hopeful thing is the
expansion of the Christian Church.”

1R5

181 Oliver, A History o f the Korean People in Modern Times, 127-128.
182 In Sonchon, a provincial center in North P’ybngan province, where over half o f its 8000 residents were
Christians, more than eighty people, including five pastors and students and teachers o f the Christian B oy’s
Academy were arrested. More Christians were arrested in P’ySngyang, Seoul, and other cities where
Christians were influential.
183 Yun Ch’i-ho was singled out not because he was guilty, but because he refused to serve in the colonial
government. See, Wells, New God, New Nation, 76-76, 78.
Ibid., 76.
185 It was from an article written by Cho Tungnin, “Han’guk hyonshi chonghwang,” Sinhan Minbo 16
September 1915. Quoted by Wells, New God, New Nation, 77.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

Japanese Colonial Rule and Korean Discontent
From 1910 to 1919, Japan’s harsh rule incited deep discontent among Koreans.
Nationalistic, anti-Japanese sentiment spread from the educated elite to the general public
who all shared in the bitter experience of Japanese repressive control and the growing
scale of systematic economic and social exploitations. The Japanese residents in Korea
enjoyed more rights and privileges than the native Koreans, received higher pay in their
salaries, enrolled in better schools, lived in bigger houses, and owned larger pieces of
land. By 1914, 76 percent of the Korean farm population had become tenant farmers.186
When the Korean people realized that they had become “second-class” citizens in their
own land and that their long history and culture were being systematically destroyed by
the colonial government, their hatred for the colonial government and their desire for
national independence intensified.

187

Nevertheless, because of the tight control by the

police, most of the anti-Japanese activities went underground. Korean nationalists were
waiting for the right opportunity to mobilize the whole nation to throw off the colonial
yoke.
In January 1919, King Kojong died suddenly. Rumors spread across the country
that he was forced to commit suicide by the Japanese. Although he was never a popular
figure among the people and very few people mourned personally for the fall of the
imperial family, his death brought forth a new tide of anti-Japanese sentiment.
Nationalist leaders used this opportunity to arouse public interest in support of a
nationwide uprising against the Japanese rule.

The movement was planned by the

collaboration of several nationalist groups: the Chungang School group (non-Christian)

186 Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” 168.
187 Ibid.
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under the leadership of Kim Song-su, Song Chin-u, and Hyon Sang-yun, and the
Ch’ondogyo group under the leadership of Son Pyong-hui, Kwon Tong-jin, O Se-ch’ang,
and Ch’oe Rin.188 The date of the uprising was set for March 4, the day of the funeral
service for the king. Since the Japanese police exerted tight control on travel, the funeral
would allow people to move around and gather for meetings without causing too much
suspicion.189 Later, the organizers of the uprising changed the date to March 1 because
word had leaked out to the police that a disturbance was coming.
In order to maximize public support and to acquire foreign sympathy and
recognition, the nationalists strongly urged all religious groups, particularly Christians, to
participate.190 Their goal was to stimulate international interest in the Korean cause with
the hope that the United States as well as other Western countries would honor their
pledge of national self-determination that President Woodrow Wilson had recently put
forth in his Fourteen Points prior to the Paris Peace Conference.
Christians’ Participation in the March First Movement (1919)
Initially, Christian nationalists had their own plans and were reluctant to partake
in a secular uprising that was beyond their control. Secular leaders, however, were eager
to form alliances with all religious groups because through them the movement would
have a stronger spiritual tone and enjoy a higher moral ground to attract international
recognition. They particularly valued Christians’ participation because of the benefit of
the church network and its foreign connections so that the movement would gain
legitimacy both inside and outside of Korea.

Therefore, in order to gain Christian

188 Choong Soon Kim, A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur: A Life History o f Kim Songsu, 1891-1955
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998), 50-53.
189 Carlton Waldo Kendall, The Truth About Korea (San Francisco, CA: The Korean National Association,
1919), 26.
190 Ibid. See also Hong, “Formation of Korean Protestantism and Its Political Nature,” 25.
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confidence and support, non-Christian nationalist leaders agreed to establish the
movement on the principle of non-violence.
When the secular leaders’ approved of the non-violence principle, Christian
groups began to join the movement individually even without the official consent of the
churches or the missionaries. The first Christian clergyman who answered the call was
Yi Sung-hun, the founder of Osan School in Chongju and one of the most respected and
influential Christian leaders of the time.191 Other Christian leaders such as Ham T’aeyong, who later became a vice-president under Syngman Rhee, Pak Hui-do, secretary of
the Korean YMCA, and Kim Won-byok and Yi Kap-song, student leaders at Choson
Christian College (today’s Yonsei University), joined the movement. As a result, the
movement became a united effort of all anti-Japanese nationalists.
From its preparation to the day of the uprising, the role of churches was vital and
the participation of Christians was remarkable.

Secret preparation meetings were

organized throughout the churches in Korea. Christians were informed of the upcoming
uprising and were instructed to follow non-violent principles.

From there, the word

spread quickly through the church network.
On March 1, Koreans throughout the land read a Declaration of Independence
signed by thirty-three leaders of various religious and underground patriotic groups on
the previous night. Of these thirty-three signers, sixteen were famous Christian ministers
including Kil Son-ju, Kim Pyong-jo, Yu Yo-dae, and Chong Ch’un-su (see Table 1.9).192
Seven of them were Presbyterians, six Methodist-North, and three Methodist-South.

191 Kim, A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur, 53.
192 Hong, “Formation o f Korean Protestantism and Its Political Nature,” 26.
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There were no Catholic signers because the Pope had, for unknown reasons, ordered the
Korean Catholic Church not to participate in the movement.193
Home-made Korean flags were waved on the streets, and slogans, such as
“manse” (“ten thousand years”) and “Taehan tongnip manse” (“Long Live Korean
Independence!”), were shouted by hundreds and thousands of demonstrators in every
major city and town. On that day, Korea showed to the world that the desire for national
independence was not the wish of a few people, but the general sentiment across the
peninsula.
Churches became the most effective channels for the distribution of copies of the
Declaration and national flags, and for mobilizing people.194 In Seoul, Sung-Dong
Church and Jung-Dong Church were used as meeting places by the student
representatives. Church-supported schools became “sources of demonstrations.” 195
Across the country, mission schools and church buildings were used as arenas to hold
declaration ceremonies.

One American missionary who was not sympathetic to the

involvement of Korean Christians in politics described the role of the church saying:
At P ’ySngyang, the so-called Christian capital, where the writer happened to be on
March 1 last year, permission was secured from the police to hold memorial services for
the ex-emperor in the chief churches. At the close o f these services the declaration of
independence was read in the churches and the first ‘mansei’ were shouted. At
Chinnampo, where I went on March 2, the mobs each time collected at the churches and
started from there... to the streets for the demonstration.196

Despite his negative view, his comment showed that churches were the centers of this
mass movement.

193 Matsuo and Takiguchi, “The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity o f the
Japan Congregational Church in Korea,” 586.
19 Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920, 135.
195 Matsuo and Takiguchi, ‘T he Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity of the
Japan Congregational Church in Korea,” 583-584.
D. Frank Herron Smith, The Other Side o f the Korean Question (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1920), 6.
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Japan’s Brutal Suppression
The police were shocked by the scale and the scope of this event. Some Korean
policemen were so moved by the crowd that they took off their uniforms and joined the
protest. Intent on bringing the situation under immediate control, the Japanese police
forces, supported by hundreds of gendarmes, armed with swords and rifles, were sent to
disperse the demonstrators and arrest trouble-makers. When this method failed to stop
the gatherings of people, the military stepped in and opened fire on the peaceful
demonstrators. Old men, women, and children were knocked down with the butts of
rifles. In some remote cities where foreigners were not around, the gendarmes fired at
the people until their ammunition was exhausted. Countless people died either on that
day or the days afterwards due to police retributions. Foreigners estimated that over fifty
thousand Koreans had either been killed or wounded in the first three months after the
uprising. 197
•

•

In one particular case, Japanese authorities demonstrated their distaste for
Christianity.

In Cheam-ni, which was about forty-five miles from Seoul, Japanese

soldiers ordered all Christian men of the town to gather at the local church. As soon as
they assembled, the soldiers fired at them and thirty-five men died at the spot. This event
was confirmed by the investigations of both British and American consular agents and
was admitted by Governor-General Hasegawa.198 A similar event also happened in
Suwon, where Japanese soldiers locked all the villagers of one town in a church, set it on
fire, and shot those who tried to escape.199 Widespread violence against Christians was

197 Kendall, The Truth About Korea, 33. This estimation is also supported by Korean historians’ figures.
See also Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” 170.
198 Kendall, The Truth About Korea, 31-32.
199 Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” 171.
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reported everywhere across the peninsula. In some areas, Christians were crucified in
public.

Extremely gruesome methods were witnessed, recorded, and reported by the

missionaries and other foreigners.200
Four months after the movement, the Korean Presbyterian Church alone had lost
2,486 of their members. Among them, forty-one church leaders were killed during the
uprising and six more were tortured to death while in prison. A total of 12 churches were
completely destroyed.201 In the end, 134 Presbyterian pastors and elders lost their lives.
The Methodist missionaries described their loss this way:
When it came time for District Conference one of the Korean pastors said, ‘I think the
best place to hold our District Conference this year would be the prison.’ This remark
was brought out by the fact that 160 of our pastors, local preachers, exhorters, stewards,
class leaders, day school teachers, Sunday school workers, and others were in prison on
the account o f the independence movement.... Of the eleven ordained Conference men
eight were cast into prison and one was forced to rest on account o f poor health. We
close the year with two Conference members only. In the city o f P ’ydngyang the five
churches were supporting six ordained pastors. These were all sent to prison.. ..202

Among all the 19,525 arrested demonstrators, there were 3,428 Christians (the total of all
denominations), which was about 18 percent of those arrested (see Table 1.10).

Another

source suggested the number imprisoned was 9,458 and among them 2,987 were
Christians, which was about 22 percent of the total.203 These figures are startling when
one considers that Christians comprised only 1.3 percent of the population in 1919
(roughly 200,000 out of 16 million people).

200 Ibid. See also Moffett, “Missionaries Contributed to Korea,” In D.R.P.: The Official Bulletin o f the
Democratic Republican Party 10-11 (November 1975): 19-20.
201 The Commission on Relations with the Orient o f the Federal Council o f the Churches o f Christ in
America. The Korean Situation: Authentic Accounts o f Recent Events by Eye Witnesses (New York: The
Commission on Relations with the Orient o f the Federal Council of the Churches o f Christ in America,
1919), 8-9.
202 Korea Conference: P ’yfingyang District (1919) Annual Report o f the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the
Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History,
2001), 602.
203 Man-yol Yi, H an’guk kidokkyo minjok uishik (Christianity in Korea and National Consciousness)
(Seoul: Chishik Sanopsa, 1991), 349.
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Although Christians did not participate in the movement as an organized religious
body, the prominent role of churches in the movement was further evidenced when the
nation witnessed forty-seven churches burned down, hundreds of Christians killed in the
demonstration, and thousands more, including women, subjected to imprisonment and
torture.204

Christian religious beliefs were a strong ideological force behind the

movement.

Many believed that they had planned the independence movement with

God’s help and they could not stop even if they had to die. Patriotism backed by religion
and the desire for religious freedom were two major motives for Christian participation in
the demonstration.205
The blow to the churches caused by the loss of personnel and property was so
great that evangelical work had to be largely halted for a time. Nevertheless, church
membership began to increase again the following year, once the turmoil had died down.
It had returned to its pre-1919 strength by 1921 (see Table 1.11). Because a great number
of students of the mission schools had participated in the uprising, many were arrested or
dropped out of school soon afterwards due to intense police pressure and surveillance. In
contrast, the Korean Catholic Church did not suffer as much police harassment as other
denominations and enjoyed an undisrupted growth of membership.
Another important aspect of the March First Movement was the role of Christian
women in the cause for independence. Of the 471 women who were arrested, 309 were
Christians, which was roughly 66 percent of the total (see Table 1.10). Yim Yong-sin,
(whom was commonly known as Louise Yim by foreigners), a Methodist woman who
204 Kyong-bae Min, H an’guk kidokkyohoesa (A History o f the Christianity in Korea) (Seoul: Taehan
Kidokkyo Ch’ulp’ansa, 1982), 311-313.
205 Matsuo and Takiguchi, ‘T he Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity o f the
Japan Congregational Church in Korea,” 585.
206 Ibid., 420.
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later became a loyal supporter of Syngman Rhee, was one of the major organizers of the
local demonstrations. She was imprisoned for months and later sentenced to 42 months
of house arrest.207 In a time when the majority of Korean women were still confined to
their homes, Christianity brought the first major challenge to the traditional role of
women in Korean society.

It soon became fashionable for women to participate in

underground anti-Japanese activities. The most famous of these women’s groups was
Songmae-hoe (the Pine and Plum Society), in which Christian women led an
underground network of nationalists.208
In spite of their high cost of thousands of lives, the peaceful demonstrations went
practically unnoticed by a disinterested American public. Although individual reports
were sent to the American churches by missionaries concerning the violent suppression
of the peaceful demonstrations, American churches refused to throw their support behind
Korean independence due to a strong pro-Japanese sentiment among church leaders in the
United States.

The US government made only a half-hearted effort to pressure the

Japanese government to stop the oppression.
Meanwhile, although missionaries witnessed this unprecedented nationalistic
political movement and were very sympathetic to it, they were not free to express their
thoughts. They feared that their association with the movement would anger the Japanese
government and thereby jeopardize their missionary activities in Korea. Their hesitation
to openly side with the Korean nationalists and the failure of the American church
community to respond to the movement or to pressure the US government to take bolder
207 Louis Yim, M y Forty Year Fight for Korea (Seoul: International Culture Research Center Chungang
University, 1951), 107-117.
208 Famous women leaders included the teachers and students from Sungsil Girl School in P ’yongyang.
Hwang Ae Tok, Kim Yong Hui, Yi Hyo Tok, An Chong Sok, Pak Hyon Suk, Yi Ma Tae, Ch’ae Kwang
Tok, Song Pok Um, Hwang Sin Tok.
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steps to stop the Japanese persecution were examples of inaction that would be long
remembered, though few Americans recognized their importance at the time. When the
next opportunity came (this time in the struggle against Communism), American church
leaders and missionaries were quite determined to prevent the United States government
as well as themselves from making the same “mistakes” again.209
The effect of American missionaries in Korea during the colonial era was mixed.
Some people accused them of helping the Japanese colonial government by keeping
Korean Christians submissive to the Japanese government.210 Nevertheless, the same
point can also be reversed by considering that the presence of missionaries helped the
Korean churches by keeping the Japanese restrained. They prevented further unnecessary
loss of lives and properties as the church suffered under a heavily oppressive policy put
in place since March 1919.211 In fact, because American missionaries did not initiate or
participate in the March First Independence Movement directly, the Japanese had no
excuse to charge them. Behind the scenes, therefore, missionaries negotiated with the
Japanese government so that they could continue their missionary activities in Korea. As
a result, American missionaries succeeded in enabling Korean Christianity to survive and
continue to grow steadily throughout the 1920s. Although it was not the missionaries’
intention, the continuing existence of the Christian churches did pose a constant threat
and challenge to the Japanese colonial authoritarian government.

209 The word “mistakes” was used in the resolution adopted by the Foreign Mission Conference o f North
America in January 1947. The resolution was reported by The Voice o f Korea 6 (15 February 1947): 1.
This publication was found in the Vertical File: Truman Subject File - Religion, Truman Library.
210 Joe, A Cultural History o f Modern Korea, 555-563.
211 Here I pass no judgment on the moral issue o f the stand o f the missionaries, but present the background
o f their views during the colonial era so that it might shed light on their potential influence in post-war
Korea-American relations as well as Korean domestic politics.
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Christianity and Cultural Nationalists
In the post-March-First independence straggle, the temporary union among
various nationalist factions began to fall apart. The cultural nationalists, by-and-large
Christian laymen, began to dominate the independence straggle inside Korea, while the
radicals were either heavily suppressed by the Japanese police or fled overseas for
survival or recruitment. These groups marked the two competing versions of Korean
nationalism that split the resistance into opposing camps. For the rest of the colonial
period, these two groups straggled to survive under Japan’s surveillance and competed
for supporters from among both domestic and oversea Korean patriots.
Inside Korea, because of the bad publicity of their brutal suppression of the
independence movement, the Japanese government adopted a new policy known as
Bunka seiji (cultural rule), allowing more freedom for the Korean people in order to
appease the Korean nationalists and to satisfy the international community. The new
Governor-General, Admiral Baron Saito Makoto, sought reconciliation with Korean
political and social leaders. The colonial government allowed Koreans to publish their
own newspapers, but with strict government censorship, and to hold meetings, but with
careful police scrutiny. It also provided loans for Korean investors and industrialists, but
only to develop small-scale industries using local raw materials.212 Governor Saito also
agreed to establish more schools for Korean children, end discrimination of salaries in
government services, and abolish flogging.

Nevertheless, these were empty words

because flogging and discrimination against Koreans continued throughout the colonial

212 Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” 176.
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period, and the schools for Korean children were not comparable to the schools for
Japanese children.213
While the government agreed to lessen its social and political control, it tightened
its control over the Christian churches. On the surface, the colonial government made
some concessions to the missionaries in order to pacify them, by allowing religious
teachings in mission schools and lessening the requirements for the construction of new
churches, but deep down, the Japanese held the Christian community in great contempt.
Although there was no more persecution and brutality against Christians under Governor
Saito’s rule, the Japanese police watched everything. One missionary reported:
They [the policemen] often insist on attending the services of the churches and schools
and in regulating what is said and done. They frequent the halls o f the schools and arrest
the students on all sorts o f suspicion. They censor all publications and often object to
articles in the weekly church’s paper.214

Their policy was aimed at preventing the Christian churches from ever again becoming a
hot-bed for anti-Japanese sentiment.

The policy would become tougher when Japan

began to prepare to wage a war of conquest in East Asia in the 1930s.
In order to keep the church weak, the colonial government discriminated against
Christians economically.

When Japanese landlords took over Korean farmlands,

Christian tenants were often thrown out and the right to farm the land was given to nonChristian tenants. In this way, the Japanese government was successful in disabling the
long-term growth of the Christian church by indirectly denying the economic support it
needed. According to Samuel H. Moffett, the son of an early missionary pioneer in
P’yongyang, “A 1927 study of church giving in Korea concluded that the church was

213 Ibid., 175-176.
214 Harry A. Rhodes, History o f the Korean Mission Presbyterian Church, 1884-1934 (Seoul: Chosen
Mission Presbyterian Church U.S.A., 1934), 503.
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paying only half enough toward an adequate income for its church workers.”215 Because
the church did not have enough resources to train and retain qualified leadership, the
growth of most local churches in the later period of the colonial reign was stunted (see
Table 1.12).
The fruitless result and the cost of human suffering also brought important
changes to the minds of the church leaders and Christian intellectuals. They were willing
to take a more conservative role in the independence movement.

Japanese brutality

caused American missionaries and Korean pastors to redirect the focus of their flocks to a
peaceful path of resistance to avoid any further direct conflict with the colonial
authorities. They advocated the importance of education and industrial development. As
a result, the gradualist, cultural-nationalistic approach was commonly adopted by most
Korean churches. While pastors focused their responsibility on preaching, individual
Christian elders took up the responsibility of social improvements.
Cultural nationalism, as a result, gained a wider domestic following during the
colonial period from 1919 to 1945. Christian schools and small businesses sprang up
throughout Korea within the boundaries that were set by Japanese colonial authorities.
Whoever chose to remain in Korea would be forced to make hard decisions whether to
comply or face imprisonment. Dr. Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), the President of Ewha
Women’s University from 1939-1961, related that it was hard to define who was a
collaborator and who was not, because in order to survive and carry on their educational
work, Korean leaders all had to collaborate in one way or another. The same situation
also applied to Kim Song-su, who sought to build up the Korean economy through both

215 Samuel H. Moffett, “Missionaries Contributed to Korea,” 72.
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educational and economic means.

0 1( \

He later became the most famous and influential

cultural nationalist in postwar Korea.

CONCLUSION
Korea fell to Japan because of the weakness of the late Choson court, which was
infected with corruption and power struggles.

Lacking good political leadership and

determination, most reform efforts failed as soon as they started. The decline of the
Middle Kingdom due to foreign encroachments left Korea at the mercy of its neighbors.
Korea’s hostile actions against foreign priests and native Christians, in turn, aroused the
attention of Western powers that in the end brought many gunboats to the Korean coast.
Nevertheless, it was eventually the growing power of Japan and its desire for territorial
expansion that fundamentally disrupted the stability of the region and brought wars to the
Korean soil. "When Western powers, particularly the United States, not only refused to
restrain Japan, but also gave their consent to Japanese control of Korea, there was little
hope for Korea’s survival as a nation.
While the US government had very little interest in defending Korea, and while
most American businesses in Korea gradually yielded their operations to the Japanese in
the midst of Japan’s encroachment on Korea, there were small groups of Americans who
were determined to stay. Instead of giving up their fruitful field, missionaries continued
their religious activities despite the constant hostile interference of the Japanese colonial
government. Throughout these difficult decades, missionaries stood behind the Korean
Christian churches, although they did not support anti-Japanese activities by individual
Christians.

Missionaries fought for greater religious freedom and liberty, and their

216 Kim, A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur, 117-120.
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influence was felt all over the peninsula, from the biggest cities to even remotest villages
of the north.
Although there were no formal diplomatic relations between Korea and America
in the three decades of Japanese rule, informal relations between the Korean people and
the American people continued to flourish.

Under missionary sponsorship, Korean

students came to the United States and Canada to pursue higher education, and then
returned to serve their country. In this way, the religious connection opened a channel of
communication between the colonized peninsula and the Western world, planting hope
for an alternative vision for the future development of the country based on the Western
democratic model.
Missionary activities not only influenced the Korean image of America and the
American people, but also affected the Koreans’ image of themselves and their nation as
well. Some students magnified what they learned from the missionaries and then turned
the religious messages of personal salvation into political sermons to inspire their own
people. Christian nationalists, who lived and grew under the shadow of the American
missionaries, became dominant political figures in modem Korea.
Therefore, it was at least some missionaries, if not all, who impressed the Koreans
with the promises of national and personal salvation that partially boosted the Koreans’
grand expectations from the United States and motivated them to seek American aid
persistently.217 It was also their evangelical teachings, education work, and medical

217 This point has been clearly presented and elaborated by Harrington, God, Mammon and the Japanese,
when Harrington analyzed how Dr. Horace Allen gave assurances to the Korean king about potential
American aid, and by Kim, Protestants and the Formation o f M odem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920,
when Kim presented Horace Underwood’s positive assurances the American support behind the cause of
Korean Independence. Both Allen and Underwood spoke their own convictions rather than the board’s
position.
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services as a whole that induced crucial elements of change in the struggling Korean
nation. Western education, undoubtedly, gave new understanding and new hope to the
Korean people during the dark colonial era.
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CHAPTER 2
Religious Factors in North Korea

INTRODUCTION
While nationalism helped to stir up many Koreans to resist Japanese colonial rule,
the failure of the March First Movement and Japan’s new “cultural rule” polices caused
serious disagreement among Korean nationalists. The split between the radicals and the
gradualists affected the future development of Korean politics. While the gradualists had
more influence and power inside Korea, the radicals earned their fame through political
assassinations and armed struggles against the Japanese forces in China and Manchuria.
In the post-colonial era, these divergent views of how the country should be liberated and
developed became a constant source of tension among Korean nationalists, affecting the
development of Korean politics and its foreign policy outlook.
The competition between leftists and rightists did not begin in 1945, but had
instead been developing throughout the colonial period, as cultural nationalists were
challenged by radical Communist nationalists.

The dispute went beyond fractional

differences and power struggles between ambitious politicians; at its core, it was clash
between two incompatible philosophies. It was a battle over the vision that would guide
Korea’s future: a radical revolution to achieve a Communist dictatorship or a gradual
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transition into a Christian-influenced democracy.1 The division of the country by two
ideologically-competitive powers in August 1945 watered those seeds and caused them to
flourish. While the Communists sought support from the Soviet Union, the Christian
nationalists desired an alliance with the United States.
In the northern part of Korea, where Christianity had taken a strong hold in the
hearts of the people, the clash between the gradualists and the radicals was intense even
within the first three months of the liberation in 1945. To analyze the postwar political
struggle in the north, it is important to first understand the final decade of Japanese
colonial rule in Korea, in particular Japanese policy toward Christian churches. Christian
nationalists, who had survived Japanese persecution, were the main political obstacle to
Communist dominance in the north. Thus, when the Communist government sought to
control the native religions in the north, it singled out Christian groups for more severe
treatment.2 Their political rivalry and open confrontation had a significant impact on the
polarization of Korea politics during the inter-war years.

THE DARKEST HOURS OF THE COLONIAL ERA (1931-1945)
Japan’s policy of bunka seiji (cultural rule) drew to a close as Tokyo began to
mobilize for war in the 1930s. Ever since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War,

1 According to John K Fairbank, there were many kinds o f nationalism. He simplified them into two major
categories: the conservative and the reformist-revolutionary. See John K. Fairbank, ‘T he Problem of
Revolutionary Asia,” Foreign Affairs 29 (October 1950): 107. Fairbank was speaking o f East Asia in
general; a more careful analysis o f the specific case of Korea, however, reveals a political landscape that
was too complex to be adequately described by these two simple categories. The Korean rightists consisted
o f more than conservatives who wanted to preserve their power at the expense o f change, but also of
Christians and other reformers who embraced some elements of the leftist agenda for positive political,
social and economic changes. A temporary alliance between these groups was possible only because their
interests, though different, were all equally threatened by Communism.
2 U.S. State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over (Washington D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 96.
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Japanese troops, known as the Kwantung Army (Guandong Army), had been stationed in
Manchuria to protect Japan’s newly-acquired railroad interests. The Kwantung Army
was controlled by a militant faction of Japanese expansionists, eager to start a war of
conquest against China. In September 18, 1931, two Japanese junior officers, Colonel
Itagaki Seishiro and Lt. Colonel Kanji Ishiwara, both militant extremists, blew up a
section of Japan’s South Manchuria Railway near Mukden.3 This event stirred up
conflict between China’s troops under Zhang Xueliang and the Kwantung Army. The
Japanese seized upon the crisis to send 10,000 troops to Mukden, ostensibly for the
“protection” of the railroad system.

Without facing any strong resistance from the

Chinese army, Japan occupied Manchuria and established a puppet state, Manchukuo.
After the Manchurian Incident, political pressure mounted for Korea to assume a
bigger role in Japan’s expansion. As a result, totalitarian measures were taken to tighten
the control of the Korean peninsula, suppressing all potential domestic opposition and
foreign influences that might jeopardize the war effort.

In 1931, General Ugaki

Kazushige replaced Admiral Saito Makoto as Governor-General of Chosen. The new
government remilitarized the nation, ruthlessly suppressing opposition. Later, in 1936,
General Minami Jiro, a pro-war militarist, replaced Ugaki and ruled with an even heavier
hand. Japan was preparing for war against China.
A Full Scale “Japanization” o f Korea
Korea, as the gateway that connected Japan to Manchuria, was an indispensable
base for Japan’s invasion of the Asian continent. A full scale war between China and
Japan started in July 1937, after Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at Marco Polo
Bridge.

As Japan ramped up its production for war, Korean factories were quickly

3 Japan seized Manchuria from China and established a puppet regime called Manchukuo.
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converted into a vital element of its war machine, and Korean natural resources were
seized upon to fuel the Japanese Army. War factories were established in P’ydngyang,
Hamhung, and Wonsan. In order to supply enough energy to keep the factories running
for long hours, the colonial government developed hydro-electric power in northern
Korea that supplied electricity not only to the whole peninsula but also to Manchuria as
well.

In the south, the Japanese took over Korea’s most fertile farmland and exported

the rice to feed Japan and Japan’s army, while they imported barley and wheat from
Manchuria to feed the Koreans. The Japanese also conscripted young Korean men into
the Japanese army and forced young Korean women to become “comfort women” for the
Japanese soldiers.4 The railroad network was used to transport troops and war materials
from Pusan to Manchuria.
Economic and military mobilization, however, was not seen as enough to
transform Korea into an essential partner in the war.

The Japanese government

demanded all Koreans to be fully assimilated into the empire. A complete program for
the “Japanization” of the Korean people began. The colonial authorities ordered Koreans
to adopt Japanese names and forbade them from using their own native language in
public. Only Japanese history was to be taught, and only the Japanese language was
allowed in schools.
Shintoism, the Japanese national religion of emperor worship, was enforced
throughout Korea in the 1930s. Students were required to participate in Shinto worship
on a regular basis. Shinto temples were built in each city, town, and village. At first, the
Japanese authorities planned their propaganda campaign carefully, hoping to confuse
4 “Comfort women,” also known as wianbu in Korean, were young women forced by the Japanese to serve
as prostitutes for Japanese soldiers on the front. While the majority o f them were Japanese and Koreans,
there were also Chinese, Taiwanese, and some other women under Japanese occupation.
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church opinion by making a distinction between “State” and “Sect” Shinto. They argued
that State Shinto was a mere patriotic ceremony and they promised noninterference with
church activities. But the Japanese later intensified their demands and sought to enforce
Shintoism by any means necessary.
Buddhist temples.

Shrines were put in all Christian churches and

The police also ordered a kamidana, which was an individual

household shrine, to be placed in each Korean home. Churches were only allowed to
hold Christian services before or after working hours.
The Influence o f American Missionaries in the Korean Christian Community
While most religious groups in Korea did not have a serious problem accepting
Shinto worship, Korean Christians adamantly refused because of the main Biblical
invectives against idol worship. Foreign missionaries were caught in the middle of this
controversy. During the earlier period of bunka seiji, the Shinto issue was seldom raised
because the Japanese government guaranteed some level of religious freedom. But when
the Shinto rites became a test of loyalty to the emperor, they carried a deep political
meaning.

Japanese militarists feared that foreign religious influences would weaken

support for the war, so they pressured all Christian institutions to perform Shinto rites in
order to show their loyalty and patriotism.
Japan’s fear of foreign influence among Korean Christians was not unfounded.
By 1931, foreign missionaries had established successful and influential mission
enterprises in the Korean peninsula. The French Catholics’ strongholds were in Seoul
and Taegu. The German Benedictines, though they came to Korea in 1909, began to
focus their activities in the northeast region in 1921, from Wosan through the Hamgyong
Provinces into Jiandao and all the way to Khabarovs. American Catholic missionaries
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(the Maryknoll Fathers) did not arrive until 1923 and their works were mainly in the
northwest region.5 By 1941, their most successful mission area was in Yongyu, a city
near Uiju on the Yalu River.6 The Irish Columbans came in the early 1930s. All together,
the four Catholic missions had more than 140,000 converts by 1939 (see Table 2.10).
Although the Catholics had started 100 years earlier than the Protestants, the
Protestants had already outgrown the Catholics in term of numbers of missionaries,
converts, and mission institutions as early as 1910. At that time, more than 80 percent of
foreign missionaries were Protestants and they controlled about 90 percent of all
missionary premises, 91 percent of all mission hospitals, and 95 percent of all mission
schools (see Table 2.9). When the first American Maryknoll missionary, Father Patrick
Byrne, arrived in P’yongyang, he was shocked by the success of the Protestant churches
in northern Korea and exclaimed, “Pyeng Yang [sic] is the most Protestant city I was ever
in, in America or elsewhere.”7
American missionaries, in fact, were the most influential within the Korean
Protestant community. In 1910, over 75 percent of all Protestant missionaries were from
the United States and they controlled the majority of mission schools and hospitals (see
Table 2.9). More than two decades later, in 1939, Americans still represented more than
76 percent of all Protestant missionaries and had influence over 72 percent of all of the
Korean Protestants that were under the care of foreign mission stations (see Table 2.10).
Among them, the Presbyterian missionaries were the most successful. There were
six main Protestant missions working in Korea.

Four were Presbyterian: Northern

5 Donald N. Clark, Christianity in Modern Korea (Lanham, MD: University Press o f America, 1986), 11.
6 Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT:
EastBridge, 2003), 140.
7 Quoted by Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 137-138.
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(U.S.A), Southern (U.S.), Canadian, and Australian. While the Northern Mission had ten
stations across the peninsula, the Southern Mission had four stations in two Cholla
provinces.8 Altogether, the American Presbyterian missionaries had influence over 70
percent of the Presbyterian churches with more than 200,000 members. In addition, the
American Methodist missionaries had more than 800 churches with 50,000 members.
Other American sects, such as the Seventh Day Adventist Mission and the Holiness
Church had a total of 390 churches with about 12,000 members (see Table 1.6).
Missionaries from other countries, except the Catholics from France, were only
marginal in their overall influence among Korean Christians. While working closely
with their American counterparts, the Canadian Presbyterian Mission focused its work in
two Hamgyong Provinces in the north and the Australian Presbyterian Mission had its
main center in Pusan, South Kyongsang Province.

In 1939, the Canadians had 38

missionaries, taking care of about 17,000 converts in the north, and the Australians had
29 missionaries, ministering to about 19,000 converts in the south. The English Church
Mission had 136 churches with about seven thousand members in 1910, but by 1939, its
four missionaries ministered to only about six thousand converts. The Salvation Army
had 140 centers with 4,876 members in 1910, and its membership grew to be 18,000 in
1939 (see Table 2.9 & 2.10). The Greek Orthodox had only six churches with 115
members, mostly White Russians (see Table 1.6) in 1941. All of these, even added
together, formed a relatively small fraction of the American mission enterprises.

8 In 1929, the Southern Missions had 10,809 baptized membership in its area. See George Thompson
Brown, Mission to Korea (USA: Board o f World Mission, Presbyterian Church U.S., 1962), 134.
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Controversy over the Shinto Issue
In Japan, foreign missionaries did not challenge the idea of “State Shinto,”
because it was part of the expression of Japan’s nationalistic sentiment. For practical
reasons, they accepted it as they did the Confucian notions of loyalty and filial piety. But,
the case in Korea was completely different.

The Christian community, including

missionaries, church leaders, and native converts, were deeply divided over Shinto
worship. The Korean Catholic Church took its official position from the example of the
Japanese Catholic Church and interpreted the ceremony as a patriotic ritual, but
individual priests, such as Monsignor John Morris, refused to accept it.9 In response,
Morris was fired from his position.

Likewise, after intensive debate, the Methodist

missionaries and the Korean Methodist Church yielded under intense political pressure
from the colonial government. The Seventh Day Adventists and Congregationalists also
followed a non-resistant approach under pressure from the Japanese authorities.
Concerning the Presbyterians, who represented more than 78 percent of all
Protestants (see Table 2.5), the scale of controversy was much bigger and the resistance
was much stronger.

Since the American Presbyterian missionaries controlled the

majority of the mission schools and had influence over many churches, their opinions on
this matter had a great impact on many people, including non-Christians. Some (mostly
from the Presbyterian P ’yongyang Mission Station and Southern Presbyterian Mission),
such as Rev. Samuel A. Moffett, Rev. Otto DeCamp, Dr. DeWitt Lowe, and Dr. George
McCune, objected to Christians’ participation in Shinto worship.10 Dr. McCune’s
argument was based on one of the Ten Commandments: “Thou shalt have no other gods

9 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 213.
10 Brown, Mission to Korea, 149-152.
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before me.”11 His opinion persuaded the Presbyterian Mission in the north to vote to
close its schools rather than have its students participate in Shinto shrine worship. As a
result, the famous Sungsil College in P’yongyang (also known as Union Christian
College) was, under Dr. McCune’s leadership, closed in 1938.

The Southern

Presbyterian Mission also decided to close down all of their mission schools if Japanese
authorities forced their students to perform Shinto rituals.12
Nevertheless, other missionaries, especially those in Seoul, took a more practical
view of Shinto worship, hoping to preserve their institutions. Dr. Horace H. Underwood,
for example, advanced an argument based on the idea, “Render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar’s.” 13 He regarded the Shinto ceremony more as a citizen’s political
obligation, and therefore, one that should be honored. His position was supported by
many in the southern Christian community, who valued education and wanted to preserve
the mission schools.

Underwood’s position influenced the Presbyterian Board of

Foreign Mission in New York to decide to continue supporting Christian institutions in
Korea, overruling the Presbyterian Mission’s decision to close down all mission schools
and ordering the missionaries to transfer ownership of individual schools to the hands of
the Koreans if necessary. In the end, the mission schools that stayed open until 1945
were those who were transferred to non-mission management.14
The final decision on how the individual churches should respond fell on the
shoulders of the Korean church leaders of the different denominations. After a long

11 Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f Horace G.
Underwood, ed. Michael J. Devine (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 64.
12 Brown, Mission to Korea, 156.
13 The debate between the two groups o f missionaries was reported in “A Debate,” The Presbyterian
Tribune, 20 January 1938. See also ibid., 64.
14 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 63-65.
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period of discussion and facing strong government pressure, the Presbyterian Church
followed Underwood’s reasoning and adopted a conciliatory approach.

The General

Assembly declared that attendance at a Shinto ceremony was merely a patriotic rather
than a religious act.15
The decision of the General Assembly did not, of course, represent the beliefs of
all Presbyterian ministers or their congregations. Many pastors who had graduated from
P’yongyang Presbyterian Seminary disagreed with the decision of the assembly, and
many Christians left their churches in protest.16 The Japanese colonial police arrested
most anti-Shinto church leaders.

In the north, 40 percent of Protestant pastors were

imprisoned. The most famous anti-Shinto pastors were Rev. Chu Ki-ch’ol, the pastor of
Sanjonghyon Church in P’yongyang, and Rev. Son Yang-won, the pastor of the Leper
Colony in Sunch’on. Neither were the anti-Shinto missionaries immune to punishment.
When Rev. DeCamp and Dr. Lowe removed shrines from churches and Christian homes,
they were also arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison. They were expelled from Korea
shortly afterwards.
In the end, 1,200 churches were closed, and about 3,000 church leaders, mostly
from the north, were thrown into prison due to their opposition to Shinto worship. All of
them were subjected to brutal torture at the hands of the Japanese police.17 About fifty of
them, including Rev. Chu, died as martyrs before the day of liberation.18 The religious
fervor of these inmates led to nationalistic fanaticism as well. Rejecting Shintoism, they

15 Chung-Shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle, WA: University o f Washington Press,
2003), 155.
16 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140,
Box 16, Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
17 Ibid., see also Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 156.
18 Chu, Kwang-jo, More Than Conquerors (Seoul: Daesung.com, 2006), 121-127.
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reasoned, was rejecting the emperor. Enduring years of abuse in prison had refined the
resolve of these Christians. When these church leaders and laymen were later released
from prison following liberation, they were intensely anti-Japanese and anti-Communist,
with no interest in compromise. They had also earned the respect of the Korean people
and were recognized as courageous, principled, uncompromising nationalists.

They

would enjoy enormous public support from both Christians and non-Christians, and many
became national leaders.
The confrontational stance of some American missionaries encouraged the
Japanese government to impose tough restrictions upon the Korean churches. First, it
ordered the Japanese churches to take control of all Korean churches and Christian
organizations. 19

For instance, the Korean Y.M.C.A. (Young Men’s Christian

Association) was forced to merge with the Japanese Y.M.C.A., prompting the
International Y.M.C.A. to deny Korean representatives permission to participate in
Y.M.C.A. international conferences.

Such restrictions gradually expanded to all

Christian denominations, cutting off Korean religious affiliations from their outside
organizations. In 1939 and 1940, the Presbyterian Church of Korea was bracketed with
the Presbyterian Reformed Church in Japan, and the Korean Methodist Church with the
Japanese Methodist Church.20
Second, Japan carefully regulated any personal interaction between Korean
Christians and foreign missionaries. Missionaries were asked to withdraw from local
church organizations.

They were forbidden from conducting mass evangelism or

19 Seijiro Niwa, “The Federated Union o f Japanese and Korean Churches in the Peninsula,” The Korean
Mission Field, (August 1940). The source was used by Yoko Okuyama, “Helen Kim’s Life and Thought
Under the Japanese Colonialism, 1918-1945” (MA Thesis: Yonsei University, 1989), 40-41.
20 “Korea Report, 1943,” Annual Report o f the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Methodist Episcopal
Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute of Korean Church History, 2001), 890.
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speaking in churches. As the pressure continued to tighten, Japanese police would stop
any church meetings where missionaries were present. Even innkeepers were instructed
not to host missionaries. In this way, the colonial authorities succeeded in curtailing all
missionary evangelical activities by June 1940.

01

The Deterioration o f Japan-America Relations
Meanwhile, Japan’s aggression in China aroused international concerns. When
Nanjing, the capital of China, fell, reports of unconscionable brutality against civilians
were told by missionaries and reporters around the world. Public opinion in the United
States turned against Japan. In 1938, the United States government imposed an embargo
on war materials to Japan. Tensions between the two countries intensified when Japan
signed the Tripartite Mutual Defense Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. In
response, the United States declared an embargo on scrap iron and steel to Japan.
American missionaries began to discover that, even if they were willing to
compromise with the Japanese government, it would not save them from eventual
banishment from Korea. The colonial police forces began full scale surveillance of all
foreigners. Korean Christians were ordered not to interact with missionaries because all
foreigners were considered possible spies. With the worsening of US-Japan relations,
Gaylord Marsh, the American consul general in Korea, advised all American citizens to
leave. The US government provided special transportation for the evacuation.

00

Many

missionaries chose to go because their mission services were no longer possible in such a
hostile environment. On November 16, 1940, the S. S. Mariposa took 219 Americans,

21 Brown, Mission to Korea, 159-160.
22 Ibid., 161.
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mostly missionaries and their children, back to the United States.23 The British also
followed the American lead and evacuated their nationals, including Canadians and
Australians.24 The missionary community in Korea thus shrank to a dozen families in
major cities.25
The attack on Pearl Harbor followed soon afterward on December 8, 1941
(Korean time), and all remaining foreigners and missionaries in Korea were arrested.
One of them, Dr. John Van Neste Talmage, was chief of the Southern Presbyterian
Mission juridical body. He was jailed for 121 days on charges of possessing certain maps,
even though they had been registered with the authorities.

The real purpose of his

imprisonment was to force him to sign over various mission properties.

When Dr.

Talmage refused regardless of threats of torture and further imprisonment, he was
expelled from the country.
Meanwhile, the Japanese police also tried to prove that the Presbyterian Mission
was a spy organization. They tortured Dr. Frederick S. Miller, Dr. Edwin W. Koons, and
Mr. Ralph O. Reiner, who were key members of the Mission, in an attempt to force them
to make false confessions.27 The missionaries refused to comply.

On May 31, 1942,

after five months of confinement, Japanese authorities transferred their foreign prisoners
to Kobe, where the Japanese gathered all foreigners and repatriated them back to America
and Europe in two separate ships.

23 Ibid.
24 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 252.
25 Seven Southern Presbyterian missionaries chose to stay behind. They were Dr. and Mrs. Wilson, Dr. and
Mrs. Talmage, Dr. J. C. Crane, Miss Mary Dodson, and Miss Florence Root. See Brown, Mission to Korea,
162.
26 Ibid., 162-164.
27 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution, and Peace, 81-82.
28 Ibid., 84-86.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123

Christians who Collaborated with the Japanese
Meanwhile, Christian churches in Korea faced another challenge after the
departure of foreign missionaries. As soon as war broke out between the United States
and Japan, Japanese authorities automatically assumed that all Christians were against the
colonial government and began to exert tighter control over the churches.29 Church
services were largely reduced to once a week, usually in the evening because Christians
were required to work on Sunday.
defense projects.

Pastors were forced to perform manual labor on

Church services were censored, and Shinto elements were forcibly

incorporated into them.

Many Christian schools were closed or transferred to non-

Christian ownership. No religious instruction was allowed to continue in any schools.
The government also closed down the Christian Literature Society and the British and
Foreign Bible Society so that no more Christian literature was published.
seminaries and Bible schools were also closed down, with only a few exceptions.

Most

on

In June 1945, the Japanese authorities issued a new order to require all Protestant
denominations to join together and form a new amalgamation called Kyodan (“church
federation”), also known as the United Church of Korea, which was completely under
01

colonial government control.

Representatives were called and asked to vote for a

“moderator” of the new church, but the result was never made public.

Instead, the

Japanese colonial government appointed Rev. Kim Kwan-sik to be the moderator.
Clergymen and laymen who resisted the process were purged from their churches or
institutions. About one third of Korean Christian churches closed their doors and church
29 Adams, “Report on Korea,” 2.
30 “Survey 1947: Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church, USA,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Box 16, Folder 34 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
31 “Korea Report, 1942,” Annual Report o f the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Methodist Episcopal
Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute of Korean Church History, 2001), 878.
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buildings were taken over by the government and used for secular and military
purposes.32
Japan’s policy against the Christian churches in Korea left serious divisions and
scars within the Christian community. During those darkest hours of colonial history in
Korea, some clergymen and laymen who were determined to keep their churches and
schools open had no option but to collaborate with the Japanese.
Dr. Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), for example, the President of Ewha Women
University at that time who was one of the most influential women in Korea, had to work
with Japanese government agents in the school and write pro-Japanese articles endorsing
government policies. Some charged that she made pro-Japanese speeches in villages, and
even assisted in the recruitment of prostitutes for soldiers on the war front.33 Regardless
of her reasons for collaboration, Dr. Kim’s effort did not bear much positive results.
Normal academic programs were eventually halted by the Japanese government and
Ewha girls were sent to villages as war propagandists, telling the Korean people what
they must do to help the Japanese win the war.34
The most egregious case was that of Dr. Song Ch’ang-gun, President of the
Choson Seminary.

In order to keep his seminary open, Dr. Song actively supported

Japanese policy, making speeches on behalf of the government. He even acted as a priest

32 Adams, “Report on Korea,” 2.
33 Okuyama, “Helen Kim’s Life and Thought Under the Japanese Colonialism, 1918-1945,” 45-46. In her
autobiography Dr. Helen Kim confessed that she had made pro-Japanese speeches in Ewha, but did not
mention her pro-Japanese articles. See also Helen Kim, Grace Sufficient (Nashville: The Upper Room,
1964), 101.
34 Okuyama, “Helen Kim’s Life and Thought Under the Japanese Colonialism, 1918-1945,” 48.
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at a Japanese shrine, going through its rites of cleansing like a Japanese priest. Many
charged him with being the guiltiest collaborator in the Christian community.35
Despite the willingness of many Christian leaders to collaborate with the colonial
government, Japan’s mistrust of Korean Christians remained unchanged.

Japanese

authorities feared that their hidden pro-American attitude would jeopardize the
government’s effort to defend the Korean peninsula against an American invasion. The
colonial government thus formed a list of Christian leaders whom they planned to
execute on August 17, 1945. Fortunately, liberation came before the designated date.
The lives of these Christian leaders were spared.

THE LIBERATION OF NORTH KOREA
The Pacific War came to a quick end in August 1945 after Truman ordered the
use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, respectively.
The Japanese government’s hope to avoid an unconditional surrender was dashed as soon
as the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8.36 These two main factors led
Japanese Emperor Hirohito to announce his decision to terminate the war on August 15,
1945.

It was supposed to be good news for Korea, which had been under Japan’s

colonial rule for four decades. Nevertheless, what disappointed many Koreans was that
shortly after the liberation, they found that their country was not only divided, but also
forcibly occupied by two new foreign powers.

35 Letter from Fran Kinsler to John Smith, 19 March 1949, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
36 For a detailed analysis o f Japan’s serious effort to keep the Soviet Union neutral, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa,
Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender o f Japan (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2005).
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Drawing a Demarcation Line
The division of Korea along the line of the 38th Parallel was initially the result of
a military agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union when Japan
surrendered. On August 15, 1945, President Harry Truman cabled a draft message of
General Order N o.l to Generalissimo Joseph Stalin, which contained an order to the
Japanese troops in Korea to surrender to the Red Army north of the 38th parallel and to
the American army south of that line. Stalin accepted Truman’s proposal without dispute,
and as a result, a demarcation line along the 38th Parallel was drawn. It was a strange and
arbitrary arrangement that has troubled many Koreans to this day. Why did Truman
propose this demarcation, and why did Stalin accept it?
Truman wrote about his decision years later, testifying that it was merely a
“convenient allocation of responsibility for the acceptance of the Japanese surrender.”37
However, historians have suspected that the real reason for Truman’s proposal was to
prevent the Soviet Union from occupying the whole Korean peninsula.38 Keeping Seoul
in American hands strengthened the U.S. position in steering Korea’s political
development, since Seoul was the political, economic, and cultural center of Korea. In
addition, by securing the lower half of the Korean peninsula, the United States prevented
the Soviet Union from controlling the Tsugaru Strait, the water between Honshu and
Hokkaido, which was an important sea route for the movement of submarines.

37 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs o f Harry Truman, Vol.l: Years o f Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1955), 444-445.
38 See Erik van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford, New York &
Munich: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989), 63. See also Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 252.
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Nevertheless, according to Dean Rusk, a colonel in the army at that time, who
wrote in 1990 about his experience, the demarcation line was selected in “great haste”
and “under great pressure”:
Working in great haste and under great pressure we had a formidable task: to pick a zone
for the American occupation. Neither Tic [Charles H. Bonesteel III] nor I was a Korea
expert, but it seemed that Seoul the capital, should be in the American sector. We also
knew that the U.S. Army opposed an extensive area o f occupation. Using a National
Geographic map, we looked just north of Seoul for a convenient dividing line but could
not find a natural geographical line. We saw instead the thirty-eighth parallel and
decided to recommend that.. ,.39

Rusk’s testimony led historians to wonder just how serious the United States was about
occupying South Korea.

Clearly, Washington was distracted with many post-war

concerns in both Europe and Asia, and the U.S. Army in the Pacific was quite unprepared
to occupy a land of nearly 20 million people.
Soviet motives were even less clear. Historians have puzzled as to why Joseph
Stalin would promptly agree to limit the advance of the Red Army when it seemed that it
could have easily outrun the United States and captured Seoul first. One possible reason
was that Stalin might have expected the United States to allow the Soviet Army to
occupy the northern part of Hokkaido as a Soviet occupation zone in Japan if he
complied with the American request on Korea.40 Although the Americans had never
made such a promise, it was a plausible hypothesis explaining Russian motives in August
1945.
Nevertheless, the readiness of Russia to keep its promise over the 38th Parallel did
not necessarily mean that it was willing to cooperate fully with the United States
concerning Korea. Korea had far more vital strategic value to the Soviet Union than to
the United States. For one thing, Korea was on Russia’s back doorstep. Moreover, if the
39 See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Penguin Book, 1990), 124 and 167.
40 For details o f the Russians’ motives, see Van Ree, Socialism, in One Zone, 63.
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Soviet Union could extend its sphere of influence over the whole peninsula, then the
U.S.S.R. would be in a stronger position to influence the post-war political and military
development of China. It would also be in a far better position to challenge American
dominance of Japan.
Soviet Occupation above the 38th Parallel
When the United States received the news of Japan’s unconditional surrender,
President Truman ordered American commanders in the Pacific to suspend their
offensive operations against Japanese forces.

The Soviet Union, however, continued

their offensive operations against the Japanese forces on all fronts. Russian troops were
battling to push their position deeper into Manchuria, Korea, and the Kurils, hoping to
seize all the territories promised at Yalta.41 On August 16, 1945, the Soviet Army had
not yet occupied any territory on the Korean peninsula because the Japanese were still
resisting the advancing Red Army from various strategic positions.42 The cease-fire
order from Tokyo was not issued to the Kwantung Army until August 18. The Soviet
Union and Japan eventually reached their cease-fire agreement on August 19.
As soon as the Soviet Army entered Korea, the majority of its troops were sent to
stand guard along the 38th Parallel.

Southbound routes were generally open, but

northbound movement was closely watched.

The natural flow of information and

transportation between the north and the south gradually came to a halt. The northern
section became entirely cut off from Seoul once the Soviet Army sealed the border.
Hence, crossing the 38th Parallel became more and more difficult and dangerous.

41 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 253.
42 The Japanese did not stop fighting on August 16, 1945, because they claimed that they had not yet
received the formal order from the emperor. See Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 62-64.
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The immediate impact of the demarcation line was to create a deep sense of
uncertainty among Koreans on both sides. Koreans were a homogenous people with a
unified language, culture, and set of customs. The northern and southern half mutually
depended on each other economically. The north needed southern food, particularly rice;
the southern factories needed northern electricity, and the southern peasants needed
northern fertilizers. The overnight appearance of an artificial line dividing the country
caused immense logistical problems and frustrations. The electricity supply for Seoul
and the rest of the south was now in Russian hands in the north. Meanwhile, with the
influx of 100,000 Russian soldiers, who normally lived off their occupied lands, the north
faced an immediate food shortage.
In addition, Seoul had long been the center of Korea’s political activities.
Historically, whoever controlled Seoul usually controlled the nation. Most of the nation’s
top political activists such as Yo Un-hyong, Song Chin-u, and Pak Hon-yong resided in
Seoul. For this same reason, even the leftists’ stronghold was in the south. By isolating
the north from Seoul, the Red Army created a sudden power vacuum in the north, which
none of the leaders in Seoul were able to fill.
Christian Domination o f Local Committees fo r the Preparation o f Korean
Independence (CPKI) in North Korea
While the Russians were fighting their way to P’yongyang from August 11 to
August 24, the Japanese were searching for some means of safeguarding the lives of
Japanese civilians and of preserving peace and order during the transition period.
Knowing that their country was about to surrender to the Allies, Japanese officials in the
north contacted Cho Man-sik, a prominent Christian nationalist in P’yongyang, to
manage security in the northern part of the peninsula. Cho Man-sik’s high reputation
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among anti-Japanese nationalists was indisputable. He had founded Sin’ganhoe (New
Korea Society), a united nationalist organization that enjoyed the strongest political
following in the north prior to liberation and had a membership of thirty thousand.43
In the south, the Japanese approached Song Chin-u, a famous educator and
cultural nationalist. Cho accepted the offer, but Song declined. Yo Un-hyong became
Song’s substitute. Yo Un-hy5ng had studied in the Paejae School (the first mission
school established by American Methodist missionaries). He dropped out of school when
he was punished for not attending religious services. In 1908, he was baptized by Rev.
Charles A. Clark, an American Presbyterian missionary, and became an assistant minister
in Seoul for two years in the Sungdong Church. From 1911 to 1912, he studied theology
at the P’yongyang Presbyterian Seminary.

Like An Ch’ang-ho, Yo advocated both

education and military preparation. He was a major figure in the Korean Provisional
Government in Exile (KPG) in Shanghai44 He was a moderate, leaning to the left, an
ideal figure for a leftist-nationalist coalition.45 On September 6, 1945, a “Korean
People’s Republic,” under Yo’s leadership, was proclaimed in Seoul.
While Yo mobilized all the underground rightists and leftists to form a temporary
alliance under the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) in the
south, Cho was simultaneously doing the same thing in the north. On August 17, 1945,
Cho Man-sik organized a local committee in P’yongyang, which he affiliated with the
CPKI in Seoul. Both the northern and southern CPKIs were therefore headed by
43 The US government document translated Sin’ganhoe as the “National Foundation Association.” See
State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Takeover, 13.
44 The Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was established in Shanghai by around 1,000 Korean
nationalists in April 1919. Syngman Rhee was chosen as its Premier, while Kim Kyu-sik was its foreign
minister. Among its best known leaders were also Yi Tonghwi, An Ch’angho, Y8 Unhy5ng, and Kim Ku.
Finally, under Kim Ku’s leadership, KGP earned its fame through terrorist activities against Japanese
leaders.
45 See Lee Wha Rang, “Who Was Y8 Un-hy5ng?” http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/mongyang.htm.
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prominent Christian laymen. Also, Christians were heavily represented in both the north
and the south CPKIs, outnumbering the Communists in almost every local council.
Nonetheless, relatively speaking, the strength of the Communists and their leftist
allies was concentrated in the south, and the Christian nationalists were most powerful in
the north.46 According to Korean historian Kim Nam-sik, “the People’s Committees
were not created from the center but organized from the bottom up.”47 In other words,
the leadership of the People’s Committees (PCs) and CPKIs revealed the relative political
strength of the leftists and rightists in local settings. In South P’yongan Province, where
Cho Man-sik received the most support, Communists had a difficult time in controlling
the local PCs.
For instance, among the twenty members of Cho’s committee, there were only
two Communists. Likewise, all CPKIs in the north were under the control of Christians,
except the North and South Hamgyong Provinces, who were either influential local
pastors, such as Rev. Yun Ha-yong and Rev. Han Kyong-jik, or prominent Christian
nationalist leaders who had been imprisoned by the Japanese following the March First
Independence Movement. Even though there were Communists and other leftists present
in all local PCs in northern Korea, they tended to be a minority and less influential.
Therefore, in order to boost the political standing of the Communists, whenever the Red
Army entered a town, they would force the local CPKI to reorganize by enlisting more
Communists as committee members, and would change their name to a People’s Political
AC,

Committee, a term which was not used in southern Korea.

46 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2003), 50-51.
47 Quote in ibid., 49.
48 Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 93-95.
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The influence of Christians in the local CPKIs was so powerful that the
Communists could not use the CPKIs to push their agenda. The Soviet army had two
options: to allow the CPKI to continue to function, or to impose its own political system
immediately.

The Soviet leaders chose the first option. With very few Communist

national figures available to them, they were willing to work with Cho Man-sik, since this
would buy time for the Communists to build up their own network and to tighten their
grip on the power system.49 It was not a surprise that Cho led the South P’yongan
Provincial People’s Political Committee (SPPPC) immediately after liberation50 and later
headed the Five-Provinces Administration Bureau (FPAB) under the sponsorship of the
Soviet Union.

POLITICAL COMPETITION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND
COMMUNISTS IN POST-LIBERATION NORTH KOREA
According to Charles K. Armstrong, the author of The North Korean Revolution,
1945-1950 (2003), religious groups, such as Christians and Ch’ondogyo followers (from
the Tonghak Movement), had a strong influence in North Korea and thus competed with
the Communists for political domination.51 Although the population of these two groups

49 Most o f the famous Communist leaders were in the South. The headquarters of the Korean Communist
Party was located in Seoul. Kim Il-sung did not return until September 1945.
50 Actually the Soviet leaders forced Cho to include more Communists in his committee. According to a
CIC document, “On 27 August 1945, Soviet troops entered P ’yQngyang, largest city in Korea north o f the
38th Parallel. They found there already established a Nation Reconstructing Preparatory People’s
Committee composed primarily o f Christians, businessmen, and educators. Head o f the Committee was
Cho Man Sik, a Presbyterian minister. On that same day Soviet authorities informed the Committee that
they were turning over the government to the Koreans, and that they desired this Committee to be
composed o f 15 members from the Preparatory Committee and o f 15 members from the Communist Party,
no members from which were on the original body. This request was acceded to and Cho Man Sik was
elected Chairman o f the new group.” See “Weekly Information Bulletin#20,” 4 September 1947,
CIC
M JZ *j 1 9 4 5 .9 - 1949.1 (Seoul: Hallym University, Institute of
Asian Culture Studies, 1995) 2: 381.
51 Tonghak meant Eastern Learning. See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 14-15.
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was less than four percent of the overall Korean population, their political influence
remained strong among the Korean nationalists.
It was true that the most common religious practice in Korea was ancestor
worship, but since it was organized according to each clan on a local level, it did not
generate a nationwide political force to support Korean independence. Like the case of
China, Korean ancestor worship was a direct result of the cultural influence of
Confucianism and Buddhism, but these two religious faiths did not have strong organized
structures and overseas connections.52 Their political influence in Korea was declining
while Christianity and other messianic types of religious sects, such as Ch’ondogyo, were
gaining popular support during the colonial period.
While Ch’ondogyo’s power base was among poor peasants in the countryside,
particularly in the Hamgyong region, Christians’ influence lay more in urban areas and
among intellectuals, especially in the P’yongan region. After liberation, both groups
resisted the Soviet-inspirited Communist revolution, using peaceful as well as violent
means.53 This section describes the political competition between the religious groups
and Communists prior to the Communist take-over in February 1946.
Ch’dndogyo’s Strong Influence in Rural Areas
Ch’ondogyo was a religion with roots in the Tonghak peasant uprising in the late
Choson dynasty.

Nationalist Kim Ku, the President of the Provisional Korean

Government in Chungking, China, was once a member of this movement before he was
converted to Catholicism.54 With the help of the Chinese government, the Choson

52 State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over, 96.
53 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 115 and 119.
54 Kim Ku, Packpom Ilchi: The Autobiography o f Kim Ku, translated, annotated and introduced by Jongsoo
Lee (Lanham, MD: University Press o f America, 2000).
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government crushed the Tonghak rebellion in 1895, and many Tonghak believers moved
north. Son Pyong-hui, the third head of Tonghak escaped to Japan and when he returned
in 1905, he renamed the religion Ch’ondogyo, the original name applied to the doctrine
by the founder in his own Scriptures.55
Under the leadership of Son, Ch’ondogyo expanded quickly and set up places of
worship in every province and county. Priority was also given to the establishment of
schools.

Ch’ondogyo’s strongest base was in the P ’yongan area.56 In 1919, since

Ch’ondogyo’s followers were active participants in the March First Independence
Movement and Son was the first signer of the 1919 Declaration of Independence, the
Japanese authorities arrested Son. According to Japanese statistics, there were about
111,000 Ch’ondogyo followers in 1920 (see Table 2.1). The actual number, however,
was actually about 3 million, much higher than the official figure because of the secret
nature of the group.

By the 1920s, it had founded more than thirty schools in the north,

and was active in organizing peasants, merchants, women, young students, and even
children.58 After Son’s imprisonment, the work was carried on by a new leader, Yi Tonhwa.59
From its beginning, the religious teaching of Ch’ondogyo always contained a
strong political element. It advocated the idea of in nae chon (“man and heaven are one”),
which generated the belief of social egalitarianism, quite a radical idea for Korea’s
traditional class-conscious and hierarchical society. The religion stressed kaebyok, which

55 R. Pierce Beaver, “Chondogyo and Korea,” Journal o f Bible and Religion 30 (April 1962): 117.
56 Songbo Kim, ‘T he Decision and Development Process o f North Korean Land Reform” (unpublished
manuscript), 11. See also Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 15.
57 Wi Jo Kang, Religion and Politics in Korea under the Japanese Rule (Lewiston, N Y : Edwin Mellen
Press, 1987), 70-73.
58 Ibid., 73. See also Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 126.
59 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 127.
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meant “awakening.”60 Individuals needed religious enlightenment, the nation needed
independence, and Korean society needed a new social order so that all people could
reach their full potential.61 Their version of “new democracy” was the elimination of
feudal relationships, the end of colonialism, the removal of “reactionary fascism,” and the
promotion of the leadership of the unified working masses.62
Since Ch’ondogyo members were mostly stem nationalists, they formed a
“Young Friends’ Party” (YFP) (Ch’ongudang) as the political wing of the religious group
in 1923 to carry out their work of education, reform, and religious teaching. Although
the YFP had branches all over Korea, the party recruited most of its supporters from the
northern provinces (see Table 2.2).

Its religious publication, Kaebyok, was a major

literary journal in the early 1920s. The Japanese colonial government therefore regarded
Ch’ondogyo as a “quasi-religion” that posed a great threat to the reign of the Japanese.
The government forced all Ch’ondogyo-affiliated schools to shut down in retaliation for
their involvement in the March First Movement.
In 1931, when the YFP attempted to organize a Second March First Movement,
the colonial government launched a major campaign to arrest YFP members. Since the
police effectively cracked down on Ch’ondogyo’s activities throughout the 1930s, the
YFP was forced to go underground. The official membership of Ch’ondogyo gradually
declined to about 72,000 in 1944 (see Table 2.1) after its central headquarters in Seoul

60 Ibid., 128.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Beaver, “Chondogyo and Korea,” 118.
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was converted by the government into a factory that manufactured Japanese army
uniforms.64
Ch’ondogyo, nevertheless, remained popular in rural areas, especially in North
P’yongan and South Hamgyong. Its followers in the P’yongan area organized the Korean
Peasant Society (KPS) to lead peasant protests against the Japanese colonial authorities.
They agreed to cooperate with the leftists (“the Red Peasant Unions”) against the
Japanese when the colonial authorities tightened up control over all the underground
political groups. The leftists, however, did not trust the KPS because they believed that
the Ch’ondogyo followers were “reformists,” not revolutionaries. Since Ch’ondogyo had
a strong base and deeper historical roots than the Communists in the countryside, the
Young Friends Party became a major competitor for political power in the post-liberation
period.65
Underlying Conflicts between Christians and Communists
While Ch’ondogyo was a sectional religious group with strong influence in rural
areas, Christianity was more a national religious organization that enjoyed a prominent
position in the cities and among educated elites. Although it was true that Christians in
general often did not work effectively as an organized political group - holding disparate
political opinions, not standing behind one leader or supporting one political party nonetheless, the Christian community was reasonably well organized in northern Korea.
In particular, five unique features of the Christian community of northern Korea gave the
Soviet occupiers many headaches.

64 Ibid., 127.
65 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 15.
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First of all, among the major organized religious groups (Buddhists, Christians,
and Ch’ondogyo), the Christians had the largest official membership in Korea in 1944
(see Table 2.1) and they were highly concentrated in the north.

The population of

northern Korea in 1941 was about 9.3 million, which was about 37.6 percent of the
overall Korean population (see Table 2.4b). The majority of Koreans, therefore, lived in
the south. The distribution of the Christian population, however, was the opposite of the
national trend. There were more than 2,000 churches in the north with about 300,000
registered members (compare Table 2.5).66 The three northern provinces alone (South
P’yongan, North P’yongan, and Hwanghae) had about 1,000 churches, and around a
quarter of the overall Christian population on the whole peninsula.

ft!

According to a

survey presented by Dr. H. A. Rhodes in 1944 on the proportion of Presbyterians to the
overall population, northern stations, such as P’yongyang, Sonch’on (near Sinuiju and
Uiju) and Chairyong (near Sariwon), had the highest ratios (see Table 2.6).

This

proportion of Christians to the overall population in these areas would be even higher if
/TO

other Protestant and Catholic populations were included.
In P’yongyang, for example, there were two seminaries, one Christian college,
two technical colleges, and several hospitals. There were nearly 400 churches and 150

66 ‘T he List o f Worship & Religions in Korea” by the Training Dept., Education Bureau o f the Governor
General o f ChosSn, December, 1941, pp.55-57 recorded in “Statistics - Japan & Korea” / General
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Box#5780, RG331 GHQ/SCAP records, CIE ©,
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington National Records Center. Concerning the
official members o f the churches in North Korea, the five Presbyteries in the north reported 300,000
members. See Allen D. Clark, History o f the Korean Church (Unpublished manuscript), 14, Presbyterian
Church Archive - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
67 William N. Blair, “Samuel A. Moffett: On His Seventieth Birthday,” The Presbyterian (1934): 6. The
cutting was found in Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder: Samuel A. Moffett Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
68 Dr. H. A. Rhodes’ presentation “Survey o f the Stations” during the Korea Consultative Conference
(September 22-24, 1944), Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 30 Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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ordained ministers responsible for the city and its vicinity.69 Time Magazine reported in
November 1950 that about 50,000 Christians lived in the city, about 17 percent of the
population.70 The P ’yongyang Presbyterian Mission Station was the largest American
Presbyterian station in the world in terms of the number of both missionaries and native
Christians.71 These Christian institutions were influential in the city life. Throughout the
colonial period, foreign missionaries, church pastors, elders, and Christian laymen
operated many mission schools from the elementary level through high school level.
Clearly, Christians had a dominant role in medicine and education, fields of particular
honor in East Asian societies.72 Therefore, a high concentration of the Christian
population in major northern cities posed a great challenge to the Communist revolution
because the Christian community tended to give less support to Communist ideology or
Communist leaders.
Second, the Christian community in Korea was historically pro-American, and
indirectly served to foster pro-American sentiment among the general population. Most
of the church members, mission school graduates, and hospital patients had some degree
of interaction with American and Canadian missionaries. Many young people, believers
and non-believers alike, had come to know the benefits of Christianity through the
humanitarian work and social services provided by missionaries and perceived
Americans as their teachers or doctors; a number hoped one day to study in North

69 Rhodes’ presentation, “Survey o f the Stations.”
70 “Carrots and Radishes,” TIME, 13 November 1950.
71 Ibid. See also Roy E. Shearer, ‘T he Evangelistic Missionary’s Role in Church Growth in Korea,” The
International Review o f Missions 54 (1965): 465.
72 In the 1930s, Rev. Samuel A. Moffett received a reward from the Japanese colonial government on his
contribution to the education work in Korea. See William N. Blair, “Samuel A. Moffett: On His Seventieth
Birthday,” The Presbyterian (1934), newspaper cutting found in Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 360, Folder: Samuel A. Moffett - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Amenca.

7-1

Such pro-American sentiment was stronger in P’yongyang than in Seoul or

any other major city. Therefore, when this northern city fell into the hands of the Russian
Army, a deep sense of fear and disappointment was felt among its dwellers. Earnest
efforts were made by Christian nationalists and capitalists to join together in preserving
self-autonomy and hopefully ultimate independence.
Third, the concentration of the Christian population into specific local
communities would allow them to unite in resisting Soviet policies. Their high influence
in the local CPKIs showed the reality of their political strength. The determination of
church leaders in the north to stand against Shinto worship during the Japanese colonial
period would also not bode well for the Communists’ own efforts at cracking down on
the Christian community.

Having learned from the years of persecution and

imprisonment, Christian leaders would present a real obstacle to the ultimate threat of a
Communist revolution. Foreseeing these potential problems, the Communist government
decided on a gradual policy of containing Christian influence, while slowly carrying out
its revolutionary reforms and consolidating its control.
Fourth, to compound Russia’s troubles, not only was Christianity strongest in the
north, but Communist influence was also the weakest there. The center of the Korean
Communist Party was in the south, because the majority of the population was landless
farmers and Communism offered a better alternative promise for landless serfs. The
tenancy issue was less of a problem in northern rural life than in the south, partially

73 Such desire was not limited to merely Christian believers, but affected non-Christians as well. In the
memoirs o f No Kum-sok, even though he was not a Christian, he and other fellow classmates still had a
desire to study in the United States. See Kum-sok No, A MiG-15 to Freedom: Memoir o f the Wartime
North Korean Defector Who First D elivered the Secret Fighter Jet to the Americans in 1953 (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1996). See also the interviews in Hildi Kang, Under the Black
Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea 1910-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 15, and 77.
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because northern farmland was generally less desirable for commercial rice cultivation,
so northerners had been less harassed by Japanese investors.
According to Dr. Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner’s 1925 survey,74 the percentage
of Korean families that owned a farm was far higher in the north than in any other part of
Korea. Christian families in the north, in particular, had enjoyed a higher rate of land
ownership than their non-Christian neighbors (see Table 2.7b).75 It was hard to say that
all these northern Christian farmers were landlords and therefore supported reactionary
policies, but it was certainly possible, from the data of Table 2.7b, that Christian farmers
were slightly better off than others in the region, and thus less receptive to the appeal of
radical land reform. Facing the institution of Communist land reform, moreover, it was
highly possible that Christians would become the victims of the Communist policy. Not
only did churches themselves hold a large amount of land but, in addition, Christian
landowners might be specifically targeted as a means of weakening the Christian
community.

74 Although Dr. Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner’s survey only consisted o f 35 villages in Korea, the villages
selected were typical in each region. This study was presented in The Jerusalem Meeting o f the
International Missionary Council (24 March - 8 April 1928). The US State Department also received a
copy of this research. The value o f Brunner’s results was that it provided data on the Christian population
so that the relative difference o f rural experience between Christians and non-Christians was shown in the
figures. The data closely resemble other studies conducted later by historians. See Gi-wook Shin, Peasant
Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea (Seattle, WA: University o f Washington Press, 1996), 202.
See also Kim Songbo, “Land Reform and Agricultural Collectivization in North Korea” (Ph.D. diss.,
Yonsei University, 1996), 35.
75 The survey in 1925 (Tables 2.7a and 2.7b) showed general rural conditions during the colonial era.
Certainly, rural-urban migration did occur during the next two decades o f Japanese rule and the rate of
tenancy did increase due to the Japanese policy, especially among Christian villages in the south where the
land was more fertile and more suitable for rice cultivation. Because the Japanese government targeted
Christians and took their land by force or through false charges in order to weaken the influence o f the
Church, more southern Christian farmers lost their land. As the figure showed in 1925 (five years after the
March First Independence Movement), Christian families in the north still owned land (even higher than
the regional overall percentage), whereas in the central region, where the capital Seoul was located,
Christians shared a far lower percentage o f landownership than the overall figure. Thus, the north still
enjoyed a relatively higher percentage o f families who tilled their own land by 1945.
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The Communists were more successful in the Hamgyong region, which ironically
was the highest non-tenancy area in all Korea. More than fifty percent of the peasants in
North Hamgyong Province were owner-cultivators and in South Hamgyong had the
second highest figure (32 percent).

7

f\

The main reasons for their popularity were,

therefore, not the promise of land reform, but the result of its further distance from the
colonial power centers (in P’yongyang and in Seoul), its closer proximity to the Russian
and Manchuria borders, and the smallest numerical presence of Christian and
Ch’ondogyo population. In the P’yongan region, where the Christian and Ch’ondogyo
populations were concentrated, the Communists faced strong resistance.

If the

Communists wanted to control the political center in P’yongyang, they would need to
nullify the religious influence in the P’yongan region before they could secure firm
control over the cities and the countryside.
Fifth, the prominent position of individual Christian leaders within the cultural
nationalist circle also produced a natural union between Christians and other non
religious rightists, especially landowners, educators and capitalists.

Since mission

schools had graduated about one third of all Korean high school students, and since
Christians were famous for their zeal for evangelism through their churches and their
schools, Christian education competed directly with Communism in capturing the hearts,
minds and souls of the youth.
The Rise o f Cho Man-sik
The Soviet Army was willing to work with Cho Man-sik because of his
undeniable popularity in North Korea. Cho was a renowned Christian conservative in

76 Kim, “Land Reform and Agricultural Collectivization in North Korea,” 35. See also Armstrong, The
North Korean Revolution, 14.
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P’yongyang and his reputation among Christians was high throughout the colonial period.
In 1916, he became the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the P ’yongyang YMCA.
Cho was also an elder of the famous Sanjonghyon Church, where Rev. Chu Ki-ch’ol was
a pastor before he was arrested by the police due to the Shinto controversy. During Rev.
Chu’s imprisonment, Cho continued to provide for Chu’s family, defying the order of the
colonial government.
Cho’s influence as a Christian educator was also well-known in Korea. After his
graduation from Meiji University in Japan, he took up a position as a teacher and later
became principal of the famous Osan School in 1913.77 The Japanese imprisoned him for
about a year because of his participation in the March First Independence Movement in
1919. After his release, he continued to advocate resistance through “non-violence,” and
earned a nickname as the “Gandhi of Korea.”
Since then, Cho worked with other cultural nationalists to promote education and
native economic production.

However, under Japanese pressure, Cho, like other

conservative nationalists, had to make public statements to encourage students to
volunteer for the Japanese war effort in late 1943.

It did some damage to Cho’s

reputation as a nationalist.78 Even so, Cho remained the most respected non-Communist
leader in the north when the country was liberated by the Allies.79 His fame in Korea was
as strong as other nationalists in the south, such as Syngman Rhee, Yo Un-hyong, Kim
Ku, and Kim Kyu-sik.

From August to December 1945, Cho was the leader of a

77 Osan School was a famous institution established by An Ch’ang-ho.
78 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 55.
79 Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence o f Separate Regimes
1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 402.
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Nationalist-Communist Coalition.

His popularity among both Christians and non-

Christians made him an ideal leader for north Korea.
A Nationalist-Communist Coalition
Without any prominent nationalist figure to compete with Cho Man-sik, the
Soviet Union adopted a gradual and conciliatory approach in gaining political control in
north Korea, and prevented open confrontation between the Communists and the
conservatives. At that time, the domestic faction of the Korean Communists led by Hyon
Chun-hyok and O Ki-sop supported Cho Man-sik, hoping to establish him as a national
symbol and supreme leader.80 Restraining orders were sent to all Soviet commanders to
forbid the Russian soldiers from following the demands of the local Communist radicals
so as to limit the chance of local unrest or armed uprisings.81
Meanwhile, the Russian occupation forces gradually reorganized all the CPKIs
and made sure that Communists comprised at least half of the membership of these local
organizations.

The Soviet army went from city to city, taking over all enterprises,

railroads, radio stations, banks, and other important economic installations; there was
little opposition, since all of these facilities had been formerly owned by the Japanese.
After securing the food supply, they next worked to take control of local security forces.
The Russians placed Communist “red guards” in charge of all provincial police stations
because they feared that pro-Americans and anti-Communists might have taken root in
these vital units.82

80 Chong-sik Lee, “Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage,” The China Quarterly 4 (April-June
1963): 6.
81 The Red Army was generally receptive to the local radicals’ demands to redistribute land. It caused a lot
o f grievances and social unrest among the rightists. See van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 100-101.
82 Ibid., 94-96.
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Outwardly, the Russian leaders proclaimed that “the stage of the Korean
revolution is the stage of bourgeois democratic revolution”83 and sought to form a broadbased coalition.

But secretly, they were working hard to weaken the power of the

rightists and to gradually boost their own strength, all the while waiting for the right
moment to strike. This time-honored Communist political ploy was very effective; the
Soviets managed to tighten their military grip while successfully concealing their long
range intentions under the guise of liberation.
There were four different factions among Korean Communists. In addition to the
domestic faction, there were three more groups: the “Kapsan faction” led by Kim Il-sung,
the Yan’an faction led by Kim Tu-bong, and the Soviet faction led by Soviet-born Ho Kai.
The Russians had not quite decided whom they would support as rulers in Korea. Kim Ilsung and his group of sixty partisans returned in September 1945, while the “Yan’an
faction” led by Kim Tu-bong, Mu Chong, and Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik, arrived a month later.
Since the Soviet faction would probably receive the least direct support from the Korean
people, the major political competition was therefore mostly among the domestic, Kapsan,
and Yan’an factions. However, whoever could gain the support of the Soviet faction
would substantially enhance their political position.
The most promising group seemed to be the Kapsan faction.

Kim Il-sung’s

guerrilla experience in Manchuria, his informal connection with both the Soviet Union
and the Chinese Communist Party, and his Christian family background in P ’yongyang
gave him invaluable political assets, making him an ideal person to be a Communist

83 Quote in Ibid., 99.
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representative to prepare for a nationalist-Communist front, and the future replacement of
Cho Man-sik.84
The first sign of Soviet intention to build up Kim Il-sung’s reputation was the
huge welcoming ceremony staged by the Russians.

On October 3, General Terentii

Shtykov brought Kim Il-sung to Cho Man-sik, asking Cho to introduce the young
nationalist to the Korean people.

On October 14, 1945, in a ceremony to welcome

“General Kim II Sung” back to Korea, Cho Man-sik introduced Kim Il-sung as a
legendary anti-Japanese hero to a crowd of 70,000 people.85 On that day, many people in
the crowd had doubted Kim’s true identity due to his youthful looks and his mysterious
name as Kim Song-ju. Rumors about him as an imposter were spread throughout the
north and the south. Kim still needed time to build up his support base in the north, while
he competed with other Communist factions in gaining control of the Korean Labor Party.
A coalition between the leftists and rightists seemed to be possible at that time
when the Russians still allowed a certain degree of political autonomy, letting the
rightists organize their own parties and allowing religious activities to continue. During
September and early October, members of the Soviet high command in P ’yongang and
various Communists leaders, including Kim Il-sung, urged the non-Communist members
of the People’s Committee to establish a political party to mobilize his supporters.86
Main Political Ideas o f Cho Man-sik
When Cho Man-sik started his work to organize a rightist political party, he
attracted a wide range of followers. He received solid support not only from Christians,

84 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 121.
85 Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 401.
86 “Weekly Information Bulletin#20,” 4 September 1947,
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but from non-Christians as well, especially among the well-educated elites and the
propertied classes. Communists from the left and collaborators from the right were all
willing to work with him in the South P’yongan Provincial People’s Political Committee
(SPPPC) and the Five-Provinces Administration Bureau (FPAB). Cho attracted a wide
following and received Soviet support because of his national fame and his moderate
political platform.
Since Cho considered that it was important to improve the welfare of the whole
nation and maintain unity with the social elites, he did not want an immediate resignation
of all Japanese collaborators, even though he personally believed that “national traitors”
should be stripped of suffrage and other political, economic, and social privileges. He
was more of a figure of reconciliation who attracted many ex-pro-Japanese followers.
Here, Cho’s idea did not differ greatly from Syngman Rhee’s concern over the question
of collaboration; Rhee also advocated a peaceful transition period.
Cho’s idea of land reform was also rather moderate.

He supported the

improvement of the tenancy system, but not its outright abolition. He did not support a
radical land reform that confiscated land without compensation to the land holders. He
advocated social justice, but he did not neglect the needs and the rights of landlords. For
example, the Communists proposed a “3-7” tax system, which meant that the tenants
were allowed to keep up to 70 percent of their products and gave 30 percent to the land
owners. Cho fought bitterly against this “3-7” system because he believed that it was too
harsh to the landowners. He thus proposed a moderate “4-6” distribution instead, in
which land owners could receive 40 percent of the output. In spite of Cho’s position, the
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South P’yongan People’s Committee adopted the “3-7” system on September 27, 1945.87
Since Cho frequently stood up to defend the interests of capitalists and landowners, it
made him a very popular man among the rightists and the moderates.
Even so, the Soviet Union favored Cho Man-sik as the leader for a coalition
because he was a less controversial figure. Thus, under Cho’s leadership, a coalition
government (similar to those in Eastern Europe) perhaps could solve the problem of the
38th Parallel division, and achieve the ultimate independence of Korea. After a “push” by
Soviet officials, Cho Man-sik and Rev. Yi Yun-yong formed the Choson Democratic
Party (CDP) on November 4, 1945. The strength of CDP grew quickly to 300,000 and
demonstrated its power in local People’s Committee elections in November 1945.88 By
early 1946, its membership grew to 500,000. Kim Il-sung sent three agents, one of whom
QQ

was Kim Ch’aek, to be installed as Demcratic Party officials.
The CDP was a party of cultural nationalists. It adopted their ideas of national
unity, patriotism, and independence.

It published three newspapers in the north:

P ’ydngbuk minbo (People’s News in North P’yong’an Province), Hwanghae minbo
(People’s News in Hwanghae Province), and Kwangwon minbo (People’s News in
Kangwon Province).90 The party stood for the improvement of the welfare of the whole
nation, not merely of the interests of the underprivileged. It paid special attention to the
unity of all social elites and supported the idea of freedom of speech and universal
suffrage for all except “national traitors.” Like Cho, the party advocated an improvement
of the tenancy system and labor reform. Education, the CDP believed, was the key to the

87 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 121.
88 Ibid., 122.
89 State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over, 14.
90 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 163.
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enhancement of national culture.

The political platform of the CDP was generally

tolerated by the Communists, the socialists, and the Russians because they all believed
that it was appropriate for the current stage of Korean development.91
Although Cho Man-sik seemed to be the leader of the north, he actually had very
little real power; he was merely a figurehead. The Russians controlled not only the local
People’s Political Committees, but also the police forces as well. However, what the
Russians had miscalculated in the formation of such a coalition was that Cho Man-sik
was more loyal to the interests of the Korean people and the idea of independence than
his own political fortune.

The conflict between the CDP and the Russian occupation

forces began to intensify a few weeks later, when Cho opposed the Red Army’s policy of
taking grain away from the Korean farmers in the name of food procurement.92 The
underlying tensions between the Christian community and the Communist authorities
also fueled the breakup of the coalition.
A Major Clash between Christians and Communists
The first major clash between Christians and the Red Army occurred in midNovember 1945, in the North P’yongan Province, a Christian-dominated area. In Sinuiju,
where Christians dominated the CPKI, two Presbyterian pastors, Rev. Yun Ha-Yong and
Rev. Han Kyong-jik, organized the Christian Social Democratic Party in September
1945.93 It was probably the first political party to be organized in the whole Korean
peninsula after liberation, preceding the CDP by two months. The party platform was to
91 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 122.
92 “Weekly Information Bulletin#20,” 4 September 1947,
■’ CIC (
tfl)
1945.9 ~ 1949. 1, 2:381. See also Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 117. There was a serious food shortage
during the first eighteen months o f Soviet occupation. The economy was disrupted by the division o f the
country and the slaughter o f livestock by the Soviet occupation forces in the fall o f 1945.
93 At that time, Syngman Rhee was still in Washington waiting for a passport to enter Korea. Kim Il-sung
arrived at W6nsan on September 19, but he did not appear in public until October 14,1945, when Cho
Man-sik, under the arrangement o f the Russian General Chistiakov, introduced him to the public.
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promote democracy and reform the country in line with Christian ideals. Later, it was
renamed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in order to attract a wider following. This
party was mainly organized through church channels.

According to Korean church

historian Allen Clark, “in each district, with the Church as a center, a district branch was
organized and became so strong that the Soviets became much concerned.”94 The SDP
was similar to Cho’s CDP, but had stronger religious connotations. Rather than being a
competitor, the SDP endorsed Cho Man-sik and worked closely with the CDP, whose
political base was in South P’yongan Province.
The conflict between the SDP members and the Soviet occupation forces began as
soon as the party was established in September because Soviet leaders were afraid of the
growing influence of SDP. Since the Communists did not have enough loyalists in this
province, the Red Army needed to bring in additional Communists from the remote
Hamgyong Province to organize the local non-Christian residents, mostly uneducated
farmers and laborers.95
When the SDP District Executive Committee in Yongamp’o Po, under Deacon
Chang Won-bong’s leadership, met on November 16, 1945, student representatives spoke
up against the violent control of the Red Army.96 The workers in a local factory, stirred
up by the Communists, attacked the meeting. One church elder was beaten to death and
many others injured. The mob destroyed the church building where the meeting was
taking place and damaged the homes of most of the SDP executive committee

94 Allen D. Clark, A History o f the Church in Korea (Seoul: The Christian Literature Society o f Korea,
1971), 240.
95 Ibid.
96 Most o f the local grievances in the north against the Soviet Army were over widespread rapes,
requisitioning excessive amounts o f the local food reserves, and looting the factories and banks. See van
Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 118.
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members.

Q7

Students from local high schools, mostly Christians, rose up to defend the

executive members of the SDP when they saw the Communists’ violent methods. As
soon as they arrived at the scene, a fight broke out between the students and the
Communists.

Many were injured; yet it was just the beginning of a wider student

uprising.
A few days later, on November 23, 1945, about five thousand Christian high
school students in Sinuiju, organized by student leaders in three local, church-connected
high schools, gathered to confront the Communist authorities through a mass
demonstration, in the spirit of the March First Independence Movement. They divided
themselves into three groups and marched peacefully toward three different locations:
Communist headquarters in Sinuiju, the North P’yongan People’s Committee office, and
Sinuiju Police office.98 Alarmed by the potential spread of wider social unrest, the
Russian Army immediately suppressed the demonstration, using machine guns. In the
end, twenty-three students were killed, about seven hundred were wounded, and more
than one thousand were arrested.99 Among them, about two hundred students were sent
as exiles to forced labor camps in Siberia.100
The Russian Army issued a warning against any student demonstration, and began
to arrest all SDP Executive Committee members. Rev. Yun and Rev. Han, the organizers
of SDP, escaped the purge because they had left for the south already. The confrontation

97 Clark, A History o f the Church in Korea, 240. See also Clark, History o f the Korean Church, 12-13.
98 Seong-Jae Lee,
Haebangihu
buk’hankidokkyohoe gongsanjeonggwongwaui gwangyee tehanyeongu Study on the Relation Between
North Korea Government and North Korean Church since Liberation,” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University,
1992), 39-40.
99 Ibid., 40. See also Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 117.
100 The Siniiiju Student Uprising was the second most famous uprising in the 1940s. It demonstrated the
influence o f Christianity in the north and the political and social conflicts between Christianity and
Communism in northern Korea. Ibid., 40.
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and the crackdown on the SDP marked the beginning of a Christian “exodus” to the south.
The Russians then began tightening their control over churches, planting spies in each
congregation to spot any potential anti-Communist activities, just as the Japanese had
done during the colonial period.

Christian family background was declared to be a

condition of political “unreliability.”101 Many more clashes between Communist forces
and nationalist rebels occurred during that winter and spring.102
Cho Man-sik’s Objection to the Moscow Agreement
A major breakthrough that could possibly have resolved the division of Korea was
the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow in December 1945. It was a genuine effort
by the great powers to save their wartime alliance and preserve the possibility of
cooperation in post-war international affairs. The foreign ministers of the United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met together in Moscow on December 16 to discuss
various key issues of unresolved wartime programs.

Korea was one of their main

concerns.
During the conference, the United States proposed a plan calling for a four-power
trusteeship of Korea, while the Soviet Union declared that it wanted quick Korean
independence.

Yet, what the Russians really desired was an “independent friendly”

Korea, a Korean government that was controlled by pro-Soviet leaders.

The United

States, however, insisted on a trusteeship, hoping that by doing so, it could have a
stronger influence over political development of Korea. In the end, both sides agreed to
form a US-Soviet Joint Commission to assist the establishment of a provisional Korean
government. The new government would then consult the Joint Commission and decide

101 State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over, 97.
102 See Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 117.
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on detailed arrangements for a four-power trusteeship of Korea for up to five years. The
final version of the Moscow Agreement opened the possibility that a trusteeship might
not be necessary if both the Joint Commission and the new provisional government
agreed to drop the plan.

im

It also implied that the United States and the Soviet Union

would cooperate to put an end to zonal occupation.104
The Koreans’ response to the Moscow Agreement, however, was generally
negative in both the north and the south.

Most people, including the Communists,

naturally resented the whole arrangement because the word “trusteeship” was often
mistranslated as “protectorate” in the Korean language. It reminded them of the old
memories of how Korea became a Japanese protectorate between 1905 and 1910 and
eventually lost its independence. Therefore, in order to soften the resistance of the people
in their occupation zone, the Russians carried out an extensive campaign to explain the
idea of “trusteeship” to the Korean people. The word “trusteeship” was translated into
Korean as “guardianship” to distance its connection with the unpalatable past.

The

Soviet officials also emphasized that the new Korean government would come first before the trusteeship - and the Korean people should support the plan in order to secure
their quick independence.
Cho Man-sik and the CDP stood firmly against any arrangement of trusteeship.
On December 28, 1945, the trusteeship plan for Korea was officially announced in the
two occupation zones. Cho Man-sik immediately voiced his opposition to the plan.
Dining a meeting of the People’s Committee (SPPPC), representatives were asked to cast
their votes on the plan. While Communist members supported the plan, Cho and his

103 Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 217.
104 Ibid.
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supporters voted against it because they believed that any compromise on the idea of
trusteeship, regardless of how the term was translated, would delay the possibility of
immediate independence.

In other words, their stem opposition to trusteeship had

nothing to do with the plan itself, but with the idea of foreign intervention in Korean
affairs. Cho and his supporters, who were mostly cultural nationalists, found it an insult
for the foreign powers even to consider a trusteeship because they believed in their
capacity for self-government, and they did not need the consent of any foreign powers.
Therefore, in protest against trusteeship, Cho Man-sik and several other CDP members
resigned their position in the SPPPC.
Cho Man-sik’s protest against the Moscow Agreement caught the Russians by
surprise. After Cho’s resignation, Soviet officials tried to persuade Cho to change his
mind, but Cho refused.105 On January 5, 1946, exhausting all possible means to sway
Cho from his anti-trusteeship position, the Soviet authorities finally decided to take him
into “protective custody,” which meant house arrest in the Koryo Hotel, a luxury hotel in
P’yongyang.106 There were many testimonies saying that the Soviet generals as well as
other Communists and leftists, including Kim Il-sung and later Yo Un-hyong, gathered
around Cho to persuade him to support the Moscow Agreement and promised to make
him the head of state in northern Korea. Had Cho accepted the offer, the course of
history might have been different.
The point here was not whether or not Cho Man-sik accepted the Soviet offer, but
the offer itself. It showed the lack of confidence of the Soviet generals and Kim Il-sung
in assuming full control of the northern zone without the collaboration of Cho. It was

105 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 123.
106 Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 217.
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true that in the end the Communists did manage to control the whole zone, but it was not
without loss. Open confrontation was the last thing the Soviet Union desired, especially
when United States’ public opinion might be sensitive towards the oppression of the
Christian church in the north. They did not want to provoke a big uprising like that of
March 1st 1919. Therefore, they wanted to push forward the plan of coalition as long as
possible so that they could conduct their house cleaning quietly.
The way in which the Russians handled Cho’s opposition supported this point.
The Russian had shipped to Siberia almost everyone who stood up against the trusteeship,
but not Cho Man-sik. He was only put under house arrest in the best hotel in P’yongyang.
Clearly, because of Cho’s strong influence in the north, it was too much of a risk to
execute him. Perhaps the Russians might have believed that Cho would possibly change
his mind later, and could therefore be useful to pacify the north as well as to gain support
in the south. In fact, Cho Man-sik’s reputation in the south increased rather than declined
when he openly opposed trusteeship. Thus, Cho still had future political bargaining value.
Also, Cho Man-sik was different from other rightists because he was a true
national figure. Similar to Syngman Rhee and Yo Un-hyong in the south, his name had
symbolic influence among the people of the whole nation. Killing Cho or sending him to
Siberia was too much of a political risk to take because the anti-Communist rightists
might use this opportunity to incite a nationwide, anti-Soviet uprising that could
jeopardize the Communist position while its hold on power in the north was still weak. It
was better to keep Cho under “house arrest” so that the rightists had no excuse to
mobilize a mass movement.
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From 1946 to 1950, many people tried try to persuade Cho Man-sik to give up his
anti-trusteeship stand and support the Moscow Agreement. Nevertheless, Cho was not
swayed because he was more a nationalist than a politician. His anti-trusteeship position
was also in line with public opinion, so his resolve only increased his popularity, causing
many people to come forward and plead for his life.

107

Beyond his personal appeal,

Cho’s story also suggested the overall strength of the Christians and their rightist allies in
the north, as well as the fears that the Soviets and the Korean Communists had
concerning them.

RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION
Cho Man-sik’s downfall marked the end of any Soviet attempts at forging a
coalition with the rightists.

The Five Provinces Administrative Bureau (FPAB) was

dissolved and replaced by a new political organization, the North Korean Provisional
People’s Committee (NKPPC), under Kim Il-sung’s chairmanship.108 It became the
central government in P’yongyang that controlled the five provinces in northern Korea.
A Communist Revolution in North Korea
A systematic purge of rightists started first against the Choson Democratic Party
(CDP), and then against other groups. In February 1946, a General Meeting of delegates
of the Choson Democratic Party was called in P’ydngyang.109 The party was forced to

107 Syngman Rhee’s government attempted to exchange Cho for two convicted Communist spies, but the
effort was cut short due to the outbreak o f the Korean War. According to Pak Kiryong, a North Korean
Communist official who fled to the Soviet Union in 1959, when U N troops were marching toward
P ’ydngyang in October 1950, Cho and all his family were executed before the Communists fled north. See
Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 123.
108 The North Korean Provisional People’s Committee (NKPPC) was later renamed the North Korean
People’s Committee (NKPC) in February 1947.
109 “Weekly Information Bulletin#20,” 4 September 1947,
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elect a new party chairman, Ch’o Yong-gon, who had been in Soviet Russia and was a
close associate of Kim Il-sung. When the purge began, many Christians and rightists in
the CDP joined the “exodus” of refugees fleeing south, including one of Cho’s sons and
the vice-chairman, Yi Yun-yong.110
The NKPPC began a series of reform programs including land reform, new
regulations on labor, legalized equality between the sexes, and the nationalization of
major industries. The Communist authorities also passed legislation to improve working
conditions, provide social insurance, and expand educational, cultural, and health
facilities.111 To expand the influence of the Communist Party, the NKPPC mobilized the
poor peasants, workers, women, and youth, who were the traditionally underprivileged
elements of Korean society.
The land reform program in March 1946 was the main effort to buy the support of
landless farmers. The NKPPC issued an order that land was to be confiscated from
former Japanese holdings, known collaborators, landlords with over 5 chdngbo (about
2.45 acres), absentee landlords, and religious organizations, and then distributed to
agricultural laborers, landless tenants, and peasants with less than 5 chdngbo. In the end,
about 1 million chdngbo were confiscated and re-distributed to 700,000 families.112
About seventy percent of the farming population benefited from the reform. A stateoperated Farmers’ Bank offered loans for farmers to buy seed, fertilizer, and equipment.

110 Rev. Yi Yoon-yong remained politically active in the south. At the request o f Syngman Rhee, Rev. Yi
gave a representative prayer at the opening session of the first National Assembly on May 31,1948. See
Nak Heong Yang, Reformed Social Ethics and the Korean Church (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.,
1997), 136.
111 State Department, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Take Over, 16.
112 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 76.
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The Land Reform was, in fact, not as bloodless as the Communists claimed. The
rightists in South P’yongan region resisted the land redistribution. Riots broke out in
many places. Russian soldiers were called in by the NKPPC to suppress these local
11-2

rebellions.

The majority of landlords left the north for the south even though their

decisions would leave them permanently landless.114 When the land redistribution was
completed on March 31, 1946, the popularity of Communism among the landless
peasants and urban workers began to rise, and the political and social power of the
rightists continued to decline.
In many leftists’ eyes, the northern revolution was a successful model because it
met relatively little resistance and enjoyed strong public appeal. The success, however,
was not truly realistic because the Communists’ popularity was the simple consequence
of arresting the most disgruntled, or pushing them south.

The Communists were

untroubled by the loss of about two million people who migrated south; removing this
surplus population lessened northern food demands and increased the political, economic,
and social turmoil below the 38th Parallel (See Table 2.8). It was a wise political strategy
that allowed the Communists to kill two birds with one stone.
In reality, the land reform actually gave more economic power to the state than to
individual farmers because the Communist authorities actually taxed about 50 percent of
the farmers’ crops.115 Later, on some occasions when farmers failed to meet their
predicted goals, they had to surrender 75 percent of their crops to the state. The land
reform neither solved the food shortage problem, nor improved the livelihood of the

113 See Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 153.
114 Mun Woong Lee, Rural North Korea under Communism: A Study o f Sociocultural Change (Houston,
TX: Rice University, 1976), 20.
115 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 143.
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northern farmers. Communist authorities adopted food rationing to solve the shortage
problem. Without a free market, food distribution enabled the Communist authority to
exert greater political control over city dwellers, because the government could withhold
food from their political opponents and supply good quality food to their loyal
supporters.116
Christian Opposition To Communist Political Control
The arrest of Cho Man-sik and the loss of the Social Democratic Party (SDP)
upset many church leaders in the north who knew that the Soviet Union had no desire to
grant them political freedom. As the March First celebration was approaching in a few
weeks, church leaders seized the opportunity to mobilize their congregations to voice
their discontent. Before the fall of Cho, the Soviet authorities had shown no objection to
the churches’ participation in the celebration of March First. In February, however, the
North Korean Provisional People’s Committee suddenly issued an order prohibiting any
church from celebrating the independence movement and commanded all people to
attend the People’s Assembly organized by the Communists.

117

Such an order did not, however, deter clergymen from organizing their own
religious memorial services for the loss of their members during the March First uprising.
The P’yongyang Pastor’s Association met on February 21, at the Somun (West Gate)
Church,118 and they decided to hold their own March First memorial service. Communist
authorities immediately demanded that the clergymen change their minds. When the
pastors refused, police arrested about sixty P ’yongyang city church leaders. A few who
116 Ibid., 144.
117 Lee, “Study on the Relation Between North Korea Government and North Korean Church Since
Liberation,” 43-44.
118 The West Gate Church was the oldest Presbyterian Church established by an American missionary, Rev.
Samuel A. Moffett around 1895.
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managed to escape arrest went on with the original plans for the memorial service in
various locations.119 On March 1, 1946, at ten o’clock in the morning, about ten
thousand people gathered at the Changdaehyon Presbyterian Church, the original site of
the March First Movement in P’yongyang city, to attend the memorial service. The
Communist authorities surrounded the church with armed men, but because of the
presence of several thousand Christian young people, they did not disturb the service and
waited until Rev. Hwang Un-gyun finished his sermon. As soon as he was done and the
people bowed their heads in prayer for the independence of Korea, the police came in and
took the pastor away in front of the whole congregation.120
Rev. Hwang’s arrest did not prevent Christians from continuing with their
planned programs. About five thousand Christians rushed out, waving Christian and
Korean flags and shouting the famous slogan, “Tongnip Mansei/” (which means “Hurrah
for Independence”), then singing the hymn, “Onward Christian Soldiers,” as they
marched towards the Soviet Army headquarters. When they saw the Communist police
and Red guards, they waved their Christian flags and shouted, “Freedom of religion.
Government control of religion [is] absolutely opposed.”121
The parade attracted the attention of many sympathetic P’yongyang citizens who
voluntarily joined the demonstration.

When they finally reached the P’yongyang

Railway Station, where Kim Il-sung held the Communist March First celebration, the two
groups confronted each other, and Kim’s celebration came to an abrupt end. Similar
clashes between Christians and Communists occurred everywhere in the northern cities.
For example, in Yongch’on and Uiju in North P’yongan Province near the Korea119 Clark, History o f the Korean Church, 12-13.
120 Ibid., 13.
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Manchurian border, not far from Sinuiju, where there was a huge concentration of
Protestants and Catholics (see Table 2.6), the confrontation between the Communist
authorities and the Christian community was particularly intense, resulting in the
destruction of many churches and mass arrests.122
What disturbed Kim Il-sung even more was that several assassins had tried to kill
him with hand grenades while he was giving his speech during the March First Memorial
celebration.123 Kim Il-sung put the two events together and concluded that Christian
churches were conspiring with the southern rightists in order to eliminate him and destroy
the Communist revolution in the north. As a result, Kim became even more determined
to take full control of the churches and exterminate all anti-Communist and reactionary
elements from northern society.
Shortly after the March First event, the Uiju Presbytery moderator, Rev. Kim
Kwon-jo, called a meeting of Christians on March 17, 1946.

He suggested that

Christians in the north send a joint statement to the south, informing southerners of the
Communist atrocities in the Russian occupation zone.

As soon as Kim Il-sung

discovered the plan, the police immediately arrested Rev. Kim and his associates.124
Communist Control over Christian Churches
This chain of events triggered Kim D-sung’s wrath against the churches. As a
result, Communist authorities organized a systematic dissolution of the influence of the
Christian churches. First of all, they intentionally scheduled all important affairs on

123 This event is also written by one o f the assassins. See In-ho Kim, Across the Line o f Death (Seoul:
Thinking People Press, 1999). See also Lee,
4
cfl
Study on the Relation between North Korea Government and North Korean Church since
Liberation,” 45-46.
124 Clark, H istory o f the Korean Church, 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161

Sunday, conducted political lectures in church buildings, and demanded that all
Christians attend. The most serious dispute was the election on Sunday, November 3,
1946. The authorities demanded that all people come out and vote. Christians, who did
not want to vote, perceived this as a direct threat to their religious freedom. Church
leaders finally became disgusted with the Communists’ unreasonable demands, and
united together to voice their discontent. The North Korean Joint Presbytery declared:
Our 2,000 churches and 300,000 Christians, for the preservation o f the faith and the
progress o f the Church, having approved the following five principles for the government
o f the Church and as rulers for Christian living, wish to inform the People’s Committee
of these Principles, hoping for their kind cooperation: 1) Keeping the Sabbath holy is of
the life o f the Church, so there should be no attendance at things other than worship on
the Lord’s Day. 2) Government and religion should be kept separate. 3) Respect for the
Deity in the church building is the proper duty o f the church, so that the use o f this
church building for other purpose than worship is forbidden. 4) In the event that an acting
church worker enters the field o f politics, he must resign his office in the church. 5) The
Church stands for freedom of religion and assembly.125

Their opposition to the Sunday election and their refusal to comply with Communist
orders revealed their desire to distance themselves from the new Communist regime.
In order to weaken the unity of the Christian community, Communists applied a
divide-and-conquer strategy. Under the direction of Kim H-sung, a separate pro-regime
Christian organization, known as the Christian League (Kidokkyo Kyodoyonmaeng), was
formed and headed by Kim’s relative, Kang Yang-uk, a former pastor in P’yongyang. It
was designed to take members away from the influential Presbyterian Church and other
denominations.

Initially, their effort was not successful, but when a famous Korean

missionary to China, Pak Sang-sun, and a retired minister-evangelist, Kim Ik-du, joined
the league, some Christians followed in fear of Communist persecution.

125 Ibid., 14.
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Probably the last major organized resistance by the Christian community against
Communist control was on election day, November 3, 1946.126 Most churches in both
North and South P ’yongan Provinces refused to participate in the election despite Kim IIsung’s order.

10 1

Christians crowded their churches and did not leave for the entire day.

In other provinces, Communists went to Christians’ home, asking them to vote in the
morning. When they did not listen, the police waited for the end of the worship services,
and forced the church members to vote. In some areas, the election was extended to
Monday morning so that Christians had no excuse not to vote.128
The election was an effective means of creating the illusion of mass support,
while at the same time rooting out opposition members. The people could either vote for
the communist candidate, or they could vote against him by placing their ballots in an
ominously colored “black box.” There was no way to conceal an anti-Communist vote
because all of the ballots were serially numbered and the Communist guards were
watching carefully.129 Despite these dangers, of the 4,516,120 legitimate voters, around
25,000 refused to vote, and 131,757 chose to vote against the Communists (see Table
2.8).130 The number of anti-Communist voters was actually as high as 156,692, or about

126 Following the consolidation o f Communist power in the north, little is known for certain about the fate
o f those Christians who remained. According to the reports of the refugees and the testimonies of
individual northern Christians during the Korean War, most o f the remaining clergymen were either
arrested or converted by the Communists.
127 Clark, History o f the Korean Church, 14.
128 Lee,
^
Study on the Relation between
North Korea Government and North Korean Church since Liberation,”,49.
129 Buk Lee, “Report on North Korea,”
(F. E. G i l l e t t e )
i f $ eft
1946-1948 (Seoul: Hallym University, Institute of Asian Culture Studies, 1996), 1:2324. See also Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, 158. Two ex-north Koreans, Chung Hwak-sil and Jeong
Chun-seop, whom the author interviewed in June 2004, also testified to a similar situation.
130 The Communist authorities used the “two-box system” for the election. Each voter received a card with
the name of a candidate and threw it either into the white box ( ‘yes’) or into the black box ( ‘no’). This
election was hardly democratic because there were basically no options. The names o f the candidates were
mostly Communists or pro-Communists. Those who rejected the Communist candidates had to put their
ballots into the “Black Box” before the eyes o f the Communist guards, a very daring move.
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3.5 percent of the total legitimate voters (see Table 2.7). To cast a ballot into the black
box or to refuse to show up at the election center was to put one’s life at risk. A report by
an anti-Communist publisher in the south, Yi Puk, claimed that prior to the re-election the
following year in March 1947, “members of the Democratic Young Men’s Alliance and
Laborer’s Union carried out a widespread massacre of the black box voters.”131
In addition, since the November election, any attempt to organize a rival political
party would immediately attract the police. The most well known case was the Christian
Liberal Party (CLP) under the direction of Rev. Kim Hwa-sik. Like the SDP, the CLP
began its organization around September 1945, but the formation of the Choson
Democratic Party under Cho Man-sik’s leadership attracted most of the attention. Rev.
Kim and his supporters gave up their effort.

Nevertheless, new international

developments motivated Rev. Kim to mobilize again.

In September 1947, after the

collapse of the US-Soviet Joint Commission to resolve the division of Korea, the United
States referred the Korean situation to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The
US plan was to call for separate elections in two zones in Korea. After two months of
debate and discussion, the General Assembly adopted the US-sponsored plan to establish
the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to investigate the
situation in Korea and oversee the upcoming election in the American zone.132
Fearing that the nation was going to be divided permanently, the remnants of the
northern Christian nationalists tried to rise up again to reverse this trend. When news of
the UN resolution reached the ears of Rev. Kim and his supporters in November, they

131 Lee, “Report on North Korea,”

(F. E. G i l l e t t e )

-& & 4I

z Q & r m 1946-1948, 1:24.
132 Jon Halliday, “The United Nations and Korea,” in Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship
Since 1945, ed. Frank Baldwin (Toronto: Random House, Inc., 1973,1974), 112-117.
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hoped that the situation might turn to their favor, and thus hurried to form a new political
party to support a general election throughout the country. Nevertheless, the day before
the formal ceremony of the CLP’s establishment, the Communist police arrested Rev.
Kim and some forty leaders of the party. Most of these men either died in prison or
permanently disappeared.133
The resistance of the northern Christian leaders against Communist domination
cost the Christian community heavily.

Kim Il-sung intensified his pressure on the

clergymen and laymen through the Christian League. From 1948 onwards, all Christian
workers were “required” to join the league. Most of the well-known pastors and elders
who refused to join the league either were arrested one-by-one or went missing or
escaped to the south before the police found them.134 In the end, a total of 212 pastors,
not including elders and laymen, lost their lives before the outbreak of the Korean War.135
By forcing two Protestant seminaries to combine and limit their enrollment to only 120
students, the Communist authorities sought to starve the Christian community of any
potential leadership so that it would never be able to rise again to resist the
government.136
Because of the Communists’ harsh policies against the Christian community, a
large number of Christians became uprooted refugees in the south. Although the actual
number of Christians that fled south is unknown, the figure likely exceeded one hundred
thousand.

The majority of these refugees were pastors, laymen, church workers,

133 Lee, “Study on the Relation Between North Korea Government and North Korean Church Since
Liberation,” 41.
134 Clark, A History o f the Church in Korea, 243-244.
135 There were about 109 pastors in the five presbyteries o f the south in 1940. By 1947, there were about
179. About seventy Presbyterian pastors had left the north. With a total o f 212 northern pastors’ deaths by
1950, we can guess the majority o f the clergymen in the north were either exterminated or fled.
136 Lee, “M M lik'ik j b f t f i l f t f c #
study on the Relation between
North Korea Government and North Korean Church since Liberation,” 58-60.
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educators, landowners, students, or businessmen.

Their presence in the south would

provide new political, social, and religious force to the anti-Communist cause.
The Last Stand o f Ch’dndogyo
The Young Friends’ Party (YFP) organized by Ch’ondogyo’s followers was a
serious rival opposing Communist domination in the countryside. When the Christians
clashed with the Communists in the cities during the first eighteen months of Russian
occupation, the YFP remained quiet in the countryside since the YFP’s approach to social
issues such as land reform was quite similar to the Communists. Their differences began
to emerge later in 1947 when the Communists tried to weaken the influence of the YFP,
and also when the failure of a real rural transformation and Communist control became
obvious to some Ch’ondogyo followers.
When Ch’ondogyo continued to grow and attract followers among peasants, the
Communist authorities were alarmed.

In mid-1947, Ch’ondogyo claimed 1,690,000

adherents in north Korea.137 In March 1948, the YFP conducted a “Second March First
movement” to advocate national unity and independence, supporting the idea of a
nationwide election. Since the YFP believed that the peasants’ rights should be above the
state, and that the public should be free from the extractive hand of the state and
government control, the movement aroused the suspicions of the Communist authorities.
Many Ch’ondogyo believers were arrested by the police.

Kim H-sung denounced

“reactionaries” among the peasants in the YFP in his speech before the Korean Workers
Party Congress in March 1948.138 The YFP leaders became fearful of their political
future, and would never again make any statement or take any action that would provoke

137 Armstrong, The Korean Revolution, 128.
138 Ibid., 133.
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the Communists.

Under Kim Tal-hyon’s leadership, the YFP reversed its position,

denounced the UNTCOK, and accused the United States and “reactionaries” in the south
of perpetuating the division of Korea. After that, the YFP submitted fully to the political
leadership of the Communist government in North Korea.139

CONCLUSION
Religion was an important political factor in post-liberation North Korea. Both
Ch’ondogyo and Christianity were popular.

While Ch’ondogyo received its support

mainly from farmers, Christianity was popular in the cities and among educated elites.
An immediate Communist dictatorship was not possible right after liberation because of
the influence of these religious groups. A nationalist-Communist coalition was, therefore,
desirable, yet not necessarily attainable. The rise and fall of Cho Man-sik signified both
the attempt and the failure of such a coalition in north Korea. The division of the Korean
peninsula, the clash between Christians and Communist authorities, and the exodus of
refugees from the north would have equally significant impacts on the south.

The

refugee problem was an added burden on an already troubled and inflamed southern
society, further complicating the political, economic, social, ideological, and religious
conditions in the south.
Koreans, in general, had a very limited understanding of American democracy.
Nevertheless, through either the church or its public outreach services, many Koreans had
formed a favorable view of America, through a “special relationship” dating back sixty
years. And among all Koreans, Korean Christians had the strongest ties to America, and
were the most ardent admirers of America’s freedoms and way of life. Preserving their
139 Ibid.
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religious freedom became part of their struggle to achieve an American style of
democracy. Among the two million refugees, there might not be many common traits they came south from all socioeconomic backgrounds, and left the north for a variety of
reasons, not all of them religious. However, they shared one common idea - a hatred, if
not a fear, of Communism.
The influx of two million refugees into the southern Korean zone (enough to
swell the overall southern population by about 10 percent) would, of course, come to
have a dramatic effect on the polarization of the south.

These northern refugees,

including prominent Christian clergymen, elders, and educated laymen, would emerge as
a significant political, religious, and social force in the southern zone. As a result,
whichever southern leader could capture the refugees’ support would likely gain enough
political strength to rise above his political rivals.
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CHAPTER 3
Religious Factors in South Korea

INTRODUCTION
When the northern refugees arrived in the south, they discovered a very different
world.

Lacking the troop numbers,1 the political savvy,2 and the ruthlessness of the
-5

Soviet Army, the U.S. occupation zone was rocked by other kinds of problems such as
terrorist activities, political assassinations, strikes, guerrilla attacks, political uprisings,
and anti-government demonstrations. In addition, an influx of migrants from Manchuria,
China, Japan, and North Korea caused serious shortages. Refugees suffered from squalid
living conditions as a massive relief effort was needed just to provide basic necessities.
Nevertheless, for many refugees from the north, the southern wind was a breath of
fresh air. The southern clime was especially welcome to the Christians, educators, land
owners, and the pro-Japanese collaborators, who had generally been the most persecuted
in the north. Under the U.S. occupation, Christians and collaborators were two of the
major groups dominating the American Military Government (AMG). Christians were
free to preach, foreign missionaries were coming back and working for the AMG, and

1 According to General John Hodge’s report to General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo on September 13,
1945, the strength o f US Army stationed in south Korea was very limited, far less than the number the
Soviet Union had sent to north Korea. See “Conditions in Korea,” 13 September 1945
(John R. Hodge)
1 9 4 5 .6 -1 9 4 8 .8 (Seoul: Hallym University,
Institute o f Asian Culture Studies, 1995), 3:6.
2 It is generally agreed by most historians that United States forces were unprepared and uninformed for
their occupation task in south Korea.
3 The ruthlessness o f the Soviet Army during the initial stage o f the occupation is presented by Erik van
Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989).
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Christian leaders could be found all along the political spectrum from the right to the left
(though not the extreme left). Why did the AMG favor Christians and hire collaborators?
To cover every aspect of the American occupation is far beyond the scope of this
chapter, and has already been the subject of various books.4 Instead, this chapter will
focus only on finding the missing pieces in the puzzle of how Christians rose to power
under the AMG and of how Christianity became an important factor in the rise of radical
anti-Communism in southern Korea.5

THE ROLE OF GEORGE Z WILLIAMS IN THE FORMATION OF THE AMG
As soon as the demarcation line was drawn on August 16, 1945, Washington
informed General Douglas MacArthur about the American occupation of Korea. But,
who should General MacArthur send to be in charge of Korea? There were several
logical choices. The most suitable one was General Joseph W. Stilwell, the Commander
of the Tenth Army, because he had wide experience in the Far East. He had worked with
both the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists during World War II, but Chiang Kaishek disliked him intensely because of Stilwell’s harsh criticism of Chiang’s government
while working with Chiang in the China-India-Bumia theater in 1942-1944. General

4 The most comprehensive work is Bruce Cumings’ two volumes on the origins o f the Korean War. Bonnie
B.C. Oh’s collection o f articles, Korea Under the American Military Government 1945-1948, provides
interesting analyses o f specific aspects o f the American Military Government (AMG). Jongsuk Chay’s
Unequal Partners in Peace and War gives a solid overview of the bilateral relations between Korea and
America before and during the Korean War. Robert T. Oliver’s Syngman Rhee and American Involvement
in Korea 1942-1960 is an in-depth pro-Rhee study o f the relationship between Rhee and the American
government.
Chung-shin Park’s study, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, is an important overview, but he does not
study the connection between Korean Christians, American missionaries, and the AMG in depth. Donald
N. Clark’s account o f missionaries in Korea, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 19001950, gives some important details, but still, he provides no elaboration on the connections between these
three major groups.
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MacArthur did not send Stilwell due to Chiang’s strong opposition.6 Another possible
choice was Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was in command of all
American forces in China at that time. Since he had trained the Korean “Restoration
Army” in Xi’an, China, he was well-known among Korean nationalists.7 Had he been in
charge of the occupation, he would have wide support from Korean nationalists in China,
in particular, the Korean Provincial Government (KPG) in Chongqing (Chungking).
Nevertheless, perhaps Wedemeyer was too involved in China affairs, and too far away to
come. The assignment fell on the shoulders of General John R. Hodge for one simple
reason: he was geographically the closest to Korea at the time.
General Hodge and Commander Williams
General Hodge was in Okinawa when General MacArthur’s order arrived. He
needed to move his troops from there to Inch’on Harbor as quickly as possible. Although
Hodge was a good soldier and a courageous commander, he had very limited knowledge
of Asia.

Neither Washington nor General MacArthur offered him much help.

He

received little guidance on how to set up a military government in the southern zone, and
had few troops and no interpreters.

Hodge’s first political adviser was H. Merrell

Benninghoff, a low ranking State Department officer who could not speak with authority

6 Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence o f Separate Regimes
1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 123.
7 Henry Chung, Korea and the United States Through War and Peace: 1943-1960 (Seoul: Yonsei
University Press, 2000), 99-100.
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and had very little knowledge of Korea.8 Hodge’s ignorance of Korean affairs paved the
way for Commander George Z. Williams, the son of Rev. Frank Williams, who was a
Methodist missionary to Korea, to become Hodge’s trusted personal adviser during the
first three months of US occupation in Korea.
George Z. Williams was bom in Inch’on and had spent the first fifteen years of
his life in Korea, but he was not originally assigned to the Korean occupation force on the
eve of General Hodge’s landing. During World War n, Williams had served as the head
of the Department of Laboratories at a large hospital on the U.S. naval base in Brisbane,
Australia. In 1945, he took up a new assignment as an Assistant Fleet Surgeon, where he
was in charge of the medical landing operations for US forces. He applied for a transfer
as soon as he heard of the plan of American forces to occupy southern Korea. His
application, however, was rejected twice because Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, the
Commander of the 7th Fleet, wanted to keep him on his ship.
Nevertheless, through a mere coincidence that would have far-reaching effects on
the AMG, Williams’ ship came in on September 8, 1945 because the 7th Fleet was
assigned to the convoy escorting General Hodge and his troops to Inch’on. Speaking
fluent Korean, Williams was the only American at that time able to communicate with
the three Korean representatives who were waiting for General Hodge at Inch’on

8 Neither did Washington have any bright ideas about domestic politics in Korea. Most o f the reports the
State Department officials received were basically unreliable or tainted by political leanings. Cumings, The
Origins o f the Korean War, 129. See also James I. Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in
Korea, 1945-1948,” Korean Studies 19 (1995): 20. To make it worse, Benninghoff was a low ranking State
Department officer who could not speak with authority. Thus, General Hodge requested to have
“Washington officials empowered to speak o f the future be added to [his] staff.” See “Conditions in
Korea” 13 September 1945,
(John R. Hodge) ^ 1 $ 1945.6-1948.8,
3:8.
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Harbor.9 Williams seized this opportunity to plead his case directly to General Hodge.
Hodge immediately took him to be his personal political adviser.

It was initially a

temporary assignment, but Williams would ultimately serve in this capacity for about
three months. Since Hodge had already been given Benninghoff as his political adviser
from the State Department, why did he choose to put Williams in the same role? It was
not just because Williams could communicate freely in Korean, but also because he could
mingle with the Korean people due to his religious connections.10
Commander Williams’ Responsibilities
General Hodge asked Williams to advise him on the political conditions in Korea,
to hire Koreans for the American Military Government (AMG), and to speak on behalf of
the AMG to Korean leaders.11 Each of these assignments would prove critical to the
initial formation of AMG. By combining three crucial responsibilities into one position,
and then entrusting that position to a hastily chosen individual, Hodge unintentionally

9 These three Koreans were delegates of the Committee for Preparation o f Korean Independence. See
Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners In Peace and War: The Republic o f Korea and the United States, 19481953 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 2002), 40.
10 On September 8, 1945, right after Williams had met with the three representatives and brought the
General’s words back to them, they took Williams around town and fed him dinner. When he returned to
the ship, he reported his “investigation” back to the General. That night, the Admiral sent word to
Williams, asking him to work for General Hodge. “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur
Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the Methodist Chapel, 30 January 1946,” Presbyterian
Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29: 1, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. (This document is the most interesting document I found in the church archives. Although it
was a message to the Methodist leaders, I found the document instead in the Presbyterian archives. At the
top of the document, it was marked as “very confidential - not to be quoted.” It was a private statement by
Commander George Z. Williams to the church groups and secretly circulated among church leaders who
had a deep interest in the missionary work in Korea. Since this document was buried in the church archives
and not generally available to diplomatic historians, I think it is important to take a deeper look at it
because o f the influential role Williams played during the early months o f US occupation. The document
reveals Williams’ inner thoughts, frustrations, and even his “prophesy” on the future development o f a
divided Korea.)
11 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

173

made Williams the most powerful and influential person in the AMG - at least for the allimportant first month, if not longer.12
Williams, however, was a medical specialist, not a trained interpreter, and not a
well-informed political advisor. Thus, his views were not necessarily in accordance with
the position of Washington, and he was vulnerable to the manipulations of skillful
Korean politicians. Also, his religious background and church connections tended to
make him more receptive to the opinions and the needs of Christian groups, educated
elites, and missionary communities. His extensive contact with the Korean elites and his
free access to General Hodge were probably the keys to understanding how the rightists,
especially the Christian elites, came to dominate the AMG.13
Williams’ first mission was to learn as much as he could about Korean public
opinion and political leanings, and then to report it to General Hodge. What kind of
information did he submit to Hodge?

First of all, he showed particular favoritism

towards conservatives and Christian elites, such as Song Chin-u, Kim Ku, and Syngman
Rhee.

His favorite Korean leader was Song Chin-u, who was a famous cultural

nationalist during the colonial period, and was also the leader of the Korean Democratic
Party (KDP).

Williams saw Song as a stem anti-Communist and pro-democracy

conservative. He regarded the people in the KDP as prominent and trustworthy Korean

12 It is important to note that Washington did not send any specific or detailed guidelines for the occupation.
It made Williams’ role in the first three months of occupation more critical. A lack o f preparation and an
absence o f qualified personnel haunted the initial stage o f Hodge’s military occupation in Korea. See
Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948,” 21.
13 It is hard to evaluate George Z. Williams’ work because there is not much information available. Since
he was a last minute kind o f adviser o f whom the State Department had no foreknowledge and over whom
it exercised no direct control, State Department files contain only a few written materials concerning him.
Neither did he have a formal responsibility to report on his duties to the Army Headquarters in Tokyo. Nor
is much available in the military file. Nevertheless, from September 1945 to January 1946, Williams was
very close to Hodge, receiving full attention from the General. He was everywhere in the field and very
active in the AMG, but unfortunately remained basically invisible if we only seek information on him in
the government archives.
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leaders. This probably explained why the AMG appointed many KDP members to its
administration. Since the arrival of the US occupation forces, the KDP had advocated the
return of Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku to Korea, and lobbied for the recognition of the
exiled Korean Provisional Government (KPG), then based in Chongqing (Chungking),
China. Song and his associates worked hard to convince Williams that Rhee and Kim
would receive “ninety percent support” from the Korean people if the United Nations
were willing to recognize them.14 Soon afterward, General Hodge, probably acting on
Williams’ advice, urged General Douglas MacArthur to bring Rhee back from the United
States and to recognize the KPG “as a provisional government under Allied sponsorship
to act as figure-heads during the occupation,” if possible.15
The problem, however, was that Williams actually knew very little about any of
these individuals.

The names of Song, Rhee and Kim were indeed famous among

Koreans,16 but this did not necessarily mean that they would be the best choices for the
benefit of an American occupation. History would show that Rhee and Kim caused more
problems and headaches for the AMG than anyone else. The anti-trusteeship campaign
devised by Rhee and Kim was a great burden on the AMG.17 Kim’s attempt to overthrow
the AMG in early 1946 also weakened the legitimacy of the AMG.

These rightists

14 “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the
Methodist Chapel, January 30, 1946,” 2-5. According to Cumings, the KDP constantly demanded the
return o f the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) to offset the influence o f the People’s Republic.
These two self-proclaimed governments thus competed vigorously for public support as well as political
legitimacy in the first year o f American occupation.
15 Hodge himself knew that not all Koreans favored the KPG due to “a wide diversity o f opinion.” Thus, he
allowed the KPG members to return only as private individuals and did not recognize the KPG without the
approval o f Washington. See “Conditions in Korea” 13 September 1945, M M U kffllW fB X 'M M •' &}x l
(John R. Hodge)
1 9 4 5 .6 -1948.8, 3:6-8.
16 All their names appeared on the list o f the cabinet members o f the People’s Republic even without their
consents. Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 87.
17 For details o f the trusteeship debate, see Choi Sang-Yong, “Trusteeship Debate and the Korean Cold
War,” in Korea Under the American Military Government 1945-1948, ed. Bonnie B.C. Oh (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 2002), 13-39.
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probably caused as much trouble as the leftists, making the American occupation even
more difficult. In fact, the State Department trusted neither of them and even blocked
Rhee’s return by denying him a passport. Nevertheless, because of the insistence of
Hodge and MacArthur, the War Department bypassed the State Department and brought
Rhee back to Korea on its own airplanes. This action sparked the beginning of an on
going conflict between Hodge and the State Department throughout the occupation
period.
Second, Williams did not trust the leftists, particularly the Communists. Despite
Yo Un-hyong’s general popularity among the Korean people, Williams feared that his
People’s Party was actually controlled by the Communists.18 According to Williams’
own political surveys, probably conducted during the first two months of the American
occupation, the Korean Communist Party (KCP) only had 300 members when the
Americans landed, and the overall support for the Communists was a meager five percent
of the southern population. He also asserted that the Communist leader, Pak Hon-yong,
was politically insignificant because no one in Korea knew who he was. But, since Pak
was the only Korean delegate that Williams could identify as ever visiting Moscow,
Williams suspected that Pak was a puppet, and that the Russians had real control over the
People’s Party.19 Williams’ major concern was that Pak actually ran the People’s Party20
instead of Yo. Thus, since Williams believed that the leftists were politically marginal,
and at the same time wide open to Soviet subrogation, he was unwilling to depend on

18 “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the
Methodist Chapel, January 3 0 ,1 9 4 6 ,” 4-6.
19 Ibid., 5. Actually, Y6 Un-hy6ng had also visited Moscow in his early life. Y6 became a devoted Socialist
after his tour to Russia. See Lee Wha Rang, “Who Was Yo Un-hyung?”
http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/mongyang.htm.
20 Because o f General Hodge’s command, the People’s Republic was forced to change its name to
“People’s Party,” in order to avoid suppression by the AMG.
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them for advice or public services.

His survey probably explains why the General

initially refused to work closely with the People’s Party.21
Since Williams was responsible for hiring Korean elites to fill high positions in
the AMG, he naturally loaded the government with more conservatives, in addition to the
already empowered pro-Japanese collaborators. According to historian Bruce Cumings,
the AMG hired or retained about 75,000 Koreans from September to December 1945,
and most of these men were affiliated with the KDP.

O ')

Seeing that the United States had

made a great mistake by hiring pro-Japanese “traitors,” Yim Yong-sin,23 a well-known
female nationalist, hurried to confront the AMG officials about the problem. However,
an official told her that since there was only one person who spoke Korean in the whole
US occupation force, there was no way for the Americans to distinguish who were
collaborators and who were not.24
Williams was actually quite sympathetic to those Koreans who had worked and
lived under the Japanese reign of terror. When some accused collaborators showed him
how they had tricked the Japanese and “sabotaged the Japanese war effort,” Williams was
rye

very impressed and hoped that someone might write a book about it.

His positive view

of these collaborators perhaps had encouraged him to keep them in the military
government. According to his primary investigation, he discovered that “the Koreans had

21 General Hodge agreed to cooperate with the leftists and worked with YC Un-hyOng when Washington
pressured him in 1947 to bring forth a coalition between the leftists and the rightists, but the effort came too
late.
22 Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 156.
23 Louise Yim was a graduate from Ewha Women University and received her Master Degree at the
University o f Southern California, with her thesis, “Korean Buddhists Are Turning to the Christian Faith.”
She turned to Korea in 1932 and began to build a new Women University in Seoul. She was well-known
among the anti-Japanese underground circle, and a loyal supporter o f Dr. Syngman Rhee.
24 Louise Yim, M y Forty Year Fight fo r Korea (Seoul: Chungang University Press, 1951), 242.
25 “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the
Methodist Chapel, January 30, 1946,” 3.
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been forced to cooperate in all the war efforts,” and believed that it would be unfair to
exclude them simply because they had worked for the Japanese.26 If so, no one would be
qualified to serve in the AMG.
Most American missionaries agreed with him.

For example, Horace G.

Underwood, who had lived in Korea during the colonial era, knew the difficulty of the
issue and explained the situation well. According to his experience in the education field,
most of the collaborators in Korean schools were actually “good people,” but they had no
choice if they wanted to survive the thirty-five years of Japanese occupation. From top to
bottom, collaborating with the Japanese was basically unavoidable.27
Growing Christian Influence in the South
Liberation of South Korea by US troops offered Korean Christians an opportunity
to gain power.

Since Americans were looking for educated and English-speaking

workers, it was relatively easy for Christians, who were educated in mission schools and
had worked closely with missionaries, to enter the AMG. Thirty-five out of fifty Koreans
in high positions were Choson Christian College (Yonsei) professors, graduates,
clergymen, and church laymen.28 In addition, six Korean doctors, who were all
personally trained by American medical missionaries during the Japanese colonial period,
were appointed by AMG as vice-governors.

Compared to these two sets of figures with

the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (KILA) and the directly-elected Korean

26 Ibid.
27 Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f Horace G.
Underwood (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 106.
28 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, p.3, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 16, Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. See also Arthur J. Moore, The
Church Cradled in Conflict: A Report o f an Episcopal Visit to Korea in 1946 (New York: The Methodist
Church, 1946), 8.
29 R. Manton Wilson, “Dear Friends” letter, 23 January 1946, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), Department of
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
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Legislative Assembly (KLA), the proportion of Christians was high in all three, but by far
the highest in the AMG administration appointments (see Table 3.1).
In fact, when General Hodge ordered Williams to set up a National Advisory
Council for the military government, he also showed his favoritism toward Christians.
The general wanted the council to consist of “two non-pro-Japanese lawyers, two bankers,
some agricultural men, two highly successful business men, a doctor, and two
representatives of the Protestant Churches, one of the Catholics, one of Confucianism,
one of Buddhism, and one from each of the main political parties - the People’s Republic
and the Democratic Party.” 30 Given that Christians were less than three percent of the
overall Korean population, a request for three out of five religious representatives taken
from the Christian circle was exceptionally high. Following Hodge’s direction, Williams
was able to find people to fill the council except for the two representatives from the
Protestant churches because he could not immediately locate any non-pro-Japanese
pastors. For the rest of the group, the majority of them were Christian laymen. Williams
called it a “Christian National Advisory Council.”31
In another case, General Hodge asked Williams to find a head for the Korean
National Police, one of the most crucial positions in the AMG. Williams turned to Song
Chin-u for help and instructed him to find someone to run the police who would be antiCommunist and have the courage to put anti-Communism into practice.32 When Song
came back to Williams the next day, he brought with him Cho Pyong-ok, a well-known

30 “Notes on address by Commander George Tsur Williams to Korea secretaries and missionaries in the
Methodist Chapel, January 30, 1946,” 6.
31 Ibid. Eventually, Kim Song-su, Kim Yong-mu, Song Chin-u, Yi Yong-sol, Kim Yong-sun, O Yong-su,
Kang Pyong-sun, and Yun Ki-ik participated in the council, but Y5 Un-hy6ng quit and Cho Man-sik was
not able to attend because he was in the north. Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 147.
32 Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 158.
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Christian nationalist and an active KDP member.33 Cho’s anti-Japanese record and his
American-educated background satisfied the criteria, and so Williams persuaded the
General to immediately appoint Cho as the head of the national police in October 1945.34
Since whoever controlled the police force would eventually control the future political
and social development of the American zone, the rightists and Christians were gaining
more power and obtaining a stronger position in the south with a Christian KDP man in
charge.
Because more Christian clergymen and laymen were entering into positions of
influence, there was an immediate impact, boosting the political and social standing of
the Christian community. Rather than being persecuted, as they were during the colonial
period, Christians became a new ruling class in the liberated southern zone. This was not
accidental, but was a natural result of a synergistic match between a successful American
mission field for the previous four decades and the rise of an American hegemony.

AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE AMG
The establishment of a military government in the south hastened the return of
American missionaries and provided an unprecedented opportunity to re-establish their
influence in Korea.

Although the American Military Government (AMG) and the

missionaries had completely different goals, each side needed the other to achieve them.
The AMG was desperate for trained workers and the missionaries were desperate for
visas. Though having no direct power in politics or policy-making, the missionaries

33 Cho Pyong-ok was a student in Paejae School. He graduated from Columbia University and claimed to
have received a Ph.D. there also. He later returned to Korea and became a YMCA Activist. Cho was
arrested during the colonial period because of his anti-Japanese activities. See ibid., 501.
34 Ibid., 158.
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would come to wield a remarkably strong influence upon both American military
generals on one side and Korean leaders on the other.
Preparation fo r their Return to Korea
After being forced out of Korea by the Japanese in 1942, missionaries looked
forward to their return to the peninsula as ambassadors of peace.

At the inter

denominational Korea Area Conference held in 1943 in New York, the attendants
expressed their desire for Korean independence.35 At first, they were optimistic about the
growing power and influence of Russia and China in Asia, hoping that “the eclipse of
Japan” would produce greater freedom for evangelization in China and other Asian
countries. With such hope, they supported religious freedom so that missionaries might
advance the Christian cause without hindrance.36
Around this same time, some religious political action committees, such as the
Christian Friends of Korea, began to advocate that missionaries become involved in
Korean politics. Their representatives urged churches in the United States and Canada to
“unite in an effort to prevail on the Allied Nations, especially America, to immediately
recognize the independence of Korea, deal with the [Korean] Provisional Government in
Chungking China, through its accredited representative in Washington just as they
continue to recognize the provisional governments of several European countries and
deal with them through their accredited representatives.”37

35 “Letter by the Board to members o f the Sub-Committee on Korea,” 26 April 1943, Presbyterian Church
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
36 J. L. Hooper, “Basic Issues Confronting Postwar Missions,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Box 16, Folder 30: Korean Consultative Conference, 1944-Presbyterian Historical Society,
Philadelphia.
37 O. R. Allison, “Note on objections some missionaries and some Board Secretaries make to joining in a
movement to urge the United States o f America to declare the immediate independence o f Korea,” 18
November 1943, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29 - Presbyterian
Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Planning the future of a not-yet-liberated Korea, some church activists envisioned
a land of confusion and many competing ideologies - democracy and communism being
just two. Having a history of monarchy but now without a king, and having had no selfgovernment for forty years, post-war Korea would be a power vacuum. Since Korea had
a large number of well-trained Christian leaders, missionaries expected the Christian
elites to be the ones to maneuver this new nation toward America and toward the
American ideals of democracy and the free practice of religion. The missionaries’ role
would therefore center on assisting native-Christian leaders and on extending the
Church’s influence.38 To be sure, not all missionaries thought in such political terms or
would become involved in politics; yet, no missionary (or church member for that matter)
could remain entirely aloof from the religious implications of a Communist Korea. Such
political planning reveals that the seeds of future alliances between individual
missionaries and the Korean rightists had already been planted before the war’s end.
The Return o f Missionaries
When World War II finally came to a close, the US occupation of southern Korea
encouraged American missionaries, who expected that their government would be
favorable to their cause, opening the way for their prompt return, and working with them
to develop Korea. Korean Christians had similar expectations. As soon as the war ended,
Korean Churches sent a deluge of requests for missionaries to the Foreign Missions desks
of their parent denominations in America. For example, representing the general opinion

38 Ibid.
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of the Korean Christians, Rev. Yun Ha-yong39 and Rev. Han Kyong-jik also wrote to the
Presbyterian Board in early 1946 that they were “waiting for the missionaries” and
wanted to establish new Korea “on the sure foundation of Christ.” 40
Similar requests from individual Korean clergymen and laymen arrived frequently.
American church leaders were excited and moved to act quickly. As early as November
1945, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (USA) had already expressed the hope
that the United States would enter into a short-term trusteeship with Korea so that the
United States could offer political support and economic assistance to Korea through both
government and private channels 41 The board adopted a strategy of inter-denominational
collaboration to lobby the U.S. government to help Korea attain political and economic
stability and independence and the full religious liberty of the Korean people.42 To
maximize the religious influence, the Presbyterian Church (USA) encouraged
missionaries to enlist in “the Red Cross, OFRRO, or other government agencies”
involved in relief work.43
In spite of pressure from religious groups, the State Department hesitated to send
back missionaries due to security concerns. The missionaries turned their efforts to the
U.S. Army. Here, they met with greater success, because the army recognized that, to

39 Rev. Yun Ha-y6ng, a formerly pastor o f the First Presbyterian Church in Sinuiju, was the co-founder of
the (Christian) Social Democratic Party in North Korea. After he escaped to South Korea, the American
Military government appointed him to be the governor of North Ch’ungch’bng Province. Harry A. Rhodes
and Archibald Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission Presbyterian Church in the USA Vol.2 1935-1959
(New York: Commission on Ecumencal Mission and Relations, The United Presbyterian Church in the
U.S.A., 1964), 88.
40 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, p.5, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 16, Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
41 J.L.H. “Reports From Korea,” 6 November 1945, Presbyterian Church Archives, RG 140, Box 16, Folder
29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
42 Ibid.
43 Charles W. Iglehart, “Some Notes on Post-war Relief and Reconstruction,” 28 September 1943,
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society,
Philadelphia.
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effectively occupy Korea, it would need as many people as possible with expertise in
Korean society. The War Department expressed a willingness to sponsor missionaries “if
they would cooperate during the first period of their arrival with the relief program of the
army.”44 Even though the missionaries were connected to the army, “they would be free
to give time outside the regular hours to making contacts with the Christian groups.”45
General Hodge also gave his personal assurance to Bishop Arthur J. Moore of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, who visited Korea in early 1946, that he welcomed
missionaries to come and work for the AMG.46 Blocked by the State Department, the
missionaries therefore saw the AMG as the only way to get their feet back on Korean soil.
In the final analysis, the stonewalling of the State Department surely increased the
political impact of the missionaries, because they became entrenched in many
government posts as a result.
The first missionaries to return were those already enlisted in the military. Like
Williams, they requested transfers to Korea. Among this first wave of returnees were Dr.
Horace H. Underwood, Lieut. Horace G. Underwood, Lieut. Richard Underwood,
Gordon Avison, Jr., Park L. Gerdine, and Charles K. Bemheisel.47 These men were all

44 John Hooper, “Letter from the Board to the Korea Mission,” 22 October 1945, Presbyterian Church
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 2, Folder 28 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
45 Ibid.
46 The following is a quotation from a radiogram sent by General Hodge to the Department o f State.
‘Policy on missionaries this headquarters revised as follows. Each religious denomination formerly
represented in Korea may send former missionaries not to exceed number formerly maintained in Korea by
each organization. Government transportation to Korea is desired until commercial transportation becomes
available. Local transportation and living accommodations exceedingly limited. Military Government can
assist in making food available and in finding limited housing. But it must be understood by individuals
that living conditions will be rugged and for that reason selection should be limited to male missionaries.
No facilities for families at present time. This headquarters desires opportunity to approve individual cases
prior to departure from United States.’ See Moore, The Church Cradled in Conflict, 20-21.
47 The author o f this dissertation cannot find the rank of the rest o f them.
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Korean-born children of missionaries.48 Their army status, their local connections, and
their language skills made them very useful to the occupation forces.
Lieut. Richard Underwood, for example, was an 18 year-old army officer who
was receiving training for future intelligence work in Korea by the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) shortly before the war ended.

Outrunning his oldest brother and his

father, Richard Underwood was the first member of the prestigious Underwood family to
return to Seoul49 Upon landing in Seoul, he was immediately put to work in the Property
Custody Section because he spoke fluent Korean. Then in the spring of 1946, he was
sent to the American Liaison team in P’yongyang. Purportedly assigned as the chauffer
for the Head of the Liaison Office, his real mission was collecting intelligence
information. But where could he find a network of pro-American informants? Naturally,
he used his church connections. Making contact with a local Presbyterian Church in
P ’yongyang, he earned their trust through his missionary credentials as a third-generation
Underwood in Korea.

Church members provided him with valuable intelligence

information about Russian soldiers and the communist government in the north.50
Richard Underwood’s father, Dr. Horace H. Underwood, the only son of Rev.
Horace G. Underwood, the first ordained Presbyterian missionary to Korea, returned to
Seoul as a 54-year-old civilian officer under the AMG.

He also had conducted

48 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, p.3, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 16, Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
49 According to his Memoirs, Dr. Syngman Rhee allowed Richard Underwood to fly with him from Guam
to Tokyo in the private plane that was prepared by General MacArthur. Richard F. Underwood, “Memories
and Thoughts,” (unpublished manuscript, 2002), 42.
50 Ibid., 56-58. It is hard to verify exactly what information the church members provided for Richard
Underwood, but judging by the time o f his residence in P’ySngyang, it was the period shortly after the
implementation o f land reform. Anti-Communist sentiment among the rightists, especially among church
leaders, certainly ran high because all the church farmland was confiscated by the Communists and
redistributed to landless peasants.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

185

intelligence work during the war for the US government in Asia and had been reassigned
to similar murky duties in Seoul, arriving soon after his son Richard, in October 1945.51
Meanwhile, Lt. Horace G. Underwood was serving in the US Navy and
participating in the occupation of Japan because he was fluent in both Japanese and
Korean.

Later, in early 1946, he was transferred to Seoul and placed in charge of

reorganizing Seoul National University.

59

He “was the only bilingual person working

between the university’s newly appointed president, Dr. Harry B. Ansted, and the
Military Government on the one hand, and the Korean faculty and students on the
other.”53 Lt. Underwood remained in the AMG through August 1947.
In addition to these missionary “kids,” other civilian missionaries also found their
way to Korea through the AMG. Since General MacArthur thought that there was a link
between Christianity and democracy, he gave permission for another twenty American
male missionaries (10 Protestants and 10 Catholics) to return and serve in AMG’s
Department of Public Health and Welfare.54 In addition, Mr. Dexter N. Lutz and Rev.
Frank Williams (George Williams’ father) became agricultural advisers of the AMG; Dr.
John D. Bigger and Dr. Roy K. Smith worked as medical advisors; Dr. R. Manton Wilson
was put in charge of medical services for lepers, and Miss Ella Sharrocks and Miss Edith
Myers served as nurses. The AMG depended heavily on these “Old Korea hands” to
understand Korean affairs. For instance, every Friday morning at ten o’clock, General
Archer Lerch, the Military Governor, would meet with these missionaries and listen to

511 cannot locate the details o f their return. Since Richard Underwood mentioned his father’s position, we
know that Dr. Horace H. Underwood was attached to the U.S. Army: “Even my 54 year old father was
signed up to go to China as a Department o f the Army Civilian (DAC) to be involved in Korea-American
affairs in some unspoken manner.” See Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” 37.
52 The exact date o f his transfer is not available. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 103.
53 Ibid., 103.
54 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 294.
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their advice.55 Seeing the potential benefit of missionary-AMG cooperation, Mr. Lutz
urged the Presbyterian Foreign Mission Board to send more missionaries to work for the
military government because they could obtain more power and resources to carry out
their Christian reform programs in Korea.56
By joining forces with the military government, American missionaries wielded a
stronger influence over the modernization and development of Korea in terms of
education, social work, agriculture, and of course, religious freedom and the promotion of
Christianity than other foreign missionaries, who returned later than the Americans.57
American Catholic missionaries, for instance, replaced the French in leading the Korean
Catholic Church.

For example, Bishop Patrick Byrne, one of the early American

Maryknoll missionaries who had begun work in P’yongyang in the 1920s, was appointed
by the Vatican as its apostolic delegate to Korea in 1948.58
American missionary works had always included aspects of modernization and
democratization, as well as spreading the gospel. For the missionaries who had struggled
in vain to advance their reform programs through the long years of tight Japanese
colonial control, US occupation of Korea was the breaking of a logjam. Their positions
in the AMG and the support they received from the army were like a dream come true.
They were excited and hopeful about working to build a Korean government for the
future based on American and Christian ideals.

55 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission, 379-380.
56 Dexter N. Lutz, letter written from Seoul to Dr. Hooper, 7 May 1946, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
57 The earliest group of civilian missionaries (non-American) returned in June 1946, about six months to a
year later than the Americans. See Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 295.
58 Ibid., 349.
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Missionaries and the Influx o f Northern Refugees
By early 1946, a massive influx of refugees was causing serious problems for the
military government in the south. More than a million Koreans had been repatriated from
Japan and 401,685 more were recorded as migrants from above the 38th Parallel. But
there were about 1,450,000 more who arrived without any records (see Table 3.2).
Christians and clergymen from North Korea were among them.59 Most of these refugees
settled in the big cities; the majority of those from the north stayed in Seoul, unless they
had relatives in other parts of Korea (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Caring for these refugees
became a major headache for the AMG. Food, housing, clothing, and job opportunities
were all in short supply, and the potential for epidemics was high.
Out of compassion for the needs of these destitute people, and recognizing an
opportunity for mass evangelism, missionaries and Christian churches took up the
daunting burden of caring for these millions. Missionary homes, especially the big house
belonging to the Underwood family, served as informal relief centers and storage areas.
Mission schools and local churches were also focal points of private relief work. Ethel
Underwood (the wife of Dr. Horace H. Underwood), for example, recruited volunteer
women from various churches for assistance. The Underwood family alone supplied
60,000 people with clothes in a year.60 These extensive religious relief networks also
presented a significant opportunity for increasing the visibility and public image of
Christianity among the new refugees. The church network and Christian connections

59 William A. Linton, “Dear Friends” letter, 4 October 1947, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), Department of
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
60 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 110-111.
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also gave some Christian refugees a better chance of survival and higher upward mobility
by securing jobs in the AMG.61
According to a survey conducted by the Presbyterian Korea Mission in 1947,
church attendance in the south increased markedly from 1946 to 1947. People seemed
very eager to hear the Christian message.62 The numbers of pastors reported living in the
south grew rapidly because of the south-bound migration of many northerners.

The

Presbyterians had 109 pastors living in the south in 1941. However, in 1947, there were
179, a sixty-four percent increase, a direct result of an influx of Christian clergymen from
the north.63 New refugee churches began springing up in many southern cities. Formerly
Japanese churches in the once Japanese settlements were now occupied by Koreans. In
some cases, even Shinto temples were turned into churches.
The Rise o f Radical Anti-Communism among Christians
The north had always been the heart of Korean Christianity, both in terms of the
proportion of the overall population and evangelical zeal. Since Christians had been
persecuted by Communist authorities in the north, they longed for the religious freedoms
of the south.

When these refugees began to concentrate in the south, it infused the

southern church with new radical anti-Communist vigor.
Maie B. Knox, an American missionary in Kwangju, wrote to her friends across
the Pacific about the rise of anti-Communist sentiment among Korean Christians:

61 Since American missionaries constantly hosted and befriended American officials, it was easier for
Christians, with references both from Church leaders and missionaries, to secure clearance to work for the
AMG. See Anna McQueen, “Dear Friends” letter, 26 November 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.),
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
62 “Survey 1947, Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.,” p.4, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Box 16, Folder 34 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
63 “Survey 1947, Korea Mission, Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.,” pp.2-3, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 34 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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The refugees continue to pour into South Korea from the Communist North, and of
course are destitute, having to leave everything to the Communists and begin again from
scratch. Leaving is a very precarious business and babies and old people sometimes die
on the way. But they say they cannot exist under Communist rule. So many fine
Presbyterians have flocked to Seoul, and sixty new churches have been organized
recently, and now Seoul has eighty three Presbyterian churches.64

Churches with a strong anti-communist message gained members at the fastest pace,
particularly among the refugees.

The most famous example was the still-widely

renowned Yongnak Church in Seoul, led by Rev. Han Kyong-jik, the former leader of the
Social Democratic Party (SDP) of the north. By 1949, the membership of this church
exceeded three thousand - most of them refugees from Sinuiju, in North P ’yongan
Province.65
Working in close contact with refugees, missionaries were well informed on
conditions in the north. For instance, Knox reveals how the story of one such refugee
influenced her own attitudes. Her friend Rev. Kim Hyun-jung, whom she had supported
in his education, told her that he was imprisoned and tortured by the Russian occupation
forces simply “because he [was] a minister of the Gospel.” He described the Russians as
pigs, and was convinced that they spread lies in order to “win the Koreans to
Communism.”66 Repeatedly hearing the same types of horror stories from the victims'
own mouths alarmed the relief workers. Anti-Russian and anti-Communist sentiments
were strong among Christians and missionaries. Many regarded the Soviet Union and the
Communist regime above the 38th Parallel as the “two most anti-Christian powers” in

64 Maie Borden Knox, “Dear Friends across the Pacific” letter, 7 March 1949, Presbyterian Church (U.S.),
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
65 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 303.
66 Maie Borden Knox, “Dear Friends” letter, 14 January 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), Department of
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
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their time.

£>1

They did not want Korea to fall into the control of Communists because in

their eyes, the salvation of Korea was the symbol of the salvation of the whole Orient.68
Interactions with refugees had a critical impact on the Christian opinion of
Communism, causing many missionaries and church leaders to shift to the right and
become more politically conscious. It was true that they supported Korean independence
and wanted Korea to be united, but they desired more to see the establishment of a free
and democratic government based on the American model.69 By 1947, the competition
between the leftists and rightists in the south had escalated into a vicious power struggle
in which both missionaries and the Christian community would become entangled and
play significant roles in the establishment of a separate regime in the south.

THE CONDITIONS OF THE SOUTHERN CHURCHES
By the end of World War II, the Korean Church was disorganized. Partly due to
the more liberal view of missionaries in Seoul that encouraged cooperation with Japanese
demands, and partly due to the tighter control of the Japanese police over the citizens in
Seoul, anyone who remained in leadership positions in the church community in the
capital had had to yield to the colonial government’s pressure.

7fl

When liberation came,

collaborating clergymen were all in disgrace. Clergymen who had suffered imprisonment
and survived stood up against the current leaders in the church community. They refused
to participate in the existing general assemblies, and instead, set up their own
67 Marion E. Hartness, letter to Dr. J. L. Hooper, 2 February 1946, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
68 Ibid.
69 “Churches Demand Immediate Freedom for Korea: Separate Government Idea Oppose,” The Voice o f
Korea 6 (15 February 1947): 1. This publication was found in the Vertical File: Truman Subject File Religion in the Truman Library.
70 Helen Kim, Grace Sufficient: The Story o f Helen Kim by Herself, ed. J. Manning Potts (Nashville, TN:
The Upper Room, 1964):103-105.
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organizations. Because of the collaboration controversy, the Christian community was
deeply divided during the early months of liberation.

Four major factions emerged

among Korean Christians.
Non-compromisers
The first and the most influential group was led by those anti-Japanese clergymen
and their followers who had refused to yield to Japanese demands and as a result,
suffered persecution, exile, or imprisonment. These survivors instantly became popular
in the post-liberation period. They were respected by both Christians and non-Christians
because of their courage and patriotism. The most famous clergymen in this group were
Rev. Han Kyong-jik, the SDP leader who had fled from the north, and Rev. Son Yangwon from the “leper colony” in Sunch’on, near Kwangju. In the years of the AMG, these
non-compromisers were more outspoken critics of pro-Japanese collaborators, both
within the church and across the nation.

They demanded open repentance and the

spiritual regeneration of the ex-compromisers.
The ranks of non-compromisers would swell drastically from 1945 to 1950,
forever altering the composition and ideology of the southern church. Their numbers
increased mostly because of the influx of northern refugees. Not only had non
compromisers been more numerous in the north, but they were also more likely to be
persecuted and flee south.

71

Because they had already refused to bend under forty years

of Japanese pressure, non-compromisers were in no mood to suddenly kowtow to Soviet

71 Those pro-Japanese compromisers (clergymen) in the north were less likely to flee south because the
charge o f their crime was purely religious and the Communists did not go after them. Instead, they were
encouraged to participate in the government sponsored church and enjoyed new religious authority under
the Communist reign. Actually, many ex-compromisers did join the official church in the north and fade
away in the religious scene.
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demands. As a result, all of Korea's conservative church elements became concentrated
in just the bottom half of the country.
Once in the south, these clergymen became hardcore anti-Communist activists.
By 1948, they grew to be a powerful political, social, and religious force commanding
about a hundred thousand Christian refugees living in the south, with about seventy
thousand of them concentrated in Seoul and its vicinity.

79

Seoul had long been the most

crucial city in Korea. Whoever controlled Seoul could command the political direction of
the rest of the country. The influx of northern Christians, together with other rightist
elements, rapidly transformed the political, social, and religious landscape of Seoul,
favoring the cause of the rightists. The Christians’ platform of religious freedom, strong
nationalist integrity, and charismatic leadership boosted the popularity of the rightist
camp and gave it a more humane and appealing face.
According to data gathered by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), northern
refugees, including many Christians, were the main supporters of rightist youth groups,
such as Sobuk ch’dngnydndan (Northwest Young Men’s Association or Northwest Youth
Corps).73 Having just fled from the north in search of religious freedom, these Christians,
though eager for unification and the chance to return home, dreaded the prospect of
unification under communism.

These northerners would not support politicians who

sought compromise with either the Communists to the north or leftists in the south. Nor
would they tolerate such views within their churches.

72 Petition from the Association o f Christians from North Korea, 14 September 1948, Presbyterian Church
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
CIC (
Cl) M J l^ j 1 9 4 5 .9 - 1949.1, 1 (Seoul: Hallym University, Institute
o f Asian Culture Studies, 1995), 1:469-494.
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As their numbers and power grew (not only through Christians fleeing south, but
also through revival meetings and evangelical work among the non-Christian refugees),
they criticized and even physically attacked leftist elements within the Church. Their
fervor and their harrowing tales of persecution swayed many southern Christians to join
their crusade, so that even native southern Christians became decidedly anti-Communist.
Moreover, those few church leaders who did not repudiate their liberal stances would be
gradually purged from power within each denomination. Political and religious pressures
from these northerners had a profound effect on the southern church, causing it to take a
tremendous lurch to the right from 1945 to 1950, even while the global church outside
Korea remained captivated by the social gospel.74
Compromisers and Collaborationists
The second major group of clergymen consisted of compromisers and
collaborationists. Compromisers and collaborationists were similar, but not exactly alike.
Some clergymen compromised with the Japanese demands because of the fear of death
and/or because of a personal desire to save the established church. They pointed to the
Biblical principle of “submission to authority” as their justification and personal
defense.75 Compromisers might have not gained any personal power or wealth during the
colonial period. Their livelihood could have been as hard as others. They felt that they
were being misunderstood and hoped to reconcile with the non-compromisers and be
accepted. This group probably represented the majority of Christian clergymen.

74 See Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle, WA: University o f Washington Press,
2003), 169-170.
75 The missionary community was also divided by the Shinto issue. Not all missionaries agreed to bow
down to the Shinto Shrine. In fact, most o f them, such as Dr. George McCune, Rev. Otto DeCamp and Dr.
DeWitt Lowe, did not and were arrested by the Japanese immediately, but Dr. Horace H. Underwood
thought that to comply was the right course when the church faced a harsh ruler. Underwood, Korea in
War, Revolution and Peace, 65.
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Nevertheless, there were a few Christian clergymen who not only compromised,
but also actively collaborated with the Japanese and even propagated the Japanese Shinto
religion in order to gain personal wealth and power. Both kinds were charged by their
contemporaries as “collaborators,” but since the nature of their crimes or sins were very
different, their ends were also very different.
After Japan was defeated, both groups were called to account.

Famous

collaborators, such as Rev. Chong In-gwa (Chung In-kwa),76 Dr. Song Ch’ang-gun,77 and
Rev. Pak Hyung-chul78 were stripped of their religious positions after they were
convicted of crimes by a Korean court.79 Church conservatives were particularly
troubled by the compromisers' willingness to sacrifice the gospel message by allowing
Shinto shrines to be put in their churches. Facing severe criticisms, these compromisers,
such as Rev. Kim Kwan-sik

RO

and Rev. Chong In-gwa, who had not betrayed their

country but simply had organized and supported the United Christian Church under
Japanese direction, struggled to survive and keep their positions of influence in the
Christian community.
Due to constant debates and power struggles between the northern non
compromisers and the southern compromisers, the Christian community was initially

76 Rev. Ch6ng In-gwa was pastor of the Korean Church in Yunchi Dong. He was a key leader o f the
Korean Presbyterian Church during World War II. See Rhodes and Campbell, History o f the Korea
Mission, 259.
77 Dr. S6ng Ch’ang-gGn was the President of the ChosSn Seminary. See Chapter 2.
78 Pastor Pak Hyung-chul was connected to the Sung Duk Hostel. They were all strongly pro-Japanese
ministers who constantly gave their loyal support for the Japanese militarist policy. See Francis Kinsler,
“Dear John,” 19 March 1949, Presbyterian Church Archives, RG 140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian
Historical Society, Philadelphia.
79 Letter from Fran to John Smith, 19 March 1949, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box
18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
80 See Chapter 2.
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rather unstable.

QI

For all of its new-found conservatism, however, the non-compromisers

were far more ready to forgive their collaborationist brethren than were nationalists
outside of the church - forgiveness being, after all, a core teaching of Christianity. The
missionaries, in particular, labored to bring reconciliation among church leaders, hoping
that the Koreans could put their past behind them and focus on the future. The situation
began to improve when sincere repentance and spiritual revival meetings swept through
the south like wildfire. Ex-compromisers were allowed to keep their positions, and ex
collaborationists were generally accepted back into the church unless they had been
convicted of their crimes.
There is an old diplomatic notion that says, “The enemy of my enemy is my
friend.” As the south faced the threat of being overrun by Communist subversion, antiCommunism grew to be a crucial element in hastening reconciliation and bringing the
northerners and the southern ex-compromisers to form a temporary alliance with other
rightists. Christian collaborators, like others tainted by Japanese ties, tended to be solid
supporters of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), which labored to protect collaborators,
landowners, and capitalists. Thus, the KDP was strongly anti-communist for economic
reasons, and this second category of Christians would be as anti-Communist as the first
group, although perhaps from a different motivation. This alliance of Christians and nonChristians within the KDP would also lead to the formation of several rightist youth
organizations, such as Taehan yonmin doklip ch’dngnyondan (the Great Korean

81 Missionaries constantly reported the miserable situation o f the church during the first two years of
occupation.
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Independence Young Men’s Corps), a group that would not support any candidate who
proposed compromise with the leftists for the sake of their ultimate survival.82
Educated Elites and Church Laymen
Like the clergymen, educated elites and church laymen had to make hard choices
during the colonial period. Many, though anti-Japanese at heart, were forced to cooperate,
at least passively, in order to maintain their schools, hospitals, churches or other
institutions. Most southern church laymen belonged to this category. These elites and
intellectuals held positions as principals, university presidents, lawyers, and judges.83
Many were gradualists who felt that they had worked toward eventual Korean
independence, although compromise had been necessary if they were to work within the
Japanese system. Therefore, these elites protested the label of “collaborator,” arguing for
a clear definition of the term, and even seeking approval of their work from the Christian
community as well as the general public. For example, at the farewell party for General
Hodge in August 1948, Dr. Kim Hwal-lan “asked the Assembly to be considerate of the
[pro-Japanese], because [they] all had had to cooperate.” 84
Many of these intellectuals worked for the AMG as advisors or administrators,
maintaining close relationships with missionaries inside and outside the government.
Their political and social ideals traced back to the cultural nationalists of the early 1900s,
who believed in the gradual transformation of the country and rejected radical reforms.
Under the support of the AMG, these Christian reformers devised reform programs on
82 See
CIC (
$ ) M JZ ^ j 1 9 4 5 .9 - 1949. U 1:469-494.
83 The most famous examples were Dr. Helen Kim, President o f Ewha University; Louise Yim, President of
Central Women’s College; and Dr. George Paik, President o f Chosen Christian University (which is
today’s Yonsei University). They did not believe that they had done anything wrong. Instead, they
believed that they had made significant contributions to the educational and economic development of
Korea during the colonial era.
84 Quote in Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960: A Personal
Narrative (Seoul: Panmun Book Company Ltd., 1978), 192.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

197

improving education, implementing voluntary land reform programs, and re-establishing
international trade. In his letter to the American Board, Dr. George L. Paik (Paek Nakchun) expressed the Korean Christian elites’ political leaning:
The Japanese enslavement o f the Korean people has gone forever. The Korean minds are
receptive o f things American. The religious revival is bound to come as the general
order o f things is established. The liberated Korea needs her strong physical body o f the
Statehood, but making the soul o f the nation is the paramount task. [A] wide door of
opportunity is open for all sorts of constructive work in making a Christian nation in the
heart o f the Orient. Christianization of Korea will be the best investment for the
evangelization o f the whole Orient.85 (Italics added)

The new Korea that they envisioned would be Christian, pro-American, and democratic a vision almost identical to the one Syngman Rhee had put forth in his book, The Spirit o f
Independence .86
Communism, the antithesis of everything these Christian gradualists had worked
for, sought to establish an atheistic and undemocratic state through radical reform. For
the Christian gradualists, it was a huge dilemma.

On the one hand, theyfeared

Communism, but on the other hand, they desired peace instead of war. Therefore, they
favored unification through peaceful and democratic means, or barring that possibility, at
least maintaining of the status quo.

Nevertheless, if the Communists threatened the

country with violence and war, the gradualists would stand up against the disruption of
peace.

Having political astuteness and influential positions, the elites would be an

important ally for the politicians who could gamer their support.
General Churchgoers
The majority of the Christian population was general churchgoers. This catch-all
grouping included people of diverse political leanings, yet certain generalizations about

85 Edward Adams, “Report on Korea,” 15 January 1946, Presbyterian Church Archives, RG 140, Box 16,
Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
86 See Chapter 1: Christianity and Korean Nationalism.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198

them are possible.

In 1945, the southern church members tended to be politically

moderate or even somewhat to the left of center. They supported peaceful unification,
democracy, religious freedom, and land reform. However, within a few short years, they
would move farther and farther to the right. One major reason was the influence of
northern refugees and their reports of persecutions in the north.
There was also another equally significant cause for the southern churchgoers’
change of opinion: the events that they, themselves, experienced while living in the south.
As violence against the rightists began to intensify in early 1948, Christian believers and
villages were specifically targeted by terrorist attacks and Communist guerilla uprisings,
because of their religious faith.

Such unprovoked assaults pushed these unorganized

individual Christian families more and more firmly into the hawkishly anti-Communist
camp.
For example, during the first week of May 1948 (the election month), a total of
162 people were killed in civil conflicts (see Table 3.4). In this wave of violence, two
churches were destroyed in Kaesong and in Kanggyong, and one Catholic missionary’s
home was burned in Ch’unch’on. A few months later, during the Yosu Rebellion of
October 1948, rebels burned at least twenty-five Christian homes in one community.87
Another widely publicized case was the murder of Pastor Son Yang-won’s two teenage
sons, who were well-known Christian leaders in a local high school in Sunch’on, during
the rebellion.88 When the rebellion was finally put down by the South Korean
government, more than one thousand civilians had lost their lives including both the

87 Florence E. Root, “Dear Friends” letter, 14 October - 26 November 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.),
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
88 Ibid.
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leftists and rightists.

Christians had suffered greatly too. In the cities of Sunch’on and

Yosu alone, more than 82 Christian families were left destitute and homeless from a
single devastating fire that was set by rebels as they retreated.90
Shortly after the Yosu Rebellion, Maie and Robert Knox, a missionary couple in
Kwangju, reported to their American friends that:
Kwangju is the capital o f the Province and has been heavily guarded. Korean troops are
constantly on the alert, and many volunteers are being trained for guard duty. We have
no trouble so far. But the Communists are active in the country, living in the mountains
and darting out fo r quick raids on the villages. They shot a Korean Christian the other
day, a valued assistant in one o f Rob’s churches, because he was a Christian. They
threaten to kill all Christians and missionaries, but so far they have been restrained and
have killed only a few Christians and no missionaries... Our new governor is a
Presbyterian minister and he seems to be trying to do all in his pow er to pu t down the
menace o f Communism. He has organized the men o f the city into volunteer bands fo r
protection. Meanwhile, the seven o f us missionaries in Kwangju go on about our work
almost as though nothing were going on, except that we are keeping out o f the
Communist infested mountain regions at night... .9I (Italics added)

The Knoxs’ observation showed that what was happening in Yosu was also flaring up all
across the country. Regardless of their class background, Christians in the countryside
were undeniably singled-out by the rebels. The main reason was that, compared to other
country folk, Christian peasants were less willing to support the guerrillas, so the
Communists considered them to be traitors to the Korean nation and enemies of
revolution.

Although unrest within the cities received more attention, it was in the

countryside that the Communists had their bases and left their deepest mark.
As the power of the guerillas grew in late 1948 in South Cholla Province, the
death rate and material deprivation became higher in the countryside than in the big cities.
These losses were caused not only by rebel attacks but also by police countermeasures.
89 The actual number o f civilian casualties was hard to determine. Richard Underwood claimed that there
were about 1000. Bruce Cumings says that at least 500 civilians died in Sunchon alone. See Cumings, The
Origins o f the Korean War Vol.2 (Seoul: Yuksabipyungsa, 2002), 266.
90 Louise B. Miller, “Dear Friends” letters, 5 December 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) Department of
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
91 Maie and Robert Knox, “Dear Friends o f Ours” letter, 26 November 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.)
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
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Many people had to move into fortified villages or cities and leave most of their
possessions behind.

In Tongbok County near Kwangju, Miss Florence E. Root, a

Southern Presbyterian missionary, reported that twelve of fifteen villages were ordered to
be destroyed, allowing nothing to fall into the hands of the raiders.92
Kwangju, the capital of the South Cholla Province, was overcrowded with
refugees from the countryside.

These people had experienced the same suffering at

Communist hands as the northern refugees had. They were also just as destitute and
angry. Crowded together in the cities, these two groups would become a strong antiCommunist force, supporting the government’s hard-line measures to wipe out
Communist bases hidden in the hills.93
Common Ground Among Christian Refugees
Not all Christians were of one background or opinion; there were refugees, ex
collaborators, elites, and general churchgoers. Nevertheless, almost all Korean Christians
shared three common characteristics. First, they were generally pro-American. They had
had favorable experiences with American missionaries and recognized that without the
work of these missionaries, Christianity would not have grown in Korea. Second, they
were politically active, despite the fact that they might not always act in unity. Third,
they wanted to keep Communism out of the south, for the sake of their own survival - a
very compelling motivation.

92 Florence E. Root, “Dear Friends” letter, 13 October 1949, Presbyterian Church (U.S.), Department of
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
93 The new effort to wipe out Communist guerrillas was led by the new Governor, Rev. Lee Nam-gyu, at
Kwangju, o f South Chulla Province, which was heavy infested with guerrilla activities. See Anna
McQueen, “Dear Friends” letter, 26 November 1948, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) Department o f History,
Montreat, North Carolina.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

201

Like all Koreans, Christians wanted unification, and especially so that they could
reclaim the northern church. But for many, unification took a backseat to preserving the
religious freedoms that they enjoyed in the south. On the whole, one point was clear:
despite their various denominational differences and internal divisions, they shared a
common enemy to the north, which served as a unifying force, and thus brought the
Christian community together under the banner of anti-Communism.
Therefore, it was hardly surprising that the Christian community as a whole
would actually welcome a leader with a heavy hand, given their fears of Communism and
their desire to restore peace and order. According to Rev. William A. Linton, a senior
missionary in Chunju of the North Cholla Province, the Christian churches in Korea were
“willing to take a stand against Communism and face whatever hardships the future may
bring.”94 By 1947, the Christian community firmly backed several well-known Christian
politicians: Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo, and Kim Kyu-sik and they wanted the south to
form a separate government under the sponsorship of the United Nations.95 From late
1947 to May 1948, Christians were looking for a leader who would reverse the
Communist tide. Nonetheless, their moral principles would prevent them supporting an
outright dictator. The leader who wished to win over the Christian votes, would have to
be a man shrewd enough to tacitly make use of the militant right-wing groups, who were
carrying out violent attacks, while he himself remained aloof from charges of thuggery.

94 William A. Linton, “Dear Friends” letter, 4 October 1947, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) Department of
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
95 Ibid.
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SYN G M A N R H EE AND THE FORMATION OF A SE P A R A T E GOVERNM ENT
The religious factor soon emerged as a crucial element in southern politics. Not
only did Christianity become an important anti-Communist ideological force, but the
Christian community, as a whole, became the backbone of the rightists. By the end of
1945, four high-profile Christian leaders competing for political domination had emerged
in the southern zone: Yo Un-hyong, Kim Kyu-sik, Kim Ku, and Syngman Rhee.
However, only Rhee emerged as the victor. Why?
The Weakening o f Yd Un-hyong’s Popularity
Yo Un-hyong was the most popular leader in Korea when the peninsula was
liberated by the Allied Powers. Having been a Christian evangelist earlier in his career
and enjoying nationwide fame as an underground nationalist, he was an influential
Christian socialist during the 1930s, who sacrificially gave away all his land inheritance
to his poor tenants.96 Therefore, he was very popular among Korean leftists.

Yo

originally received solid support from the southern clergymen when they crowded into
their local CPKIs in September 1945. When the Korea People’s Republic was formed on
September 6, moderate and leftist church leaders, such as Rev. Kim Ch’ang-je, Rev. Pak
Song-sa, Rev. Kal Hong-gi, and Rev. Sin Hung-u stood firmly behind Yo.
Yo Un-hyong’s political position was weakening in 1946, however, under attacks
from both the right and the left. When General Hodge refused to recognize the People’s
Republic and forced Yo to change its name, Yo’s popularity began to shrink.

The

extreme rightists attacked Yo’s Christian supporters when they gathered to organize
Kidokkyo minju ydnmaeng (the Democratic League of Christians) in 1946.

Three

hundred men from the Northwest Young Men’s Association stormed the YMCA building
96 See Lee, “Who Was Yo Un-hyung?”
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in Seoul and disrupted their ceremony.
seriously beaten.

Q7

No one died, but most of the leaders were

Christians from the north, in particular, disliked Yo’s willingness of

compromise with the Communists. When more tales of Communist persecution against
Christians reached the south, the Christian community was less willing to compromise.
Therefore, the influence of leftist clergymen weakened as more rightists flooded the
southern cities.
Yo Un-hyong’s moderate attitude toward the Communists in the end cost him
dearly. In late 1946, the Communists, under Pak Hon-yong’s leadership, succeeded in
infiltrating all levels of the People’s Party and eventually tore the party apart. Yo’s party
ceased to exist. His earnest attempt to work with the Communists bore no fruit. By 1947,
Yo told the AMG officials that his life was in danger because both extreme leftists and
extreme rightists wanted to kill him. Nevertheless, General Hodge did not give him any
protection. On July 19, 1947, Yo was gunned down in his car by right-wing extremists:
Yu Yong-ho, Kim Hong-sung, Kim Hun, Kim Yong-sung, and Han Ji-gun. Most of them
were refugees from the north. Yu Yong-ho said that he wanted to kill Yo because he was
the main instigator of a left-right coalition that would split the nation. Kim Hong-sung
said that he wanted to kill Yo because Yo had made many trips to north Korea. There
was no proof who actually gave the order, but the closest guess was Chang T’aek-sang.
General Hodge pointed his finger at Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, but there was no hard
evidence for such a charge.98

97 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 169.
98 Lee, “Who Killed Yo Wun Hyung?” http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/mongyang.htm.
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A Christian Moderate Kim Kyu-sik
Compared to Yo Un-hyong, Kim Kyu-sik seemed to be in a better position to
secure the support of the Christian community in 1947. Kim was an orphan raised by
Rev. Horace G. Underwood. He received a degree from Roanoke College in Virginia.
As an American-educated Christian intellectual who enjoyed the complete confidence
and support of General Hodge, Kim was a rising political star in the south under the
sponsorship of the AMG.

American leaders found comfort in Kim’s willingness to

cooperate and his status as a selfless statesman.

Hodge appointed Kim as the chairman

of the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (SKILA) in October 1946.

The

SKILA was a half-elected and half-appointed legislative body with a total of ninety
representatives. The election of the SKILA, however, was not open to every citizen.
Only the taxpayers and landlords were allowed to vote to “assure a conservative
delegation.”99 As a result, most of the forty elected representatives were rightists from
the KDP.

To balance the SKILA, Hodge appointed 45 moderates and leftists, such as

Yo Un-hyong and Kim Kyu-sik, to the body.
So, why did Kim fail to become the new president of South Korea? As historian
Bonnie B. C. Oh points out, Kim Kyu-sik was not a self-serving politician and was
faithful to the cause of forming a coalition for peaceful reunification.100 But his naive
stand towards the Communists,101 and his lack of political skills made him unfit to lead a
deeply divided country.102 Since he strongly opposed the establishment of a separate

99 Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 260-261.
100 Bonnie B. C. Oh, “Kim Kyu-sik and the Coalition Effort,” in Korea Under the American Military
Government 1945-1948, ed. Bonnie B. C. Oh (Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 2002), 106-109.
101 Kim Kyu-sik was actually sympathetic toward socialism. He represented the liberal wing o f the
Christian intellectuals.
102 Ibid., 120.
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government, he failed to understand the mentality of most southern Christians, who,
though desiring unification, wanted absolutely nothing to do with the Communists. His
political fate was sealed in May 1948, when Kim chose to attend a conference in the
north, where he met with Kim H-sung instead of preparing for the May election. The
political backlash from this meeting led him to completely withdraw from politics shortly
thereafter.
The Master o f Korean Assassins was Assassinated
Kim Ku, another well-known Korean nationalist, was also tainted by this very
same conference in the north when he attended it together with Kim Kyu-sik. Prior to
that, Kim Ku had earned his fame through political assassinations and terrorist plots
during the colonial era. His leadership position in the Korean Provisional Government
(KPG) came after his several attempts to assassinate the Japanese Emperor in Tokyo and
Japanese officials in China. Because of his fame, Kim Ku was the only nationalist leader
who could challenge Syngman Rhee’s leadership among the rightists. Although he was a
Methodist, Kim was not as influential as Kim Kyu-sik and Rhee among the Protestant
elites. Nevertheless, Kim Ku enjoyed the support of a group of loyal followers in the
KPG, and benefited from his reputation for political assassinations.
Being the Chairman of the KPG, Kim initially gained the full backing of the
KDP.103 He was also in command of most of the extreme rightist terrorist groups.
Nevertheless, Kim’s relations with the KDP leaders began to turn sour due to his critical
view of the pro-Japanese collaborators.104 He was less a skillful politician and more a

103 Individual wealthy KDP members supported both Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee and helped meet their
financial needs after their return from exile.
104 Patrick D. Gardner, “Prerequisites of Power in Liberated Korea: The Political Relationship between
Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku,” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2000): 36-37.
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fervent nationalist. There was an allegation that he had ordered the assassination of Song
Chin-u, when Song expressed his support for the Moscow Agreement.

His action

haunted his relationship with the KDP and lost him some support from the rightists.
Since there was a rumor that he had also directed a failed attempt to assassinate Kim IIsung, the Communists had no love for him as well.
Neither was Kim Ku active in cultivating Christian support.

These policies

weakened Kim’s position in the ideological battle against Syngman Rhee. Kim lacked
the political skills and the mind to understand the game of politics in post-war Korea and
grasp the picture of international relations during the initial stages of the Cold War.105
His anti-American views and activities over the trusteeship issue forestalled his chances
for growth under the AMG. His inability to master English or to cultivate friendships
with foreign residents limited his international reputation.

Kim’s narrow-mindedness

blocked his political ascent.
Even though Kim Ku had great potential to lead the fight against the Communists,
he did not fully commit to the anti-Communist cause. Being an idealist longing above all
else for Korean independence, Kim Ku sincerely wanted to unite the country even though
it might require collaborating with leftists.106 Since Kim Ku’s opposition to the
formation of a separate southern government was shared by Kim Kyu-sik, both these men
refused to participate in the 1948 election, instead meeting with Kim Il-sung in the
northern zone.
Nevertheless, an American political observer in the State Department, Joseph
Jacob, saw a different political motivation for their boycott:

105 Ibid., 106-107
106 Ibid.
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While on the surface, hue and cry o f both Kims is ‘unification o f Korea,’ in reality basic
cause o f their proposal for north-south conference and acceptance o f P ’ydngyang
invitation is realization that they had no real following (insufficient at least to ensure their
election or appointment to high office) and they ‘don’t want to play ball.’ They prefer to
seek better prospects elsewhere.107

Jacob’s comment showed that both Kims were actually losing their influence in Korean
politics even prior to the 1948 election. Neither of them had succeeded in consolidating
their power in spite of each having a number of political advantages at the beginning,
such as the rightists’ support of Kim Ku, and General Hodge’s support of Kim Kyu-sik.
The two Kims had been deceived by the Communists who used their visit to the north for
propaganda purposes. Their visit and their similar decisions not to support the election
disappointed many Christian leaders and even non-Christian voters.108 While Kim Kyusik eventually retired from Korean politics, Kim Ku’s influence in the south shrank
tremendously when the Republic of Korea was established in Seoul under Syngman
Rhee’s leadership.
Syngman Rhee’s Experience in the United States
In contrast to these men, Syngman Rhee was less an idealist and more a
pragmatist in his political outlook. His biographers, his supporters in both Korea and the
United States, and historians all had very different opinions on Rhee, but most of them
agreed that he understood politics and diplomacy due to his long years of experience in
the Western world. His views on Christianity and his relationship with Christians were
the backbone of his political career. Apart from his education in Paejae and his close
relationship with missionaries in his early life, Rhee’s academic and political lives in the
United States and in Korea were built through the Christian network. In the 1920s, he

107 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relation o f the United States (1948) Vol 6, The Far East and
Australasia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974): 1177-1178.
108 See Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960, 155.
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had worked for religious organizations, such as the YMCA in Korea and the American
Methodist Church in Hawaii. He had even organized his own church and school in
Hawaii when his views on the education of women clashed with conservatives in the
Methodist Board.

Although Rhee faced opposition from various Korean radical

independence groups in the United States, his most loyal supporters and followers were
among Korean Christians and their children in the United States. They included Im
Pyong-jik (also known as Ben C. Limb), who later became the first minister of foreign
affairs in Rhee’s administration, Chong Han-gyong (Henry Chung), and Yi Won-sun
(Won-soon Lee). Their loyalty did not fade even after Rhee’s political demise in I960.109
Rhee bore not only the image of a cultural nationalist, who advocated the
importance of education and gradual transformation, but also the image of a pro-Western
Korean diplomat, who persisted in seeking a political, economic, and military alliance
with the United States. Prior to World War II, Rhee acted as a political prophet, who
constantly warned against Japanese aggression in Asia, but his warnings went unheeded
in Washington. During the war, under Rhee’s leadership, the Korea Commission, which
was a diplomatic agency representing the KPG in Washington, lobbied for the immediate
recognition of the Korean Provisional Government in Exile. He argued that recognizing
the KPG, it would help to stabilize postwar Korea and prevent the Korean peninsula from
falling into the hands of the Communists.110 His effort, nevertheless, had very limited
success because the United States refused to recognize the KPG due to the lack of

109 Rhee’s Christian supporters in Hawaii housed, clothed, and fed him when he was almost penniless in the
last few years o f his exile life in the United States.
110 Jungmin Kuk, “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic o f Korea: Robert T. Oliver’s Publicity and
Lobbying Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960,” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2000), 24.
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political representation of the KPG among Korean natives and the division within the
KPG leadership.
During these decades in the United States, Rhee’s anti-Japanese and later antiCommunist positions alienated him from most Asian experts and liberals, such as Alger
Hiss, in the State Department. The State Department advised Rhee and the KPG to form
a coalition with other Korean leaders such as Han Kil-su (Kilsoo Han), whom Rhee
condemned as a Japanese spy and a Communist. Rhee rejected the idea because he
believed that a coalition with the Communists would invite the Russians into the Korean
peninsula and eventually jeopardize the ultimate goal of Korean independence.111 Rhee’s
refusal to cooperate with Korean leftists further distanced him from the officials in
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration.112 In 1945, during a United Nations conference
in San Francisco, the Russian journalist, Emile Gourvereau, misinformed Rhee that the
United States had handed Korea over to the Soviet Union at the Yalta conference.
Angered by what he was told, he distributed a leaflet condemning the policy of the
United States without further investigation.

His action seriously jeopardized his

relationship with the State Department, leaving him with very few friends inside the US
government. 113
Nonetheless,

Rhee’s

bitter

experiences

in

Washington

and

his

deep

understanding of international diplomacy molded him to be the most successful
statesman in Korean politics. His relationship with Washington began to improve when
the US-Soviet relationship began to get worse and the power of anti-Communism took
root in the US government.

Despite his lack of progress in getting diplomatic

111 Ibid., 31.
112 Ibid., 25.
113 Ibid., 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

210

recognition, his effort in Washington made him a legendary hero in the struggle for
Korean independence. His name was so well-known in Korea that both the leftists and
the rightists wanted to acquire his support and endorsement, but Rhee had his own plan
for political domination by building up a political network in the United States as well as
in Korea.
Rhee’s Publicity Work in Washington
Knowing that unlike China and Japan, Korea attracted very little attention among
American officials and that he was not popular in the State Department, Rhee needed
every single drop of support he could possibly acquire if he wanted to achieve political
victory over his opponents and competitors and establish a new modem Korea of his own
dream. The very first step that Rhee took prior to and after his return to Korea was to
maintain a close correspondence with church leaders in the United States, such as Rev.
Edward Junkin, a former missionary to Korea,114 and Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, the
Chaplain to the U.S. Senate. Rhee attended Rev. Frederick Brown Harris’ church in
Washington when he was doing his lobbying work on behalf of the KPG.115 Later, Rev.
Harris, who subsequently became the Chaplain of the Senate, emerged as one of the
major defenders of Rhee throughout Rhee’s presidency in South Korea.

Rhee also

maintained close contact with Bishop Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York. Prior to

114 See David Brickey Bloomer, “Syngman Rhee’s Spokesman in the United States: Dr. Robert T. Oliver’s
Korean Lobby and Public Relations Efforts 1942-1948,” (M.A. thesis, Yonsei University, 1996), 43.
115 Historian Bruce Cumings thought that Rhee did so because Rev. Harris was the chaplain o f the Senate,
but the fact was that Rev. Harris was chosen to be the chaplain in 1949, three years after Rhee had moved
back to Korea. See Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, 62, 64. See Joungwon Kim, D ivided Korea.
The Politics o f Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 36. See also
Ibid., 89.
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Rhee’s return to Korea, Bishop Spellman praised Rhee as the American Catholic
Church’s choice for leadership in Korea against the forces of godless communism.116
Since Rhee understood the importance of public opinion on American policy
makers, he recruited as many sympathizers in the United States as possible to expand his
publicity work in the United States in order to arouse American interest in Korea and
improve his image in Washington. Through Rev. Junkin’s introduction, Rhee met Dr.
Robert T. Oliver in 1942, a full-time professor of communications at Bucknell University
in Pennsylvania, and invited him to assist in his publicity work in Washington. Dr.
Oliver was not only a good writer, but he also had very strong experience in publicity.
During the war, he took a wartime leave of absence to work as an Assistant Chief of the
Office of Civilian Defense in Washington.

His job was to write speeches to direct

American citizens’ attention to support war efforts.117 Oliver frequently submitted
articles to the Washington Post and other well-known newspapers and journals. Rhee
was fortunate to have Dr. Oliver as his adviser and publicity director because from 1942
on Oliver became the most effective and loyal lobbyist for the Korean cause. In addition
to Oliver, Rhee also acquired help from Jay Jerome Williams, who served as Rhee’s
advisor and fundraiser, and Preston M. Goodfellow, a US colonel in the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), who later assisted Rhee in getting military aid and equipment.
At first, Dr. Oliver only helped Rhee on a part-time basis, but after Rhee left for
Korea, Oliver began fulltime publicity work on behalf of Korea. Rhee regarded Oliver’s
publicity work as “the only thing that will help get the Russians out of Korea.”118 The

116 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 349.
117 Jungmin Kuk, “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea: Robert T. Oliver’s Publicity and
Lobbying Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960,” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2000), 15.
118 Quote in Ibid., 34.
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goal of Oliver’s work was to reverse the negative image the American people had of
Korea. In Oliver’s first book on Korea, Korea: Forgotten Nation, published in 1944, he
argued that Korean fighters could have contributed greatly to the war effort in the Pacific
greatly if the United States had trained and allowed them to participate in the war
earlier.119 In order to arouse public sympathy, Oliver devoted one-third of the book to
describing Japanese persecution of Korean Christians and Western missionaries during
the colonial period. His book was well-received in the United States. As soon as it was
published, both the hardcover and paperback editions were sold out within a very short
period of time.120 In addition, since Oliver’s articles on Korea were well-written and
carefully researched, his works surpassed most of the Korean and American writers of
those days.121 Oliver reported to Rhee that his publicity works were enthusiastically
received, particularly by church people.122 In late 1946, he worked closely with Rev.
Harris to lobby the US government to understand the needs of Korea.
R hee’s Political Support in Korea
As soon as Rhee arrived in Korea in October 1945, both the Korean Democratic
Party and the People’s Republic offered Rhee leadership positions in their organizations.
Rhee wrote to Oliver, boasting that all parties were solidly behind him.

Surprisingly,

Rhee accepted neither of them. Nor did he join Kim Ku’s group in the formation of the
Korean Independence Party in spite of his connection with the KPG.

Rhee kept his

distance from these existing political parties because he did not want to lend his

119 Robert T. Oliver, Korea: Forgotten Nation (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1944), 102.
120 Kuk, “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea: Robert T. Oliver’s Publicity and Lobbying
Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960,” 23.
121 Ibid., 8.
122 See Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 101-102.
123 Rhee’s letter to Oliver, 21 October 1945. See Kuk, “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic o f Korea:
Robert T. Oliver’s Publicity and Lobbying Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960,” 36.
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prestigious name as a mere symbolic figure-head, lacking actual political power and loyal
following.
Instead, Rhee started to organize his own political organization, the National
Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (NSRRKI).

He began

building his political organization through the Korean church network, met with Korean
Christians, and “preached” his idea of national independence, supporting his case with
Biblical passages much like a zealous preacher. He cultivated friendships among Korean
Christian elites, especially important educators like Dr. Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), Dr.
Paek Nak-chun (George L Paik), and Yim Yong-sin (Louise Yim).124 These leaders
would become his most loyal supporters throughout his presidency. He also sought out
Christians such as H6 Chong, Yim Yong-sin, Cho-Py6ng-ok, Yi Ki-bung, and Hwang
Song-su to be his closest advisers.125 In the end, Rhee’s NSRRKI enjoyed some success
in forming local groups all over the south as a counterforce to the Choson Minjujuui
Minjok Chonson (Democratic People’s Front) organized by Yo Un-hyong.126
R hee’s Popularity in South Korea
The extent of Rhee’s popularity in Korea has always been a matter of serious
dispute. American officials in the State Department thought that Rhee did not have a
strong base of support in Korea.

Those on the ground in Korea, however, almost

universally disagreed with the State Department’s assessment. During the early days of
US occupation, Commander George Z. Williams believed that Rhee was popular, though
he might not be as popular as Kim Ku among ordinary Koreans. Rhee was certainly

124 See Kim, Grace Sufficient and Yim, My Forty Year Fight fo r Korea.
125 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 170.
126 Allen R. Millett, The War fo r Korea, 1945-1954: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2005), 82.
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popular among educated elites. But Rhee’s fame and his seniority over Kim Ku and Kim
Kyu-sik gave him a relative advantage in their political competition.

The general

population tended to regard Rhee as their “grandfather,” someone to be treated with great
respect. During his visit to Korea in mid-1946, Dr. Oliver talked with Major Wayne
Geissinger and Colonel Anderson, the Military Governor of Kyonggi Province. They
both told him that among all Korean politicians, only Rhee could draw a huge crowd
whenever he appeared in public, and that Rhee was “the strong man of Korea” even if
General Hodge believed that he could ignore Rhee.127
On July 8, Oliver met with a Colonel Green, chief public relations officer for the
American Military Government in Seoul. The colonel told him that public opinion polls
taken by the military showed that seventy percent of the Korean people below the 38th
Parallel supported Rhee.

Nevertheless, the AMG suppressed the finding.

Instead,

General Archer Lerch, the military governor of Korea, forced Colonel Green to falsify
the findings to show less than a majority for Rhee because of Rhee’s strong stance
against trusteeship. Dr. Oliver observed during his two-month stay in Korea that Rhee
was the most respected and popular representative of the Korean people.

198

In addition to Oliver’s observation, reports both from the CIC and from various
missionaries also showed that Rhee had widespread popularity.

For instance, an

American information officer responsible for gathering political information on Korea,
though himself unimpressed by Syngman Rhee, reported that Rhee was “the most revered
and respected name among the Korean villagers.” In the mind of the Korean people, the
officer observed in 1947, Syngman Rhee “occupied a place somewhat akin to that of a
127 Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea 1942-1960, 35.
128 Ibid., 38. Oliver’s note was also quoted by Bloomer, “Syngman Rhee’s Spokesman in the United States:
Dr. Robert T. Oliver’s Korean lobby and public relations efforts, 1942-1948,” 84-85.
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legendary hero.” 129 No one in the AMG doubted the power or stature of Rhee, and some
even credited his shrewd leadership as being the reason why Communists were restrained
from taking over the entire peninsula.130
Rhee Gains Loyal Followers from the Christian Community
Rhee’s religious and political outlook made him particularly popular among
Christians, for three reasons. First, he understood the importance of Christianity in the
reconstruction of Korean society. As early as 1942, he wrote to his friend that Korea had
“more than one million Christians” and that Korea was “Christianity’s greatest bastion in
the Orient.” 131 He was exceptionally optimistic about the role of Korea “as the future
aerial gateway to Asia” and “the crucible for the tenets of Confucius and teachings of
Christ.”132 His desire to gain the support of Korean Christians was not merely shrewd
politics, but a genuine personal conviction. He had never wavered in his belief that a
modem Korea should be built upon the Christian model - an idea he had articulated
while imprisoned by the Choson government in his book, The Spirit of Independence.133
In fact, he was determined to implement his ideas as soon as he gained political power.
Second, despite being classified by many political observers as an extreme rightist,
Rhee’s policy outlook was rather moderate and even leaned toward the left.

He

understood the importance of seeking social justice, but favored a gradual approach

129 Richard D. Robinson, “Korea - Betrayal o f a Nation” Unpublished manuscript (1947), 121. See
Joungwon Kim, D ivided Korea, 37.
130 Bloomer, “Syngman Rhee’s Spokesmen in the United States: Dr. Robert T. Oliver’s Korean Lobby and
Public Relations Efforts, 1942-1948,” 84.
131 “Letter from Syngman Rhee to Dr. Hoo,” 5 December 1942, Political Affairs: Korean Independence
Movement, 1941-1944, RG 59, Records o f the US Dept of State relating to internal affairs o f Korea, 19401944, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
132 Ibid.
133 Syngman Rhee, The Spirit o f Independence: A Primer o f Korean Modernization and Reform, translated
by Han-kyo Kim (Honolulu, HI: University o f Hawaii Press, 2001), 282-283. See also Chapter One:
Christianity and Korean Nationalism.
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rather than a radical one. While serving as an elected member in the Korean Interim
Assembly (KIA), he had advocated a fair and just review of all the collaboration cases
following the establishment of the new Korean government because he believed that
tolerating an irrational hatred for collaborators would bring more harm than good to
Korean society.134 Rhee gained support from the rightists because he supported a gradual
land reform policy rather than a radical one by first selling Japanese-owned areas to
landless farmers, and then by encouraging landlords to sell their holdings through
incentives and credits for conducting industrial investments.135 Therefore, KDP members
supported Rhee even though they were never his trusted lieutenants.
Third, Rhee was being hailed as the “chief bulwark against the communization of
Korea” and the man who could hold the reins of a free and independent Korea if it were
so created.136 Rhee’s anti-Communist and anti-trusteeship political positions were clear
and consistent. While the Christian non-compromisers took confidence from his clear
stand, the ex-collaborators needed him to shield them from potential losses, both political
and material, due to his moderate views on collaboration. Rhee received loyal support
from both South Korean rightists and North Korean refugees among the militant youth
groups such as the National Salvation Young Men’s Federation, the Northwest Young
Men’s Association, and the Korean National Youth Corps.

1^ 7

134 Syngman Rhee was also seeking a middle-of-the-road method to settle the collaboration problem
because he knew that American public opinion favored forgiveness rather than revenge, whereas the
Korean public opinion favored justice and punishment. See Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American
Involvement in Korea, 153.
135 Rhee tried to delay selling the ex-Japanese owned land by the AMG. He desired to have a new Korean
government to implement the land reform programs. The land reform policy, however, was never
successfully carried out due to the resistance o f the KDP. It was the Korean War several years later that
brought the final implementation o f land reform. Nevertheless, Rhee’s moderate attitude in 1947 did earn
him support from most o f the landlords. See Ibid., 153-154.
136 “Report on Korea,” The New York Times, 10 November 1946, editorial section.
m MW JBcMswmxnM : c ic a t% rn ) m j z ^ i 1 9 4 5 .9 -1 9 4 9 .1 , 1:469- 494.
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In the end, Rhee’s pro-American attitude, his Christian faith, his emphasis on
education, and his tough anti-Communist position made him the top candidate of
Christian non-compromisers, elites, and ex-collaborators alike. In this way, Rhee was
able to rally a strong Christian coalition behind him, as well as gain strong popular
support among the public. In the end, most Christian groups came out to support Rhee
and his organization, NSRRKI, in the 1948 election in the name of Christian unity and
early independence.138
The May 10,1948 Election
When the Soviet-US Joint Commission came to a deadlock in mid-1947 due to
dispute over the issue of proper representation of different political groups, the United
States submitted the problem of Korean unification to the United Nations. The United
Nations agreed to carry out a separate election in South Korea, and appointed a United
Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK).

The responsibility of the

UNTCOK was to oversee the election of a Korean National Assembly in May 1948. The
responsibility of this assembly was to write a Korean constitution and establish an
executive branch of government for South Korea.
In a country where less than four percent of population was Christian, the election
of 1948 marked the beginning of strong Christian influence in South Korean politics for
decades to come. The date of the election was itself an important indicator of things to
come. Originally scheduled for a Sunday, May 9, 1948, both the Korean churches and

138 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 170.
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the missionaries petitioned to change the date.139 General Hodge granted their demand,
and moved the election to Monday, May 10, 1948. The election was a general success.
Ninety-four percent of all of South Korea’s eligible voters were registered and among
them ninety-one percent came to the p o lls.140

A total of one hundred ninety

representatives were elected to serve a two-year term in the National Assembly.
Christian candidates, in particular, received votes from both believers and non-believers.
Out of the one hundred and ninety elected representatives, thirty-eight were Christians twenty percent of the total of elected representatives (see Table 3.1).
Syngman Rhee was elected by the National Assembly as first president of Korea,
and the Republic of Korea was formed in August 1948. Rhee’s regime was known as the
First Korean Republic. Under Rhee’s leadership, a Christian-style ceremony replaced the
Confucius-Buddhist traditions and Shintoism in all government gatherings. In Rhee’s
inauguration ceremony, the President took the oath of office with his hand on the Bible,
an event unprecedented in Korean history. No one raised any objection when Rhee
suggested that the opening ceremony of the National Assembly begin with a prayer of
thanks by Assemblyman Yi Yun-yong, a Christian minister.141 Clearly, Christianity was
widely respected or, at the least, tolerated by the majority of the non-Christian population.
The First Korean Republic in South Korea marked the dawn of a new Christian influence
in Korean history. Such an era began not because of the numeric strength of Christianity
in Korea, but due to the political power of this foreign religion. Christianity became a

139 Bruce F. Hunt, a missionary o f the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, wrote to General William F. Dean on
April 2 ,1 9 4 8 , asking the general to change the date of election because of the symbolic Christian meaning
o f keeping the Sabbath Day holy. Letter from Bruce F. Hunt to General Wm F. Dean, 2 April 1948,

(F. E. G ille tte )

7

$ # 7 ] ^ 1946-1948 (Seoul:

Hallym University, Institute o f Asian Culture Studies, 1995), 2:189-191.
140 Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 165.
141 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 173-174.
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religion of the Korean elites, and Christians emerged to dominate the new ruling class in
South Korea. This trend was further strengthened by the outbreak of the Korean War.

CONCLUSION
The return of American missionaries and their children as liberators to the
southern half of Korea marked a new phase of Korean political, economic, social, and
cultural development along a course completely different from the one in the north.
Nevertheless, the seeds of division were also being sown at this point, because the
political, economic, social, and religious well-being of the Christian community became
so closely tied to American missionaries and the military government that it began to
realize what it stood to lose if Korea were united under Communism.
In both the south and the north, the early days prior to the arrival of foreign forces
had already witnessed the forming of a broad coalition between leftists and rightists, all
sharing a common dream of an independent and unified Korea. Cho Man-sik in the north,
and Y6 Un-hyong in the south, seemed to provide the best formula for transforming the
former colony into a liberal democratic nation.

But then the intervention of two

superpowers changed everything. Cho Man-sik and Yo Un-hyong's moderate visions
were replaced by the realities of Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee. Rhee’s victory and his
unwillingness to compromise with the leftists made peaceful unification almost
impossible. The establishment of two separate regimes on the Korean peninsula not only
consolidated the division of the country but also set ticking the time-bomb of a bigger
conflict to come.
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CHAPTER 4
Religious Anti-Communism and American Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION
The previous three chapters have explored the influence of Christianity in Korean
nationalism and post-war politics. The discussion in this chapter turns to the other side of
the globe, and the influence of Christianity within the United States during the early post
war years, examining how religious factors became a powerful force in American politics
and a useful propaganda instrument, and how South Korea grew to be a symbol of the
struggle for religious freedom and a focal point of America’s anti-Communist strategy in
East Asia.
Religious influence on foreign policy had both individualistic and institutional
elements that were difficult to quantify.

From 1945 to 1950, the US government

developed a close partnership with religious actors in the conduct of foreign affairs. It
enlisted the support of religious leaders and religious institutions to propagate its political
agenda.

Meanwhile, church leaders also tried to lobby politicians to protect their

interests and expand their influence in their mission fields.
To illustrate the complexity of religion in the conduct of US foreign affairs, the
first two layers of discussion focus on President Harry S. Truman and his major foreign
policies during the interwar years. While it is true that US foreign policy has never been
a direct product of the will and actions of a single individual, it is also true that whoever
occupied the White House - his personality, religious beliefs, and political philosophy -

220
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substantially affected the decision-making process. Of course, the ultimate result is the
product of complex interactions of the President’s close advisors and other institutional
actors, but as the head of the US government, the President has the responsibility to sell
his policies to the American people. Being both a leader and a man of his time, President
Truman and his public speeches provide the important clues to understanding the
mainstream religious sentiments of the United States in the early Cold War era. The
purpose of this chapter is not to determine whether Truman was, in his heart, a true
believer or merely a skilled politician who had used religious rhetoric to cultivate public
support.

Instead, this chapter investigates the essential role of religion in the early

formation of the Cold War.1
The third layer of discussion relates to the impact of the discovery and the use of
the atomic bomb. The atomic issue not only caused serious debates and a moral dilemma
among American political and religious leaders, but also generated enormous fear over
the ultimate annihilation of human civilization. The destructive nature of the atomic
bomb brought significant impact to the development of American Christianity.

The

possibility of an atomic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union
was a key concern for many US policy makers. It affected Christians’ perception of
themselves and the Soviet Union that hardened anti-Communist sentiment in the United
States. It is essential to understand the origins of atomic fear in order to examine the later
controversy over the idea of fighting a limited war in Korea.

1 If the President, as a skillful politician, needed to pretend to be religious in order to get elected and enjoy
public support, this would clearly demonstrate the central role of religion in American politics. On the
other hand, if he was a sincere believer who was unabashed about expressing his thoughts, then religion
could have had an even stronger role on his policy decisions. Yet he would still not have won the election
if his religious rhetoric had not resonated with the sentiment o f his time. Therefore, regardless o f his
personal beliefs, Truman’s comments reflect the public mood. Examining Truman’s religious justifications
serves to shed light on the essence o f these values in US domestic and foreign policy.
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The fourth layer of discussion focuses on the opinion of religious leaders and the
official position of American churches on the US interests in Korea. The rise of religious
anti-Communism, the expansion of missionary activities in Korea, and China’s closing
the door on Christian missionary activities altogether generated a keen interest in
supporting South Korea among American church leaders.

Christian publications and

inter-denominational conferences voiced their support for religious and political freedom
in Korea.

They were the leading force urging American economic assistance to the

struggling Syngman Rhee regime in Seoul. Deepening religious connections between the
two countries was the main underlying cause of the continuous American involvement in
Korea.

AMERICA TRIUMPHANT 1945-1948
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, Vice President
Harry S. Truman became commander-in-chief of a nation at war. On that day Truman
wrote in his diary, confessing his uncertainty about the future and about the many
decisions he was about to make.2 As Truman took office, the United States faced major
problems about not only how to end the world war, but also how to set the course of
peace. Many people, including Truman himself, had thought that the job was too big for
the man from Missouri. Unlike Roosevelt, who personally dominated the formation of
US foreign policy, Truman depended more on the advisors around him due to his lack of
knowledge and experience in foreign affairs. As a result, it gave room for such officials
as Dean G. Acheson, W. Averell Harriman, Robert A. Lovett, John J. McCloy, George F.

2 Robert H. Ferrell, ed„ O ff the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1980), 16.
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Kennan, and Charles E. Bohlen to influence the President on the formation of the
containment policy against Soviet political and military expansion.

Throughout

Truman’s years in the White House, his foreign policy was a product of a team effort in
the administration.3 Even so, Truman was generally regarded by historians as a strong
leader who not only led the Allies to military victory, but implemented practical plans to
reconstruct a new world order. His courage and his style of leadership were connected
with his religious background and beliefs.
The Religious Beliefs o f Harry Truman
Truman was a devoutly religious man although he was not a faithful churchgoer
while he was in the White House. Throughout his life, Truman was deeply committed to
his personal faith and “lived by a strict Baptist morality.”4 Growing up under the strong
religious influence of his devoutly Baptist mother, Martha Ellen Truman, he had read the
Bible twice by the age of twelve, and was impressed by the moral codes set out in the
Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount.5 He had even considered becoming
a minister when he was young, but it did not work out.6 Instead, he found interests in
politics and became a very successful senator. His fame in Congress eventually earned
him a place on the Democratic ticket as President Roosevelt’s running-mate in the 1944
presidential election. After he entered the White House, his busy schedule kept him from

3 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1986), 26-27.
4 Andrew J. Dunar, The Truman Scandals and the Politics o f Morality (Columbia, MO: University of
Missouri Press, 1984), 2.
5 Ibid.
6 Dianne Kirby, “Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold War,”
in Religion and the Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 86.
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going to church every Sunday, but he continued to read the Bible and interpret it for
himself.7
Many people underestimated the importance of religion in Truman’s life and
decision-making because he did not like to talk about his religious life, thinking that
religion was “something to live by and not talk about.”8 While he was a senator living in
Washington D.C., very few people were interested in his religious life and church
attendance, but as soon as he became the President, he discovered that suddenly the
whole world was watching him. When he attended church, Truman felt that his presence
attracted too much gossip and national attention. He was particularly frustrated when he
felt that some religious leaders were taking advantage of the publicity show.9 Because of
this, he attended church irregularly, gave no advance notice and usually “slipped into a
rear pew o f ’ a church quietly so that he could “beat the publicity boys.”10
Despite his Baptist background, Truman’s religious outlook leaned toward the
ecumenical.

His wife and daughter belonged to the Episcopalian denomination. As

President in the White House, he supported all denominations and sought to have peace
with other religions, showing no particular favoritism towards any religious affiliation in
his political appointments.11
Since the President cherished the American tradition of religious tolerance, he
emphasized the importance of religious life and the right of religious freedom for

7 Clark M. Clifford, ‘T he Unique and Inspiring Leadership of President Truman,” in Harry S. Truman: The
Man From Independence, ed. William F. Levantrosser (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 385.
8 Quote in Ibid.
9 Harry S. Truman, Mr. Citizen (New York: Popular Library, 1953), 97.
10 See Truman’s diary, 1 June 1945, Off the Record, 40-41.
11 Merlin Gustafson, “Church, State, and the Cold War, 1945-1952,” Journal o f Church and State 8 (Winter
1966): 50.
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American citizens.12 Ecumenical religious organizations, such as the Federal Council of
Churches of Christ (FCCC), enjoyed President Truman’s respect. The FCCC was first
organized in 1908 and expanded gradually. By 1949, it received the support of three
Eastern Orthodox denominations and twenty-four Protestant denominations, except the
Southern Baptists, in the United States.
associated memberships.

11

It claimed about twenty-eight million in

The work of the FCCC was carried on by more than twenty

committees and departments that covered all phases of church affairs. Since the FCCC
was one of the influential church lobbies in the nation’s capital, the President took their
views seriously and maintained a friendly relationship with them in order to mobilize
their support for domestic and foreign affairs. He was the first President of the United
States to speak at a FCCC conference in Columbus, Ohio, on March 6,1946.
Truman’s religious faith influenced his style of leadership and especially some
crucial decisions that he made. Unlike his presidential predecessors who predominantly
came from well-educated and privileged backgrounds, Truman was a self-made man of
humble birth. Without even having a college degree, he had to mingle among Ivy League
graduates and many highly decorated World War II generals, while at the same time
asserting a leadership role in the top decision-making process in the highest office of the
world.

A prayer that Truman had recited frequently ever since his teenage years shed

some light on his inner desire to please God by doing what was right:
Oh! Almighty and Everlasting God, Creator o f Heaven, Earth, and the Universe: Help me
to be, to think, to act what is right, because it is right; make me truthful, honest and
honorable in all things; make me intellectually honest for the sake o f right and honor and
without thought o f reward to me. Give me the ability to be charitable, forgiving and

12 Truman, Mr. Citizen, 98.
13 Luke Eugene Ebersole, Church Lobbying in the Nation’s Capital (New York: The MacMillan Company,
1951), 43.
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patient with my fellowmen - help me to understand their motives and their shortcomings
- even as Thou understandest mine! Amen, Amen, Amen.14

As Truman faced the daunting task of leading the nation, he may well have remembered
this familiar prayer. It is at least known that when he spoke for the first time before
Congress as the President of the United States, he quoted King Solomon’s prayer for
wisdom and the ability to govern the people as they should be governed.
It is hard to evaluate how deeply his religious beliefs affected his political
behavior and leadership style, but according to historian Merlin Gustafson, who
specializes in the study of religious influence in the American Presidencies, Truman’s
political philosophy was closely connected to his religious philosophy.15

Truman

testified again and again that while he was in the White House, he desired to think and act
more as the President of the United States than as the individual, Harry S. Truman. He
thought that it was right for him to care more about the benefit of the whole country than
for his own personal interests.16 However, sometimes to do right could jeopardize one’s
political career and popularity. As a matter of fact, Truman was hardly very popular
compared to Roosevelt while he was in the White House and his approval rating dropped
every year of his presidency.

17

Despite this, Truman was able to mobilize bi-partisan

political support for some of his policies with his administration setting the course for the
American response to the Soviets in the first decade of the Cold War.
Moral Fallout from the Use o f the Atomic Bomb
As soon as he entered the White House, Truman was confronted with ending the
prolonged war against Japan. In spite of facing their doom, the Japanese continued to
14 Ferrell, O ff the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman, 188.
15 Merlin Gustafson, ‘T h e Religion o f a President,” Journal o f Church and State 5 (Autumn 1968): 379.
16 Truman, Mr. Citizen, 263.
17 See Sheldon Appleton, “Public Perceptions o f Truman,” in Harry S. Truman: The Man From
Independence, 169-184.
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refuse to surrender to Allied forces unconditionally because they hoped to prevent an
Allied occupation of Japan and to preserve kokutai, “a symbolic expression of both the
political and the spiritual essence of the emperor system,” which in the end boiled down
to the status of the imperial house.18 From June to July, Truman’s administration was
tom between whether or not to revise the Allies’ position of demanding an unconditional
surrender. Truman’s advisers pointed out that an invasion of Kyushu and the Kanto Plain
on Honshu, estimated to cost about 193,500 American casualties, would be needed to
crush Japan’s fighting spirit and completely disarm the country.19 On June 17, 1945,
Truman’s diary records his dilemma, “I have to decide a Japanese strategy - shall we
invade Japan proper or shall we bomb and blockade? That is my hardest decision to date.
But I’ll make it when I have all the facts.”20 About a month later, the successful testing
of the atomic bomb was reported to Tmman while he was meeting with Churchill and
Stalin at Potsdam on July 1 6 ,1945.21
As the President of the United States, Truman held the ultimate responsibility of
ordering the use of the atomic bombs against Japan. Tmman regarded the atomic bomb
as “the most terrible bomb in the history of the world.” However, he did not hesitate to
use it against Japan, because he believed that it was God’s favor for the United States to
possess such a powerful weapon.22 His only concern was that he wanted to use it against
a “military objective and soldiers and sailors, not women and children.”23 He wrote in

18 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender o f Japan (Cambridge, MA:
The Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 2005), 4.
19 Ibid., 103.
20 Ferrell, O ff the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman, 47.
21 Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year o f Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1955), 415.
22 Harry S. Truman, Statement announcing the use o f the A-Bomb at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, U.S.
President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 197-199.
23 Ibid.
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his diary, “Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader
of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or
the new.”24 On July 26, the day on which the Allies sent their ultimatum in the Potsdam
Proclamation, demanding that Japan surrender unconditionally through a public
declaration, Truman told the American people, “If they do not now accept our terms, they
may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this
earth.”25 When Japan refused to comply, on August 6, 1945, the US dropped the first
atomic bomb used in combat on the city of Hiroshima. Three days later, on August 9, it
dropped another atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki. Finally, Japan agreed to surrender
unconditionally on August 15.
Truman, however, had over-estimated the usefulness of the atomic bomb to end
the Pacific War because the leaders in Tokyo seemed more shaken by the hostile action
of the Soviet Union, which declared war on Japan on August 8, than the destructive
power of the atomic bombing at Hiroshima.

Of i

Nor did the bomb scare the Russians into

complying with U.S. demands in dealing with post-war settlements.

Instead, its

immediate result was to hasten Stalin’s steps toward joining the Pacific War and increase
his distrust of the United States. Historians such as Martin J. Sherwin have questioned
Truman’s inflexibility toward Japan and suggested that Truman’s hidden “atomic
diplomacy” against the Soviet Union sowed the seeds of the Cold War.

97

24 Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman, 55-56.
25 Statement announcing the use o f the A-Bomb at Hiroshima on August 6,1945, U.S. President, Public
Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1 9 4 5 ,197-199.
26 The latest interpretation is presented by Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender
o f Japan, 183-202.
27 Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins o f the Arms Race (New York:
Vintage Books, 1987).
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Initially, the American people were happy to win and proud of their
accomplishment of inventing the atomic bomb.

President Truman officially declared

Sunday, August 19, 1945, a day of prayer and “[called] upon the people of the United
States, of all faiths, to unite in offering their thanks to God.”

Most of the American

people were firmly behind Truman’s decision to use the bomb, thinking that since God
had denied the atomic bomb to America’s enemies, “we will use it in his name and for his
purposes,” making possible a world in which “we will have war no more,” in the words
of one elderly man from rural Florida.29 According to a cultural historian, John Fousek,
the bomb and the victory over Germany and Japan signified, to many people, a “national
greatness, which in turn entailed responsibility for ensuring peace and freedom
throughout the world.”

Borrowing the words of Henry R. Luce, the owner of Time,

Life, and Fortune magazines, “the American Century” had arrived because of American
leadership in the victory over the Axis Powers and the American monopoly of atomic
weapons.31
Nevertheless, the fever of victory began to subside when more detailed reports of
the horror of destruction and radiation effects caused by the atomic explosions reached
the American public. These cases of human suffering were beyond the imagination of
any scientists and political leaders prior to the use of the weapon. People began to
question whether the ends justified the means, and how much guilt they should feel for
using an immoral weapon upon women and children, even when the purported goal was,

28 “Proclamation 2660: Victory in the East - Day o f Prayer,” 16 August 1945, Public Papers o f the
Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945, 223.
29 John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots o f the Cold War
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f North Carolina Press, 2000), 24.
30 Ibid., 62.
31 Michael H. Hunt, “East Asia in Henry Luce’s ‘American Century’,” Diplomatic History 23 (Spring
1999): 322.
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ironically, “to defeat tyranny.” As the true extent of the devastation at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki became known, many American moralists and pacifists condemned the
President’s decision, arguing that it had damaged the moral supremacy of the United
States as a Christian nation. It stirred up intense controversy and deep concern over any
future use of atomic weapons.
Liberal Protestant publications were particularly critical of the decision of the
President. In late August 1945, Christian Century reported that “something like a moral
earthquake has followed the dropping of atomic bombs on the two Japanese cities.” The
editorial, titled “America Atomic Atrocity,” condemned the use of the atomic bomb,
which had placed the United States in an indefensible moral position.32 It called on the
churches of America “to dissociate themselves and their faith from this inhuman and
'j 'j

reckless act of the American government.”

Those who were involved in the making

and using of the bomb could also not escape a deep sense of guilt and responsibility.
Albert Einstein, for example, stated that if he were to live his life over again, he should
prefer to be a plumber or a peddler rather than a physicist.34 Many within the U.S.
government were troubled as well - although Truman himself never expressed any
regrets about using the bomb on Japan.
American churches were divided on this issue. Some believers, such as Catholic
clergymen and Protestant laymen, sided with the President, seeing God’s providence in
giving America the bomb.

Others, especially liberal theologians and intellectuals,

32 Leo Maley, III, “Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Memory (and Forgetting) in the Religious Press,” in The
Writing on the Cloud: America Culture Confronts the Atomic Bomb, ed. Alison M. Scott and Christopher
D. Geist (Lanham, MD: University Press o f America, Inc., 1997), 183.
33 Ibid., 184.
34 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Einstein and the World Situation,” The Messenger 19 (December 14, 1954): 6. See
also Robert E. Williams, “Christian Realism and ‘The Bomb’: Reinhold Niebuhr on the Dilemma of the
Nuclear Age,” Journal o f Church and State 28 (Spring 1986): 295.
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condemned its use. Between them, these views perhaps affected the President in the
following way: they encouraged him in believing that he had made the right decision,
while at the same time discouraging him from using the bomb again, since it had cost so
many innocent lives and caused such unprecedented suffering.35
Christian intellectuals were also deeply troubled by the discovery and the use of
the bomb. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the most famous Christian theologians
of the 1940s who later became an adviser in the State Department’s Policy Planning
Staff, initially tried to justify the use of the bomb against Japan as “the climax of the use
of methods of warfare including obliteration and incendiary bombing.”36 However, just a
few weeks later, he cautioned about the potential threat of the bomb against humanity
because a scientific breakthrough might not necessarily bring good to mankind. Nor did
the bomb, Niebuhr felt, mean a victory of good over evil.
The destructive power of the bomb, in fact, raised serious questions for those who
looked to science for hope regarding the future. Man’s quest for the mastery of nature
had climaxed in fear and trembling. Biblical predictions of a fiery Armageddon now
seemed to be real and certain. One Life editorial suggested that all the major postwar
problems were symbolically embedded in the atomic bomb: “Food, Russia, strikes, UN,
colonies and everything else on the public conscience are inseparably threaded on this
bomb, swinging like pendulums in unison between idealism and blue funk.”37
Fears of atomic annihilation were widely shared among American political and
military leaders because many people could visualize that the next world war would
35 Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender o f Japan, 202.
36 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Our Relations to Japan,” Christianity and Crisis 5 (September 17,1945): 5. See also
Willliams, “Christian Realism and ‘The Bomb’: Reinhold Niebuhr on the Dilemma o f the Nuclear Age,”
294.
37 Quoted in Fousek, To Lead the Free World, 114.
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probably be an atomic war that destroyed the whole world.

In response, American

political, military, and religious leaders began to advocate a revitalization of spiritual
values in American life as the only solution to the threat of eternal destruction. General
Douglas MacArthur, who had a clearer view of the destructive power of the atomic bomb
than most Americans because of his responsibility as Supreme Commander of Allied
Powers (SCAP) in Japan, told his troops shortly after Japan surrendered, “We have had
our last chance.

If we do not devise some greater and more equitable system,

Armageddon will be at our door.”38 The only solution to the problem, according to the
general, was spiritual. Men must first be saved in spirit in order to confront this difficult
reality of saving lives in a hostile world.39
General MacArthur’s idea was supported by John Foster Dulles, a religious
layman active in the FCCC, who also called for a “spiritual revival” of the nation, urging
the American people to rededicate their lives to the religious faith of their forefathers.40
In June 1946, Life published a two-part series by Dulles on Soviet foreign policies and
the steps needed to counter Communist encroachment. First, he called for a spiritual
renewal, because traditional American “political and religious faith” could solve the
nation’s domestic problems.

He also urged the United States to maintain military

strength and to promote, in American-occupied regions, the Four Freedoms and the
concepts of justice found within the Atlantic Charter, a vision for a post-World War II
world established by President Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill in 1941.41 The

38 Jerrold Lee Brooks, “In Search o f Peace: Presbyterians in the Early Cold War Period, 1945-1953,”
American Presbyterians 70 (Winter 1992): 261.
39 Ibid., 262.
40 Mark G. Toulouse, ‘T he Development o f a Cold Warrior: John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union,
1945-1952,” Journal o f Presbyterian History 63 (Fall 1985): 312.
41 Fousek, To Lead the Free World, 119.
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American people, Dulles warned, should be ready to accept the necessary sacrifices in
order to “help keep freedom alive in the world.”42
Speaking the Language o f Faith
One of the key roles of religion in American foreign policy was as a means of
public persuasion. As the President of the United States, Truman, along with his cabinet
members, was responsible for making US foreign policy known and acceptable to the
American people. Religious rhetoric was generally an essential part of Truman’s public
appeal for a new world order because it was an effective means of breaking down
partisanship in politics by emphasizing the common beliefs and values that were
generally shared by the American public.
At the same time, it was quite likely that the role of religion went far beyond that
of a convenient toll of rhetoric. At least in the case of Truman, his appeals for morality in
foreign policy probably derived from his own ideology and desire to “do what was right.”
On some occasions, he went against the advice of his cabinet in making his own
decisions.
Truman’s public speeches showed a consistent religious conviction - speeches
that he approved even if he did not write 43 Truman’s “references to Bible passages and
the Christian mission of the United States in world affairs,” according to historian
Gustafson, suited the spirit of the times.44 Three major events - the establishment of the
United Nations, the creation of the state of Israel, and the implementation of the Truman

42 Ibid.
43 Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., H arry’s Farewell: Interpreting and Teaching the Truman Presidency
(Columbia, MO: University o f Missouri Press, 2004), 9.
44 Gustafson, ‘T he Religion o f a President,” 380.
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Doctrine and the Marshall Plan - demonstrated how Truman used religion to build public
support for his foreign policy and how religious ideas influenced his decisions.
The Formation o f the United Nations
The idea of establishing a United Nations (UN) had originated in three major
successive political conferences (Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran) during the war in 1943.
From August to October 1944, the details of such a world organization had been worked
out by representatives from France, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the Soviet Union. As President of the United States, Truman’s role
was to persuade the American public to support this new organization for international
collective security and to accept the American responsibility in leading the postwar
world.
In his speech before the United Nations Conference in San Francisco on April 25,
1945, Truman shared his belief that the United Nations was formed by “Divine guidance”
for a new world order:
None o f us doubt that with Divine guidance, friendly cooperation, and hard work, we
shall find an adequate answer to the problem history has put before u s.... We must build
a new world - a far better world - one in which the eternal dignity o f man is respected.
As we are about to undertake our heavy duties, we beseech our Almighty God to guide us
in the building of a permanent monument to those who gave their lives that this moment
might come. May He lead our steps in His own righteous path o f peace.45

Truman’s expression was a sincere statement that revealed not only what was on his
mind, but also what he believed Americans in general had wished for.

“Our sole

objective,” the President explained, “at this decisive gathering, is to create the structure.
We must provide the machinery, which will make future peace, not only possible, but

45 Address to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, 25 April 1945, Public Papers o f the
Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945, 21-23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

235

certain....”46 Instead of depending on the American military establishment, Truman
envisioned the United Nations as God’s given machinery and structure for the
preservation of world peace. When he pitched the UN to the American people, and
particularly to religious groups, he stressed the religious principles within the UN
Charter:
We have tried to write into the Charter o f the United Nations the essence o f religion. The
end o f aggression, the maintenance o f peace, the promotion o f social justice and
individual rights and freedoms, the substitution o f reason and justice for tyranny and war,
the protection o f the small and weak nations - by these principles the United Nations has
laid the framework o f the Charter on the sound rock of religious principles.47

He wanted Americans not to see the UN as just another worldly organization, but as one
that was built on religious principles which they commonly shared and endorsed. In
other words, Truman hoped to convince people that the formation of the UN was not
merely the political design of a few heads of states, but also a general answer to the
An

public sentiment of the world.
The Recognition o f Israel
President Truman’s conviction of doing what was right motivated him to make
crucial decisions that sometimes went against the advice of his cabinet members or
against general popular opinion of the time.

The establishment of a Jewish state in

Palestine was the best example. After the end of World War II, there was an intense
effort by the Zionist leaders of the American Zionist Emergency Council to lobby for a
homeland for the Jewish refugees in the Middle E ast49 It was a highly controversial and

46 Ibid.
47 Address in Columbus at a conference o f the Federal Council of Churches on March 6, 1946. U.S.
President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1946 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1962), 141-144.
48 Arthur H. Darken, ‘T he National Council o f Churches and Our Foreign Policy,” Religion in Life XXIV
(Winter 1954-55): 121.
49 Memoirs By Harry S. Truman: Year o f Decisions, 72.
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complicated issue.

According to the Balfour Declaration (1917),50 the British had

committed to give the Jews a homeland in Palestine.51 After the end of the war, the
Allies established a protectorate, called Palestine, for Jewish refugees from Europe. The
issue of recognition of the nation of Israel came up when the Jewish population proposed
to announce their independence on May 14, 1948.

It caused serious conflicts and

controversy within the United States.
Under General George C. Marshall’s leadership, the State Department strongly
opposed extending US recognition because it was practically impossible for Jews in the
new Palestine protectorate to defend themselves against thirty million Arabs in the
Middle East unless the United States fully backed it up. To do so, in Marshall’s view,
would jeopardize American interests and its military position in the Arab world.52
President Truman, however, wanted to recognize Israel, not for any political, economic,
or military motive, but for religious reasons. He told Clark M. Clifford, his close adviser
in the White House, that he was “determined to do all that was in his power” to help the
formation of a Jewish nation because “there was a commitment in the Old Testament that
the Jews would have a homeland.”53 Because of Truman’s efforts, the United States
government recognized the State of Israel just before the Soviet Union did.54
When the Jewish representative came to thank him for his support, Clifford said
that the President’s eyes were filled with tears because the President thought that he had
done the right thing despite the opposition, and that God had been on his side to fulfill the
50 Letter from Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, 2 November 1917,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm.
51 Memoirs By Harry S. Truman: Years o f Decision, 73.
52 Clark M. Clifford, Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford by Jerry N. Hess, 3 April 1971 in
Washington, D.C., 97-98, Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaperAoreasub.htm.
53 Clifford, ‘T he Unique and Inspiring Leadership o f President Truman,” in Harry S. Truman: The Man
From Independence, 385.
54 Clifford, Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford, 102.
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prophesy.55 Clifford had little doubt about Truman’s sincere effort in supporting Israel,
but some people believed that Truman helped the Jews because it would probably help
him to gain more Jewish votes in the 1948 Presidential election. This latter argument was
supported by C. Girard Davidson who was Truman’s Assistant Secretary of Interior at
that time.56 Nevertheless, Truman’s friendliness to the Jews perhaps also cost him many
votes from anti-Semitic groups. In short, Truman’s decision was both a political gain and
loss that was hard to measure, but the importance of the religious factor remained clear.
The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan
The political and economic stability of Europe was another big concern for the
United States. As soon as the war ended, the Soviet Union expanded its military control
over Eastern Europe. Communists were gaining public support and political influence in
Western Europe as well. In addition, the weakening British Empire could not maintain
its position in Greece and Turkey when Communist insurrections disturbed the stability
of the Balkans. The British urgently asked the Americans for help. President Truman
feared that all of Europe might turn to Communism if the United States did not act
immediately. The stability and economic recovery of Europe was crucial for America’s
market economy because a Communist-controlled Europe would mean a closed door for
US products and a threat to free trade. Truman’s advisors suggested that he take a clear
stand against Communist expansion and implement crucial measures that would save the
European economy.57 The President was convinced.

55 Clifford, ‘T he Unique and Inspiring Leadership o f President Truman,” 385.
56 C. Girard Davidson, Oral History Interview with C. Girard Davidson by Jerry N. Hess, 17 July 1972 in
Washington, D.C.: 65-66, Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/koreasub.htm.
57 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They M ade, 17-19.
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However, it would not be easy for the American public to accept the rebuilding of
Berlin just after they had finished bombing it. After four years of sacrifice, the American
people wanted demobilization, a smaller government budget, and reduced overseas
involvement. A complex economic argument on preventing the spread of Communism
might not have been fully understood, so Truman instead appealed to the religious golden
rule. In a nationally broadcast speech to the FCCC, Truman called on the American
people to “save the world which is beset by so many threats of new conflicts, new terror,
and new destruction.”

He wanted the people to make more sacrifices.

“As your

President,” Truman told his audiences, “I appeal to you again - and to all Americans
everywhere - to prove your faith and your belief in the teachings of God by doing your
share to save the starving millions in Europe, in Asia, in Africa. Share your food by
eating less, and prevent millions from dying of starvation. Reduce your abundance so
that others may have a crust of bread.”58 In his 1947 State of the Union address, he
warned the United States about the difficulties of securing a peace settlement in Europe
and Asia due to the obstruction of the Soviet Union and the need to maintain the strength
and increase the security of the United States.
According to the Truman Doctrine presented two months later, the President
openly defined the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union
as the competition between two different ways of life.59 To support Greece and Turkey,
and to give economic aid to the recovery of war tom Europe, Truman argued, was an

58 Address in Columbus at a Conference o f the Federal Council o f Churches, 6 March 1946. Public Papers
o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, Truman Library,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.
59 Special message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947. U.S.
President. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1947 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1963), 177-180.
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effective way to promote the American way of life because political freedom allowed
independent countries to choose their own way of life, rather than letting Communists
impose political tyranny upon free people.60 The foundation of the American way of life,
however, was not merely built on its materialistic abundance and sound political system,
but also on its spiritual strength. Truman argued that capitalism without the guidance of
moral principles and religious freedom had very little value and thus was not much
different from materialistic Communism.61
Truman’s administration devised a comprehensive economic recovery program to
revive the European economy. The plan was known as the Marshall Plan, which was
named after the Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall.

Prior to the

implementation of the plan, the United States had already spent $9 billion in the region,
but the effort proved to be inadequate. General Marshall urged all European countries to
join the integrated effort. West Germany, the defeated enemy, would also be included in
the plan. The United States government would pump money into the reconstruction of
Europe so that the Europeans would be fully integrated back into the Americandominated free market economy.
The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were invited, but neither the
Russians nor the Eastern Europeans participated because they feared the capitalist
influence. According to the Marshall Plan, Eastern Europe would provide raw materials
to industrial Western Europe, making the region dependent on the Western world. The
Russians believed that it was a capitalist trap to nullify their domination over Eastern

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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Europe. The Soviet Union therefore organized its own recovery program, known as the
Molotov Plan, to counter the US effort.
To get the American people and Congress to support the Marshall Plan, the
Truman administration carried out a huge advertising campaign.

The government

stressed the humanitarian purposes of the recovery program, the Communist threat, and
the importance of Europe in a free market economy to generate public support. Church
leaders were also mobilized to endorse the effort, pointing out that the plan was
consistent with the Christian doctrine of loving your enemies. After months of discussion
and debate, Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act in March 1948 to fund the
project. In three years, the US government sent a total of 12.4 billion US dollars to
Europe. The plan proved to be a mixed success. It caused inflation and did not solve the
huge trade deficits between the United States and Europe, but it did generate industrial
production and stimulate European economic growth. The United States also benefited
economically and politically from the program when the Europeans were able to afford
American exports and sided with the United States in its political competition against the
Soviet Union.
President Truman’s Idea o f Building a Western Christian Alliance
The threat of Communist expansion in Europe and Asia dominated the conduct of
US foreign policy from 1947 to 1950. To find a way to nullify the threat and secure a
victory over Communism became a major concern of US foreign policy makers. Apart
from building economic strength and political alliances with non-Communist countries to
contain the spread of Communism, President Truman wanted to expand the anti
communist coalition through religious means. His outlook on foreign policy was colored
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by his religious convictions. Since he believed that a country with a strong Christian
presence and a democratic political system to ensure individual freedom would
fundamentally reject Communist philosophy,62 he was not particularly afraid of
Communist infiltration into the United States, so long as the American people held fast to
their religious beliefs and democratic institutions. To this end, the President thought that
he could use his position to encourage worship and to draw attention to the plight of
Christians in Communist countries. For instance, in his 1948 State of the Union address,
Truman defined the American objective in the pursuit of freedom:
Our first goal is to secure fully the essential human rights of our citizens. The United
States has always had a deep concern for human rights. Religious freedom, free speech,
and freedom of thought are cherished realities in our land. Any denial of human rights is
a denial o f the basic beliefs o f democracy and of our regard for the worth o f each
individual.63

The President also wanted the American people to spend more time on religious activities
and pay more attention to religion, putting their freedoms and rights into practice. Since
the world was looking to the U.S. for leadership, Truman asserted that it was the
responsibility of the United States to “rededicate ourselves to the faith in God that gives
us confidence as we face the challenge of the years ahead.”64 In a radio address a year
later, he urged the American people to go to worship and to give thanks to God because
God had blessed America while in other parts of the world there were many people who
could “only pray in secret, fearing persecution if they profess their beliefs openly.”65

62 Truman, Mr. Citizen, 98.
63 Annual Message to the Congress on the State o f the Union, 7 January 1948, U.S. President, Public
Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1948 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1964), 3.
64 Ibid., 2-10.
65 Radio address as part o f interdenominational program, “One Great Hour,” 26 March 1949, U.S.
President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1949 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1964), 187.
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Truman’s idea of the pursuit of freedom, however, had its own blind spot. The
United States’ own civil rights record did not look good. American blacks did not enjoy
the same kind of freedom as white Americans in the 1940s due to deep-rooted ideas of
racism and segregation. American racism was a glaring weakness that the Soviet antiAmerican propaganda machine attacked repeatedly. Nevertheless, it did not mean that
the President had not made any effort on civil rights issues.

Using his presidential

authority, Truman first set up a committee on civil rights. Based on the report, To Secure
These Rights, submitted by the committee, the President issued Executive Order #9980 to
set up a Fair Employment Practices Commission in the federal government, putting an
end to discrimination in the civil service system.

After this, he also issued another

executive order (#9981) to desegregate the US military forces.

Had it not been for the

presence of the Southern Bloc within Congress, who blocked any attempt to address civil
rights problems through legislation, Truman might have implemented more laws to
ensure the freedom of American blacks. Moving slightly ahead of his time, Truman was
quite sincere in his objective to ensure freedom in both domestic and foreign affairs.
In terms of foreign affairs, Truman was especially sympathetic towards those who
did not enjoy religious freedom. “Millions of people in our world,” the President wrote
in October 1949, “are living in slavery.”66 He was referring to the political and religious
persecution in the Communist countries in Europe.

A month later, he explained the

same issue on another occasion. “Men and women in the Communist world are being
systematically persecuted for their religious beliefs and campaigns are being waged to

66 Harry Truman’s letter to John L. Sullivan Accepting the Honorary Chairmanship o f National
Brotherhood Week, 5 October 1949, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman
1 9 4 9 ,499-500.
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turn religion into a tool of the state.”67 Truman argued that the American people should
offer them not only economic aid, but also “the sense of brotherhood in a common
cause.”68 Seeing that it would not be hard for him to find allies and helpers in religious
circles, Truman believed that he might “organize the moral forces of the world to meet
this situation.”69 He confided to his wife, Bess Truman, that if he could mobilize
religious leaders to join hands “against the Bolshevik materialists,” then the United States
could win the fight against Communism.70
Therefore, Truman sought to build an informal Western Christian alliance - “a
common religious and moral front” - to counter the Communist ideological expansion in
Europe and Asia.71 In 1948, he began an effort “to bring about the active cooperation of
the leaders and the followers of the great religious faiths of the world,” hoping that he
could generate “a vital force for the advancement of peace.”72 His first step was to set up
informal diplomatic relations with the Pope by sending Myron C. Taylor as his personal
representative to the Vatican. This drew criticism from Protestant groups, but Truman
wanted to work with the staunchly anti-Communist Catholic Church. Using his own
personal influence, the President then contacted Protestant leaders, such as Bishop G.
Bromley Oxnam (Methodist) and Dr. Samuel McCrea Calvert (Baptist), to mobilize their
support for the potential alliance across various denominations.

In addition to these

Christian leaders, he also reached out to Jewish leaders, spiritual authorities in the

67 Address at a Luncheon o f the National Conference o f Christians and Jews, 11 November 1949, ibid.,
561-563.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Kirby, “Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold War,” in
Religion and the Cold War, 91-92.
71 Truman, Mr. Citizen, 99.
72 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

244

Moslem world, and anti-Communist Buddhist leaders, such as the Dalai Lama of Tibet.73
Such a diverse group of religious representatives would usually not work together. But
Truman sought to convince these religious leaders “that a foe common to them all was
trying to destroy them all.”74
Partnership with Religious Institutions in Spreading Pro-American Propaganda
Propaganda was the primary benefit that Truman would reap from this religious
alliance if he could mobilize religious forces behind him. Anti-American propaganda
spread by the Soviet Union had long troubled the President. “Propaganda seems to be
our greatest foreign relations enemy,” he wrote. “Russians distribute lies about us. Our
papers lie about and misrepresent the motives of the Russians - and the British out-lie
and out-propagandize us both.”

To his frustration, Truman felt that he was facing a

three-front propaganda war and he needed help in order to offset its negative impact. It
was nothing new that Truman had a rough relationship with the American press during
his presidency.

Because of their biased reports on his administration, he labeled the

newspapers run by people such as William Randolph Hearst of the Los Angeles
Examiner, Colonel Robert R. McCormick of the Chicago Tribune, Eleanor Patterson of
the Washington Times-Herald, and Joseph Patterson of the New York Daily News, as the
“sabotage press.”76 His dislike of Soviet propaganda was hardly surprising, but what
upset Truman most was when he heard that the British put up a show for the French,
claiming credit for furnishing the French with the lend-lease materials that the United

73 Ibid., 100.
74 Kirby, “Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold War,” 77.
75 Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman, 45.
76 Ibid., 47, 6 3,192.
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States had given them.77 Truman believed that it was his job to fix this problem because
people in the world (not just Americans) needed to know the facts in order to fully
appreciate the supremacy of the American political system and way of life. If the truth
was not told, it would eventually hurt US foreign policy. Truman’s major goal in Cold
War foreign policy was to therefore spread anti-Communist propaganda while countering
anti-American messages.78
Addressing the members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, who
were resisting governmental propaganda efforts, Truman asked for understanding and
support. The Cold War, he explained, was a struggle for the minds of men. Since the
forces of “imperialistic communism” were winning the propaganda war through a
systematic program of deceit and distortion, it would be crucial for the United States to
get the real story across to the people. Otherwise, the United States would “lose the
battle for men’s minds by default.”79 Truman asserted that the United States must
intensify its effort “to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery,”
and to make American voices “heard around the world in a great campaign of truth.”80 In
March 1949, the President approved an expanded propaganda and psychological warfare
program to curb Communist activities in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, which was
known collectively as the Campaign of Truth.

The program divided the world into

77 Ibid.
78 Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War 1945-1961 (New York:
St. Martin's Griffin, 1997), 14.
79 Address on Foreign Policy at a Luncheon o f the American Society o f Newspaper Editors, 20 April 1950,
Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1950 (Washington, D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1965), 261-264.
80 Ibid.; and see also Allan A. Needell, ‘“Truth Is Our Weapon’: Project TROY, Political Warfare, and
Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State,” Diplomatic History 17 (Summer 1993):
404.
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different regions and devised appropriate means for anti-Communist propaganda efforts
in each region.
The Campaign of Truth centered on the theme of religious freedom. One way
that a religious moral front aided America’s propaganda warfare was by emphasizing
around the world that the difference between America and the Soviet Union was freedom
of worship versus state-enforced atheism. Freedom of religion was of course a much
more appealing argument for the American way of life than an economic argument for
capitalism would have been.

Truman explicitly stated that a world with freedom of

worship was an important US foreign-policy objective. He told the graduating class of
1950 at Gonzaga University:
It is the moral and religious beliefs o f mankind which alone give our strength meaning
and purpose. The struggle for peace is a struggle for moral and ethical principles. These
principles unite us with religious people in every land, who are striving, as we are
striving, for brotherhood among men. In everything we do, at home and abroad, we must
demonstrate our clear purpose, and our firm will, to build a world order in which men
everywhere can walk upright and unafraid, and do the work of God.81

The notion of religious freedom, in Truman’s eyes, was not only a powerful force to unite
the world, but also an essential principle for mankind to fulfill its eternal destiny. This
was a classic example of how a political leader might harness the power of religion in the
fight to win the Cold War.82 It was an attempt to instill a moral conviction that the
Americans were on the side of religious righteousness, while the Communists were evil.

O'}

The radio broadcasts of the Voice o f America, an official propaganda machine for
reaching the people behind the Iron Curtain, “repeatedly attacked Soviet tyranny as
hostile to religion, denounced Stalin as a pseudo-God and claimed that the Russian

81 Address in Spokane at Gonzaga University, 11 May 1950, U.S. President, Public Papers o f the
Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1950, 375-377.
82 Kirby, “Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold War,” 77.
83 Ibid.
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people still crowded into church despite all the persecution and peril.” 84 Religious
freedom grew to be the main theme of anti-Communist broadcasting conducted by the
Voice under the leadership of Edward Barrett, an assistant Secretary of State who headed
the US Information Service (USIS) from 1950 to 1952.85 The objectives of these
broadcasts were to destabilize the Communist regimes inside the Iron Curtain and to
encourage and exploit defections for the sake of obtaining a psychological victory.86
Interestingly, the separation of church and state did not stop the Voice o f America (VOA)
from broadcasting explicitly religious programming, because it was clearly understood as
one of the most effective destabilizing methods available. The US propaganda offensive
in 1949 caused the Soviet Union to increase its efforts to jam Russian-language
broadcasts by the VOA.
Another way that the religious moral front could help was to assist the US
propaganda efforts by utilizing the church networks to spread a pro-American message
around the world. The US government facilitated communication between religious
groups and other private organizations because the President believed that these groups
could “help the cause of the United States to bring peace to the world.”87 Truman
regarded missionary activities, in particular, as the most effective way to spread proAmerican information since these gospel workers could bring a positive message by
telling the people in other countries that the United States had no aggressive agenda.88

84 Kirby, “Religion and the Cold War - An Introduction,” in Religion and the Cold War, 6.
85 Ibid. See also Harriet Rasooli-Sa’eed, ‘T he Iron Curtain is Not Soundproof,” Presbyterian Life, 14 April
1951, 8-9.
86 Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War 1945-1961, 14-15.
87 Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman, 44-45.
88 Remarks to a group o f Baptist Missionaries, 3 February 1950, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the
United States: Harry S. Truman 1950,146.
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To ensure the success of this anti-Communist propaganda campaign, the United
States also needed to enlist supporters inside the hardcore regions, where neither
American private nor public institutions could function effectively, to distribute printed
materials to remote areas outside the area of radio broadcasts. A common religious cause
would offer the United States valuable allies and helpers within the Communistcontrolled regions. For instance, the Catholic churches in Eastern Europe became the
major channel for the flow of pro-American leaflets and other reading materials.89
Therefore, it was hardly a surprise that many clergymen in Europe, China, and North
Korea were charged as US spies by Communist authorities. Truman’s efforts further
intensified the Communist distrust of the Christian churches, institutions, and population,
seeing them as pro-American.

The loyalty of Christians to their native lands and

governments was constantly challenged by Communist authorities.
On the whole, Truman possessed what Reinhold Niebuhr had called the “deep
layer of Messianic consciousness in the mind of America.”90 Such an ideal, according to
historian Dianne Kirby, who has studied Truman’s presidency, “held a special appeal for
him as the leader of a nation which considered itself a special moral force in the world,
with a unique mission, bom of its righteousness.”91 Religion, in Truman’s hands, became
not only a way for obtaining personal spiritual nourishment, but also a means to guide the
Western world as it fought Communist encroachment.

The nature of the Cold War was

no longer solely the political, economic, and military competitions between two
superpowers attempting to expand their spheres of influence. Religious beliefs not only
89 Ibid., 17.
90 Quote in Kirby, “Harry Truman’s Religious Legacy: The Holy Alliance, Containment and the Cold
War,” in Religion and the Cold War, 86.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 91-92.
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became important elements in American anti-Communist ideology, but also were used as
an essential tool in the battle against Communist expansion.93

ATOMIC FEAR AND RELIGIOUS REVIVAL
The competition between the United States and Soviet Union was further
intensified by several major political developments in Europe and Asia. The first one
was the Berlin Blockade in June 1948. The crisis started because the Soviet Union
wanted to force a renegotiation of the four-power control of Germany by blocking all
supplies to Western-held sectors in Berlin. Although the United States succeeded in
breaking the blockade through the continuous airlifting of essential supplies to its
controlled areas and forced the Soviet Union to end the ineffective blockade, the event
planted real fear of future Soviet aggression in the hearts of many Americans and
Europeans, fears that caused the American people to accept greater US responsibility in
defending Western Europe. Western European nations huddled around the United States
for military protection.

Even though the United States had a long tradition of not

entering into permanent military alliances with European countries, the blockade
hastened the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military
alliance that guaranteed a collective response against an attack on any member state.
Nevertheless, the confidence of the United States was soon challenged by two major
events: the Soviet possession of atomic weapons and the victory of Chinese Communists
over the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war.

93 Rasooli-Sa’eed, “The Iron Curtain is Not Soundproof,” 8-9.
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The Fear o f an Atomic War with the Soviet Union
Most experts had predicted that the Soviets would not be able to make their own
atomic bomb until around 1955, but instead the Soviets succeeded much earlier - in
September 1949.94 The United States had lost its nuclear monopoly. President Truman
urged the American people to be prepared for any eventuality at any hour because
America was vulnerable to an atomic attack from the Soviet Union. To maintain US
military superiority, the President accepted the proposal to develop a hydrogen bomb.
The possibility of an atomic war with the Soviet Union terrified many Americans as well
as Europeans.95 People were shocked by how quickly the Russians closed the nuclear
weapons gap. Soviet spies who transferred atomic secrets to the Russians were arrested
in Canada and England. The on-going perjury trial of Alger Hiss, a State Department
official who had earlier attended the Yalta Conference with President Roosevelt, fueled
fears of severe Communist infiltration in the US government. A deep sense of betrayal
was the mood of the time. The hearts of many Americans were further darkened by the
defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops by Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in
China and Chiang’s retreat to Taiwan. Following the reasoning of the domino theory,
Americans worried which country would be next. An astute observer might well have
put odds on South Korea.
In this unsettling time, religion offered an answer to the chain of unsettling events
in world affairs, and, according to some scholars, it would grow to be “a potent political

94 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World they Made, 16.
95 “Prepare to Meet Thy God!” in Revival o f Our Time: The Story o f Billy Graham Evangelistic Campaigns
(Wheaton, IL: Van Kampen Press, 1950), 126.
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force.”96 Distraught people went to church and attended revival meetings; especially,
they looked to religious leaders for guidance and advice. In fact, the 1940s and 1950s
were decades when religious leaders, theologians, pastors, and missionaries enjoyed a
particularly high social reputation in the United States. According to cultural historian
Stephen Whitfield’s research on the culture of the Cold War, “when pollsters asked
which group was ‘doing the most good for the country,’ the answers lifted religious
leaders from third place in 1942 (after government and business leaders) to first in
1947.”97 The proportion of the public who regarded clergymen as “the most useful
citizens” grew from 32.6 percent in 1947 to 46 percent by 1957.98 “Churches,” Whitfield
observed, “were by far the most trusted institution in American life - ahead of schools,
radio, and newspapers, and the government itself.”99 From 1947 onwards, the American
people were generally more receptive to a religious interpretation of world events than at
any other time in history. As the church base within the United States widened due to an
ongoing revival, the potential influence of American missionaries in Korea on American
popular opinion was reaching its zenith.
From the secular circle to the religious realm, a general consensus was developing
as the nation faced the challenges of post-war reconstruction and peace preservation. As
Soviet-American rivalry in Eastern Europe intensified, many looked to the Bible for
answers in their insecure world. Christian leaders saw connections between current
affairs and Biblical prophecies. Most mainstream religious groups took an ecumenical

96 Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, “U.S. Culture and the Cold War,” in Rethinking Cold War Culture,
ed. Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 10.
97 Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1996), 83.
98 Ibid.
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approach to the crisis, and shared the general conviction that “the current threat to the
United States must serve as an occasion for a deep religious and spiritual renewal.”100
To many preachers, the stories of persecution of Christians in Eastern Europe and
in Asia fit the pre-millennialists’ view of the end tim es.101

The Biblical term

Armageddon was frequently used to describe the possible confrontation between the two
atomic powers.

“The common religious response to this situation,” historian Raymond

F. Bulman observed, “was the spread of a certain doomsday revivalist mentality among
the various denominational communities.”102 Prophetic beliefs played a key role in the
way many Americans understood current events. Books such as Wilbur Smith’s This
Atomic Age and the Word o f God were popular among both religious and secular readers.
The Soviet Union became the main focus of doomsday prophecy among dispensationalist
writers. For example, Rev. Harold J. Ockenga preached at a Rose Bowl Rally that “God
should judge us and use the two hundred fifty divisions of the Soviet people to whip us
and scourge us and drive us to our knees before Him in repentance.”103
Billy Graham’s Religious Revival in 1949
The most successful preacher in capturing the American anti-Communist
sentiment of the times was Rev. Billy Graham. As early as the Charlotte Revival of
November 1947, the thirty-two year-old evangelist alerted his audience that Communists
were everywhere.104 About forty-two thousand people attended this revival meeting (see

100 Raymond F. Bulman, ‘“Myth o f Origin’, Civil Religion and Presidential Politics,” Journal o f Church
and State 33 (Summer 1991): 532.
101 Dean C. Curry, “Where Have All the Niebuhrs Gone? Evangelicals and the Marginalization of
Religious Influence in American Public Life,” Journal o f Church and State 36 (Winter 1994): 104.
102 Bulman, ‘“Myth o f Origin’, Civil Religion and Presidential Politics,” 531.
103 ‘T he Christian Answer to Communism,” in Am erica’s Hour o f Decision: Featuring a Life Story o f Billy
Graham, ed. Harold J. Ockenga (Wheaton, IL: VanKamper, 1951), 153.
104 Quoted in Andrew J. Rotter, “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian
Relations, 1947-1954,” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 596.
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Table 4.1). Graham skillfully drew connections between God’s judgment and the rise of
Communism. The nation was vulnerable because the American people were not aware of
the infringement of its enemies. According to Graham, Communism, like alcoholism,
sexual immorality, and idolatry, could destroy the Christian world.
Just two days after the news that Russia had detonated a nuclear device, Graham
warned his audience at a Los Angeles crusade that if the American people refused to
repent of their sinful lifestyle, the city would soon be destroyed by the atomic bomb
because God would not spare a sinful and unrepentant city.105 In Graham’s mind, part of
Los Angeles’ guilt was its strong pro-Communist atmosphere. “Do you know that Fifth
Columnists, called Communists,” Graham explained, “are more rampant in Los Angeles
than any other city in America?”106 Although Graham did not give any example in his
sermon when he made this sweeping assertion, the American people responded to his call
enthusiastically. The Los Angeles crusade marked the beginning of more than a halfcentury long religious crusade led by Billy Graham.107

105 Marshall Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable o f American Righteousness (Boston, MA: Little Brown and
Company, 1979), 198. See also Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War, 77.
106 Ibid., 198.
107 Since, in the end, neither Los Angeles nor any other US city was destroyed in during the Cold War, one
might characterize Billy Graham as a false prophet whose predictions did not come to pass. Yet, to be fair,
Graham did not predict what would happen, but only what would happen if people did not repent. As an
evangelist, Graham saw a responsibility to warn about the coming judgment. There are Biblical precedents
for the delaying or cancelling o f an impending judgment when the people responded to the call to
repentance. In Genesis 18:32, God promised Abraham that he would not destroy the cities o f Sodom and
Gomorrah if he could find ten righteous people there. The city was destroyed because ten could not be
found. Also, in the Book o f Jonah, Jonah pronounced the destruction of to the Assyrian city o f Nineveh.
When the Ninevites heard Jonah’s message, however, they repented. “When God saw what they did and
how they turned from their evil ways, he had compassion and did not bring upon them the destruction he
had threatened.” (Jonah 3:10, New International Version) The city o f Nineveh was destroyed fifty years
later when, according to the Book o f Nahum, the new generation went back to their wicked ways. In other
words, a successful revival was measured by how many people responded to the call and made confessions,
not by how accurate the prophecy turned out to be. This understanding helps to explain how Graham’s
revival started and flourished during the Cold War.
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Graham defined the Cold War in completely religious and absolute terms as the
struggle between good and evil, between the godly and godless. He urged Los Angeles
residents to respond to God’s call immediately because:
God is giving us a desperate choice, a choice o f either revival or judgment. There is no
alternative! ... The world is divided into two camps! On the one side we see
Communism. On the other, we see so-called Western culture, and its fruit had its
foundation in the Bible, the Word o f God, and in the revivals o f the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Communism, on the other hand, has declared war against God,
against Christ, against the Bible, against all religion! ... Unless the Western world has an
old-fashioned revival, we cannot last!’108

Listeners were being urged to view their feelings of insecurity as a call to repentance, by
choosing to make a clear stand on God’s side, against Communism. Communism was,
by nature, completely against Christianity. If the American people refused to turn back to
Christ and repent, Graham warned, the American nation would not be spared.109
Christianity was not only the antithesis of Communism, but also the means of salvation
for the whole of the American nation and the world. Graham drew no clear line between
religion and either ideology or American nationalism.
Billy Graham’s vigorous anti-Communist evangelical preaching appealed to an
anti-Communist publisher, William Randolph Hearst, whom President Truman regarded
as “the top mind prostitutor” and “the number one whoremonger.” 110 According to Don
Goodenow, photo editor of the old Los Angeles Examiner in 1949, Hearst asked him to
send teletype messages to his managing editors, urging them to “give attention to Billy
Graham’s meetings.”111 Reporters and photographers from the Examiner and Hearst’s
other papers came to cover the crusade. Goodenow arranged a full page of photographs
108 Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable o f American Righteousness, 198.
109 Graham, “Will God Spare America?” in Am erica’s Hour o f Decision: Featuring a Life Story o f Billy
Graham, 116-126.
110 See Monte M. Poen, ‘“Rose, File It’: What Harry Truman’s Unmailed Letters Tell Us About the ThirtyThird President,” in Harry S. Truman: The Man From Independence, 372.
111 Quoted in Patricia Daniels Cornell, A Time For Remembering: The Story o f Ruth Bell Graham (San
Francisco, CA: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983), 86.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

255

of Graham preaching each Friday night throughout the crusade in Los Angeles.
Favorable letters from readers poured into the Examiner's editorial department. Stories
about Graham’s crusades and success were reported all over the country.

Newsmen

praised Graham’s “charisma,” saying that he was eloquent and powerful in his
preaching.112 Because of Hearst’s support, Graham’s Los Angeles crusade attracted
nationwide attention. By the end of the eight-week revival, about 350,000 had attended
the meetings and around 3,000 had come forward to make a decision to believe in Jesus
Christ or to rededicate their lives to having active Christian fellowship in local churches
(see Table 4.1). Indianapolis Star reported on November 2, 1949 that Billy Graham,
according to churchmen, started the greatest religious revival in the history of Southern
11-3

California.

Graham’s story of success in LA was not a one-time event as some people

thought. Instead, it marked the beginning of a long-wave of national and international
revivals.
About a month later, Graham’s success in Boston attracted the attention of many
political leaders. When Graham held another month of revivals in South Carolina (this
time, attended by one hundred and ninety thousand people - see Table 4.1), Governor J.
Strom Thurmond and former Secretary of State James M. Byrnes came to endorse the
crusade. Henry Luce was also interested in this young preacher and flew out to meet
Graham personally. After that meeting, Luce became a loyal supporter of Graham’s
evangelical movement.114 From 1949 to 1955, Graham frequently made the front cover
of Luce's Time and Life magazines. The media’s positive support and coverage of Billy
Graham’s crusades made him into an influential religious figure throughout the 1950s.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War, 78.
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In about eight years, the Billy Graham Evangelical Association grew rapidly from
one secretary in a one-room office in 1950 to being headquartered in a four-story office
building in Minneapolis with two-hundred staff workers. Each week, the association
received about ten thousand dollars from letters, and each year it collected and disbursed
over two million dollars for national and international crusades. Moreover, from 1952
onward, Graham had his own weekly television program on top of his already-verypopular “Hour of Decision” radio program. And his newspaper column was published by
125 newspapers across the country.115
The Political Influence o f Billy Graham
Rev. Billy Graham was one of the most important religious figures in the 1950s
because he emerged as the spokesperson of American Protestantism, receiving the
endorsement of most mainline denominations. He was labeled as “the pope of protestant
America.”116 His anti-Communist message found resonance across the entire religious
spectrum.

117

And because his theology so often merged religion with policy, he would

also turn out to be one of the era’s key political figures. An out-spoken critic of President
Truman’s foreign and domestic policies, he insisted on hardening the U.S. position
against Communist infiltration and Soviet expansion in East Asia.

His evangelical

crusades and his anti-Communist preaching gave rise to a new nationalistic religious
fervor and colored American public opinion toward the Soviet Union.

115 Ibid., 79.
116 Harold Bloom, ‘T he Preacher Billy Graham,” TIME (6 July 1999),
http://www.time.com/time/time 1OO/heroes/profile/grahamO 1.html.
117 James German, “Economy,” in Themes in Religion and American Culture, ed. Philip Goff and Paul
Harvey (Chapel Hill, NC: The University o f North Carolina Press, 2004): 287.
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First, Graham’s negative view of Communism reinforced anti-Communist
hysteria in the United States. In his sermon, “Satan’s Religion,” he explained how he
saw Satan working through the Communists:
The Devil is their god; Marx, their prophet; Lenin, their saint; and Malenkov their high
priest. Denying their faith in all ideologies except their religion of revolution, these
diabolically inspired men seek in devious ways to convert a peaceful world to their
doctrine o f death and destruction. So fanatical and ruthless are these disciples o f Lucifer
that in thirty years they have slaughtered millions o f innocent persons and stand prepared
with poised weapons to kill millions more in an all-out effort to spread their doctrines to
the ends o f the earth. The mysterious pull o f this satanic religion is so strong that it has
caused some citizens o f America to become traitorous, betraying a benevolent land which
had showered them with blessings innumerable.118

Communism, in Graham’s eyes, was master-minded by Satan. Seeing that Communism
was gaining unprecedented popularity in Asia and in Europe, Graham was convinced that
it was impossible for Communism to spread so quickly without the supernatural power of
demons giving wisdom and intelligence to the Communists.119 Since he regarded
Communist ideology as a new godless religion used by the devil to try to build a kingdom
on earth without God, he encouraged American Christians to oppose Communism
vigorously.120 Graham’s preaching boosted Senator Joseph McCarthy’s credibility as he
leveled charges against the Truman administration.
Second, Graham preached against any attempt at reconciliation with the Soviet
Union. Since Communism was the “Antichrist,” controlled by Satan, Graham argued
that reconciliation and peaceful co-existence between Communism and Christianity were
almost impossible. Communism, Graham believed, had political ambitions for world
conquest and, blended with a godless ideology, it deeply threatened freedom

118 Quoted in David Lockard, The Unheard. Billy Graham (Waco, TX: Word Books Publisher, 1971), 128.
119 Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War, 81.
120 Lockard, The Unheard Billy Graham, 143-144.
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worldwide.

191

He twice preached on his radio program against tolerance, viewing broad

minded liberals as a danger to the nation’s survival in the Cold War. In every single
sermon he preached throughout the 1950s, he always mentioned the evil of Communism,
and several times he devoted a whole sermon to describing “the death-duel between
Christian America and atheistic Russia.”

199

As historian Andrew Rotter has put it, for many Americans the Soviet Union was
1 '■ jo

not just an enemy but also the antichrist, the “devil we knew.”

It is very important to

understand the implications of such a view because it suggested a completely different
spiritual approach to handling one's adversary. The Bible teaches Christians to love their
enemies, but at the same time “to resist the devil” 124 and “not to give the devil a
foothold.”125 The teachings of love supported the postwar rehabilitation of Germany and
Japan. Nevertheless, such grace would not be extended to “the devil we knew,” because
according to Graham, Communism was Satan's newest version of religion.126

Christian

ideas helped to define the containment strategy against the Soviet Union, justifying the
US attempt to roll back the communist expansion.
Graham’s revivals also encouraged the use of religion as a political weapon
against Communism. The only way to save the nation from the onslaught of demonpossessed Communism, Graham declared, was to have “millions of Americans turn to
Jesus Christ at this hour and accept him as Savior.”127 “This religious revival,” Billy

121 “Whither Bound?” in A m erica’s Hour o f Decision: Featuring a Life Story o f Billy Graham, 140. See
also Lockard, The Unheard Billy Graham, 141.
122 Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War, 79-80.
123 Rotter, “Christian, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and US-South Asian Relations, 1947-1954,” 593613. See also Kirby, “Religion and the Cold War —An Introduction,” in Religion and the Cold War, 4-5.
124 James 4:7 (New International Version).
125 Ephesians 4:27 (New International Version).
126 Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War, 81.
127 Ibid.
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Graham proclaimed, “can restore our historic heritage, create moral stamina and
consciousness, bring back the sanctity of our homes, [and] strengthen the bulwarks of
freedom.”

198

In other words, only Christianity could resist such a demonic force, and

only revivalism could save America as a nation.

Personal salvation and national

salvation were closely linked in Graham’s theology. “If you would be a true patriot, then
become a Christian,” he advised his listeners. “If you would be a loyal American, then
become a loyal Christian.”129 There was a general perception that being a good Christian
made one less likely to be a Communist. According to a poll conducted in August 1949,
77 percent of the interviewees did not think that a good Christian could be a member of
the Communist Party. Although Graham did not say that non-Christians were disloyal,
his rhetoric implied that non-Christians were more vulnerable to Communist lies and
deception.
Undoubtedly,

Graham’s anti-Communist preaching defined the religious

sentiment of the 1950s; but more importantly, according to a cultural historian, Robert S.
Ellwood, “the religion of the fifties’ revival was largely nationalistic, a spiritual
chaplaincy to the republic’s world mission.”130 Graham and his preaching added a strong
religious flavor to the new American nationalism during the formative years of the Cold
War. From his viewpoint, being an American citizen or holding an American passport
itself could not prove a person’s real national loyalty, but being a born-again Christian
with a fundamentalist leaning would be proof of his/her loyalty to the United States of
America.

128 Billy Graham, “Our Greatest Secret Weapon,” American Magazine, November 1954, 86-88.
129 Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold War, 81.
130 Robert S. Ellwood, Fifties Spiritual Marketplace (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997),
18.
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In spite of his insistence on a religious solution, Graham also put pressure on the
government to take a clear stand against Communist expansion. For example, in his
historic crusade in front of the Capitol in early 1952, he once again defined the Cold War
clearly as the battle between Communism and Christianity. In addition to urging the
American people to “turn back to God and back to Christ and back to the Bible,” he also
preached that the nation “must maintain a strong military for defense at all costs.” 131
Historian Lee Canipe explained that “for Americans fighting an ideological battle with
purported ‘atheists,’ religious faith by itself contributed mightily to the defense of the
nation and the preservation of democracy.”132
As a whole, Graham’s preaching was the rediscovery of the value of religion in
American life, in American nationalism, and in American foreign policy. According to
economic historian James German, the capitalist world of the West could not function
without Christianity. “Material prosperity, in the minds of many Americans,” German
explained, “was the natural product of political freedom and economic individualism,
which in turn were rooted in essentially religious conceptions of the human person.”133 If
a capitalist country were atheistic and “unrestrained by divinely sanctioned morals,” it
would breed dissent and fall into the hands of Communism, which would take away both
the properties, the rights and the freedoms of its citizens.134 In other words, religion was
crucial in saving the American way of life and in unifying its citizens.

131

Transcript from “Graham’s Historic Meeting On the Steps of the Capitol” (Minneapolis, MN: Billy
Graham Evangelical Association, Inc., 1952).
132 Lee Canipe, “Under God and Anti-Communist: How the Pledge o f Allegiance Got Religion in Cold War
America,” Journal o f Church and State 45 (March 2003): 312.
133 German, “Economy,” Themes in Religion and American Culture, 287.
134 Ibid.
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Religious historian Lee Canipe explains the relation between religion and
American anti-communism in this way: “For most Americans, it seemed religion and
patriotism (which at the time was virtually synonymous with anti-Communism) simply
represented two sides of the same coin. As the ‘Red Scare’ spread, church attendance
soared.

Religion suddenly became fashionable.” 135

membership rose steadily as the Cold War intensified.

Statistics show that church
In 1940, 49 percent of the

population was officially enrolled in a church or synagogue, but in 1950, this number had
risen to 57 percent (see Tables 4.2a, 4.2b, and 4.3a).136
Religious revivals led by Billy Graham and other evangelists paved the way for
the influence of Christianity to grow in American domestic politics and foreign affairs.
As more Americans were turning back to Christianity, their interests in foreign missions
also intensified. Missionaries were delighted to see an enlarged pool of support.
Graham, in particular, had a special connection with Korea and China missions
through his wife Ruth Graham, daughter of Dr. Nelson and Virginia Bell, missionaries to
North Jiangsu (Kiangsu), China. When Ruth finished her middle school education in
North Jiangsu, the Bells decided to enroll her in P’yongyang Foreign School, where
academics were rigorous and the Bible was acknowledged as the authoritative word of
God.137 Leaving her family in 1932, Ruth spent two years living in P’yongyang, the
“Christian Capital of Korea,” and befriended other missionaries’ children. Some of them

135 Canipe, “Under God and Anti-Communist: How the Pledge o f Allegiance Got Religion in Cold War
America,” 312.
136 Leo P. Ribuffo, “God and Contemporary Politics,” Journal o f American History 80 (March 1993): 15171518. Ribuffo gave the figure in 1950 as 55 percent, but the Yearbook of American Churches provided a
higher percentage.
137 Cornwell, A Time fo r Remembering, 28.
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were children of Korean missionaries who would later return to Korea after World War II
and fight side by side with American and South Korean soldiers during the Korean War.
After marrying Ruth, Graham became an active supporter of missionary works.
His family kept close contact with the missionaries who returned from China and Korea.
Thus, he was well aware of how the Communists had treated to Christians in these two
countries after they took power. Such knowledge would strengthen his conviction of a
Satanic agenda to take control of the world.

Even though he was registered as a

Democrat, Graham was highly pro-Chiang Kai-shek and he urged the United States
government to prevent the fall of Taiwan and the loss of South Korea.
Anti-Communism Sentiment in the Catholic Church
Anti-Communism among religious leaders was not limited only to Protestant
groups in the United States. American Catholics were even more outspoken in their
opposition to Communist expansion. Their stance was a result of Catholic theology,
combined with the losses of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe. “Communism,”
Pope Pius XI warned, “strips man of his liberty, robs human personality of all its
dignity.... There is no recognition of any right of the individual in his relations to the
collectivity, no natural right is accorded to human personality, which is a mere cog-wheel
in the communist system.”138 The Catholic Church, on the other hand, was presented as a
guarantor of human freedom because “in Catholic teaching, all human freedom, all
individual rights are grounded in a transcendent order.” 139 The conflict between
Catholicism and Communism, therefore, was inevitable.

138 Quoted in Robert L. Frank, “Prelude to Cold War: American Catholics and Communism,” Journal o f
Church and State 34 (Winter 1992): 47,
139 Ibid.
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These arguments, as historian Robert L. Frank observed, became “a mainstay of
Catholic Cold War rhetoric.” 140 The fear of Communist infiltration and conspiracies
drew many nominal Catholics back to the Catholic Church and brought a re-emphasis on
religious life among Catholic communities. Despite a general dislike of capitalism, they
emerged as furious defenders of America’s democratic values and way of life. Their
conversion to the American capitalist system marked the beginning of the amalgamation
of patriotism and religious faith in American culture.
Father Edmund A. Walsh, the founder of the School of Foreign Service in
Georgetown University, was the major anti-Communist spokesperson of the American
Catholics.

Throughout the Cold War, Walsh regarded the Soviet Union as a “new

claimant for the hegemony of Europe” that replaced the role of Nazi Germany.141 His
book, Total Empire, which analyzed Soviet expansion in the early years of the Cold War
from a geopolitical framework, was a 1951 bestseller.

1 AO

Based on the case of Korea, he

strongly urged the US government to adopt a stronger stand in building up its military
strength so that an aggressor would “think more than twice before provoking another
devastating conflict.”143
In addition to the idea of geopolitics, Walsh also injected a religious element into
the debate over foreign policy, when American leaders sought to determine whether
ideology or realistic political objectives motivated Soviet expansionism.144 He pointed
out that American policy-makers faced a conflict “between spirit and ideals on the one

141 Patrick McNamara, A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics o f American
Anticommunism (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 137.
142 Ibid., 135.
143 Quoted in ibid., 155.
144 Ibid., 135.
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hand, and armed materialism on the other.”145 Rising secularism in the West, Walsh
argued, contributed to the growth of Communism. Therefore, the real challenge for the
United States was to find strength in the American heritage and rely on the “spiritual faith
entrusted to Christendom,” which according to Walsh was “the anchor of stability for the
West.”146
Walsh challenged George Kennan’s realist approach to foreign policy, arguing
that a clear commitment to moral law was essential to the conduct of US foreign
affairs.147 Ironically, how to define moral law was a big problem. In fact, the question of
applying moral law had very little to do with morality itself. For example, although
Kennan was a realist, he stood against the production of nuclear bombs for moral reasons
because he saw the bomb as an instrument of genocide and suicide.148 Walsh, on the
other hand, advocated not only the production of nuclear bombs, but also the “first strike”
principle because the death of Russian civilians, he believed, would be a “regrettable
effect, not intended as such.”149 The major difference between Walsh and Kennan was
that Walsh wanted to invite religious ideas into the making of foreign policy, while
Kennan firmly opposed any commitment to religion and ideology. Although Walsh’s
opinions on foreign policy did not represent the position of the Catholic Church, he did
speak for many of his fellow Jesuit intellectuals and clergymen in America.
Even though the realists wanted to minimize the influence of ideology in making
foreign policy, religion was too strong a force to ignore in the 1940s and 1950s. Religion

145 Edmund S. Walsh, ‘T he Spiritual Aspect o f Foreign Policy,” Catholic Mind 50 (June 1952): 641.
146 Ibid., 642.
147 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics o f American
Anticommunism, 161.
148 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World they Made, 488.
149 McNamara, A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics o f American
Anticommunism, 152-153.
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left a clear mark on US politics. Joining with Protestant fundamentalists and evangelists,
especially through effective religious rhetoric and powerfully networked political
machines in major cities, Catholics gradually moved from the political periphery to the
political center. (The process was eventually completed by the election of a Catholic
President, John F. Kennedy.) Together, they became the backbone of support for the
many conservative politicians in the decade of McCarthyism, a campaign started by
Senator Joseph McCarthy (himself a Catholic) to root out Communists from public
positions, and later from the entertainment industry and other areas of American life.
Fueled by hysteria, McCarthyism would degenerate into the modem equivalent of a
witch-hunt. Officers in the State Department such as John Carter Vincent, John Paton
Davies, and John Stewart Service, who were well-known experts on East Asia, were
some of the victims of McCarthyism.

AMIERCAN POLICY ON SOUTH KOREA
As the Cold War continued to intensify, American people’s concern over the
division of Korea also increased. As early as August 31, 1946, a Saturday Evening Post
feature article, “Our Most Dangerous Boundary” by Dr. Harold Noble, son of American
missionaries to P’yongyang prior to World War II and a foreign correspondent in Seoul
in 1946, labeled the 38th Parallel separating north and south Korea as the most dangerous
line between the United States and the Soviet Union.150 Noble questioned the motives of
the two powers that occupied Korea, but he also praised American benevolence in the
south and criticized Soviet control in the north. Analyzing the tension along the 38th

150 Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots o f the Cold War, 117118.
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Parallel, he even predicted that there would be a war in Korea. Korea was a potential
trouble spot for the United States in its ideological and political competition with the
Soviet Union.
An Ambiguous Stand on Korea
What should the United States do concerning the deteriorating conditions in
Korea?

South Korea had been identified as part of the “crucial periphery” in the

Campaign of Truth, a propaganda program set up by the US government against
Communism behind the Iron Curtain.151 Korea was regarded by US propaganda experts
as a valuable spot for spreading anti-Communist and pro-US propaganda or, if possible,
for rolling back Communist power.

From 1947 to 1949, there were internal battles

between the State Department and the Defense Department, as they searched for the right
way to deal with the Korea question. John C. Vincent of the State Department observed
that Korea had become a symbol of the Cold War. If the US army left Korea, Japan
might question America's commitment to its security and therefore seek an agreement
with the Soviets for its own protection.

Vincent similarly argued that a continued

American presence might help Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Chinese Nationalist
regime in Nanjing, in his struggle with the Communists in Manchuria and other areas of
China.152 Realizing the need for initiative on the Korea problem, the State Department
created a special 5-member, inter-departmental committee on Korea in early 1947. The
committee suggested that the US government should stay in Korea for an important
psychological reason: “to demonstrate to the communists and Koreans, that (the U.S.)

151 Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War 1945-1961,14-15.
152 Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 19451950 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1981), 92.
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meant to stay in business in Korea and, practically, to create a viable economy in South
Korea capable of withstanding subversion.”153
Meanwhile, there were also warning voices expressing their concern over the
situation in Korea.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican from Michigan and

chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, argued that
the United States had an inescapable obligation in Korea even though Korea was
strategically difficult to defend.154 He believed that the principle of the Truman Doctrine
and economic programs similar to those in the Marshall Plan should also be extended to
South K orea.155 If there was strong political pressure to keep Korea free from
Communist expansion and a determination to make it a symbol of democracy in East
Asia, why did the Truman administration not make a clear commitment to Korea and
build up the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) fully?
There were basically two reasons for the ambiguity of the US position. The first
reason was that the United States government did not trust the South Korean President,
Syngman Rhee.

During the period of American occupation, Rhee had been very

outspoken against the policies of the American Military Government in Korea. Although
his administration was highly pro-American, Rhee had no desire to bow to American
hegemony. Instead, Rhee hoped that the United States would support his plan to unify
Korea by all means and keep Korea free from Communist domination. If the United
States had had a military alliance with him at that time, many American policy makers
feared that his unpredictable behavior would have dragged the United States into war
with the Soviet Union.
153 Quoted in ibid., 92-93.
154 Ibid., 95-96.
155 Ibid.
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Therefore, Truman’s administration avoided committing the United States to a
permanent military partnership with South Korea, even though the President and the US
military were fully aware that the Russians had supplied powerful weapons to the North
Korean army.156 The United States even deliberately tried to keep the South Korean
army weak by not giving them any tanks or heavy artillery, so that Rhee would be
incapable of initiating any attempt to march his army northward.
Apart from the administration’s distrust of Rhee’s government, another cause for
the policy ambiguity was that the US military did not see South Korea as strategically
crucial in comparison to Japan and the Philippines.

The Pentagon wanted to withdraw

from Korea as soon as possible due to the massive reduction of the military budget in
1948. Had it not been for the insistence of the State Department, the US Army would
have departed as soon as the Republic of Korea was established in August 1948. Most
US Asian specialists focused their attention more on China and Japan, seeing that the fate
of the rest of East Asia depended on the result of the ongoing civil war in China and the
conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. As a result, China, Japan, and the Philippines
consumed a lot of US attention and resources and the significance of Korea fell far below
these countries.
The Churches' Clear Stand on Korea
While the US Army was trying to pull out of Korea, American missionaries in
contrast were eager to go there. Among all private groups in America, churches had the
strongest ties, the greatest awareness, and the largest interest in Korea. The influence of
churches on American public opinion has been a very important aspect in analyzing

156 Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee And American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Book
Company, 1978), 271-277.
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domestic and foreign policy. Cultural historian Christina Klein, author of Cold War
Orientalism (2003), studied the growth of American interests in Asia during the Cold
War period and recognized a connection between Christianity and the American image of
Asia.

“The Protestant missionary movement,” Klein explained, “encouraged a U.S.-

centered internationalism based on spreading American values and institutions and
transforming other nations along American lines, initially through religious conversion
and later by building schools, universities, and hospitals.” 157

“With its network of

congregations and settlements,” Klein pointed out, “the missionary movement created a
worldwide institutional infrastructure that enabled millions of Americans, especially in
isolated Midwestern and rural communities, to understand themselves as participating in
world affairs.” 158 In other words, religious belief became a crucial link in drawing a
common bond between American Christians and Asian converts. “These institutions,”
Klein argued, “enabled Americans to feel themselves bound to the people of Asia and
Africa, despite the myriad of differences that separated them, through ties of religion,
money, and emotional investment.”159
Klein’s study showed that the missionary movement was important in sustaining
American interests in the Pacific Rim.

In a few countries, when the US diplomatic

establishment was unprepared for the task of US occupation, Christian groups and agents
filled the need. In the case of Korea in the postwar period, the missionaries were very
active in providing humanitarian services, such as hospitals, orphanages, and distributing

157 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley, CA:
University o f California Press, 2003), 30.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., 30.
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relief supplies, proof that American churches were actively supporting missionary work
in Korea.
Through religious networks, news about Korea and the condition of the Korean
churches spread from coast to coast and from north to south. Even churchgoers in the
most isolated Midwestern and rural communities somehow connected with distant Korea
due to the flow of information through religious journals, pamphlets, and circulating
letters.

Equipped with language skills and cultural exposure, missionaries served as

influential producers of knowledge through books, newsletters, and photographs. The
writings and materials distributed by US churches generated increased interest in Korea
among the American Christian population. While the United States government saw
South Korea as a military liability, Christian groups in the US had a rather optimistic
view of the future of Korea.
American churches wanted to send more missionaries back to Korea. Because of
their intense efforts, the number of American missionaries in Korea increased from a
dozen in 1945 to more than 200 by the end of 1949. Prominent clergymen also visited
Korea, bringing back news and reports on the condition of the Korean churches. Bishop
Arthur J. Moore from the Methodist Church visited Seoul in early 1946. He spoke to
many Korean churches, reaffirming the commitment of the American Methodist Church
to the independence and reconstruction of a new Korea.160 In his journey report which
was published in the form of a pamphlet, he quoted Chiang Kai-shek as saying, “If Korea
is not independent, the peace of East Asia and the world cannot be secure.”161

160 Arthur J. Moore, The Church Cradled in Conflict: A Report o f an Episcopal Visit to Korea in 1946
(New York: The Methodist Church, 1946), 3.
161 Quoted in ibid., 3.
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Bishop Moore was not alone in emphasizing the American commitment to the
future of Korea.

According to the resolutions adopted by the Foreign Mission

Conference (FMC) of North America in January 1947, Protestant leaders from both the
US and Canada, acknowledged that there were “close bonds which have long existed
between Korea and North America through the relations between Christians in these two
countries.” 162 Therefore, the FMC urged its constituency to have “an intelligent and
active interest in the great cause of our Korean brethren who demand their long-promised
liberty.”163 The resolution even recognized “the importance of United States policy in
regard to the Korean situation and [called upon America] to rectify in part the mistakes
our nation has made in this regard since 1905.”164 Clearly, the Protestant churches in the
United States had agreed not to let Korea down a second time in this moment of
uncertainty.
To further propagate their cause, religious groups willingly provided a publicity
channel for the Korean government. Dr. Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee’s publicity
advisor from 1942 to 1959, was welcomed by most Protestant groups. They published
his papers in their religious journals and invited him to give speeches and seminars to
their congregations.

Oliver would skillfully present the case for Korea as a nation

struggling for its independence and religious freedom. Other Christian figures such as
Dr. Kim Hwal-lan (Helen Kim), the President of Ewha University, were well known
among US church communities.

According to one American Methodist missionary,

Marion Lane Conrow, “To many people [in the United States], Korea is Helen Kim, and

162 The resolution was reported by The Voice o f Korea 6 , 15 February 1947, 1. This publication was found
in the Vertical File: Truman Subject File - Religion in the Truman Presidential Library
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Helen Kim is Korea. Fortunate is Korea to be so represented!” 165 Dr. Kim was so
popular and famous in the United States that she was even given “the invitation of Smith
College to receive an honorary degree on Oct. 15th [1949], along with Mrs. Roosevelt and
other great women.”166 In fact, most contacts that the American public had with Korea
were through these Korean Christians and church lobbies. Since most of the Korean
Protestant churches were the fruits of the American missionaries, Rhee’s supporters
constantly reminded and lectured the churches in the United States of their responsibility
for the preservation of Korean religious freedom.
As the political and economic situation in Korea showed no sign of improvement
even though a new republic was established in the south, missionaries continued to send
positive reports back to their home churches.

In a 1948 report prepared by Rev. S.

Dwight, Presbyterian missionaries not only urged American churches to send out more
workers to the field, they also portrayed the “New Korea” as a country that “holds the
center of the stage in international politics in the East.”

When they observed political

developments in Seoul in 1949, they rejoiced because “many Christians [had]
distinguished themselves as officials in the new government,” and because the churches
were packed with sympathetic listeners.168 They were hopeful for the future and wanted

165 Marion Lane Conrow, “Helen K. Kim, Ph.D. President o f Ewha College,” File Name: Conrow, Marion
L. (1940-1949), Missionary Vol.3, United Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
166 Alice R. Appenzeller, “Letter IV from Seoul dated Nov. 12,1949,” File Name: Appenzeller, Alice R
(1929-1949), Missionary Vol.3., United Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
167Rev. S. Dwight, “Korea Mission,” Annual Report o f the Executive Committee o f Foreign Missions,
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. 1948 (Nashville, TN: Executive Committee o f Foreign Missions, 1948),
78-79.
168Rev. Joe B. Hopper, “Korea Mission,” in Annual Report o f the Executive Committee o f Foreign
Missions, Presbyterian Church in the U.S. 1949 (Nashville, TN: Executive Committee o f Foreign Missions,
1949), 86.
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the American church to send more missionaries. Otherwise, they would “lose the field of
battle to heathenism, or communism, or materialism.”169
In his article written in April 1950, “Which Way Korea?” in World Outlook, Dr.
Thobum T. Brumbaugh, the associate secretary of the Methodist Division of Foreign
Missions who supervised the missions in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines,
asserted that Korea was the place where “the issue between Communism and Christian
democracy is more clearly defined than anywhere else in the Far East.”170 The American
Methodist church viewed the ideological battle in Korea as a struggle “between Soviet
and Christian concepts of democratic progress.”171 Christianity, Brumbaugh asserted,
would be “a great factor” in the internal political struggle in South Korea. He told his
readers that since Methodism was the largest Protestant denomination in the United
States, “what [the] Methodists think and do about the cause of Christian missions in
Korea” would determine whether Korea [went] Communist or Christian.172
According to a booklet, Korea at the Crossroads, written by Rev. William E.
Shaw, a Methodist missionary, and published by the American Methodist Church, “if
Democracy of a Christian nature wins, America and all democratic nations will retain a
friend in a most strategic part of the world, and democracy will have an important foot
hold in the heart of Asia.”173 The fate of South Korea was tied to the policy of the United
States and the “Christian forces of America.” 174 Rev. Shaw positively asserted that
“Christianity [was] already the strongest religious influence in Korea” because “Japanese

169 Ibid.
170 Thobum T. Brumbaugh, “Which Way Korea?” World Outlook, April 1950,798.
171 Ibid., 798.
172 Ibid., 800.
173 William E. Shaw, Korea A t the Crossroads (New York: The Methodist Church Editorial Department,
1950), 5.
174 Ibid., 6.
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Shintoism [had] been discredited” and “there [were] no great organized religions which
[offered] stiff competition.”175 He rallied American Christians to pray for Korea that
“atheistic Communism may not succeed” and that “Christ and Christian Democracy may
win.”

Shaw’s statement had its own ground.

Certainly, the cultural and social

influence of Confucianism and Buddhism remained strong in Korean society, but in
terms of the level of political influence on a national level, Christianity took the lead due
to its organizational strength and leadership quality, despite its relatively small number of
followers in comparison to the traditional religions. The Korean people looked to welleducated Christian leaders for inspiration and guidance. Political groups led by Christian
laymen were the major forces that could effectively challenge the Communist position in
Korea.
“The Loss o f China”
The creation of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 fundamentally
altered American strategy in Asia. The outcome of the Chinese civil war was especially
frustrating to many Americans who had great hopes for the postwar political, economic,
and religious development of China.

When a Communist victory on the mainland

became unavoidable, the United States government knew that it would soon lose its most
valuable ally in East Asia. In 1949, the United States was therefore desperate to find a
strategy to halt the spread of Communism in Asia.
Many different interest groups in America wished for more to be done to aid
Chiang Kai-shek’s ailing regime. For one, religious circles considered the possible loss
of China as devastating, because churches had made substantial investments of

175 Ibid., 6.
176 Ibid., 6-7.
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missionaries and dollars. For another, business interests also regarded the loss of the
China market as unacceptable. For yet another, Chinese Nationalists sent to America as
lobbyists by Chiang Kai-shek had a personal interest in the outcome of the civil war.
These Chinese lobbyists in the US, along with certain American business, media and
other interests, formed the influential China Lobby and aligned themselves with the
powerful China Bloc in Congress. They criticized the Truman administration vigorously
and pushed for more financial and military aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in
Taiwan, hoping not only to preserve the Nationalists, but if possible to roll back
Communist influence in China.
In spite of enormous political pressure from the China Lobby, the Truman
administration refused to continue its aid to the Nationalists. In August 1949, the State
Department published a thousand-page document known as The China White Paper to
justify the administration's stand. From that point on, Truman pursued a new approach of
strengthening the Asian periphery states such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines,
following a strategy of containment.

Since Japan was still under American military

occupation, a speedy and comprehensive reconstruction program for Japan’s war-torn
economy was necessary to protect the US strategic position in East Asia. Truman wisely
selected a Republican bipartisan figure, John Foster Dulles, who had enjoyed wide
religious support through his participation in the FCCC, to lead the American delegation
to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan.
In contrast, opinion within Truman’s cabinet on how to deal with the newly
formed, internally unstable, and potentially troublesome South Korean Republic was
deeply divided.

The military favored a complete withdrawal, but diplomats favored
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maintaining American influence in South Korea, lest the domino effect lead to more
losses in Asia.

More important, economists argued that a stable, democratic, and

capitalist South Korea would be a crucial factor in the recovery of Japan.
The Korean Aid Bill
By mid-1949, President Truman had made up his mind to support the economic
recovery of Korea instead of merely providing basic relief. He decided to present a
Korean aid bill to Congress.

In his address to Congress on June 7, 1949, Truman

explained the importance of Korea as a model that carried American ideals and principles
for the Asian world in the battle against Communism. Its ultimate survival, the President
declared, would stand “as a beacon to the people of northern Asia.”177 He proclaimed the
fierce passion of the Korean people for freedom, and reminded his Congressional
audience of what American missionaries had contributed to the struggle for freedom
while the country was still under the bondage of the Japanese. He also appealed to the
“sympathetic feelings” that the American people had for Korea through their longestablished religious connections to win support for his economic aid bill.178
Truman had no intention of withdrawing economically from Korea. Instead, the
administration asked for $150 million dollars for a comprehensive program for the
economic rehabilitation of Korea.179 The President even identified the progress of the
Korean people with America's foreign policy goals in East Asia. When Congress debated
the bill, those who supported giving economic aid to Korea argued along the same lines

177 Message from U.S. President Truman to the Congress of the United States, Regarding Economic
Assistance to the Republic o f Korea, 7 June 1949, Documents on Korean-American Relations 1943-1976,
ed. Se-jin Kim (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1976), 75.
178 Ibid., 73.
179 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners In Peace and War: The Republic o f Korea and the United States,
1948-1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 140.
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as Truman, declaring that the United States had a “moral obligation” and
“responsibilities” toward the Korean people and arguing the value of South Korea as “the
last foothold” or “toe hold” to keep the Asian continent free from bondage.180
Nevertheless, the United States government was not ready to commit fully to the
security of South Korea. According to Secretary Acheson’s National Press Club speech
on January 12,1950, the United States government was ready to commit to the defense of
Japan and the Philippines. In the case of Korea, Acheson acknowledged that the United
States had interests and a responsibility, but he skillfully put its security under the duty of
the United Nations.181 Acheson’s statement gave many people the erroneous impression
that the Truman administration had abandoned Korea, but the secretary made it very clear
at the end of his speech that the United States government intended to continue to support
South Korea by providing economic aid and that it would be the “most utter defeatism
and utter madness” to “stop half way [and] scrap all that.”182
South Korea’s Appeal fo r US Support
Meanwhile, the Korean administration understood that the United States
government did not trust Syngman Rhee because he had an aggressive political agenda to
unify the country on his own terms. To gain American support, South Korea had to
influence general public opinion in America. Nevertheless, unlike China, Korea attracted
little direct American economic interests, except related to the recovery of Japan. Its
strategic position was not as crucial as Japan’s.

The Koreans could only appeal to

America's moral obligation. However, such an obligation by itself could be burdensome
to the American people, so would not be an effective propaganda tool.
180 Ibid., 141-142.
181 Quoted in Thornton, Odd Man Out, 69.
182 Quoted in Ibid., 71.
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Therefore, the Korean government wanted to present a religious connection to the
American audience and emphasized the symbolic role of Korea in the ideological battle
between Communism and the Western world. Even though Korea was not a Christian
nation, with only three to four percent of the population being Christian at that time,
South Koreans enjoyed religious freedom.

Korean propaganda materials also

emphasized that Korea was on a path to becoming a Christian nation, hoping that the
sense of Christian brotherhood could bring the two distant nations together. Most of the
American missionaries endorsed such a vision, praised the potential of the South Korean
Republic, and continued to present favorable reports to their American supporters.
To build US sentiment, the National Christian Council of Korea organized a
public demonstration across Korea on June 23, 1949.

More than 50,000 Christians

participated in Seoul alone, carrying slogans such as, “We Christians will defend our
native land from Communist attack,” “The insecurity of Korea is a threat to world
peace,” “All Asia is watching America’s action in Korea in defense of democracy,” and
“Let the churches of the world unite their strength to protect the churches of Korea.”
They issued a proclamation, declaring that only in the atmosphere of Christian ideals
could democratic government survive in Asia. They argued that if the Christian world
refused to protect and help South Korea, the whole of Asia would be lost.183
The Koreans’ desire for American protection was not simply orchestrated
propaganda. According to the letters of missionaries, Korean Christians were genuinely
afraid of a Communist invasion. Two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War,
Syngman Rhee met with Dr. Bob Pierce, an American evangelist and a close friend of

183 Marion Conrow, “Christian Rally, Seoul, Korea, 23 June 1949,” File Name: Conrow, Marion L. (19461949), Missionary Vol.3, United Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
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Billy Graham, and told him that every Christian in Korea knew that they were prime
targets, especially those who served in the South Korean government. Rhee wanted to
convince Dr. Pierce that there was not much time left for the South Koreans to live and
enjoy freedom, if they did not have military protection from the United States.184
Most of the religious leaders and political leaders in the United States understood
the significance of Korea in both religious and strategic senses. American public opinion
in general strongly favored the Korean aid bill.

But the Republicans, who wanted

Truman to give economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek, blocked its passage. The rejection of
the bill by the House on January 19, 1950, was panned by the American press. The New
York Times, for example, called the failure of the House to pass the bill “a blunder” and
“something of a legislative fluke” to be rectified. It also blamed the China Bloc and the
“rat hole” view of its defeat.185 In order to get a speedy passage through Congress, the
administration was willing to cut $30 million from the original budget and to extend a
new economic aid program to Taiwan.
What happened to the Korean aid bill revealed something important about the
attitude of the United States. According to historian Charles Dobbs, the bill paved the
way for American intervention in the Korean War.186 South Korea moved to the secondrunner up position on Truman’s list of American interests in Asia. In addition, it also
reflected the competition in American politics between idealists, who favored a moral
commitment to Korea, and realists, who rejected the strategic significance of the
peninsula.187 The ambiguous attitude of the Truman administration, despite its clear aim

184 Franklin Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do (USA: Samaritan’s Purse, 1983), 146.
185 Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War, 142.
186 Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, 537.
187 Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War, 145.
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to help South Korea, confused American legislators; some congressmen thought that the
administration had already abandoned Korea. More important, according to historian
Jongsuk Chay, the delaying of the aid hurt the Korean economy, defeating its veryintended purpose, and also strengthening the Communists' belief that the United States
was uncertain of its commitment to Korea.188
The administration’s ambiguous stand also caused historians to question US
motives in Korean policies. Historian Richard C. Thornton suggested a theory that the
US government, under Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s direction, was “tethering a
goat to trap a tiger” by intentionally keeping South Korea weak to invite an attack from
the north so that “the United States would mobilize the ‘free world’ in justifiable defense
against the communist menace, giving firm structure to the Cold War.”189 Thornton’s
argument was based mostly on circumstantial evidence that the United States not only
denied South Korea aggressive weapons, but even defensive weapons such as anti-tank
guns, anti-tank mines, anti-aircraft guns, and coastal patrol craft.190 Such policies,
Thornton believed, created confusion and invited the North Koreans to march south.
Thorton’s interpretation has difficulty, however, in explaining the unpreparedness
of the US military in both Washington and Tokyo. If the US had indeed set a trap in
Korea to lure the Soviet Union into starting a war, then the peninsula should have been
carefully watched and monitored by the intelligence community, so that the United States
would be ready to confront the enemy. The evidence suggests that this was not the case.
US troops in Tokyo were poorly trained and poorly equipped. No effective anti-tank

188 Ibid., 144.
189 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins o f the Korean War
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 147.
190 Ibid., 149.
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weapon was available during the first month of the war. US aircraft and transportation
equipment in Japan were insufficient to support the war effort. To explain these military
deficiencies, Thorton’s interpretation must presume that the State Department did not
share its strategy with the Pentagon - a politically unlikely scenario.
Rather than being an elaborate ruse on the part of Acheson, it seems more likely
that the lack of US support for South Korea was the result of an ill-thought-out foreign
policy.

The ambiguity of the US position sent wrong signals to the North Koreans,

making them think that the Americans had little interest in Korea. The lack of military
aid to defend South Korea encouraged Kim Il-sung to be confident that he could unify
Korea quickly through military action before the United States had enough time to send
troops.

Therefore, impelled by these data and his own personal political ambition, Kim

Il-sung urged Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong to support his military unification plan.191

CONCLUSION
The years between World War II and the Korean War coincided with the dawn of
a religious revival in the United States. To understand the religious aspects of the Korean
War, the character of these prewar years must first be understood. It was an era where
many were deeply religious, and saw America's place in the world in religious terms.
The notion of a “civil religion” extended even into political life, with leaders speaking
openly about God, appealing to Christian nature, and touting the virtues of freedom of
religion.

191 Kathryn Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project
Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993): 1,14-15.
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President Truman employed religious ideas and rhetoric when he presented his
policies to the American people, mobilizing them to support his domestic and foreign
policy. The main difference between the American way of life and the Soviet way was
religion, Truman argued.
people.

The Cold War was a struggle between godly and godless

By 1949, religious freedom emerged as a major theme in Truman's foreign

policy. To this end, he sought to build a Western Christian alliance to fight Communism.
Christian clergymen’s anti-Communist preaching made direct connections
between religious and public life. Such a theology would provide a channel for religious
factors to enter foreign policy, both prior to the Korean War and even more so after
fighting began.

Religion provided a way to understand the frightening and rapidly

changing world, and assisted in the internalization of the Cold War in the American
mind. Religious groups were strong supporters of anti-Communism and anti-Communist
propaganda both domestically and around the world.

When the whole country was

gripped by fear, religion became a means of rebuilding American confidence and national
pride.
Religion became a common bond between Korea and the United States.
Missionary interests aroused economic and political support for Korea.

A common

Christian brotherhood encouraged both personal giving and political leanings that would
push the US government to act in Korea’s interests.

Such efforts met with strong

government resistance in the pre-war years, as Washington was swamped with other
concerns.

Nevertheless, once the war started, such politics would soon gain a more

receptive ear in the capital.
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CHAPTER 5
The Outbreak of the Korean War

INTRODUCTION
The road leading up to the outbreak of the Korean War had both domestic and
foreign aspects. Internally, the competition between the north and the south intensified
after the establishment of two separate regimes in Seoul and P’yongyang. Unification
was a vital political objective for both sides, but neither one could act without the full
support of their superpower allies. Whatever military designs Syngman Rhee might have
were futile because he could not secure American backing and supplies to launch a
military offensive. In contrast, Kim D-sung had better luck with the Russians and the
Chinese and eventually won the support of both Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong.
This chapter traces the major politically oriented religious developments leading
to the outbreak of the Korean War. The first part considers the political maneuverings
and military preparation of North Korea and the rest of the Communist Bloc. The second
part explores conditions in the south at the time of the attack, focusing on how the
Christian community in South Korea responded to war rumors.

The third section

examines the perspective of American policymakers and explains how the future
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and various American churches came to view the
outbreak of the Korean War in a religious context.

284
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PLANNING A SECRET MILITARY ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA
According to historian Kathryn Weathersby, who translated and interpreted most
of the newly-released Russian documents for the Cold War International History Project
(CWIHP), from 1946 to 1950, Kim Il-sung had sent forty eight messages to Moscow,
urging the Russians to allow him to launch a military attack against the ROK.1 Kim
naturally wanted to unify Korea, but why was he so bent upon a military approach? The
following three subsections will consider three possible reasons.

One possible

explanation was personal ambition - that Kim wanted the glory of being a conqueror.
Another possibility was that a war would allow Kim to eliminate his political enemies. A
third reason was that should he receive the support of his Communist neighbors, an attack
might have seemed to him to be the quickest, easiest, and most certain means of unifying
the peninsula.
Kim Il-sung’s Ambitions and the Personality Cult
Revisionist historians have long described Kim Il-sung more as a nationalist than
a Communist, arguing that he was not alone in his desire for national unification. His
political rivals, including Pak Hon-yong and Syngman Rhee, also wanted unification,
even through military conquest. But this view fails to appreciate the extent of Kim IIsung’s personal ambition.

From 1945 to 1950, Kim Il-sung took advantage of the

worldwide Communist revolution in order to strengthen his own position against the
political challenges from Kim Tu-bong, Kim Mu-jong, and Pak Hon-yong. Regardless of
how his opponents in the South might have chosen to behave, Kim planned to be the
“Supreme Leader” of a unified Korea.

1 Kathryn Weathersby, ‘T he Cold War in Asia: New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” Cold War
International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 30-35.
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One religious aspect of Kim’s plan was his establishment of a personality cult.
Theoretically, Communism should be atheistic, but in North Korea, Kim’s personal
ambition was to be deified. The campaign to establish a personality cult began in 1946,
soon after Kim’s purging of the Christian leader Cho Man-sik. During the Founding
Congress of the North Korean Workers Party (NKWP), Kim Il-sung was hailed as “the
leader of all the Korean people,” “the hero of the nation,” “the great leader,” and many
other venerable titles.2 When the Central Historical Museum of P ’yongyang opened in
1947, Kim’s Kapsan supporters tried to highlight his military achievements by
designating a special room with 316 items on display to show his military credentials as a
guerrilla ranking as “general” in his campaign against the Japanese. The propagandists
credited the creation of the People’s Army (Inmingun) to Kim Il-sung. It was an attempt
to lift Kim up above other famous Communist fighters such as General Kim Mu-jong,
who had served bravely in the Chinese Communist Army and was a close comrade of
Mao Zedong. Like Stalin, Kim Il-sung enjoyed military poses and postures, but instead
of dressing himself in military uniform, Kim wore a gray Mao suit to draw a connection
with Mao Zedong, casting himself in the images of two supreme Communist leaders.
Kim’s personality cult program was a combination of different religions and
ideologies including Christianity, Confucian familism, Korean shamanism, Japanese
emperor worship, and Stalinism.4 Kim sought to portray his family as the consummate
example of a Korean noble family, embodying the virtues of hard work and nationalistic

2 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2003), 134.
3 Allan R. Millett, The War fo r Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2005), 176.
4 See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 223-224.
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loyalty.5 He represented himself as the successor to his noble father’s nationalistic, antiJapanese revolutionary movement.6 Despite his relatively young age when compared to
other nationalist leaders, Kim H-sung was able to cultivate the image of being a great
leader (in Korean terms, a suryong) for the Korean people.7 In 1946, the North Korean
novelist Han Sor-ya, who became the head of the North Korean writer’s league and the
chief engineer of Kim’s personality cult, described Kim as the “sun of the nation” - a title
that had been formerly used in the Shinto religion to describe the Japanese emperor.8 In
1947, according to North Korean Communist hagiographical writer Han Chae-dok, Kim
H-sung’s fight against the Japanese was like a brilliant star and his return to Korea like
the rising of the sun. Han also borrowed Christian imagery to portray Kim as a savior
who had shed his “precious blood” for the sake of national salvation.9
Kim also “indigenized” Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism to make it more appealing
to the popular masses in Korea by incorporating aspects of folk belief.10 In this effort, the
images of Confucian familism proved useful. Stalin and Kim H-sung became paternalist
figures for the Korean nation, a replacement of the traditional ancestor worship culture.
Throughout North Korea, pictures of Stalin and Kim Il-sung were displayed side-by-side
in courthouses, post offices, schools, theaters, and other public buildings. Even religious
buildings, including worship halls, temples, and Cathedrals were required to show
5 Yong-ho Ch’oe, “Christian Background in the Early Life o f Kim Il-song,” Asian Survey 26 (Oct
1986): 1083-1085.
6 See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 223.
7 Suryong was a Korean term reserved to address political leaders, such as Yo Un-hyong, Cho Man-sik,
Syngman Rhee, and Pak H5n-y6ng in very respectful terms. The use o f Suryong for Kim Il-sung began
shortly before the formation o f the Democratic People’s Republic o f Korea in 1948 and became his main
title after the mid-1960s.
8 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 223.
9 Chaedok Han, Kim Ilsong changgun kaeson’gi (Record o f the Triumphant Return o f General Kim II Sung)
(P’ySngyang: Minju Chosonsa, 1947), 10. Quoted in Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 223.
10 Young-sook Kim Harvey, ‘T he Korean Shaman and the Deaconess: Sisters in Different Guises,”
Religion and Ritual in Korean Society, ed. Laurel Kendall and Griffin Dix (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1987), 156.
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Stalin’s and Kim’s portraits.11 Not surprisingly, some churches refused. The police then
closed these churches, confiscated their properties, and arrested their leaders.12
To ensure the success of his personality cult and political dictatorship, Kim Ilsung planned to destroy Christian churches and silence opposition from all religious
groups.

1^

Christians, Ch’ondogyo followers, and Buddhists were identified by the

Communists as “reactionaries” and individual believers were persecuted by the
authorities.14 Resistance from Ch’ondogyo worshippers ended in 1948, when its political
leadership chose to support the Communist authorities.

Some Christians, however,

continued their struggle against the government by organizing underground churches and
participating in guerrilla activities in Hwanghae Province, the province of Syngman
Rhee’s ancestors.
Since Korean Christianity had strong connections with Western countries such as
the United States, Canada, and France, Communist authorities did not trust Christian
believers, regardless of their political affiliation.

The government began to

systematically destroy the influence of the Christian community. From 1947 to 1950, all
churches that had been built by foreign missions were considered “enemy alien property”
and were therefore forced to close down.15 The Communist government and officials
occupied most of the former mission compounds and mission school buildings. For
11 Letter from Harry Hill, 22 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18,
Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. Rev. Harry Hill was a Northern Presbyterian
(USA) missionary in the P’ydngyang Station before World War II. This information was obtained through
his interview with North Korean Prisoners o f War.
12 Letter from Chaplain Harold Veolkel, 15 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
13 According to Charles Armstrong, the major opposition against the Communist groups came from the
Christians and Ch’bndogyo. Since Ch’bndogyo’s power base was among the landless masses, the
Communists’ land reform had very little impact on cutting Ch’dndogyo’s followers. See Armstrong, The
North Korean Revolution, 125-131.
14 Ibid., 130-131.
15 Letter from Harry Hill, 22 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18,
Folder 1 4 -Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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example, the Presbyterian mission station in P’yongyang, which had been the largest
Presbyterian mission station in the world, was converted into the Communist
headquarters.16 And Kim Il-sung’s own personal office had formerly been the home of
an American missionary, Margaret Best.
Next, Kim Il-sung sought to prevent the young people from joining religious
groups by converting them to Communism instead. According to the memoir of No
Kum-sok, the North Korean pilot who defected to the South with his MIG-15 in 1953,
students were instructed that there was no God and that the world Communist victory
would be won with a vast amount of modem weapons, not with religious faith or
superstition.

17

Sales of Bibles and other religious materials were prohibited. Bookstores

were allowed only to sell Communist publications and Russian materials.

School

officials harassed children from Christian backgrounds. Naturally, many young people
left their parents’ churches, while many older believers went underground to avoid
persecution.
The government also planned to liquidate the church leadership gradually.
Christian leaders and educators were divided by the North Korean secret police into three
categories: 1) openly against Communism, 2) potential hindrances to Communist mle,
and 3) those with a close southern connection.

Pastors who refused to join the

government-sponsored Christian League were arrested and summarily executed.

18

When

16 A confidential letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel from P ’yOngyang, 29 October 1950, Documents o f
the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Kim Heung Soo (Seoul: Institute o f Korean Church History, 2003),
146-147.
17 No Kum-sok, A M iG-15 to Freedom (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1996), 36.
No Kum-sok’s mother was a devout Catholic.
18 Seong-Jae Lee,
:J tS tS # £ fc # * 1 6 1 4 ^ MM3H ^ ^ fiffft Haebangihu
buk’hankidokkyohoe gongsanjeonggwongwaui gwangyee tehanyeongu Study on the Relation Between
North Korea Government and North Korean Church since Liberation” (M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University,
1992), 70.
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preparations for war intensified in early 1950, the government further tightened its
control over all religious groups because Kim Il-sung worried that news of his secret war
plan might leak to the south. On the eve of the attack, the police arrested even more
pastors and Catholic priests so that they could not hinder the war effort.19 Once the
attack started, all religious activities were forced to stop. No more worship services or
religious gatherings were allowed, not even in Communist-controlled churches.

The

police locked the doors of most churches.20
Kim Il-sung’s Political Intentions in Military Conquest
Kim had two southern political rivals, Pak Hon-yong and Syngman Rhee, and a
war might enable him to beat both of them and assume supreme control over the whole
peninsula. Historian Robert Simmons, who has explored domestic conditions in North
Korea in his book Strained Alliance (1975), attributed Kim Il-sung’s eagerness to march
south to his power struggle with Pak Hon-yong.21 Simmons argued that Pak pressured
Kim to attack because Pak wanted to return to Seoul and unify the country.22
However, it was also possible that Kim did not act simply because of Pak’s
political pressure. Kim intended to nullify the influence of Pak Hon-y6ng in South Korea.
Pak had the loyal support of most domestic Korean Communists.

He had led the

Communist resistance throughout the colonial area inside Korea and had suffered
immensely in his pursuit of Korean independence. After the Japanese surrendered to the
Allies, Pak established the Korean Communist Party in Seoul.

Being a native of

Kwangju, Pak’s main power base was in the southern region of Korea. He headed the
19 Ibid., 71.
20 Ibid.
21 Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, P ’ydngyang, Moscow, and the Politics o f the Korean
Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975).
22 Ibid., 104-110.
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Communist guerilla forces in the Cholla region before fleeing to P’yongyang in October
1946. His credentials made him highly popular among all Korean Communists. Pak
directly challenged Kim’s claim to the throne in Seoul.
In North Korea, Pak Hon-y6ng received solid support from Communist refugees
who had fled South Korea because of the anti-Communist purge launched by Rhee’s
government.23 Once in P’yongyang, Pak plotted how he might return south and lead an
uprising.

He promptly organized the Democratic Front for the Unification of the

Fatherland (DFUF), which advocated a peaceful unification of Korea.24 Because of his
invaluable knowledge of the south, he also became the supervisor of the Kangdong
Political Institute, which was responsible for training guerillas to be sent south for
infiltration and subversive activities.

Since Pak enjoyed wide support in the newly

unified Korean Workers’ Party, and also among the guerrillas, Kim Il-sung appointed
him as the Foreign Minister of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in
September 1949, hoping to use his influence in the South to gain Stalin’s support for a
swift military conquest.
Using military means, nevertheless, was not the only option for the North Koreans.
There were two other ways to achieve unification: to allow a national election sponsored
by the United Nations, or to overthrow the Republic of Korea (ROK) regime through
subversive means and guerrilla attacks. Nevertheless, these two options were not options
for the benefit of Kim Il-sung because both ways offered Pak the upper hand in the
control of Seoul. For instance, a national election would certainly favor Pak because
23 Millett, The War fo r Korea, 1945-1950, 175.
24 Although the Democratic Front for the Unification o f the Fatherland (DFUF) was organized by Pak H6ny6ng, his name was not listed on the seven-member chairman group of the front. See Dae-sook Suh, Kim II
Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 120.
25 Simmons, The Strained Alliance, 104.
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leftists in the South knew Pak better than Kim.

If Pak succeeded in overthrowing

Syngman Rhee’s regime in Seoul and eventually unifying the country through subversive
activities without the help of the North Koreans, then Kim’s position in the newly unified
Korea would be over-shadowed by Pak’s remarkable success. And since Pak enjoyed a
larger following in the South than Kim did, the Soviet Union might install Pak in Seoul
rather than Kim in a newly unified Korea.
From 1945 to 1949, Stalin favored subversive activities to take full control of the
south. Therefore, he ignored the American plan to have a national election for all Korea
under the direction of the United Nations and rejected Kim’s constant pleas to march
south. In March 1949, Stalin told Kim plainly that the 38th Parallel had to be peaceful
and the Korean People’s Army (KPA) existed only for defensive purposes.26 He would
allow Kim to use force only if the South Koreans launched an attack against the North.
Kim Il-sung, nonetheless, did not give up his plan, due to his political ambition.
If Kim wanted to be the supreme ruler of all Korea, he had to march south before Pak’s
uprising succeeded. To do so, he needed to find ways to control Pak’s power base and
eliminate all of Pak’s supporters. A swift military operation might allow Kim to absorb
the guerilla units into the People’s Army (Inmingun). This strategy was consistent with
Kim Il-sung’s constant efforts to incorporate the Korean Communist Party into the
Korean Workers’ Party, allowing the northern Communists to control their southern
comrades.27

26 Quote by Evgueni Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics o f the Korean War, 1949-51,” Cold War
International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 54.
27 See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 218-219. According to historian Dae-sook Suh, against
the hope o f most domestic Communists, it was Kim Il-sung’s initiative, with Soviet leaders’ support, to
establish a Worker Party that was independent o f the party in Seoul. See Suh, Kim II Sung: The North
Korean Leader, 70-71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

293

Knowing Kim’s political ambitions, Pak Hon-yong also wanted a military
conquest, but he had a different plan in mind. He knew that time was against him
because Syngman Rhee was cracking down on the southern guerrilla forces. Two of
Pak’s guerrilla leaders, Kim Sam-yong and Yi Chu-ha, were arrested by ROK police in
March 1950.28 Pak needed to act quickly in order to save his comrades from annihilation.
Since he had the loyalty of the southern guerrillas, Pak depended on them for political
leverage against Kim Il-sung. His strategy was to divert the ROK army’s attention with a
military attack from the north, so that the 500,000 loyal members of the South Korean
Labor Party (about 2 percent of the overall southern population) would rise up and seize
Seoul before the KPA could enter.29 Perhaps Pak also expected that, with the ROK
moving all of its troops to the north to prevent the fall of Seoul, his own guerrilla forces
would have time to overrun the southern half of the peninsula. In this way, Pak might
have calculated that his guerrilla forces would become the new KPA in the south on their
own merits and would not be incorporated into Kim’s units.30
Both Kim and Pak took great risks, but Pak thought that he had a better chance
because his popularity in the South meant that he would be sure to win more support in
Seoul than Kim Il-sung.31 His failure was tied to the fact that he over-estimated the
strength of the guerilla forces. In addition, what he did not expect was the overwhelming
power of the northern army, the ROK’s strategy of withdrawing its army from Seoul, a

28 Suh, Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader, 121.
29 ‘T he North Korean Labor Party’s Internal Factions,” originally published in the Japanese monthly Jiyu.
Written by ‘T he Neighbouring Countries Research Institute.” Translated in the Selected Summaries o f
Japanese Magazines (U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, June 26-July3,1967), 4; quoted in Simmons, The Strained
Alliance, 110. The number 500,000 was provided by Pak H6n-y5ng. It is quite possible that Pak
overestimated the strength o f the guerrillas in the south.
30 This line o f reasoning is also supported by Dae-sook Suh’s analysis. See Suh, Kim II Sung: The North
Korean Leader, 121.
31 Simmons, The Strained Alliance, 110.
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lack of public enthusiasm toward guerrilla uprisings, and the effectiveness of ROK police
action against subversive activities.

Pak’s failure to foresee the defeat of his guerrillas

later made him a convenient scapegoat. Eventually, his comrades in the North arrested
and sentenced him to death after the conclusion of the armistice.33
Building a North Korean People’s Army
Since Kim Il-sung calculated that he would need a massive army to overthrow the
southern government and unify the country under his rule, his preparations began in 1947,
even before the formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK). During a meeting with the
North Korean People’s Committee, Kim argued that since “there [existed] aggressive
forces” in the south under the direction of American imperialists, North Korea would
need its own army to defend against an attack.34 By exaggerating the southern threat,
Kim got his proposal accepted by the committee and the process of recruitment for the
People’s Army began.
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) was initially composed of Kim’s partisan
contingency, Korean returnees from Russia, the Korean Volunteer Corps and several
thousand independent Communist fighters from Manchuria and other parts of China.35
Recruitment efforts sought young men from reliable backgrounds: poor peasants or
workers, with no relatives in the south.

Former landlords, the bourgeois, and Christians

32 The ROK government employed strong tactics against potential guerrilla uprisings once the war started.
For example in Kochang (Map 5), the police arrested and executed a huge number o f leftists and their
sympathizers. See H. K. Shin, Remembering Korea 1950: A Boy Soldier’s Story (Reno, NV: University of
Nevada Press, 2001), 39-40.
33 Simmons, Strained Alliance, 109, 234.
34 Kiwon Chung, ‘T he North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” The China Quarterly 14 (April-June
1963: 107.
35 Ibid., 108.
36 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 235.
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were generally excluded.

<27

Although marred by low public enthusiasm, falsification, and

inefficiency, the recruitment effort was, for the most part, smooth and successful.38
Kim Il-sung carefully concealed the size of his army by organizing divisions
under various non-military names such as the “Peace Preservation Corps,” the “Border
Constabulary,” and the “Railroad Guards.”39

In the early stages, the People’s Army,

despite its size, was still inferior to the southern forces, because the KPA lacked weapons
and ammunition. In his report to Moscow in March 1949, General Terentii Shtykov,
Ambassador to North Korea, told Stalin that the North Koreans did not have enough
trained personnel, adequate weapons, and sufficient bullets to defend the country if the
South attacked.40 In June 1949, the Soviets finally yielded to Kim and Shtykov’s
requests, supplying numerous planes, tanks, cannons, landing ships, machine-guns, and
engineering equipment.41
Kim’s war preparations also involved the construction of elaborate bomb shelters.
According to Lieutenant Howard Moffett, who was among the first to enter the city after
its fall (having been bom in P’yongyang to missionary parents), the shelter was “a
fabulous subterranean system of passageways and rooms extending down an estimated
100 feet.”42 It was “a real atom proof shelter with electricity and air-conditioning.”43

37 See No, A MiG-15 to Freedom, 36-39.
38 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 235.
39 Chung, ‘T he North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” 107.
40 Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics o f the Korean War 1949-1951,” 54.
41 Ambassador Shtykov reported that the ROK and the United States were preparing a large-scale war
against the north and complained that the DPRK army would not be able to resist. See Shtykov report to
Stalin, 2 May 1949, Archives o f Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), also Marshal Vasilevsky
and Ambassador Shtykov’s cable to Stalin on 20 April 1949, N 17064, Archives o f the President o f the
Russian Federation (APRF). The documents were mentioned by Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics o f the
Korean War, 1949-1951,” 54. For the treaty between the Soviet Union and the DPRK, see APRF, Fond 6,
list 9, file 14, p 57.
42 Letter from Howard Moffett, 25 October 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 139MO.
43 Ibid.
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Perhaps such preparations were defensive in nature, but they could also indicate that Kim
Il-sung was ready to confront the atomic threat of the United States, should his invasion
plan fail.
The military operation would not be successful if China was not on Kim’s side.
From 1946 to 1950, Kim Il-sung strengthened his ties with the Chinese Communists. In
December 1947, Kim and Mao reached an agreement. Mao would provide foodstuffs
and recognize the North Korean People’s Committee as the legitimate government of
Korea. In exchange, Kim would send two divisions to assist Mao in his revolution. These
divisions totaled about 100,000 young men, and consisted of both North Koreans and
Korean residents of Manchuria.44
This deal benefited Kim Il-sung in two ways. First, the Chinese civil war served
as a training ground for his soldiers. When these two divisions were finally returned to
North Korea, these veterans doubled the strength and fighting capacity of the KPA.
Moreover, American intelligence estimated that 80 percent of the officers in the Korean
People’s Army (KPA) had fought in China.

Second, because “the bright five-starred

national flag of the People’s Republic of China was also dyed with the blood of the
Korean revolutionaries,”45 Mao would be obligated to support Kim’s own war when the
time came.
In March 1948, a secret Soviet-Chinese-North Korean Joint Military Council
(Haptong kunsa hyobuihoe) was established in P’yongyang, for the purpose of
coordinating military activities between the three Communist countries.46 These military

44 Chung, ‘T he North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” 109. See also Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man
Out: Truman, Stalin, M ao and the Origins o f the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 109.
45 Chung, ‘T he North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” 109.
46 Ibid.
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connections between the Chinese and the North Koreans paved the way for Chinese
intervention. Once the Chinese entered the war, this council would work extensively
with both Soviet military advisers and Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV).47
Stalin’s Approval o f Kim’s Military Conquest
Kim Il-sung understood the crucial role of the Soviet Union in his unification
scheme. Regardless of how well he prepared, his hands were tied unless he had full
Soviet support and Stalin’s approval. Therefore, Kim carefully cultivated a friendship
with Stalin, demonstrating his loyalty to the Russian leader and his commitment to
Communism at every opportunity. He constantly thanked Stalin for liberating Korea
from the Japanese imperialists and praised the Soviet Union as the Communist fatherland.
Stalin’s picture was posted everywhere in Korea. Standing before the Russian dictator,
Kim Il-sung practiced humility and self-control by remaining patient and persistent while
pursuing his goal of unification.
From 1947 to 1949, Stalin carefully restrained his young Korean comrade from
stirring up trouble along the 38th Parallel. However, in January 1950, Stalin reversed his
position - giving Kim the go-ahead and supplying him with Russia’s most advanced
weapons. Adam B. Ulam, the ex-director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard
University and an expert in Russian foreign policy, pointed out that Stalin would never
have made such a reversal just because of Kim’s persistence.48 The decision to attack in
1950 must have served Stalin’s own purposes.49 Although it is still not known what was
truly in Stalin’s mind, his comments to Mao about the “changed international situation”

47 Ibid.
48 Adam B. Ulam, “Letters: Stalin, Kim, and Korean War Origins,” Cold War International History Project
Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994): 21.
49 Ulam’s idea is further supported by Thornton’s Odd Man Out.
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might be the primary reason for the new Russian strategy.50 Stalin might well have felt
more comfortable with starting a Korean conflict once he had atomic bombs and
Communists were in firm control of the Chinese mainland. Soviet documents further
suggested that Stalin received intelligence information, a message sent from a British spy
Donald MacLean prior to Secretary Dean Acheson’s National Press speech of January 12,
1950, that the United States would not intervene in Korean affairs.51 Acheson’s speech
further strengthened Stalin’s conviction.
Looking at the situation from another angle, historian Richard C. Thornton argued
that Stalin’s real motivation was that he was uncomfortable with Mao’s success in China
and thus tried to control him.52 According to Thornton’s analysis, Stalin had a plan not
only to prevent Mao from conquering Taiwan in August 1950, but also to drag the
Chinese Communists into a war with the United States, thereby isolating China from the
Western world. Stalin may have seen Korea as an opportunity to confront the United
States without using his own troops. One indication of this was Stalin’s insistence that
Kim Il-sung obtain a Chinese commitment to send ground troops if the Americans or the
Japanese intervened.53
Stalin, nevertheless, wanted to conceal his involvement in the planning of a North
Korean attack in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States.

He

instructed the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, Jacob (Iakvo) Alexandrovich
Malik, to walk out of the UN Security Council on February 3, 1950. Outwardly, Malik
50 Coded message N 5 5 0 0 ,1 4 May 1950, APRF, Fund 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55, Wilson Center Cold War
International History Project. Document quoted in Paul Wingrove, “Who started Korea?” History Today
50 (July 2000): 46.
51 Kathryn Weathersby, ‘T he Korean War Revisited,” Wilson Quarterly 23 (1 June 1999): 91.
52 Thornton, Odd Man Out.
53 Coded message N 5 5 0 0 ,1 4 May 1950, APRF, Fund 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55. Wilson Center Cold War
International History Project. Document quoted in Paul Wingrove, “Who started Korea?” History Today
50 (July 2000): 46.
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was protesting the refusal to admit Communist China into the United Nations and the
presence of the Nationalist representation, but in reality, Malik’s action was to shield his
country from accusation of any foreknowledge of the attack and to avoid potential
diplomatic damage caused by the outbreak of the Korean War. Had the Soviets been
present at the Security Council meeting, Malik would have found himself confronted
with the decision of whether or not they should use the veto power. If the Soviet Union
had vetoed the UN resolution against North Korea, it would have been condemned by
world public opinion. However, if the Soviet Union had supported the UN resolution, it
would have prevented any other Communist nation from coming to North Korea’s aid.
Even if the Soviet Union had simply abstained from voting, it would have destroyed its
credibility in the Communist world by allowing the capitalists to win without putting up a
fight. Therefore, the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council meetings
was the best way to avoid a no-win situation.
Stalin’s Use o f Churches fo r Anti-Atomic Weapons Propaganda
Stalin’s next step was to find a way to nullify US atomic superiority should the
United States enter the war. In March 1950, Moscow started a propaganda offensive by
launching the “Signatures For Peace Campaign” in Stockholm, Sweden.

The

Communist-controlled World Congress of Partisans of Peace (WCPP) adopted the
“Stockholm Resolution,” urging a complete ban on the use of atomic weapons.54 This
campaign sought to convince the UN to condemn any first-use of atomic weapons.
What was the political purpose of this campaign at this time? Putting this event in
the context of the upcoming attack in June, it was a psychological offensive in
preparation for the Korean War. Given the fact that Stalin had in mind to start a war, his
54 “M oscow’ ‘Signatures for Peace’ Campaign,” Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 151.
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goal was to prevent the United States from using atomic weapons against North Korea.55
According to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean
War “more than half the population of North Korea was reported to have signed the
petition.”56 The petition requested the United States and the Soviet Union not to never to
use atomic weapons. The campaign played on public sentiments, such as a universal
aversion to war, the fear of atomic destruction, the concern for economic recovery, and
the desire for international tensions to cease.57
In fact, the Stockholm Peace Campaign targeted religious groups in the West and
served to confuse religious opinion on the use of atomic weapons, rendering the weapon
morally indefensible. To publicize the message of this peace initiative, Communists
employed religious leaders from Eastern Europe, under the leadership of Bishop Albert
Berezky, the leader of the Hungarian Reform Church.

Stalin was not above benign

manipulation of religious opinion in the West with one hand, even while his other hand
crushed the churches in the East. He understood that Christianity was the major moral
foundation of the Western world, so he appealed to religious morality and ideals to limit
US military options and hopefully to ground all atomic weapons for the benefit of North
Korea’s invading army. By May 1950, the WCPP claimed to have received 100 million
signatures, mostly from behind the Iron Curtain.58 Although there were fewer signatures
than had been anticipated from the West, the effort was successful in swaying European

55 The North Koreans’ fear o f the atomic bomb was real because Kim Il-sung had built an underground
bomb shelter to protect himself from any potential U.S. atomic bombardment.
56 Statement by Dean Acheson on the “Soviet Peace Petition on July 12, 1950, Documents o f the WCC
Library: The Korean War, 45.
57 “M oscow ‘Signatures for Peace’ Campaign,” Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 151.
58 Ibid.
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opinion.

Religious leaders, such as the Bishop of Chichester, would later lobby the

British government to prevent the use of atomic weapons in the Korean War.59
Preparing For a Surprise Attack on June 25,1950
As soon as Kim Il-sung received approval from Stalin, he immediately
accelerated preparations for war. In March 1950, Kim Il-sung asked to use the Soviet
credit that had been allocated for 1951, in order to acquire additional military hardware.
The Soviet Union promptly agreed.60 The Russians also delivered more arms and
equipment for forming additional units of the KPA.

A month later, leaders of the

southern Communist guerilla forces arrived in P’yongyang to work out a program of
action for before and after the invasion.61 After Kim H-sung met with Mao Zedong in
May 1950, the Chinese promised to send food aid and to transfer one army closer to
Korea, just in case the Japanese entered on the side of the South.”62
In May 1950, Kim Il-sung informed General Shtykov that his general staff had
started to plan for a June attack, contingent on the arrival of the promised Soviet
armaments. Kim was in a hurry because he was afraid that a possible leak would spoil
the element of surprise, or that the July rainy season might hinder its speed.63 At his
insistence, the war was finally scheduled for June 2 5 ,1950.64

59 The Russians’ planning paid off eventually when the British obtained Truman’s promise not to use the
atomic bomb without consulting them. Truman’s hands were tied due to international and religious opinion.
60 Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics o f the Korean War 1949-1951,” 54.
61 Ibid.
62 Telegram 362,1950. Quote in Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” Cold War International
History Project Electronic Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993): 16.
63 Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics o f the Korean War,” 54.
64 Telegram 408, 1950, quoted in Weathersby, “New Findings on the Korean War,” 16.
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A SOUTHERN REVIVAL ON THE EVE OF WAR
According to historian Kathryn Weathersby and Christian F. Ostermann, Director
of the Cold War International History Project, the North Korean leadership had “greatly
overestimated the support it enjoyed among the population of the South and
underestimated the likelihood of U.S. intervention to defend” the South Korean
government.65 The main reason for this discrepancy was the religious factor, an
important aspect that was somehow missed by both North Korean leaders and Korean
War historians. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the South Korean government,
the Korean churches, and American missionaries had labored intensively to rescue the
nation from Communist expansion through religious means.
Church and State
Religion and politics were intertwined in the Republic of Korea (ROK). While
traditional religions were losing their share of political power, Christianity was on the rise,
especially after Syngman Rhee came to power.66 Not only did Christians closely identify
with Rhee’s regime, but they were active in both the National Assembly and the
provincial governments.

In spite of their small percentage in the overall Korean

population, Christians were gaining political power in the South. By May 1950, about
half of Rhee’s cabinet members were Christians. Around forty of the newly elected 210
legislators in the National Assembly were also Christians. The Vice Chairman of the
Assembly was a Presbyterian elder. The mayor of Seoul and three of the eight provincial

65 Christian F. Ostermann and Kathryn Weathersby, “New Evidence on North Korea,” Cold War
International History Project Bulletin 14/15 (Winter 2003-Spring 2004): 5-7.
66 The growth o f Christianity and its political influence in the South has been catalogued in chapter 3.
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governors were also Christians.

The future of these Christian leaders depended very

much on keeping the Communists at bay.
Fear and uncertainty were inescapable elements of life in South Korea due to the
division of the Korean peninsula. Those who were either in the ROK government or
loyal to Rhee were particularly worried. According to President Rhee, “Every Christian
knows he is a prime target” since so much of the Korean leadership was closely
/T O

connected to the church and the foreign missionaries.

Rhee believed that because these

Christians had “ideas and convictions and would stand up against the Communists,” they
would be murdered if the North took control.69
As rumors of war grew louder and the prospect of American military support
faded away, many Christian clergyman and some ROK officials became convinced that a
national revival was the only way to avert disaster.

They hoped that God’s divine

intervention would save the country from an invasion and would counteract the climate
of fear. President Rhee told Rev. Bob Pierce, a Youth for Christ evangelist who visited
Korea in April 1950 and later became the founder of World Vision, Inc., that “the reason
Communism had been unable to destroy his government through termite tactics was
because of the tremendous surge of spiritual passion which had come to his people,” in
the words of Pierce.70 The nation, Rhee believed, needed “some kind of a spiritual
renewal” if the South wanted to survive a military conquest from the North.

71

In early

67 Letter from Harold Voelkel to Dr. John C. Decker, 29 July 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The
Korean War, 61.
68 See quote in Franklin Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do (USA: Samaritan’s Purse, 1983), 146.
69 Ibid.
70 Bob Pierce, The Untold Korean Story (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1951), 5.
71 Rhee as quoted in Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do, 146.
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1950, a National Day of Prayer was called by the churches and supported by the ROK
government.
Bob Pierce and the “Save the Nation Evangelistic Crusade”
In March 1950, Protestant churches under the sponsorship of the Korean National
Council of Churches (KNCC) conducted a nationwide evangelistic campaign, entitled the
“Save the Nation Evangelistic Crusade.”72 American missionaries, such as Rev. Harold
Voelkel and Rev. Otto De Camp, were involved in the interdenominational preparation
committee.73 The crusade was to be a series of city-wide evangelistic campaigns in key
areas throughout the nation, modeled after Billy Graham’s successful American crusades.
The cities that were chosen represented Korea’s major population centers. The areas with
the highest Christian population were Taegu, Seoul, and Inch’on, but the campaign also
went to Pusan, Taejon, and Kaesong (see Map 4), thereby covering the major political,
economic, and strategic areas of the south (see Table 5.1). During the Korean War, most
of these cities (except Pusan) would be completely destroyed and many of their residents
became refugees.
The highlight of this campaign was the participation of three young American
preachers: Gill Dodds, Rev. Bob Findley, and Rev. Bob Pierce. Their participation arose
from unplanned happenstance. Rev. Eddie Kilboume of the Oriental Missionary Society
and his wife Ernie Kilboume were friends of Pierce. They had left China for Korea after
the fall of Beijing, and had become involved in planning the crusade. When they heard
that Pierce would be visiting Korea on his way to Tokyo, they invited him to lead the
72 The government did not pay for the campaign, but Rhee’s administration was supportive o f the efforts of
the churches.
73 The crusade was greatly praised by Rev. Harold Voelkel in his letter (29 July 1950) to Dr. John C.
Decker, the Secretary o f the International Missionary Council, shortly after the outbreak o f the Korean War.
Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 61.
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“Save the Nation Evangelistic Crusade.”74 The Kilboumes specifically asked him to
bring along Gill Dodds, a famous US track star, because of high Korean interest in the
sport of track and field. Rev. Pierce not only brought Dodds but also invited Bob Findley,
a national inter-collegiate boxing champion who also planned to take a trip to Korea and
Japan.

Upon arriving in Seoul, they were enthusiastically welcomed by the leading

sports writers, government officials, Korean church leaders, and missionaries.75 They
stayed in Korea for almost nine weeks, leaving in early June 1950, a few weeks before
the outbreak of the Korean War.76 Revival meetings were carried out in major cities
including Taegu, Pusan, Seoul, Taejon, and Inch’on.
The “crusade” specifically focused on high school and college students - the very
groups that Communist propaganda also targeted. Daily meetings were conducted in
local high schools while the crusade team was in town. These usually were not mission
schools, but public and non-religious private schools. On every night of the crusade, the
entire student body of that school (typically one to two thousand) would crowd into the
school auditorium to listen to the American speakers through a Korean translator. Based
on data provided by Rev. Pierce, he visited at least forty schools and spoke to about
seventy to a hundred thousand students during the nine-week schedule.

77

Why would secular public schools and non-Christian private schools want to
invite American preachers? It was because the schools were concerned about leftist
activities among the youth, so that even secular educators encouraged religious teaching

74 Bob Pierce met the Kilbournes in China. After the Communists took power in Korea, they joined the
Korea mission instead o f returning to the United States. See Pierce, The Untold Korean Story, 6.
75 Ibid., 9,
76 Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do, 146.
77 The size o f high school was usually from 1000 to 1500. The American team spent 10 days in Taegu, 5 in
Pusan, 11 in Seoul, and unknown in Taejfin (at least 5 days).
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to counteract Communist utopianism. One non-Christian principal explained to Rev.
Pierce, “We want you to preach your Christ, because even though most of us on the
faculty are not Christians, we know that only Christianity offers a challenge strong
enough and stirring enough to turn these young people from Communism.”78 Since the
beginning of the century, Christianity had gained a positive reputation among Korean
educators. Its influence on Korean nationalism and postwar anti-Communism marked it
as an essential social and political force in South Korea. Although the majority of South
Koreans were not Christians, most of them respected Christianity and embraced Christian
ideas.
The ROK military in particular was eager to support the crusade. Many military
leaders invited the American preachers to preach to their soldiers. In Taegu, Rev. Pierce
and his companions drove out to an ROK army camp and preached to hundreds of
soldiers.79 In Kaesong, they visited the 38th Parallel, and again spoke to the troops. Most
of the guards whom they talked to that day would be captured or killed by the KPA a
month later.80 The Korean army invited these preachers because they believed that
Christian soldiers were better fighters and that Christian beliefs were essential to
containing Communist infiltration.
The best example of the influence of Christianity in the ROK military was the
case of the Coast Guard. The American Military Government (AMG) organized the
Coast Guard in early 1946. Like the Constabulary, the Coast Guard attracted many
dissidents, including Communists from the radical sailors’ unions. Many defected to the
north with their boats and equipment. When the Republic of Korea was established in
78 Pierce, The Untold Korean Story, 30.
79 Ibid., 32.
80 Ibid., 56-59.
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August 1948, President Rhee appointed Admiral Son Won-il, a Methodist, to take charge
of the Coast Guard.

Admiral Son immediately established a new way to comer the

subversive elements by making Protestant Christianity the official religion of the Korean
navy.

Starting from November 1948, Admiral Son ordered that sailors who were

stationed at his Seoul headquarters had to attend chapel services. His policy became
common practice throughout the ROK navy so that eventually a Chaplain Office was
established in November 1950, five months ahead of other ROK forces. In addition,
under Admiral Son’s order, navy recruiters sought out Christian refugees from North
Korean fishing communities, while investigators were tracking down the last
Communists hiding in the ROK navy.

When the American advisors came to have

training sessions with the ROK navy, they discovered that the navy had the strongest
anti-Communist fighters in the ROK military.81
In addition to Admiral Son, there were other Christian generals in the ROK army.
The most famous one was General Won Yong-dok, the son of a Christian minister from
North Korea and a medical doctor trained by American missionaries. He was the most
loyal supporter of Syngman Rhee and took charge of Rhee’s coup against the National
Assembly in May 1952 and the release of the anti-Communist North Korean POWs in
June 1953.82 The famous “Paik brothers” in the ROK army - Colonel Paek Son-yop of
the Capital Division and Colonel Paek In-yop, the Commander of the 17th Regiment on
the Ongjin Peninsula - who were later promoted to become generals during the Korean
War, were very pro-Christian because of their close connection with Cho Man-sik.

81 Millett, The War fo r Korea, 1945-1950,174.
82 Sun-yup Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom: Wartime Memoirs o f the Republic o f K orea’s First Four-Star
General (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1992), 82, 194, 229.
83 Ibid., 7 7 ,7 9 , and 82.
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Support from provincial officials also facilitated the campaign. For example, in
Taegu, where the crusade began, Pierce recounted, “The city officials gave it their whole
hearted cooperation.”84 The governor of the province (North Kyongsang) Cho Jae-chon
(Jo Jae-cheon), who was a Christian, even came to the revival meeting in the Town Hall
for all eleven nights. Governor Cho allowed them to use the city’s giant stadium to host
Gill Dodds’ exhibition race. On that day, 60,000 people came to the revival meeting at
the stadium. The event was highly publicized and students were dismissed from high
school so that they could participate in the campaign (see Table 5.2).85 Each night, over a
hundred people came forward to make a public confession of their faith.
In Pusan, the American team was invited by the governor of South Kyongsang
Province, Yang Song-bong (Yang Seong-bong), who was also a Christian, to combine
their evangelical meeting with the celebration of the return of 3000 soldiers from guard
duty along the 38 Parallel, in the city’s biggest stadium. Around 30,000 Pusan residents
came to the stadium to attend the celebration and to see Dodds, because Korean runners
had just swept the top three places in the Boston Marathon the week before.86 After the
ceremony and an exhibition race, all the soldiers and townspeople stayed to listen to
Dodd’s testimony and Rev. Pierce’s message.87
The “Save the Nation Evangelical Crusade” was the most successful evangelical
campaign in Korean Church history up to that point. After nine weeks of preaching, Dr.
Pierce reported that over 25,000 new converts made their public confessions.88 These
numbers were much higher than the crusades led by Rev. Billy Graham in Los Angeles
84 Ibid., 33.
85 Ibid.
86 Newsweek, 1 May 1950, 70-71.
87 Pierce, The Untold Korean Story, 36-37.
88 Ibid., 29.
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(1949) or any other Youth for Christ rallies in the United States. In fact, Dr. Pierce did
not plan the campaign. Nor did he personally know much about the Korean churches and
political, social, and military conditions prior to his visit.

The crusade’s planning

committee headed by missionaries and Korean pastors made all the arrangements. The
name of the crusade demonstrated the goal of the planners to identify personal salvation
with national deliverance. Christianity thus emerged as a dominant ideological force
against Communism in South Korea.
Warnings Go Unheeded
As North Korea proceeded with preparations for a surprise attack, intelligence
began to reach the ROK by May 1950. The North’s large concentrations of troops and
tanks along the border alarmed the Korean Defense Minister, Sin Song-mo (Shin Sungmo).

As early as May 10, Minister Sin had called a press conference for foreign

correspondents to announce the discovery of at least 155 Soviet-made T-34 medium
th

tanks, the massive military build-up along the 38 Parallel, and the presence of 118,000
Communist troops in combat positions.89 Two days later, President Rhee also held a
press conference, referring to Minister Sin’s report, complaining about the United States’
ambivalent position and emphasizing the need for immediate action.90 The ROK hoped
that the United States and its allies would recognize the threat, respond with military
supplies, and make preparations to repel an attack.
Nevertheless, neither the US press nor US experts took these warnings seriously.
The New York Times, for example, buried Sin’s report on page 14, in a thirty-three-word

89 Thornton, O dd Man Out, 172.
90 Ibid., 175.
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newsbrief.91 Minister Sin’s warning was further refuted by Charge d’Affairs Everett
Drumright who argued that the Korean reports were exaggerated and reasoned that the
South Koreans intended to manipulate the threat to elicit additional military aid from the
United States.92 Drumright’s argument was supported by intelligence reports submitted
by the CIA, the Pentagon, and the Far Eastern Command in Tokyo.93 The United States
government therefore refused to answer the pleas of the ROK. The South Koreans were
desperate to find even one sympathetic ear in Washington.
John Foster Dulles Visits Korea Eight Days before the War
Ambassador Dr. John M. Chang, himself a devoted Korean Catholic, believed
that John Foster Dulles was the key to persuading the Truman administration to supply
equipment to the South. He knew that Dulles was an influential Republican foreign
policy expert who was willing to work with Democrats to pursue a bi-partisan approach
to post-war reconstruction in East Asia.

And, since Chang had previously worked

closely with Dulles in obtaining recognition of Korea by the United Nations, he felt that
he could get Dulles’ attention. Hearing that Dulles had been appointed as a special envoy
to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan, and that he was planning a stopover in Korea,
Ambassador Chang invited Dulles and other high-ranking State Department officials to a
dinner at the Wardman-Park Hotel in Washington, DC. He urged Dulles to investigate
the factual conditions along the 38th Parallel and to speak before the newly elected

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 173.
93 For the CIA report, see CIA report #172: ORE 18-50,19 June 1950, “Current Capabilities o f the
Northern Korean Regime,” National Archives Record Administration (NARA). For the details o f the US
Army position, see James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1972), 64. For Tokyo’s report, see Thornton, Odd Man Out, 175.
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National Assembly.

Dulles agreed and prepared a speech, which was approved by

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for the assembly.
To appreciate how Dulles’ visit would come to impact the religious aspects of the
war, his political and religious background must first be understood.

Dulles’ record

reveals close connections with the Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCC) and the
Presbyterian Church (USA) throughout the 1940s.

He was the son of a liberal

Presbyterian minister, Rev. Allen Macy Dulles, and the grandson of a missionary to India,
John Wesley Dulles. On his mother’s side, his grandfather, John Watson Foster, had been
Secretary of State under President Benjamin Harrison. He therefore inherited the genes
of a politician and a preacher.

Growing up under the influence of his father and

grandfathers, Dulles held liberal religious beliefs and a worldview of American mission
and exceptionalism.94 Dulles became a successful lawyer and chaired the Commission to
Study the Basis of a Just and Durable Peace, created by the FCCC in February 1941. As
a well-known Christian layman with political and business connections, he rose quickly
within the ranks of the Republican Party.
Dulles’ influence in Washington was not overlooked by American missionaries in
Korea. They understood that Dulles would be a great friend within the administration, if
they could only impress upon him the vitality of Korean Christianity and the spiritual
nature of the Korean struggle. Since Dulles was coming to Korea, the Presbyterian
missionaries in Seoul invited him to a special reception in his honor.

Being a

Presbyterian himself, Dulles gladly accepted. Flying from Tokyo to Seoul on June 17,
Dulles found himself on the same plane as Dr. John C. Smith, the Foreign Secretary of

94 For details, see Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S.
Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), 1-3.
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the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Mission, who was on his way to Korea to attend the
Annual Conference of the Northern Presbyterian Mission.
This dinner party with Dulles would be a prime opportunity for the missionaries
and the Presbyterian Board Secretary to plead for Korea’s need of support, to recount the
history of the Korean Church, and to present a vision of a future when Korea would be
largely Christian. They reported the recent success of Bob Pierce’s evangelical crusade
and the Christian influence within the ROK government. After the dinner party, the
missionaries persuaded Dulles to take a detour with them to visit the Yongnak Church, a
well-known North Korean refugee church in Seoul established by Rev. Han Kyong-jik.95
The church was holding a special Saturday night evangelical meeting of three thousand
people. Dulles and Smith made a quick stop and briefly greeted the refugees. Although
there were hundreds of churches in Seoul, Yongnak was the biggest and most beautiful of
the refugee churches. The missionaries chose to take Dulles to this church because they
wanted him to tell the American people and the President that the Korean people
deserved their support because they were fighting for freedom (in particular, religious
freedom).
Dulles saw his trip as a fact-finding mission and so he paid close attention to
every detail.96 Before going to the dinner reception, he first visited the 38th Parallel
together with the Foreign Minister Im Pyong-jik, and other Korean officials. At the same
time, Dulles sought to counteract the feeling among Koreans that the United States had

95 Letter from Harold Voelkel to Dr. John C. Decker, 29 July 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The
Korean War, 61.
96 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: Republic o f Korea and the United States, 19481953 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 167-168.
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abandoned them.97 In his address before the Korean National Assembly on June 19, he
described how he had seen the 38th Parallel, met with ROK soldiers, conversed with
government officials, educators, and economists, and prayed with North Korean refugees.
He confided that he was impressed and had found “in the Korean nation a worthy ally for
peace and justice in the world.”98 He assured the Korean people that they would not
stand alone against the Communists, so long as they acted worthily in the great design of
human freedom. After spending five days in Korea, Dulles left for Japan on June 22,
1950.
Undoubtedly, Dulles’ speech and personal convictions did not represent the
official policy of the United States government.

Also, his visit was too short and

occurred too late to influence US preparations for an attack that would come in only three
days. Nor did any practical help immediately follow his visit. His “You are not alone”
statement, however, was widely circulated across the south, and some Koreans felt that
he had given “the most explicit assurance of American protection.”99 Though not official
policy, his words did convey the underlying sentiment of at least some Americans (from
Senators100 to officials, clergymen, and citizens) that the United States had a moral
obligation toward Korea. Such sentiments should not be overlooked, especially not in a

97 Ibid.
98 Speech before the National Assembly, 19 June 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers (MC#016), Korea, Box
48, Folder 1950, Seeley Mudd Library.
99 Quote in Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War, 168.
100 Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and Congressman Walter Judd were the most outspoken in Congress on
America’s moral obligation to Korea. When they visited other Asian countries, they were impressed to
hear the often repeated questions, “What will the US do about Korea?” Korea became an important symbol.
How the United States handled Korea would seriously affect the confidence o f other Asian countries
toward the United States leadership position in the Far East. See Robert Oliver’s letter to Syngman Rhee,
dated January 7, 1950,
29
Taehanmingoksa jaryojip 29
(Documents o f the History o f the Republic o f Korea Vol. 29: Syngman Rhee Collection (1949-1950)
(Seoul: S3 la 313? I t la Guksapyeonchan wiwonhoe The Committee o f National History Compilation),
245.
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highly moralistic and religious decade, when the pressure of public opinion might
t

influence decision making in Washington.

Dulles’ visit to Korea transformed his

understanding of the Korean problem and marked his new personal commitment to the
defense of South Korea. He became a crucial voice in the State Department advocating a
firm policy on Korea.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR
The outbreak of the Korean War itself was hardly a military surprise to many
Korean officials because they had already received intelligence reports and observed
signs of a possible attack, although they did not know the exact date of the operation.
The real surprises came, however, when the fighting actually began. First, the South
Korean troops discovered that the strength of the invading North Korean army, especially
the power of the Russian-made tanks, was completely beyond their calculations. Second,
the quick abandonment of Seoul by the ROK government shocked most Koreans and
disappointed many foreign diplomats in Seoul. Third, the swift action of the United
States to send American troops to defend the Pusan Perimeter upset the plans of the
North. The focus of this section is on examining how the United States government, the
missionaries, and the churches responded to the outbreak of the war and how the
religious factor emerged as the key “selling point” in defending the US military
intervention to the American people.
The Attack on June 25,1950
On June 25, 1950, at 4:00 AM on a Sunday morning, while a third of ROK
officers were in Seoul for a special gathering and half of the Korean soldiers were on
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leave to harvest their crops, the North Koreans launched an all-fronts attack along the 38th
Parallel. The first shot was fired on the Ongjin Peninsula and the fighting quickly spread
to six other major points along the border. After five hours of intense fighting, the city of
Kaesong, once the ancient capital of Koryo, was in Communist hands.101 Five Methodist
missionaries living in the city, and one missionary visitor from Seoul, became the first
group of Americans captured by the North Korean soldiers.102 Their internment served as
a rallying cry among American religious groups, who wished to locate their whereabouts
and sought their release throughout the Korean War.
News of the assault, sent by the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG),
reached General MacArthur’s office in Tokyo within two hours of the attack. Hours later,
he also received a chain of telegrams from Ambassador John J. Muccio in Seoul,
forwarding President Rhee’s pleas for arms and ammunition. In his first complete report
to Washington, MacArthur warned, “Enemy effort serious in strength and strategic intent
and is undisguised act of war subject to United Nations censure.” 103 Even before
directions from Washington arrived, MacArthur ordered General Walton H. Walker, the
Commander of the US Eighth Army, to load the MSTS Keathley with ammunition and
mortars to send to the ROK troops so long as they had the ability to use them.104
Dulles rushed from Kyoto to Tokyo to meet with MacArthur as soon as he heard
the news of the invasion. The general, however, expressed confidence and downplayed
the attack, telling Dulles that it was just “a bonfire” and that soon “the North Korean

101 Quoted in Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 65.
102 For the details o f their imprisonment, see Larry Zellers, In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea
(Lexington, KY: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1991).
103 Quoted in Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 65.
104 Ibid., 66.
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tanks would run out of gas.”105 Nevertheless, Dulles’ own recent observations of the 38th
Parallel had convinced him that the situation was more dire than MacArthur had admitted.
That evening, Dulles and his assistant from the State Department, John M. Allison, sent a
telegram to Washington, stating their strong belief that if the South Koreans could not
repulse the attack, “US force should be used even though this risks Russian counter
moves.” They suggested that it was possible to ask for UN intervention through the
Security Council under Article 106.106
Washington’s Response
To Dulles’ delight, Truman responded to the outbreak of the Korean War swiftly.
Informed by his Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the President, who was on a weekend
visit to his hometown, authorized the State Department to bring the problem immediately
to the UN Security Council. Hurrying back to Washington approximately 20 hours after
the attack, Truman met with his top advisers from the State Department and the Pentagon.
Secretary Acheson was convinced that the Soviet Union was behind the attack and that
“to back away from this challenge” would damage the prestige of the United States.
Therefore, he concluded that the United States “could not accept the conquest of this
important area by a Soviet puppet.”107 Most officials believed that Korea was the place
where the United States had to take a stand against the Soviets. Acheson, in particular,
advocated taking a clear stand in Korea because he believed that US inaction would
jeopardize the Western Alliance in Europe.108 The President agreed, but cautioned that

105 Robert H. Ferrell, “Dulles, John Foster 1888-1959,” Historical Dictionary o f the Korean War ed. by
James I. Matray (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 146.
106 “Korea: Summary o f Actions and Decisions, June 24-25,” Korea Project o f the Division o f Historical
Policy Research, RG 59 General Records o f the Department o f State, Lot Files 78/D174, National Archives.
107 Acheson as quoted in Wingrove, “Who Started Korea?” History Today 7 (July 2000): 44.
108 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1986), 507.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

317

the United States “had to meet [the Communists’] thrust without getting embroiled in a
world-wide war.”109 The President then sent the Far East Air Force (FEAF) to assist in
the evacuation of American civilians to Japan. The Air Force was authorized to destroy
enemy tanks if necessary during the evacuation process. Truman also ordered General
MacArthur to send a survey group, headed by Brig. General John H. Church, to Korea
and to provide ammunition and military supplies to the South Koreans.
From the beginning, the President made it clear to his advisers that the United
States would wait for the resolution of the United Nations before acting because he
believed that the Korean question was the responsibility of the United Nations. The
United States should react as a firm supporter of the United Nations. Immediately after
this meeting, the State Department stepped into high gear, preparing a draft resolution
recommending a police force from all UN member states to restore the international
boundary between the two Koreas. During the second Blair House meeting a day later,
the President authorized the Far Eastern Air Force to attack all North Korean tanks, guns,
military columns and other military targets south of the 38th Parallel. He also ordered the
Navy to guard South Korea against invading forces.
On June 27, when the UN Security Council passed its resolution condemning the
North Korean attack and urging its members to aid the South, following Secretary Dean
Acheson’s suggestion, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan
Strait.110 This order effectively blocked the advance of Chinese Communists and
frustrated their plans to launch an assault upon Taiwan in August. Step by step, the
United States was drawing itself deeper into the Korean conflict.

By June 30, US

109 Truman as quoted in Wingrove, “Who Started Korea?” 44.
110 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They M ade, 508.
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involvement was official.

Alarmed at the rapid collapse of South Korean defenses,

Truman committed US ground troops to defend the Pusan Perimeter. Otherwise, the last
foothold on the Korean peninsula would have been lost.

Naturally, South Koreans

welcomed the President’s decision to confront the crisis in East Asia.
“Operation Highball”
President Truman’s evacuation order reached the American Embassy in Seoul on
June 26 (Korean time).

Ambassador Muccio immediately broadcasted the codeword

“Highball” over the army radio station, WVTP. American civilians in Seoul had been
instructed to listen for this word and then assemble at the American Embassy, bringing
only small hand-carried items.111 The General Headquarters in Tokyo had drawn up the
evacuation plan, named CHOW CHOW, in July 1949. The American military estimated
that North Korean forces needed about four days to overrun the Seoul-Inch’on area.112 In
the evacuation plan, Inch’on and Pusan were the primary evacuation ports.
In June 1950, more than fifteen hundred Americans lived in Korea. The majority
of them were families of military personnel from the American Mission in Korea
(AMIK).

Others were employees of the State Department, Economic Cooperation

Administration (ECA), and United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of
Korea (KMAG) installations.

About three hundred were missionaries and their

dependants. While most Americans lived in Seoul, American missionaries were spread

111 The term “highballing” meant getting away as quickly as possible.
112 Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 71.
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out in major cities on the peninsula. They also were to be evacuated, but would need to
find their own means of getting to one of the evacuation ports.113
Inauspiciously, the Northern Presbyterian Mission was having its annual
conference at the beautiful Taech’on Beach, about 135 miles from Seoul (see Map 5),
when the war broke out. The eighty Americans present at the meeting were unaware of
their danger because the beach had neither electricity nor telephone service. The closest
telegraph was eight miles away, in the town of Taech’on. Knowing that an evacuation
order was imminent, Bob Kinney, who worked for the US embassy, drove to the beach
through the rain and darkness because his wife, his mother-in-law, and his three children
were at the conference.114 He awoke some of the missionaries in the middle of the night
and a patrol was set up to watch the resort perimeter. In the morning, Frank Barnhart,
another embassy worker and the son of a former YMCA secretary in Korea, arrived with
news of Operation “Highball” and the evacuation of civilians, mainly women and
children in Seoul.115
Since they could not get back to Seoul for evacuation, the missionaries at
Taech’on Beach decided to head south to Pusan. At eleven o’clock in the morning of
June 26, they headed for Pusan with three rented trucks, five jeeps, two jeep trailers and
two station wagons.116 They first headed to Taejon, about 85 miles away, in the hopes of
catching a train to Pusan. It was a slow and painful journey, traveling at 10 miles per
hour over rough countryside.

Upon reaching Taejon, they discovered that most

113 The American military was also responsible for evacuating other foreign diplomats and residences,
excluding the Chinese (and unclear as to the situation o f the White Russians). See Harold Joyce Noble,
Embassy at War (Seattle, WA: University o f Washington Press, 1975), 21-23.
114 Letter from John C Smith, 30 June 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 32.
115 Ibid.
116
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Americans had already left. Hearing rumors that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) had
landed on the east coast at P’ohang to disrupt road and rail traffic, the missionaries opted
to drive over the mountains to Taegu in the middle of the night. Dr. John C. Smith, the
Presbyterian Foreign Mission Secretary from the United States, described this 120-mile
journey as the worst travel he had ever experienced, having to abandon most of their
luggage as they fought against numerous punctures, repeated breakdowns and over 25
washed-out bridges. After 14 hours of struggle, they arrived at Taegu Mission Station,
one of the large mission stations in Korea.
Their ordeal was more than a memorable adventure; it would have ramifications
in the years to come. Because they were not evacuated from Seoul, these missionaries
still had a choice of whether to stay in Korea or retreat to Japan as most other
missionaries had done. Those who chose to stay behind would not only represent the
concern of the American churches, but also give valuable services to facilitate the UN
effort to save South Korea. Those who stayed behind included Rev. Harry Hill, Rev.
John Underwood, Horace Underwood, Rev. Edward (Ned) Adams, Rev. Arch Campbell,
and Rev. Fran Kinsler. Their wives also wished to stay, but the group would not allow
them to, arguing that “the men who remained must have mobility and in addition that the
presence of American women in a theater of war would be a serious handicap to any
government.” 117 While the rest of the group proceeded to Pusan for evacuation, the
Underwood brothers and Rev. Harry Hill drove back to Ch’ungju (Ch’ongju) (see Map 5),
where Rev. Hill and Rev. John Underwood lived.
In Pusan, the majority of the Northern Presbyterian Mission boarded the Lone
Star State and left for Fukuoka, Japan, on June 28 at two o’clock in the morning (see
117 Ibid., 33.
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Map 6). Before they departed, the group gave all their Korean money to Rev. Edward
Adams, the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presbyterian Korea Mission.
The total amount of this special offering was “over half a million won, almost completely
filling one pillow case.” 118 The missionaries would soon put this money to use by
starting their first private relief effort of the Korea War.
Meanwhile, the Southern Presbyterian missionaries were having their annual
conference in Chonju (see Map 5). As soon they heard the news of a North Korean
attack, they began to prepare for evacuation to Japan (about 60 people, including women
and children).119 The mission executive committee decided that mothers and children
had to leave first, but a skeleton crew of men and a few single female missionaries
remained to take care of the two major Southern Presbyterian Mission Stations in Chonju
and Kwangju for as long as possible (see Table 5.3). Eventually, these two groups of
missionaries, except Miss Florence Root, were all evacuated safely to Pusan on July 16,
when the People’s Army advanced forcefully into the Cholla region. Miss Root was
protected by a group of Korean Christians, whom she called “the organization,” living in
mountain villages in South Cholla Province.120 She survived the ordeal miraculously
because of their help. Some of them died in order to protect her.
In WSnju, three female Methodist missionaries, Esther Laird, Sadie Maude Moore,
and Mary Jane Spindlow, were serving in a nursery in the city. Hearing of the war from
an army sergeant, they left for Pusan on June 26, because they were not sure they could
get to Inch’on harbor in time. Driving their station jeep, these three American women
118 Ibid.
119 Letter from Robert Knox, 2 July 1950, Presbyterian Church (U.S.) Department o f History, Montreat,
North Carolina.
120 George Thompson Brown, Mission to Korea (USA: Board o f World Missions, Presbyterian Church U.S.,
1962), 190.
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undertook a long and dangerous journey over unknown terrain. Fortunately, they evaded
the Communist guerrillas in the mountains along their route and made it safely to Taegu
late that night.121
The Koreans in Taegu assured these ladies that the Communists would be driven
back, but the American soldiers of the KMAG told the missionaries to hurry on to Pusan
because Seoul was about to fall and the North Koreans might have landed somewhere
else on the east coast. So they moved on to Pusan, in spite of Esther Laird’s case of food
poisoning. From Pusan, they boarded the Jesse Lykes for Fukuoka on June 28.122
Back in Seoul, most of the missionaries from different denominations, mainly
women and children, and other American civilians were evacuated by the Embassy to
Inch’on and sailed for Japan. The Catholic missionaries, however, were determined to
stay. The only commercial freighter that could be used for immediate transport was a
Norwegian fertilizer ship, the SS Reinholt, that had anchored in Inch’on. It normally
carried twelve passengers, but on the afternoon of June 26, it took on 682 evacuees. The
stench of nitrate fertilizer made the two-day journey to Fukuoka almost unbearable.
Rev. William E. Shaw, a senior missionary who had served in P ’yongyang in the
1930s, wanted, as did some of the other male missionaries, to stay longer in Seoul once
their families were safely away. However, on the next day, all Americans in Seoul were
ordered to evacuate by air immediately.123 Rev. Shaw drove all over Seoul to gather up

121 Letter from Esther Laird, 10 July 1950, Missionary Collection 4, United Methodist Church Archives GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
122 Ibid.
123 Korea Letter #1, 23 July 1950, Church and Society, United Methodist Church Archives - GCAH,
Madison, New Jersey.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

323

the remaining missionaries and then headed to Kimp’o Airport, about twenty miles away.
As they drove, they were “strafed by machine-gun fire” from enemy planes.124
At Kimp’o, there were about 360 people waiting for departure, but only five C-54
transport planes were available. Each plane could only take sixty people. No baggage
was allowed and thus a large amount of luggage was left behind at the airport, but there
were still thirty-six men left standing on the runway, including Rev. Shaw.125 At 7:30
that evening, one of those planes unexpectedly returned.

Without even stopping its

engines, the C-54 evacuated the last group of men to Tokyo.126 Most of the missionaries
found refuge in Japan and continued their missionary activities among the Korean
populations there.127 In the end, when Seoul fell into the hands of the Communists, thirty
foreign Christian workers, mostly Catholics who refused to be evacuated, were captured
by the Korean People’s Army (see Table 5.4).
Although the missionaries who had evacuated were physically outside Korea,
they continued to exert an influential role on the war relief effort. First, they organized
relief collections in Japan. Second, under Rev. Shaw’s leadership, they published an
interdenominational newsletter called “Korea Letter” to circulate in American churches.
Their goal was to supply the latest information on Korea that was provided by the “staybehind” missionaries to stir up public interest in the Korean War. Third, some of these
missionaries, having served in World War II, reenlisted in the American military as a
means of finding their way back to Korea. Fourth, those who had returned to the United
States performed a more direct role in publicity. Supported by their denominations, some

124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127
Letter - Movement o f Missionaries, 10 July 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 19.
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of them traveled across the United States to give lectures and seminars, speaking out for
the cause in Korea. They also wrote articles for church journals and the secular press,
thereby encouraging public sentiment for the support of nationwide relief for the Korean
churches and the American military operation in Korea.
The Conditions in Seoul from June 25 to June 28
In spite of their difficult and dangerous journey, the missionaries who escaped to
Japan fared better than most of the Korean populace. The majority of Koreans were kept
in the dark about the true war situation. The ROK government had no plans to evacuate
the citizens of Seoul. Only top government officials, such as the President and other
ministers, were able to leave before the army destroyed the Han River Bridge to prevent
the Russian tanks from crossing.
The speed of the North Korean advance surprised many. With the war just two
days old, Seoul was already teetering.

The blame for this situation fell squarely on

American shoulders for failing to equip the ROK army with even basic defensive
weapons. American anti-tank guns were completely useless against the Soviet T-34.
What made it worse was the fact that most ROK soldiers did not have sufficient antitank
training due to the rapid expansion of the ROK army from 1948 to 1950. Some had
never even seen a tank. ROK troops were struck with fear when they first saw the enemy
tanks and discovered the ineffectiveness of their weapons. Some simply turned their
backs and ran when they heard the word “tank.” 128

Outnumbered, outgunned, and

deprived of their best soldiers, the morale of the ROK army quickly deteriorated. Most
of the troops lost their capacity to fight. The ROK commanders of the 6th, 7th and 10th
Divisions had no option but to retreat.
128 Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom, 7.
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Under the leadership of Colonel Paek Son-yop, the ROK 1st Division (also known
as the Capital Division), however, defended their position bravely, not knowing that the
other defense lines along the 38th Parallel had already collapsed. The 13th Regiment of
the 1st Division was able to hold their ground for one day by sending suicide teams to
destroy the Russian tanks. The loss was huge, but it bought precious time for the 1st
Division to regroup after the loss of Kaesong. Colonel Paek set up a new defense line in
Munsan, when the effort to retake Munsan Salient failed. The 1st Division retreated to
the line of linchpin and asked Seoul for reinforcement. General Ch’ae Pyong-dok, the
ROK chief of staff, ordered the 1st Division to hold their ground and fight to the death if
necessary. Unlike other Division commanders who later retreated in spite of the order of
General Ch’ae, Colonel Paek followed Ch’ae’s direction. What Colonel Paek did not
know was that shortly after receiving Ch’ae’s order, Seoul fell into the hands of the North
Koreans when the People’s Army broke through the defense of the 7
Uijongbu (see Map 5).

th

Division at

As a result, the 1st Division (with about 10,000 ROK soldiers)

was trapped and left to be annihilated. The condition of Colonel Paek’s troops was
further weakened when a misinformed U.S. pilot mistook the 1st Division for the North
Korean troops and bombed the ROK position, causing many more deaths. Without any
other options, Colonel Paek ordered the 1st Division to withdraw to the south of the Han
River, hoping to preserve the 1st Division from complete destruction.129
The experience of the 1st Division revealed the lack of coordination of the ROK
government in facing the attack. Military orders were inconsistent and communication
between commanders and the headquarters in Seoul was poor.

Initially, Rhee had

planned to remain in the city to boost the morale of the soldiers and to inspire citizens to
129 Ibid., 7-15.
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defend the capital, but the hopelessness of the situation discouraged him from staying.
His cabinet members feared for their own lives and thus urged Rhee to leave the city
immediately. They argued that Rhee needed to preserve his life to lead the long term
battle against North Korea. Against Ambassador Muccio’s advice, Rhee decided to flee
Seoul on June 26.
The ROK government kept the news of Rhee’s departure from the citizens of
Seoul, which was about one and one-half million people, because officials feared that a
negative report would create chaos and affect the morale of the soldiers at the front. An
official ROK radio broadcast provided false assurances to listeners. The bureaucracy in
Seoul was left alone to help itself, receiving no clear direction on how to handle the crisis.
By June 27, when the people finally realized that the North Korean army had reached the
suburbs of Seoul, it was too late for the majority to get out, especially after the Han River
Bridge had been hastily destroyed by the ROK army.
When Ambassador Muccio saw that the ROK government had given up the
defense of Seoul, he ordered the evacuation of all American Embassy personnel.
Bringing a few key embassy workers with him, Muccio flew to Suwon to meet with Brig.
General John H. Church and fourteen other officers representing MacArthur’s survey
team.130 As a testament to America’s unpreparedness, the embassy was abandoned in
such haste that they left behind “$4.5 million in personal effects, not counting vehicles,
$100,000 worth of food, and $40,000 worth of duty-free liquor in the commissary - and a
considerable number of documents including personnel records.”131

130 For the details o f the US embassy response, see Noble, Embassy at War, 36.
131 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 364.
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The Response o f American Churches
Getting the news of a North Korean attack from the missionaries and ROK
officials, Protestant church leaders gathered together for prayers. Rev. Han Kyong-jik,
the pastor of Yongnak Church, met with Dr. Namgung Hyok, the Executive Secretary of
Korea National Council of Churches (KNCC). They decided that the KNCC should wire
President Truman in Washington, General MacArthur in Tokyo, and the International
Missionary Council in New York requesting immediate assistance.132 On June 26
(American time), Mr. Charles W. Ranson of the International Missionary Council
received Dr. Namgung’s telegram, and another from C. Y. Hwang of the Salvation Army.
They urged American churches to use their influence to mobilize the United States to
support South Korea.133
Responding to the Korean appeal immediately, on June 27, the Methodist Board,
the Presbyterian Board, and the Foreign Mission Conference of North America sent
telegrams to the State Department, urging the United States government to support the
measures already taken by the United Nations.134 To pacify these church groups, the
State Department responded by sending a staff member, Niles W. Bond, to provide
information on the evacuation process that was then underway in Seoul and Pusan. On
June 27 (American Time), the Foreign Mission Conference of North America called for a
meeting with the Board secretaries from various denominations and religious

132 Letter from Rev. Kyung-chik Han, 12 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140,
Box 16, Folder 37 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
133 Letter from Rowland M. Cross, 27 June 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 1.
134 Ibid., 2.
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organizations with interests in Korea. At the meeting, they decided to mobilize financial
and prayer support for those missionaries who volunteered to remain in Korea.

1

Saving the Korean Christians from the hands of Communist persecution would
become a major theme within Western churches throughout the war years. Dr. Thobum
T. Brumbaugh, secretary of the Methodist Board of Foreign Missions, wrote an article
entitled “Disaster to Missions in Korea.”136 He told his Methodist readers that, since the
democratic developments within Korea were the direct result of the Christian movement,
American Christians should use whatever means they could to keep the Korean church
alive. The position of American Christians, according to Brumbaugh, should not only be
to pray earnestly for Korea, but also to “give of [their] resources to strengthen the morale
of those who [were] striving still to hold high the banner of Christian enlightenment in
that unfortunate land.”137
American church leaders also appealed for moral support from the World Council
of Churches (WCC). On July 13, 1950, the Central Committee of the WCC denounced
the North Korean attack as “an act of aggression” and called for support of the UN police
action.138 In particular, the WCC supported the unification of Korea by the United
Nations, arguing that “every opportunity which [might] arise from the present tragic
situation must be used to gain this end.”139 Even though the statement issued by the
WCC recognized that “atomic and bacteriological weapons and obliteration bombing

135 Letter from Rowland M. Cross to Member Boards o f the Korea Committee, 27 June 1950, Document of
the WCC Library: The Korean War, 3.
136 Thobum T. Brumbaugh, “Disaster to Missions in Korea,” Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean
War, 18.
137 Ibid.
138 This statement was adopted unanimously with the exception o f the call for a police measure o f the UN.
Two members out o f 45 conscientiously opposed the use of military force.
139 “Korean Situation and World Order,” Approved by the Central Committee o f the World Council o f
Churches, 13 July 1950, Toronto, Canada, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 22.
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[involved] force and destruction of life on so terrible a scale,” it did not rule out their use.
Instead the WCC formally denounced the “Stockholm Appeal” as “a strategy of
propaganda,” since it only demanded the outlawing of atomic weapons without providing
any suggestions for effective international inspection and control.140 Such a position
taken by the WCC faced serious objection from the Communist-controlled Protestant
churches in Eastern Europe. Many representatives from Communist countries boycotted
the WCC to demonstrate their discontent.
Back in the United States, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCC)
stood behind the WCC’s position and mobilized the Christian community to support the
defense of South Korea. Meanwhile, Washington officials also courted the support of
religious groups because they understood that presenting a just cause and maintaining the
moral high ground were keys to stirring public favor for a major military operation in
Korea. In John Foster Dulles, the Truman administration found the ideal champion for
the war effort: a man who was capable, bi-partisan, and popular in religious circles.
After his brief visit to East Asia, Dulles took a keen personal interest in the
defense of South Korea, and held strong opinions on how the US should respond.
According to Ambassador Chang, Dulles felt personally responsible for the well being of
Korea, because of his remarks to the National Assembly. Upon returning to the States,
Dulles began to campaign for the Korean cause. On July 1, 1950, a day after the United
States had committed ground troops, Dulles gave an interview to CBS. He described his
experiences in Seoul the following way:
This Republic o f Korea was attracting a constant stream o f refugees from the north who
wanted to escape from Communist despotism. Just two weeks ago tonight at this very
hour, I was meeting at Seoul with a group o f 3,000 Christian refugees from the north.

140 Ibid., 23.
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W e were in a great new church which was in [the] process o f construction. I talked to the
refugees through an interpreter and I have never seen men and women more clearly
dedicated to Christian principles. The Communists seem to have felt that they could not
tolerate this hopeful, attractive Asiatic experiment in democracy. They had found that
they could not destroy it by indirect aggression, because the political, economic, and
social life o f the Republic was so sound that subversive efforts, which had been tried, had
failed. The people were loyal to their Republic. Therefore, if this experiment in human
liberty was to be crushed, this could only be done by armed attack. That is what is being
attempted.141

Dulles had met many groups in Korea and had seen many things, so why did he mention
this particular experience with the refugee Christians in such detail, even though he only
stayed with them briefly? There were two possible explanations. First, this refugee
church was surely very fervent and must have made a powerful impression upon Dulles.
Second, speaking on behalf of the administration, he was looking to justify US
intervention to the American people, so that the Korean War should not be viewed as
merely a civil war, but as a war for freedom and human liberty.
In a meeting concerning US actions in Korea with several representatives from
different Protestant denominations on July 17, Dulles told them that the Republic of
Korea, after a shaky start, had become a promising experiment because the new elections
in May 1950 had shown democratic vigor.142 His view on the democratic progress of the
ROK government was positive, despite the various charges that Syngman Rhee had used
repressive measures against leftists in South Korea. He avoided commenting on Rhee.
Instead, he emphasized the achievement of the Christian community in leading the
Korean democratic movement by exaggerating the percentage of Christians in the South
Korean National Assembly. He stated that one fourth of elected representatives in the
Assembly were Christians, while the actual number was about 19 percent rather than 25

141 “Speech: Re. Korea and Japan, CBS Broadcast,” 1 July 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers, Speech,
Statement, Press Conference, etc: 1950 January to August, Box 301, Seeley Mudd Library.
142 “Confidential Notes on Interview (Not to be attributed in any public manner),” 21 July 1950 Documents
o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, 46.
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percent. His emphasis on the influence of Christianity was due to his belief that Korean
Communists were jealous of the rapid Christianization of South Korea. The success of
Christianity in the South, Dulles argued, was “an additional factor in the [North Korean]
attack.”143
Dulles further developed his religious interpretation of the Korean War in his
article, “To Save Humanity from the Deep Abyss,” published in the New York Times
Magazine on July 30,1950. He again mentioned his meeting with Christian refugees and
argued that Korea was worthy of the blood of Americans because it was a land of
freedom and religious liberty. The Korean War was a “great cause” because it was a
battle to “preserve human liberty” and “to extend liberty by gradually releasing the
captive peoples.”144
Judging by Western standards of democracy, South Korea was hardly a truly
democratic state and Rhee’s regime was not a very democratic government. In fact, the
majority of South Koreans had very little understanding and limited experience of
democracy.

Rhee’s stem anti-Communist stand and repressive policies might have

alienated him from American liberals, but perhaps gained him more friends among
leading American anti-Communists. In a decade when most Americans had very limited
access to Asia, especially Korea, and when Korean experts were rare even within in the
US government, Dulles’ interpretation might have earned more sympathetic ears for
Korea than Rhee’s publicity men in Washington. The Gallup Poll did not conduct a
public survey on whether or not the United States should intervene in the Korean War,

143 Ibid.
144 John Foster Dulles, “To Save Humanity from the Deep Abyss,” New York Times Magazine, 30 July
1950. The article can be found in John Foster Dulles Papers (MC#016), Korea Box 48, Folder: Korea 1950,
Seeley Mudd Library.
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but the majority of the American people gave their approval when they heard that the
United States would send troops to save South Korea.

Almost everyone inside and

outside the US government agreed that the United States had to intervene to save South
Korea from the Communists.

The support was so overwhelming that Truman’s

administration did not bother to get any formal congressional resolution or declaration of
war before sending US troops to Korea.145

CONCLUSION
In the contest between the North and the South, Korean Communists won the first
round with the help of Soviet weapons. Nevertheless, the attack was a disappointment in
many ways, despite the fall of Seoul. For one, the ROK army was not destroyed and it
eventually regrouped at Pusan. For another, despite Kim Il-sung’s belief that America
had limited interest in defending Korea, US troops were sent quickly to help hold the
Pusan Perimeter.
Prior to the attack, South Korea gained two friends for it causes. The first one
was Rev. Bob Pierce. His nine-week visit in April and May drew him closer than ever to
Korea. He became a key religious actor who crossed the Pacific Ocean back and forth
throughout the Korean War period, bringing crucial information to shape the American
perception of Korea. The second one was John Foster Dulles. His one-week stay in
Seoul gave him a new perspective on the Korean cause. He had been sympathetic to
South Korea before he arrived, but because of the influence of American missionaries
and Korean church leaders, he began to interpret the Korean War from a religious
perspective. The religious factor affected the perspective of these two men on Korean
145 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They M ade, 509.
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affairs and in the next three years, they fought for the interests of Korea by using their
political and religious influence. Joining hands with the “stay-behind” missionaries, the
evacuated mission personnel, and American church leaders, they gave life to the religious
factor that eventually shaped the development of the Korean War.
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Chapter 6
Missionaries and Christians Living in the War Zone

INTRODUCTION
Just as the decision in Washington to send American troops to Korea was a
crucial moment for the survival of Syngman Rhee’s government, the decision of
seventeen American missionaries to remain in Korea had a great impact on the
preservation of Korean Christianity and the development of Korean-American relations.
The Christian experience during the Korean War consisted of two aspects. The first
aspect was the missionaries’ experiences in UN controlled areas, and the second aspect
was the experiences of the Christian community in the North Korean-controlled areas.
Although the Korean War was not about religion, religion was a crucial factor that
dominated the survival of many who were trapped by the war. In Communist-occupied
areas, whether one lived or died was often related to the religious affiliation and the
ideological leanings of an individual.

MISSIONARIES AT WAR
When the evacuation call went out, the majority of foreign missionaries fled to
Japan, some retreated to within the Pusan Perimeter (a total of sixteen Presbyterian
missionaries), and some chose to stay behind in the North Korean-occupied areas
(Florence Root and other Catholic priests and nuns). The most influential of these groups
would be the missionaries in the Pusan Perimeter, because those in Japan would have
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difficulty returning, while those who did not evacuate soon fell into Communist hands
and became civilian internees (see Table 6.1).1
Missionaries within American-held areas would serve as important liaisons
between American troops and Korean civilians, providing crucial support for the survival
of Korean Christianity. Some of them were attached to the US military, eating with the
officers in the mess halls, serving side-by-side with foot soldiers, flying reconnaissance
with commanding officers, and leading worship services for US troops, Korean soldiers,
and civilians.
region.

Their footprints could be found in every comer of the UN-controlled

As the level of American involvement expanded, so did the number of

missionaries in the war zone, with many evacuees finding their way back through
military or diplomatic channels.

Collaborating with South Korean Christians, the

emergency relief program established by these missionaries eased the burden of the
Korean local governments and saved the lives of many refugees.
Among them, Horace G. Underwood (also known as Hedge Underwood) was the
most significant. Underwood’s service throughout the Korean War can be divided into
three periods: the early stage with the 24th Division, the middle stage with the X Corps,
and the final stage with the Negotiation Team in Panmunjom. This section covers the
first two periods of his service. Using Underwood’s journey in Korea as a guide, this
section explores the full extent of missionary activities during the initial stage of the
Korean War, and examines their contributions to the war and relief efforts.

1 See Larry Zellers, In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea (Lexington, KY: The University Press of
Kentucky, 1991).
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Civilians in the US Military
As soon as Horace Underwood sent his family and fellow mission workers to
Pusan in late June 1950, he drove back to Taejon with his brother John, an ordained
minister, and his missionary friend, Rev. Harry Hill. The three men were looking for
ways to assist their Korean friends to win the war. Rev. Hill and Rev. John Underwood
decided to head back to Ch’ongju, where their mission station was located.

Horace

Underwood, however, could not return to Seoul because the city had been cut off by the
destruction of the Han River Bridge. ROK troops, led by Brig. General Yu Chae-hung,
the commander of the 7th Division, were fighting fiercely to keep North Korean forces
from crossing the Han River.2
Having no mission station to return to, Horace Underwood therefore decided to
look for his friends in the ROK government, hoping that he might be able to offer his
help in the defense of South Korea. When Underwood arrived at Taejon on June 29, he
found Dr. Paek Nak-chun (George Paik), an ordained pastor and a well-known Christian
educator, who served as both the president of Yonsei University and the minister of
education in the ROK government.3 Dr. Paek arranged for him to meet with Gen. Chong
Il-kwon, who had just returned from the United States in order to serve as the new ROK
army chief of staff. Chong advised Underwood to find General John H. Church, who was
the head of the US military survey group, and offer his expertise to assist the US Army.
Nevertheless, no one seemed to know the exact location of the survey team.
Driving his jeep north for miles, Underwood embarked on a dangerous search for the
American military while the war waged along the Han River. He first left for Suwon to
2 Harold Joyce Noble, Embassy a t War (Seattle, WA: University o f Washington Press, 1975), 71-72.
3 Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f Horace G. Underwood,
ed. Michael J. Devine (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 136.
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look for the general, and then searched again in Taejon after hearing that the group had
evacuated southward due to the collapse of the Han defense line.4 At that time, the 24th
Infantry Division led by Lt. Colonel Charles B. Smith (also known as Task Force Smith)
had arrived at Pusan, and was making its way northward to defend Osan, hoping to delay
the advance of the North Korean troops.
After days of searching without success, around July 2 Underwood found Major
General William F. Dean, who had just moved into Taejon to set up the headquarters of
the 24th Division. General Dean immediately invited him to his division (Underwood did
not have any formal military commission in the US Army at that point, but simply
remained “attached” to the 24th Division until August).5 After the Battle of Osan (July 5)
and the defeat of Task Force Smith, American troops made a full retreat to Ch’onan. By
July 10, the Kum River became the new defensive line of Taejon (see Map 1).
Underwood became the first American missionary to fight alongside American troops on
the front line, helping to defend TaejSn against the advancing North Korean Army.
Underwood had no clear job description within the 24 Division because he was
merely an attached civilian. He was not required to do any actual fighting, but only to
assist the troops in whatever ways he could.

However, his services were gladly

welcomed by the 24th Division. This special position made him a useful liaison for the
stay-behind missionaries and other Korean Christian workers. He was able to arrange
accommodation and meals for them while they were taking refuge in overcrowded
Taejon city.

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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These stay-behind missionaries soon proved their usefulness to the war effort.
Underwood asked his younger brother, Rev. John, who had fled from Ch’ongju, to guide
some of the Army scouts in the Taejon area.6 Being a missionary in Ch’ongju, Rev. John
was very familiar with the Osan-Ch’ongju-Taejon region due to his frequent visits to the
local churches in the countryside. Because army scouts lacked accurate maps, in addition
to their lack of experience, intelligence information, and language skills, Rev. John’s help
proved invaluable for several critical days.7 After the Taejon defense collapsed on July
18, Rev. John then moved on to offer relief services to refugees, constantly driving his
jeep all over the Pusan Perimeter.
Underwood also worked closely with US troops and their commanders.

He

fought, ate, and bathed with the foot soldiers in the 24th Division (and later the 1st
Cavalry).8 With the Taejon defenses collapsing, the deputy commander of the Division,
Brigadier General Pearson Menoher, took Underwood with him to Yongdong, where a
new headquarters was to be established.

Underwood’s mission in Yongdong was to

assist the retreating soldiers. Later, after accompanying the 24 Division to Yongchon,
he joined the “fire brigade” under General Church, who took over the command of the
24th Division following General Dean’s capture. General Church’s “fire brigade” was a
special US mobile task force set up to rescue forces in different locations in order to
defend the line along the Naktong River.

6 Ibid., 137.
7 We do not know exactly how long John helped to guide the scouts, but it seems reasonable he did so
during the days before and after the fall o f TaejSn.
8 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 137-138.
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General Church often took Underwood with him on his flights within the Pusan
Perimeter.9 He probably used Underwood as his interpreter in meetings with ROK troops,
and valued his advice on the defense of Pusan. Because of his close association with the
troops and the officers, Underwood witnessed the unpreparedness of US troops and the
tension between US soldiers and Korean civilians.10 US Army morale was poor: Russian
tanks were proving difficult to destroy, local guerrillas were constantly infiltrating the US
army’s positions, and American soldiers knew very little about Korea. Underwood’s
presence with the troops and his language skills helped to ease some of these tensions.
Underwood’s informal service with the Army ended in early August when his
request to come back on active duty in the Navy was accepted.11 He was awarded the
highest civilian honor, the Medal of Freedom, for his two months with the Army.12 This
medal recognizes civilians who make exceptional contributions to the security of the
United States.13
Underwood was not alone in serving the US military as a civilian missionary
during the first two months of war.

Wherever a qualified interpreter was needed,

missionaries would answer the call.

On July 6, Rev. Francis Kinsler (Northern

Presbyterian) went to Taegu as an interpreter for UN officials. The US Army also asked
Rev. Harry Hill, who had lived in P’yongyang before World War II, to help them
interrogate North Korean POWs, and to provide religious services to the war-weary US
9 Ibid., 140.
10 Ibid., 137.
11 For these two months, Horace was supported by the Presbyterian Mission. He received no pay check
from the US government. He applied for re-enlistment because he believed that it was “not right to go on
working for the Army as a missionary.” See ibid., 140.
12 The Medal o f Freedom is also known as the Presidential Medal o f Freedom. Ibid., 140.
13 It is given by the President on the recommendation o f the Distinguished Civilian Service Board for
“exceptional meritorious contribution to the security o f the United States or other significant public or
private endeavors.” See Norm Goldstein, ed., The Associated Press Stylebook and Briefing on Media Law
(New York: The Associated Press, 2004), 200-201.
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troops.14 In return, these missionaries were allowed to preach to North Korean prisoners
and received informal logistical support from the US military.

Rev. William Linton

(Southern Presbyterian) and Rev. Kinsler also volunteered to help the US army chaplains
by offering religious services to the US troops.15 Because of the immediate needs of the
war, missionaries who stayed behind had to play a double role —both as loyal American
citizens to the US government, and as ambassadors of mercy to suffering Korean
refugees. They were kept very busy with their work among POWs, US troops, ROK
soldiers, and refugees.
Up to this point, American missionaries received no compensation from the US
government. Instead their salaries were still paid by American churches. The churches
were willing to support them because they saw their presence in Korea as important to
the preservation of Christian influence in Korea. They believed that missionary activities
would facilitate the long-term collaboration between Korea and America in their battle to
contain the spread of Communism. According to Dr. John C. Smith, the Secretary of the
Presbyterian Foreign Mission to the Far East, the presence of the Presbyterian
missionaries in the Pusan Perimeter was “very important to the future of the work in
Korea” and crucial to the development of the Korean-American relationship.

Smith

promised to “push very hard” and “do everything” needed for full-scale relief work in
Korea and for the return of missionaries.

1fi

14 Letter from Rev. Harry Hill, 22 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18,
Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
15 Letter from Mrs. (Charlotte) Linton to her children, 13 August 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
16 Dr. John Smith’s letter to Ned Adams, 5 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 197,
Box 1, Folder 2 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Meanwhile, American military authorities in the war zone also understood that
American missionaries and their Korean Christian friends were their best allies in Korea.
In return, the military provided informal support to the missionaries, and allowed them
some special freedoms in the defense perimeter, so long as they did not hinder the
military effort. The close partnership between these missionaries and the US military
gave them the clout that they would need to carry out their essential tasks among the
refugees - something that native Korean preachers would not have been able to do.
Returning to Korea on a Military Ticket
The uncertain war situation and the complications of logistical support, however,
discouraged the immediate return of other missionaries.

17

The Army could not approve

the return of civilian missionaries unless the tide of war turned in favor of UN forces and
unless the applicants were able to guarantee their own supplies of food and shelter. Such
demands were reasonable, given that the Army was straining to feed its own soldiers, and
was fighting a losing battle in the defense of Pusan.18
Nevertheless, these restrictions did not prevent some missionaries from finding
various ways back into Korea. Since some of them, like Horace Underwood, had served
the US military during World War II and the US occupation in Korea, the quickest way
was for them to re-enlist.

The Army was quick to approve their requests; with the

memories of cooperation between the American Military Government (AMG) and the
missionary community still fresh in the minds of many US commanders in the field, they
knew that these missionaries’ knowledge, skills, and expertise would help the war effort.

17 Letter from Harold Voelkel, 12 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box
18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
18 Ibid.
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The first returnee from Tokyo was Dr. Howard Moffett, a Presbyterian medical
missionary bom in P ’yongyang. Moffett held a commission as lieutenant in the Naval
Medical Corps Reserve due to his service in World War II. After being evacuated to
Tokyo with other US nationals, Moffett requested that he be given active duty status as a
naval medical officer. His request was approved on July 27, 1950, by Vice Admiral
Charles T. Joy, commander of US naval forces in the Far East.19 His commission came
quickly because of his medical skills and experience as a residence in Taegu, the
Headquarters of the Eighth Army in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. Since the Navy
had no direct action within the Pusan Perimeter, and because his medical and language
skills were badly needed inside Korea, Moffett was sent back to Taegu in an Air Force
uniform instead. His job with the 5th Air Force in the city was to manage the Taegu
hospital, which he had ran before the evacuation.

While the city was being subjected to

heavy shelling by the North Koreans, Dr. Moffett remained from July to September to
keep the hospital running, thereby saving countless American and Korean lives.
Horace Underwood’s father, Dr. Horace H. Underwood, was with his youngest
son, Richard, visiting family and friends in the United States when the war broke out on
June 25,1950. The news was brought to them through General Archibald Arnold, the ex
military governor of Korea, whom Dr. Underwood had worked closely with during the
American occupation.

Their friendship continued to grow even after the general’s

retirement. In fact, the Underwoods were attending worship service with the general that
Sunday morning when he told them of the attack.

91

19 Religious New Service, 27 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder
15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
20 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 140.
21 Richard Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” (unpublished manuscripts, 2002), 78-79.
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Hoping to find a way to return to Korea and lobby the U.S. government to save
Korea from the invading army, the Underwoods drove down to Washington, D.C. from
New York the following day. Dr. Underwood had friends in Congress and the Pentagon.
With the help of Major General Thomas W. Herren, the commander of the Military
District of Washington (MDW), who had previously been to Korea, Richard Underwood
was quickly re-commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army intelligence service,
waiving all the red tape of obtaining a new top-secret clearance.22 He arrived in Pusan in
mid-September and was immediately assigned to the Advance Allied Translator and
Interpreter Section (ADVATIS). His job was to interrogate North Korean POWs, in the
town of Tongnae, east of Pusan (see Map 7).23
Shortly after Richard’s arrival in Japan, Dr. Underwood also flew to Tokyo from
the United States as a DAC (Department of the Army Civilian) advisor. According to
Richard Underwood, his father’s assignment in Korea was somewhat “mysterious”
because, though he wore a DAC uniform, he had “no acknowledged assignment, and
worse yet, no support in rations, quarters or even gasoline.” His father had told him that
his association with the military agency was supposed to be a secret so that no one would
suspect him of having any connection with the US government.

OA

Therefore, none of his

sons knew exactly what he did in Korea for the US government.
Like Dr. Underwood, other older missionaries also tried to find ways to return
through the Army civilian office. For example, while waiting in Tokyo, Rev. William
Shaw (Methodist) and later Rev. Harold Voelkel (Northern Presbyterian), both of whom
had worked in P ’yongyang before World War II, applied to be civilian chaplains. The
22 Ibid., 79-80.
23 Ibid., 81.
24 Ibid, 91.
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US Army hired them specifically to minister to South Korean troops and North Korean
POWs. Their work among the ROK soldiers facilitated the establishment of a formal
Chaplain Corps for the South Korean Army during the war.
It is important to note that most American denominations did not encourage their
missionaries to formally join the US military during the war because they wanted to keep
their staff ready for regular missionary work once the field was opened for re-entry.
Nevertheless, they also recognized the difficulties of endless waiting, the desires of
individual workers, and the potential benefit of having their people in the military. Once
individuals made up their minds to join the military, their mission boards in the United
States would support their decisions and continue to pay for their pensions even though
the missionaries picked up their military assignments and received government
paychecks. Except for those who worked on top-secret military projects, most of the
civilian personnel were able to keep in close contact with their boards, and provide them
with the latest war information.

They also worked closely with other civilian

missionaries to minister to the needs of the refugees, soldiers, and POWs.

REFUGEE PROBLEMS AND CHRISTIAN RELIEF EFFORTS
There were not only battles along the frontlines between the two opposing armies,
but also battles behind the lines against hunger and diseases.

Many innocent people

were forced to flee their homes or were caught in crossfire. War destroyed their homes
and robbed them of their possessions. The destitute wandered around the south without
food or shelter. Most able-bodied men were drafted into the war, while the women and
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children were left to themselves, thus destroying the traditional family structure of
Korean society.
The war also weakened traditional Korean religions, such as Buddhism,
Confucianism, and Shamanism. Their crippling lack of resources, effective nationwide
organizations, and foreign connections proscribed them from offering extensive practical
help to the dislocated masses over a prolonged period of time.

Nevertheless, this

humanitarian crisis was an unprecedented opportunity for the Christian churches.
Despite being targeted by the Communists, and suffering great losses of leadership and
materials following the fall of Seoul, the church soon rebounded with the help of the
missionaries and their overseas funding. With the US military and American churches on
their side, American missionaries were able to organize private relief services to cope
with the mounting needs of the refugees. In the process, they also trained new leadership
for the Korean churches. Throughout the war, the fame and influence of Christianity
increased. This section explores how Korean Christians responded to the war and how
missionaries and Christian workers gained influence and popularity through their
immediate relief efforts.
Christians’ Initial Response to the Outbreak o f the Korean War
As soon as news of a northern invasion reached Christian clergymen in Seoul,
most Christian ministers of the city met together to discuss the subject of helping
refugees and aiding the soldiers. They declared June 27 a special day of prayer.25 They
prayed for the victory of the south and the preservation of Korean Christianity. The
situation, however, deteriorated rapidly. By nightfall, most ROK government agencies

25 Letter from Rev. Kyung chik Han, 12 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140,
Box 16, Folder 37 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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had stopped functioning because many officials had received instructions to flee south.
As ROK troops withdrew, the danger of a Communist uprising within the city threatened
the lives of many North Korean refugees and South Korean rightists.
While some native South Korean pastors and Catholic priests and nuns bravely
decided not to desert their congregations in Seoul despite the danger, refugee Christians
from North Korea sought every means of escape, because they saw no hope in staying
behind. According to the testimony of Chang Sang, a young refugee girl from Sinuiju,
who decades later would become the President of Ewha University, her family and many
Christian friends from the north chose to leave immediately because they feared that the
local people might turn them in to Communist authorities in exchange for favors and food.
Being outsiders, Chang explained, the refugees could not expect any help from the native
southerners.

O ft

•

Hong U-jun (Hong Woo-jun), a homeless and young Christian refugee

from P’yongyang, who later rose to become a millionaire and famous educator in postwar
Korea, reached the same conclusion. His fiancee and her family urged him to leave
Seoul because of his anti-Communist background.

on

Of all people, refugee pastors had the strongest reason to flee, because most of
them were blacklisted and hunted by the North as national traitors and potential trouble
makers.
executed.

They knew that if they stayed, they would surely be arrested and possibly
On June 28, with the fall of Seoul inevitable, refugee pastors and their

congregations began the trek south.

Rev. Han Kyong-jik of the Yongnak Church,

together with a group of refugee pastors and Christians, left Seoul at eleven in the
26 Allan R. Millett, Their War fo r Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians 19451953 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), 25.
27 Hong Woo-jun was the Vice-chairman o f an underground anti-Communist youth league in P ’ydngyang,
which had plotted to assassinate Kim Il-sung during the March First ceremony on March 1946. Donald B.
Sheley, Beggar A t the Banquet (San Bruno, CA: Donald B. Sheley, 1979), 25, 66.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

347

morning. By the time they reached the Han River Bridge, they had to cross the river by
small boats because ROK engineers under orders from General Ch’ae Pyong-dok, chief
of staff of the ROK army, had destroyed the bridge earlier.

Since the ROK had

established its defenses along the southern bank of the Han, the army drove the refugees
further south to Suwon.28 Joining with the current of other refugees from Seoul, they
began the slow march to Pusan.
The Influx o f Refugees to the Southern Cities
On their journey south, these Christian pastors traveled roads clogged with people
in heart-wrenching agony. Everywhere orphans cried for their lost parents. Tired and
weary refugees sat under the sun begging for food or a ride from passing vehicles. Many
had had to flee Seoul in such haste that they had brought no food or supplies. Even a
single bowl of rice soup or a simple shelter could make the difference between survival
and death. Taejon was the worst of the refugee centers because it was located mid-way
between Seoul and Taegu. It was overcrowded and had a severe food shortage. The
suffering in Taegu was getting worse after the fall of Taejon, and Pusan was rapidly
catching up, as refugees flooded into the city.
From July to August, approximately one million people took the road to Pusan.
Feeding, clothing, and transporting these people was an impossible challenge for a South
Korean government that needed all its resources for the war effort. At the same time, the
government needed to find a solution before these crowds turned violent and brought
internal disturbance to the southern provinces.

Initially, provincial authorities turned

local churches, temples, school buildings, factories, and department stores into temporary

28 Letter from Rev. Kyung chik Han, dated August 12, 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 16, Folder 37 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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refugee centers.29 Sympathetic citizens offered what help they could. But these local
relief efforts quickly collapsed as the North Korean army continued to advance,
overrunning these relief centers, one by one. Those offering relief soon joined the ranks
of those needing relief, as the ROK army continued to retreat. More and more people
took to the roads as the North Korean army conquered more and more land. The national
government was on the verge of collapse, the military situation was rapidly deteriorating,
and the provincial governments had many other urgent needs besides feeding the
multitudes.
The refugee problem became so serious that on July 22, Im Pyong-jik, minister of
foreign affairs, sent a letter to Colonel Afred G. Katzin, the personal representative of the
Secretary General of the United Nations in Korea, pleading for UN relief assistance.30
The UN decided to offer help on July 31, 1950. But their organized relief effort did not
actually start until October 1950, too late for those who perished in the interim. The
situation continued to deteriorate throughout August, and on September 1, 1950,
President Rhee sent a letter directly to General MacArthur asking for supplies of
emergency food, clothes, and shelter for his people.

•2 1

During the first three months of the

war, massive organized relief programs did not exist. The only noticeable support came
from private local charities, Christian churches, and the meager resources of the ROK
government.

29 Letter from Mrs. (Charlotte) Linton to “folks,” 10 September 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
30 Letter from Ben Limb to Afred G. Katzin, 22 M y 1950,
29
M Taehanmingoksa jaryojip 29 (Documents o f the History of the Republic o f Korea Vol. 29: Syngman
Rhee Collection) (1949-1950) (Seoul: §3 !£ IS31 S I M # Guksapyeonchan wiwonhoe The Committee o f
National History Compilation), 327.

29

( 1949- 1950), 338 .
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Patriotic Relief Effort Initiated by Korean Christians
Seeing that the country was in turmoil and that a major relief effort was needed
among the homeless refugees, Christian clergymen took their own initiative to mobilize
their congregations to support the nation’s war effort. In Taejon, on July 3, Rev. Han
Kyong-jik was able to gather a number of northern pastors, and formed the Save the
Nation Christian Assembly (Kidokkyo Kugukhae) to promote and coordinate patriotic
relief activities among Christians. Rev. Han was elected chairman, and decided to set up
the headquarters in Taegu.32 By mid-July, in Taegu alone there were about four hundred
Christian workers taking refuge in the city,33 with more on their way to Pusan.
By fleeing to the south, Rev. Han had become a prominent leader among Korean
Christians. Having a master’s degree from Princeton Theological Seminary, Rev. Han
was also well-known among American church leaders. He worked closely with other
Protestant leaders, including Dr. Yu Hyong-gi (Lew Hyung-ki), the acting bishop of the
Korean Methodist Church, who had also been educated in the United States.

Both men

became pillars and spokespersons of the Korean Christian community during the war.
They both took a trip to the United States in August 1951, representing the Korean
churches to “express appreciation for aid given” to the South Korean people.34
The Christian National Salvation Assembly organized human networks to collect
intelligence information and provide immediate relief for the refugees. Since some of the
Korean clergy and Christian laymen knew English, they could find ways to affiliate with
UN troops and offer their services to the United Nations authorities. Within the Pusan

32 Letter from Rev. Kyung chik Han, 12 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140,
Box 16, Folder 37 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
33 John C. Smith, “Our Stake in Korea,” Presbyterian Life, 2 September 1950,13.
34 Edward Adams, ‘T he Church Met a Need in Korea,” Presbyterian Survey, August 1951,17.
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Perimeter, interpreters and English-speaking chauffeurs were in high demand.35 Young
Christians, such as Sin Yong-il (Shin Young II) and his YMCA friends, who left their
families in Seoul, quickly found jobs working for the US Army. Sin, for example, served
the 25th Division, 35th Regiment as an interpreter in the Intelligence and Reconnaissance
Section in Masan (see Map 7).36 Although the clergymen had formed a basic structure
for relief operations, they lacked the money or resources to carry out a nationwide
campaign.
Missionaries and the Beginning o f a Christian Relief Program
It was during this period that the presence of American missionaries would have
the greatest impact upon the fate of Christian refugees and the lives of the Korean people.
Although American missionaries numbered less than two dozen, they had various
resources and skills: they were the only civilians who still had their vehicles, they had
external means of support, they had connections with local churches to organize workers,
and they had influence within the US army to obtain special permission for their activities.
In Pusan, the three stay-behind Northern Presbyterian missionaries, Rev. Edward
Adams, Rev. Archibald Campbell, and Rev. Francis Kinsler, who had earlier sent their
families across the Korean Strait to Fukuoka, immediately launched an emergency relief
program. Initially, they had only the million won offered by the missionary evacuees.37
Then, as Seoul’s collapse precipitated a financial crisis, banks in Taegu would only issue
10,000 won per person per week.38 However, Rev. Adams was able to use his American

35 Letter from Mrs. Linton to her children, 13 August 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
36 Letter from Shin Young-il to Kyung Ho, 20 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 16, Folder 37 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
37 See Chapter 5.
38 Edward Adams to wife, 6 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder
14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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citizenship to negotiate the withdrawal of “a couple hundred thousand won,” and
establish a credit line for relief purposes with a New York bank.39 All this money was
urgently needed for food supplies, supporting refugee pastors to continue evangelical
work, hiring more relief workers, and paying for the transportation costs of relief
materials.
Since they could not bring their supplies from Inch’on and Seoul, missionaries
could only use materials owned by the Church World Service (CWS) that were stored in
its Pusan warehouse.40 Rev. Adams received authorization from the CWS in the United
States and took charge of distributing these supplies until the arrival of the new CWS
director, Rev. Henry Appenzeller, the son of the first Methodist missionary to Korea.41
The supplies in this warehouse were only a temporary solution, however. Missionaries
had to secure a continuous flow of relief materials if they were to establish a long-term
relief program. Otherwise, they would be “out of business soon.”42 Mission workers in
Tokyo and American friends in the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)
arranged the transport of fresh supplies in September 1950.43
Getting these supplies into the hands of the refugees was another problem. Small
quantities could be moved by truck, but to service a whole city full of refugees, they
39 Edward Adams to wife, 12 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder
14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
40 Church World Service (CWS) was founded to relieve needy people regardless o f nationality, party, and
religion. It supported Korean relief and restoration from 1946 under the guidance o f Dr. Bliss Billings, a
Methodist missionary, and later Dr. A. G. Fletcher, another Methodist missionary. From 1946 to 1950, the
agency helped mainly refugees from North Korea with supplies sent by churches in the United States.
41 Rev. Henry Appenzeller, however, did not arrive until January 1951. For six months, the relief work of
CWS was directed by Rev. Edward Adams.
42 Letter from Edward Adams to wife, 9 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140,
Box 18, Folder 1 4 -Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
43 According to the letter from Grace H. Wood to friends, the missionaries in Tokyo were able to send a
large amount o f relief goods belonging to the Presbyterian groups through the ECA because Bob Kinney,
whose wife and in-laws were Presbyterian missionaries, was the ECA’s Acting Director in Korea. Letter
dated 21 September 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 37 Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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would need the railroad. Empty freight cars for bulky materials were hard to come by, as
the transportation network was being used almost exclusively for military purposes.
After about two weeks of paperwork, Rev. Adams finally found a freight car and was
ready, on July 12, to transport the CWS materials to Taejon, where the refugee problem
was most serious.
In order to distribute the materials to both Taegu and Taejon, relief workers were
divided into two groups. One group was headed by Rev. Kinsler and the other by Rev.
Adams. While Rev. Kinsler drove loads of materials with his team of relief workers from
Pusan to Taegu and its adjacent areas, Rev. Adams left for Taejon with the other team. It
was important for at least one missionary to escort with the trucks, otherwise both the
vehicles and the supplies could have easily been taken by the ROK army - one more way
in which even a single missionary could be very important to the relief work.
Nevertheless, due to the deteriorating military situation and transportation confusion,
Adam’s freight car never left Pusan. Rev. Kinsler re-routed it to Taegu instead.44
Not knowing what Kinsler had done, Rev. Adams was waiting vainly for “the lost
freight car” in Taejon, while the North Koreans were trying to cross the Kum River 45
Following the main roads, most refugees fled Taejon to Yongdong and Kimch’on. On
July 15, Rev. Adams became the last American civilian to depart the now empty city 46
He and his faithful Korean CWS relief workers took a jeep, and laboriously dragged a

44 Letter from Edward Adams, 21 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18,
Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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broken wagon to Taegu.47 As soon as they arrived, Rev. Adams again looked for his lost
freight car and was delighted to find it parked at the railroad station 48
The missionaries then established Taegu as their main relief center within the
Pusan Perimeter. Trucks loaded with supplies were sent to different refugee-crowded
cities, including Yongdong and Kimch’on.

Local churches were often used as

distribution points. The relief materials were mainly food such as beans, flour, wheat,
and lard. The missionaries usually contacted local pastors and laymen ahead of time,
depending on them to organize the local people and get the word out. Once the crowd
gathered, relief workers distributed food together with some Christian tracts to the nonChristians. To Christians, they offered gospels or New Testaments instead. Rev. Adams
reported that relief work was the “most excellent approach to the Gospel” in the midst of
war because “the gratitude of recipients [was] most pathetic.” 49 Christians were
particularly grateful because most of them had fled in such haste that they had left their
Bibles behind. The gospels, Christian tracts, and New Testaments were in great demand.
Although supplies were distributed to all the refugees, those who were Christian
received the most, because many American churches had made donations expressly to the
Korean Christian community. Since their American supporters wanted to see the goods
reach the hands of their intended beneficiaries, the missionaries usually left behind relief
supplies for local churches so that pastors and elders could support the needs of the
Christian community. Churches became famous places for additional relief supplies. As

47 Transportation equipment was precious during the war because all kinds o f vehicles were in hot demand.
The missionaries did not want to lose even one broken wagon.
48 48 Ibid.
49 •
'Ibid.
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a result, the influence of Christianity continued to grow despite the destruction of many
churches and the loss of leadership.
A Christian relief effort was, however, no substitute for government or UN
programs. Its effectiveness lay in its collaboration with the authorities. Rev. Adams
explained the goal of their relief effort to his American supporters: “In any case we
recognize the major problem is a government and military one, in which we need to fill in
by supplementing and personalizing - taking care of the fringes where the larger machine
fails to function.” 50 The missionaries were in constant communication with ROK
officials to identify neglected areas, and fill the gaps. For example, on July 21, they
received a report from the Minister of Welfare on the number of refugees in each county,
and discovered that Uisong (Eui Sung) County had, at that point, more refugees than
Pusan. The next day, they sent a truckload of food to Uisong.51
The relief work organized by these missionaries was not limited to food
distribution, but also included emergency evacuation.

The ROK government had

conscripted most Korean-owned automobiles for military purposes; only those vehicles
driven by the missionaries or high-ranking Korean officials had escaped.

The

missionaries’ jeeps, trucks, and wagons became vital for moving supplies, people, and
equipment. As the Communist soldiers advanced, private facilities depended on CWS
transportation for their evacuation.

For example, missionaries helped to move the

important medical supplies of the Salvation Army Hospital of Ybngdong to Taegu before
that city fell to the North Korean army.

50 Letter from Edward Adams, 1 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16,
Folder 37 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
51 Letter from Edward Adams, 21 July 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18,
Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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American missionaries were especially interested in evacuating Christian leaders
since they were certain to be killed if captured. They would drive in their trucks to
evacuate pastors and their families, bringing them to safety along the coast near Pusan.
They often even went into the war zone to rescue congregations of Christians who were
caught between the two opposing armies. For example, about four hundred pastors and
their families were trapped in Taegu when it came under heavy bombing from the North
in August. Missionaries immediately arranged a large school building for them at a place
called Kamp’ori on the east coast, about sixty miles north of Pusan and twenty miles
south of P ’ohang (see Map 7). In order to bring them there, they transported around sixty
to eighty people each day, and arranged government relief supplies for them in addition
to the little they could provide from the CWS supplies.52
The missionaries expanded their operation to the non-Christian population as they
saw the military becoming increasingly hostile towards the refugees. After the fall of
Taejon, the sheer number of refugees on the main road became a serious hindrance to
military operations.

The army, needing the roads cleared for supplies and troop

transports, were constantly driving refugees away. Worse still, the refugee population
was chaotic and unregulated. Many guerillas had infiltrated their ranks, causing serious
problems for the military.

Fearing clandestine attacks, some ROK and US soldiers

became hostile to the civilians that they encountered while clearing the roads for military
transports.
Refugee distrust flared up around the time of the fall of Taejon. On July 25, top
staff officers of the U.S. 8th Army met with Ambassador Muccio's representative, Harold

52 Letter from Edward Adams, 9 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18,
Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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J. Noble, and other South Korean officials to discuss the refugees problem. They decided
to take serious measures to stop refugees from crossing US defense lines. According to a
written report from Ambassador Muccio to Dean Rusk, at that time Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, if refugees ignored warnings from US troops and continued
to advance toward their defensive lines, US soldiers were allowed to use lethal force to
halt them.53
With the defensive line shifting daily, many refugees on the road from Taejon to
Taegu were caught in between the retreating US army and the advancing North Korean
forces. For example, in Nogun-ni, a village between Yongdong and Kimch’on (see Map
7), where the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Regiment held position, there was a report that
about 400 people were killed by US troops on July 26. Although the actual death toll has
been widely disputed, civilian casualties in Nogun-ni were an undeniable fact.54 Similar
incidents happened all along the road to Taegu. It was unknown how many innocent
people lost their lives due to the combination of friendly fire and US efforts to keep
refugees away from their defensive positions.

53 Sahr Conway-Lanz, “Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War,”
Diplomatic History 29 (January 2005): 56. See also Charles J. Hanley and Martha Mendoza, “U.S. Policy
Was to Shoot Korean Refugees,” Washington Post, 29 May 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/29/AR2006052900485.html.
54 The number 400 was provided by North Korean troops who took over the Nogun-ni bridge later. See
Spencer C. Tucker, “Nogun-ni Railroad Bridge Incident,” in Encyclopedia o f The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 490. The actual
number o f victims, however, remained controversial. A report o f the Yeongdong County Office in South
Korea claimed that 248 people were injured, missing or killed by the US troops. Some Korean victims
believed that the numbers should be higher according to the investigation conducted by the Associated
Press. The study provided a list o f 181 victims killed, 20 missing, and 50 wounded. See Charles J. Hanley,
Sang-hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare From the Korean
War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 291-295. This report, however, was disputed by a West
Point historian, Robert Bateman, who argued that apart from testimonies o f the victims fifty years later,
there was no hardcore evidence supporting the claim. See Robert L. Bateman, No Gun Ri: A Military
History o f the Korean War Incident (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002).
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The movement of troops and equipment was hampered by the refugees who were
clogging the roads and railways. To prevent any further loss of time, all those evacuated
from Kimch’Sn and along the railroad line after the fall of Yongdong were shunted off
the side, and/or pushed into the mountains by the military. The refugees coming from the
north (the area around Andong) and the east were also diverted into the mountains (see
Map 7). The hillsides and streambeds became packed with refugees. These people had
nowhere to flee. Their suffering out in the open without shelter was beyond description.
They had little food and were perishing in the heat of the sun and the chill of the rain.
Unless they were transported into the Pusan Perimeter immediately, they would soon fall
into the hands of the North Korean army or die of hunger or disease. The only people
with the will and the means to help were the missionaries. With their trucks, jeeps, and
wagons, Rev. Adams and his CWS workers directed and transported about 10,000 people
who had been camped in the hills for days to refugee centers within the Pusan
Perimeter.55
Relief Work within the Pusan Perimeter
When the war finally stabilized along the Pusan perimeter in August, the
government was able to organize refugees according to their original counties (kun). The
living conditions within these herds of people, however, were terrible.
particularly overcrowded.

Pusan was

Every school building, department store, or other large

building was being used either as a hospital, a barracks, or a refugee camp.

Many

temporary buildings were erected to house more refugees. Churches and temples were
also overcrowded with people.

In some cases, thousands of people lived in one

55 Letter from Edward Adams to wife, 9 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140,
Box 18, Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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temporary building. Each family had about ten square feet of space.56 Rev. Adams
described their conditions as living “like flies,” and feared that without adequate medical
attention, an epidemic might break out.57
These overcrowded refugee centers needed immediate attention. The American
missionaries again mobilized their limited resources.58 Since most of the Southern
Presbyterian missionaries had taken refuge in Pusan,59 they began serving the city’s
crowded refugee centers. A few women missionaries and their Christian helpers visited
the overcrowded refugee centers regularly, bringing relief supplies and providing basic
medical care. They would send for a missionary doctor if the cases were serious.
The Northern Presbyterians, who possessed more resources, were able to expand
their work among the more remote comers of the perimeter, particularly those living
outdoors in stream beds or on the hillsides, by using their precious tracks. The ROK
government had tried to bring food to these people, but a lack of transportation
equipment had slowed down the process. The conditions were far worse for those who
did not have shelters or receive government support.

“When it rains,” Rev. Adams

described, “they get soaked. The nights have turned chilly, so during the night they
shiver. During the day they bake.”60

56 Letter from Mrs. (Charlotte) Linton to “folks,” 10 September 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
Department o f History, Montreat, North Carolina.
57 Letter from Edward Adams, 1 September 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box
16, Folder 37 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
58 The Northern Presbyterians were the Presbyterian Mission (USA) and the Southern Presbyterians were
the Presbyterian Mission (US).
59 Pusan was the mission base o f the Australian Presbyterian mission. Most Australians were evacuated
when the war broke out. Most o f them did not return until the war was stabilized in 1952. The most
famous ones were Dr. Helen MacKenzie and her sister Catherine MacKenzie. They ran the Australian
Presbyterian Mission Hospital from 1952 to 1975.
60 Letter from Edward Adams, 1 September 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box
16, Folder 37 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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In addition to providing regular relief supplies, missionaries were concerned with
ministering to the multitude, and hoped to develop a long-term evangelical network to
reach out to the most remote places. They first established a relief program for the
families of Christian clergymen and evangelists (not limited to Presbyterians).
Missionaries would be responsible for supplying food and special shelter for their
families so that the Korean pastors could go back to living in the refugee camps
according to the kun from which they had originally come. Rev. Adams hoped that they
could arrange at least one pastor or lay evangelist for each kun. In this way, each pastor
would establish relationships with the refugees and be able to continue caring for his
flock even after the refugees returned to their homes. These Christian workers, however,
were not paid a monthly salary.

Instead, the missions guaranteed “enough food and

clothing to protect their health” so that they could focus on their work among the
refugees “without compromising their voluntary spirit.”61
Missionaries also prepared one large tent for each kun to serve as a relief station
and a temporary worship hall. These tents became the headquarters for church workers.
The major practical function of each tent was to serve as a first-aid center for the sick,
small babies, and pregnant mothers.

Dr. Howard Moffett, being in the Air Force,

supplied these stations with basic medicines like aspirin, mercurochrome, and
penicillin.

According to Rev. Adams, the US Army advisor to the Minister of the

Interior was so moved when he heard of the program that tears came to his eyes.63

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

360

The Impact o f Missionaries on the Overall War Relief Effort
Although no data was collected to confirm the effectiveness of the relief program
operated by the missionaries in the first three months of war, their efforts certainly saved
many lives. The long-term impact of these initiatives was equally important. Their work
aroused public interest and inspired many Christians in the United States and other
Western countries to support the survival of South Korea.
Church leaders in the United States were the first group to answer the requests of
these missionaries. On October 19, 1950, shortly after the announcement of a centralized
UN relief effort, American church leaders held a meeting at the office of International
Mission Committee in New York with representatives from the World Council of the
Churches (WCC), Foreign Mission Conference (FMC), International Missionary Council
(IMC), and Church World Service (CWS). They recognized that “Christian concerns
must find expression in an organized effort for Christian relief in Korea.”64 They first
decided to establish a formal Christian relief committee in Korea through the Korean
National Christian Council (KNCC). This committee in Korea would evaluate the needs
and report to the IMC and WCC for funds and supplies. It would also be responsible for
carrying out Christian relief work and correspondence with UN relief officials in Korea.
The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) would negotiate with
the UN relief agencies in New York to allow Christian groups to distribute their own
materials.65
This meeting was historic because afterward the tide of the Korean War turned
against the United Nations forces.

Hundreds of thousands of Chinese “volunteers”

64 C. W. Randon, “Korean Relief,” in Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Kim Heung
Soo (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 136-137.
65 Ibid.
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entered the war in November 1950, and the severe cold weather in Korea threatened the
lives of many Korean refugees.66 The need for immediate relief was even more pressing
than before. A lack of clothing and fuel was more critical than food, because Koreans in
the Cholla regions were able to harvest their rice crop when the UN pushed the line back
th

up to the 38 Parallel in September 1950. Food was not the most pressing issue in the
winter of 1950, because the local government organized soup kitchens to feed hungry
crowds with their rice reserve. The need for clothing and fuel was more pressing when
civilians were forced to leave home during one of the coldest winters in Korean history.
Religious news in the United States highlighted Korean suffering.

The latest

letters and reports of missionaries and Christians in the war zone were regularly
published in an open pamphlet, “Korea Letters,” produced by evacuated missionaries in
Japan under the leadership of Rev. William Shaw and his wife, and supported by the
Methodist Board of Foreign Missions. Christians in the United States were encouraged
to pray and to donate money and relief materials. Retired missionaries, church leaders,
Korean Christian churches in the United States, and interdenominational organizations
mobilized to distribute the publication across the country. News about the missionaries
and Korean refugees was also frequently reported in a variety of other denominational
magazines.
Drives for cash donations and clothing began in November among individual
denominations. A joint effort through the Church World Service’s “One Great Hour of
Sharing” was organized in December 1950. Churches and individual Christian groups
throughout the United States and Canada responded eagerly by sending money to the
Presbyterian Boards, Methodist Boards, Church World Service (CWS), Salvation Army,
66 The discussion o f the Chinese entry into the Korean War is in Chapter 7.
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Catholic Relief Service, Maryknoll Sisters, and other interdenominational relief
organizations to support of Christian refugees in Korea. In that winter alone, the CWS
shipped 223,000 pounds of cloth, and 95,000 pounds of food (milk, beans, vitamins, etc.)
Churches in England and Australia also sent funds and relief supplies to Pusan.67 The
supplies were distributed to both Christians and non-Christians by the CWS.
Rev. Bob Pierce, who had visited South Korea shortly before the outbreak of the
war, also returned to Korea to investigate the damage. The suffering he saw led him to
establish World Vision, Inc. on September 22, 1950, which is now the largest Christian
relief and development organization in the world. Later, he returned to Korea as a war
correspondent for the United Nations, and traveled all over the war-torn country. Hoping
“to shake people up,” he focused his reports on the plight of the Christians, widows,
orphans, and babies that were left for dead in dump heaps.68
During the Korean War, Rev. Pierce made two documentaries on Korea. The first
one, The 38th Parallel, documented conditions in Korea prior to the outbreak of the
Korean War. Reports on the success of “Save the Nation Evangelistic Crusade” were
presented, showing thousands of Koreans who became Christians after they heard Rev.
Pierce’s preaching.

One local newspaper described the film as telling “the story of

[Korea’s] tragedies as well as its hopes found in the Christian way of life.”69 Pierce’s
story supported Dulles’ interpretation of the religious nature of the Korean conflict.

67 Heung-soo Kim,
A17] 7]
5] -%)
Han'gukjeonjeong sigi gidokkyo
oewondancheui guhohwaldong (Relief Activities of Foreign Christian Voluntary Agencies during the
Korean War),”
Hangukkidokgyo yeoksa History o f Korean Christianity 23 (2005):
105-108.
68 Franklin Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do (USA: Samaritan’s Purse, 1983), 170.
69 “Korean Movies at Youth for Christ,” Walla Walla, Wash, 7 December 1951. See also “Korean Film
Listed For Youth Rally,” The Gettysburg Times, 13 April 1951, and “Speaks and Shows Film,” Mansfield
O. News-Journal, 9 April 1952.
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The most noteworthy result was Pierce’s second movie, The Flames, a Christian
documentary on the Korean War released in 1952.70 It was regarded as “one of the
outstanding documentary records of all time.”71 Rev. Pierce showed the film to churches
across America and invited their members to help the refugees and Korean orphans. It
was the beginning of the World Vision Child Sponsorship Program.

His graphic

depiction of suffering women and children shocked the American people, and stirred
great enthusiasm for Korean relief. The survival of the Korean Christian community and
the future of these Korean orphans became familiar concerns to churches across America.
Throughout the Korean War, church relief organizers discovered that whenever
the label “Korea” was attached to a relief drive the public response was exceptionally
generous. Most of the Christian donors intended to send the relief supplies to the Korean
Christians, especially women and children. These wishes could not be granted, however,
since supplies had to be sent through the UN; once in UN hands, individual charities lost
control over how the materials were distributed.
Nevertheless, cooperation with the UN brought many benefits to all concerned.
First, given the astronomical costs of shipping bulky goods to Asia, the charities could
not have sent their materials without UN help. Second, the relief work established “good
will” between Christian charities and the UN and US army.

The UN needed the

experience, advice, and support of these Christian organizations. Third, Christians would,
in turn, gain access to official information so that they could have a “better chance to help
in steering supplies in the [neediest] areas, and reduce “irregularities in distribution.”72

70 Graham, Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do, 170.
71 “Dr. Pierce’s Film on Korea to be Shown Here Oct. 1,” Bralaerd Daily Dispatch, 23 September 1952.
72 Letter to Dr. John Smith, sender unknown, 19 September 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Therefore, most religious groups participated in the UN effort and volunteered to collect
and distribute relief supplies on behalf of the UN.73 By 1952, a total of forty Christian
organizations were carrying out relief programs in South Korea through the UN. From
July 1950 to November 1952, they offered as much as US $4,856,446 worth of church
donations for UN distribution, which was about 44 percent of the total donations by all
US voluntary agencies (see Table 6.2).74
In 1953, when the UN eventually allowed private organizations to conduct their
own distribution, Protestant churches in the US sent a total of US $271,341.70 in cash,
US $1,599,752.82 worth of clothing, and 5,469,882 pounds of relief supplies through the
Church World Service.75 Under the leadership of Rev. Edward Adams and Dr. Henry
Appenzeller, the Korea Church World Service emerged as the model relief agency (see
Table 6.3 for the full list of staff members).76 The money was used for orphanages,
children’s welfare, housing for widows, anti-tuberculosis projects, medical supplies, the
purchase and distribution of relief supplies, and so on. These figures did not include
materials and funds sent through individual denominations for church reconstruction and
the rehabilitation of Christian education and medical institutions. It also did not include
contributions made through Catholic charities or materials sent directly through the UN
relief agencies.

73 Letter from TTB to Shaw, 6 October 1950, Missionary Collection 4, United Methodist Church Archives
—GCAH, M adison, New Jersey.
74 This amount does not include cash distributed through private church channels which the UN did not
control. See Kim,
A] 7] 7| -5;-12. -£|
*)].£]
Relief Activities o f Foreign
Christian Voluntary Agencies during the Korean War,” 107-108.
75 Harry A. Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission Presbyterian Church in the
USA, Vol. 2,1935-1959 (New York: Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, The United
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A, 1964), 323.
76 Kim,
*<§ A17] 71
5] -£1
o]
Relief Activities o f Foreign Christian
Voluntary Agencies during the Korean War,” 109-110.
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The Christian relief program, in the end, benefited the Korean Christian
community the most.

Pastors, Bible women,77 and Christian teachers received special

help from the churches and relief agencies in addition to the meager government supplies,
which gave them a better chance of survival. For example, although the CWS supported
a policy of equal distribution among both believers and non-believers, its long-term goal
favored the development of Christianity.

Its objectives were to encourage Christian

social services, and strengthen ties of friendship between Korea and the United States,
and also between Korean and Western churches.78 Their hope was to build a new Korea
based on the American Christian model.
In addition, missionaries helped to secure jobs for Christians not only as relief
workers, but also as interpreters for US troops and chauffeurs for government officials.
Seminaries, Christian colleges and schools, orphanages, and widows’ houses were
established throughout South Korea. Partly through the relief agencies’ influence and
partly through the evangelizing efforts of the Korean church, Christianity continued to
expand during and after the Korean War. Foreign funding enabled the training of new
Christian clergymen and the expansion of Christian institutions in post-war Korea. It
marked the new beginning of an intimate American-Korean church relationship. For the
first time in Church history, Korea replaced China and Japan as the primary recipient of
American paternalism in East Asia. In this way, Christianity emerged as a dominant
political, economic, religious, and social force in postwar South Korea.

77 Bible women were female evangelists supported by the Korean churches to evangelize women and
children. They served as Bible teachers for women group and Sunday schools. In the remote countryside,
the influence o f Bible women was sometime as strong as pastors and elders.
78 Arnold B. Vaught, “Relief and Rehabilitation,” Report to Korea Planning Conference (October 13-14,
1953), World Council o f Church Library (CCIA Country Files: Asia-Korea 1953-1973), Geneva,
Switzerland.
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THE FALL AND RECOVERY OF SEOUL
While some Koreans fled before the advancing Northern army, many more
remained without being fully aware of the consequences of their decisions.79 They soon
found themselves behind the iron curtain. The Communists immediately began purging
all their opponents in the conquered territories. Christians were prime targets.

Their

experience during the North Korean occupation was a central component in
understanding the religious aspects of the Korean War. Reports of their suffering would
be widely circulated in Korea and the United States. These, in turn, mobilized American
public opinion to provide political, economic, military, and moral support to the Republic
of Korea.
The Fall o f Seoul
At roughly 3:30 on the morning of June 27, shortly after President Syngman Rhee
and his cabinet left Seoul, about 140 members of the National Assembly held an
emergency session.

Mr. Sin Ik-hui (Patrick Henry Shinicky), the Speaker of the

Assembly80 and Syngman Rhee’s major political opponent after the mid-1950s, asked the
Assembly to decide whether or not they should follow Rhee’s government. Following a
heated debate, the Assembly passed a resolution that all assembly members should
remain in the Capital, even if it meant imprisonment or death.

The resolution also

79 Because o f strict censorship by the South Korean Defense Ministry, most Korean newspapers and official
announcements did not provide accurate reports on front-line conditions, during the first few days o f the
war. Some reporters were asked by government officials to write false stories to ease the people’s fears.
See Raymond S. H. Lee, “Early Korean War Coverage,” Journalism Quarterly 55, no.4 (1978): 789-791.
80 Donald Stone MacDonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1996), 120.
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criticized Rhee’s government for betraying the trust of the Korean people by giving up
the defense of Seoul.81
The majority of the Assemblymen, including Sin himself, switched their position
within a few hours, however, and had fled south by nightfall. Out of 210 members of the
Assembly, only 60 ultimately stayed behind - mostly moderates and liberals.82 Among
them was Assemblywoman Pak Sun-Ch’on, who, as president of Women’s Daily News
(Yocha Ilbo) in Seoul, was one of the most influential women in Korea.83 Pak stayed
behind not because she was sympathetic toward Communism, but because of the
Assembly resolution and her personal responsibility to the voters in Seoul District A. But,
she urged all her subordinates and friends to evacuate immediately.84
Initially, many Communists and leftists were excited over the war, and rose up to
welcome the North Korean army. Students in Seoul and elsewhere were the most active
supporters of the occupation, volunteering readily for all sorts of tasks.

During the

occupation period, women in particular experienced a great liberation, and enjoyed wide
employment opportunities, holding jobs of honor.85 Nevertheless, such cases were a
small minority. The majority of those people who were not targets of the Communist
persecution suffered severe hardships under the North’s occupation policy.
During the transition period between the departure of the ROK government and
the arrival of the Korean People’s Army, the city of Seoul was in turmoil. There was

81 Sun-Chon Park, “Wearing a Blood-Stained Skirt,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140,
Box 16, Folder 39: 1 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
82 Hugh Deane, The Korean War: 1945-1953 (San Francisco, CA: China Books & Periodicals, 1999), 94.
83 Andrew C. Nahm, Historical Dictionary o f the Republic o f Korea (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press,
1993), 161.
84 Deane, The Korean War: 1945-1953, 94
85 Ibid.
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looting of foreigners’ houses, and many shooting incidents.86 Because the North Korean
army lacked effective logistical support, very often the soldiers demanded food from
local residents without giving any compensation. For three months, most of the people
lived on barley gruel.87 When an occupying army behaved in such a way, it did not
endear itself to the native population. As the food started to run out, even leftists and
leftist sympathizers began to regret the arrival of the Communists.88 Abuse by Northern
soldiers only became more prevalent as the tide of war started to turn against them.
Another source of conflict between North Korean authorities and the South
Korean population was the KPA policy of conscripting young men and women from the
ages of seventeen to thirty-eight, to serve in the North Korean army. Christians were
particularly reluctant to serve in the KPA. Those loyal to the ROK went into hiding to
avoid serving.89 Pae Sun-Yong (Pai Soon-young), a Christian woman, hid her husband
and her brother in their attic to avoid being found by the Communist police.90 Many,
however, were unable to escape the order. Some who were seized tried to escape, but
only a few succeeded.91

86 Maud K. Jensen, “Korea Evacuation 1950,” undated pamphlet printed for family and friends. Quoted by
Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT:
EastBridge, 2003), 364.
87 Letter from Soon-Young to Rev. Min-soo Pai, 23 October 1950, Presbyterian Archive, Record Group
140, Box 1, Folder, 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
88 Letter from Soon-Young Pai to her uncle Rev. Minsoo Pai in the United States, 10 December 1950,
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society,
Philadelphia.
89 Letter from Soon-Young to Rev. Min-soo Pai, 23 October 1950, Presbyterian Archive, Record Group
140, Box 1, Folder, 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
90 Ibid.
91 The exact extent o f conscription remained unclear. Yet, the testimonies o f most survivors confirmed the
policy o f the North Korean authorities. The number o f North Korean POWs who were determined as
South Korean citizens was rather high. About 37,000 were determined as civilian internees. Most o f them
refused to be repatriated to North Korea and created a serious problem during the Truce Negotiation in
Panmunjom.
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Skilled personnel, such as the doctors and nurses in the Severance Hospital92 and
Seoul Sanitarium and Hospital,

were conscripted as soon as the North arrived and

occupied Seoul. Since their medical skills were badly needed on the frontline, some of
them were dispersed to different KPA units to serve with other North Korean medical
personnel.94 Very few survived the occupation.
The Fate o f South Korean Politicians and Officials
Once Seoul was secured, the Communist police began to round up ROK officials,
police, and Assemblymen. Since most top officials had fled, while the rest were hiding in
friends’ houses or in the mountains, it took the KPA a great effort to root them out. First,
the KPA collected information from secret informers and infiltrators. Then based on
these reports, soldiers conducted house searches and set up road blocks to check
identification. Few escaped.
One such case was ex-Assemblyman Kim Sang-don, a Presbyterian who had to
stay in Seoul because of his large family. Kim’s political record showed that he had
always been critical of the policies of the ROK government. Some people suspected him
of being pro-Communist because he did not leave the city. The North Koreans wanted to
enlist his support. Knowing that he was a wanted man, Kim went into hiding in the attic
of a church elder’s house for months to avoid working for the Communists. When

92 The Severance Hospital was staffed by the joint effort o f both Presbyterian and Methodist missions. It
was the best-known medical institution in South Korea. Some reported that all the doctors and nurses were
murdered by the Communists. The stories, however, were hard to confirm. It is highly possible that those
who refused to collaborate with the North Korean authorities were shot on the spot. According to the
investigation o f the UN, mass graves were uncovered in the back yard of the hospital. The identity o f these
victims, however, was hard to determine. Those who were willing to work with the Communists were
possibly taken by the North Korean Army when they departed from Seoul.
The hospital was established by the Seventh-day Adventists. Most of the medical staff were trained by
Dr. George Rue and his wife Grace.
94 Penny Young Sook Kim and Charles Milles, Though Bombs May Fall: The Extraordinary Story o f
George Rue, M issionary D octor to Korea (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 2003), 79.
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someone reported his location to the authorities, the Communists came to search the
house. Though they could not find him, they shot many holes in the ceiling.

Kim

miraculously lived to tell his story.95
Assemblywoman Pak Sun-Ch’on was not so lucky. She went into hiding with her
friends in Chaedong as soon as Seoul fell, but was betrayed.

On July 3, a young

Communist policeman from North Korea dragged her out from her hiding place. He told
her that he had “been well acquainted with” her because he had seen “her picture in the
north part of the country.”96 The policeman forced her to “walk with him” to the Chongno Police Station because the Communist authorities wanted to show people that she
came with them voluntarily.97 During interrogation, the interrogator tried to force her to
agree that it was the ROK government that had started the war, but Pak refused to comply.
Some of her other colleagues in the National Assembly, who had not left Seoul, were also
arrested by the Communists, and faced the same pressure.

Pak and her colleagues

remained in prison for more than a week before they were released on July 13.
Political Pressure against Rightists
Kim Il-sung had planned to establish Seoul as the new capital of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. In order to earn national support and establish a legitimate
government, he needed to convince the southern population and the international
community that Syngman Rhee and the ROK were to blame for the war. To do so, Kim
Il-sung needed the collaboration of ex-ROK officials and politicians in Seoul.

The

95 Letter from Kim Eun-Hyung, ex-Assemblyman Kim Sangdon’s daughter, to her sister Kim Shing Hyung,
5 October 1950, Presbyterian Archives, Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical
Society, Philadelphia.
96 Park, “Wearing a Blood-Stained Skirt,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16,
Folder 39: 4-5. The manuscript was sent to the Presbyterian Church and later published by John W. Riley,
Jr. and Wilbur Schramm, The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation o f Seoul with Eyewitness
Accounts (New Brunswick, NY: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 193-198.
97 Ibid.
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Communists, therefore, launched a propaganda effort aimed at discrediting Rhee’s
government, and disputing the justifications for UN intervention.
First, the North Korean authorities pressured South Korean politicians to pledge
their allegiance to the Northern regime, and make broadcasts on behalf of the
Communists, condemning the corruption of the ROK regime. They put the most pressure
on Assemblymen and famous Korean politicians. The authorities’ goal was to convert
them to the Communist idea of unification, and to use them to condemn the ROK for
starting the war. A program led by Northern political officers to re-educate National
Assembly members began on July 8. Most of the Assemblymen were released by the
authorities temporarily on July 13, as a gesture to win their support. In the end, about
forty-eight of the sixty captured assemblymen pledged allegiance to the Democratic
People’s Republic. Some of them were appointed to judgeships and other offices.98
Pak Sun-Ch’on was one of the twelve who refused to support the Communist
government. After her release on July 13, she immediately organized a “suicide squad of
the Republican volunteers,” and for the next two months secretly led an underground
resistance movement.99 When word came of the Inch’on landing, she hid to avoid being
rearrested.
Second, the North Korean authorities also pressured Christian clergymen and
laymen to support the Communist cause, in a bid to obtain international recognition for
their government. Kim Kyu-sik, the famous moderate Christian leader, a political rival of
Syngman Rhee, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Kyongsin Boys’ Academy

98 Deane, The Korean War: 1945-1953, 95.
99 Park, “Wearing a Blood-Stained Skirt,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16,
Folder 39: 6 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

372

in Seoul, was forced to give “a few speeches,” criticizing the ROK government.100 He,
however, refused to join the North Korean government.101 His life was spared, but the
Communists took Kim with them when they retreated north.102
Many Christian clergymen, however, refused to cooperate. For example, the
Communists wanted Dr. Namgung Hyok, the executive secretary of the Korea National
Council of Churches, to lead their Korean National Christian Council, because he was
well-known in American churches. Despite intense pressure, Dr. Namgung refused to
participate in broadcasts supporting the Communists. He was arrested and never seen

Clashes between North Korean Authorities and Christians
Since the North Korean army needed places to stay in Seoul, conflict immediately
arose with church laymen who had stayed to guard church buildings, schools, hospitals,
and mission compounds. For example, at the Yongnak Church, six members were killed
with one elder being shot down in the churchyard. The Communists turned this beautiful,
newly-constructed building into their ammunition and weapon storage base. They knew

100 Letter from Harold Voelkel to Dr. John C. Decker, 29 July 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library: The
Korean War, ed. Kim Heung Soo (Seoul: Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 61.
101 See Deane, The Korean War, 95.
102 According to the North Koreans, Kim Kyu-sik voluntarily left with them. It is possible that this account
is accurate because Kim had worked with the Communists and would not be welcomed again by the South
Koreans. Yet, according to the testimony o f Park Sun-chon, her friend Wo Se-hun was about to inform
Kim Kyu-sik about the coming o f the UN troops and advise him to hide from the Communists on
September 17, but the North Koreans were a step ahead o f them. They had to flee before they could reach
Kim. See Sun-Chon Park, “Wearing a Blood-Stained Skirt,” 6. His son’s testimony also supported the
contention that his father was not pro-Communist and did not work closely with the North Korean
government. In fact, Kim had already permanently retired from Korean politics due to his disillusionment
after the failure o f his trip to North Korea in 1948. He had no intention to seek office for himself.
According to Rev. Harold Voelkel, who knew Kim Kyu-sik well, Kim was “one o f the most dedicated
Christian men in Korea.” He believed that Kim did the broadcast under great pressure from the
Communists. See Voelkel’s letter to Dr. John C. Decker, 29 July 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library:
The Korean War, 61. Thus, Kim Kyu-sik’s decision to go north and his death remained a mystery.
103 Letter from Harold Voelkel to Dr. Charles Ranson, 1 November 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library:
The Korean War, 158.
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that American forces would not bomb this famous refugee church because of its symbolic
reputation.

104

Based on the generally strong anti-Communist sentiment in the Christian
community and the refusal of clergymen and laymen to collaborate with the authorities,
the North Koreans were highly suspicious of the loyalty of all Christians, fearing that
they would leak information to the ROK. These fears were justified; Christians tended to
support underground anti-Communist activities throughout the South. As a result, the
homes of Christians were constantly checked by soldiers. If they found any suspicious
items in a home, the whole family would be in danger. In the case of Pastor Kim InYong (Kim In-yung), the Communists accused him of installing a short-wave radio
transmitter inside a church organ. He was arrested and tortured for three days. Finally,
he was released when they could not find any radio transmitter in the organ.105 Pastor
Kim immediately went into hiding to avoid further arrest.
Seoul City Sue: The Beginning o f Psychological Warfare
The North put similar pressure on US POWs. Under coercion, one American
officer of the 24th Infantry Division gave a 900-word radio speech denouncing American
involvement in the war:
We did not know at all the cause o f the war and the real state o f affairs, and were
compelled to fight against the people o f Korea. It was really most generous o f the
People’s Democratic Republic o f Korea to forgive us and give kind consideration for our
health, for food, clothing and habitation.106

104 The Young Nak church was constructed by the offerings o f Northern Korean refugees and American
Christians. The construction was completed in 1950.
105 Riley and Schramm, The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation o f Seoul with Eyewitness
Accounts, 190-191.
106 Philip D. Chinnery, Korean Atrocity! Forgotten War Crimes 1950-1953 (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2000), 9.
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To further confuse and weaken the morale of the US soldiers, the North aired
messages from “Seoul City Sue.” “Sue” spoke with a standard American accent and was
familiar with American culture and society. She told her radio audience that if she, a
white traitor, were to return home to the United States, she would get better treatment
from ordinary Americans than would a black soldier.107 Although the identity of “Seoul
City Sue” was a mystery, the most widely accepted theory is that she was Anna Wallis
Suhr, a Methodist ex-missionary to Korea.

1ftR

If so, then “Seoul City Sue” was an

unintended by-product of the American missionary movement, and marked the beginning
of religious workers’ involvement in psychological warfare.
While the Communists’ favorite attack against the United States was racism, the
US fought back by criticizing Communist persecution of Christian churches behind the
Iron Curtain. The American government enlisted ex-missionaries in Korea and China,
and escaped native clergymen to wage their own brand of psychological warfare against
the North through the Voice o f America (VOA).

Religious freedom became the

championing cry of the VGA’s broadcasts during the Korean War. According to Foy D.
Kohler, chief of the VOA, the United States had used “every peg” they could find to hang
their hats on the idea of religious freedom.109 The VOA covered the progress of the

107 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 374.
108 Anna Wallis came to Korea in 1935 but she lost both her position as a missionary and her American
citizenship when she married a Korean leftist named Suhr (also spelt as So). They spent the years o f World
War II in exile in China. When the Suhrs finally returned to Korea and she sought to reclaim her US
citizenship, she was rejected because her husband was a leftist. When the war broke out and US citizens
were being evacuated from Seoul, she was therefore ineligible and had to stay behind. Some reports
indicate that the Suhrs were arrested and taken north against their will. Most o f Anna W allis’ missionary
friends felt sympathy for her, believing that if she was indeed “Seoul City Sue” then she probably only
served to save her life and the life o f her husband, as was the case with many collaborators. Ibid., 374-375.
According to Raymond B. Lech, however, Anna Wallis Suhr was active also in the northern POW camps,
indoctrinating American soldiers. If so, then Anna Wallis Suhr’s support o f the Communists might have
been voluntary. See Raymond B. Lech, Broken Soldiers (Chicago, IL: Board o f Trustees of the University
o f Illinois, 2000), 119-121.
109 Harriet Rasooli-sa’eed, ‘T he Iron Curtain is Not Soundproof,” Presbyterian Life, 14 August 1951, 8.
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Korean War from its headquarters in New York. Koreans who possessed short-wave
radios, especially Christians in the areas controlled by the North, secretly listened to the
VOA, risking their lives to get up-to-date news on the war. No Kum-s6k, the North
Korean pilot of Catholic background who later defected to South Korea together with a
MiG-15, was in fact a secret listener to the VOA.110
“Korea Kids” and the Inch’on Landing
As the citizens of Seoul suffered under northern policies, many of them held out
hope of rescue. “When we heard the U.S. planes flying in the sky,” Kim Un-hyong (Eunhyung) wrote to her sister in the United States, “we were encouraged and happy. But we
were sad and disappointed on the days of quietness. Everybody predicted out of his
wishful thinking [sic]. Someone said the Allies [would] enter the city on August 15,
while others said it would be on September l.”111 As days became weeks and weeks
became months, many people gave up hope, especially when food ran out.
Nevertheless, the US Far Eastern Command under General MacArthur’s
leadership was eager to launch a daring amphibious assault on Inch’on just as many ROK
supporters in Seoul hoped. Mac Arthur favored Inch’on over all other sites because it was
the closest harbor to Seoul (about 15 miles away). His plan was to catch the North
Koreans by surprise, recapture Seoul in short order, and cut the North Korean forces in
half. The general believed that by opening a second front, he would also relieve the

110 No Kum-sok, A M iG-15 to Freedom: Memoir o f the Wartime North Korean Defector Who First
D elivered to the Secret Fighter Jet to the Americans in 1953 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company,
Publishers, 1996), 47.
111 Letter from Kim Eun-Hyung, ex-Assemblyman Kim Sangdon’s daughter, to her sister Kim Shing
Hyung, 5 October 1950, Presbyterian Archives, Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 - Presbyterian
Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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stress on the Pusan Perimeter and strengthen the morale of the Korean people by
recovering their capital. It was a political as well as a military move.
The choice of Inch’on, however, was generally regarded by amphibious experts in
the Navy as unrealistic and dangerous. The channel leading to the harbor (which is
known as the Flying Fish Channel) was not only narrow, but also studded with reefs and
shoals. Its five-knot current created another problem. What made it worse was that there
was no beach, but only twelve-foot-high sea walls that enabled big ships to approach the
harbor. Since the water rose and fell an average of twenty-eight feet every six hours,
there would be no way out once inside the harbor until the next high tide. All ships
would be stuck on the mud beach, making the landing particularly vulnerable if the beach
was guarded by heavy guns.

Secrecy, careful planning, adequate preparation, and a

strong will and heart were the only hopes for success. General MacArthur appointed
General Edward Almond to oversee the landing. MacArthur combined the 7th Army and
the 1st Marine together with other supporting units and formed the X Corps. Under huge
pressure from MacArthur, the X Corps had to be ready to land by September 15.
During this preparation time, Navy re-enlistment applications arrived from three
Korean-born second-generation missionaries: William H. Shaw, Jim Lampe, and Horace
Underwood (who was already in Korea, and whose earlier missionary work was explored
in the first section of this chapter).112 These men, who had all served as naval officers
during World War II, had “spent their boyhood summers boating to and from Sorai
Beach,”113 so they were very familiar with the treacherous tides of the Yellow Sea, and in

112 Jim Lampe was the son o f Rev. Henry Lampe, a Presbyterian missionary in Seoul.
113 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 376.
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particular the Flying Fish Channel.114 Furthermore, growing up in Japanese-occupied
Korea, they had no language problem in working with Japanese advisors, Korean soldiers,
and American officers.115
Bom in P’yongyang in June 1922, William H. Shaw (also known as Bill Shaw),
the son of Rev. William E. Shaw,116 was particularly gifted. When the Korean War broke
out, he was pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard in preparation to serve as a
missionary professor at Yonsei University. As soon as Bill Shaw heard the news, he
wrote to his father from Harvard, “What [good is] it for me to go out to Korea in times of
peace, if I’m not willing to go out now and serve them in their time of stress.” 117
Delaying his Ph.D. studies and leaving his wife and two young children, Bill Shaw
rejoined the Navy in order to return to Korea. As soon as his application arrived at the
Pentagon, he was sent to Tokyo to assist with the top-secret Inch’on Landing.
1 IQ

These three “Korea Kids”

were all assigned to duty with the intelligence

section of COMNAVFE, under the command of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. They
participated in planning the landing operation (under the top-secret code name,
OPERATION CHROMITE). While the Navy was responsible for transporting troops
and bombing Inch’on Harbor, the actual combat would be the job of the 1st Marine
Division under Major General Oliver P. Smith. The three “Korea Kids” were attached to
the amphibious force headquarters command during the landing.

They were not,

114 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 42-45, 72.
115 Both Horace and Bill received formal Japanese language training in the Navy during World War II.
116 In order not to confuse him with his father Rev. William Shaw, he will be called “Bill” from now on.
117 Quoted in “For His Friends,” by R. J. C., Presbyterian Life, 3 February 1951, 37.
118 This was how the children o f American missionaries to Korea were called. See Underwood, Korea in
War, Revolution and Peace, 141.
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however, assigned to combat. Instead, their job was to “guide the landing craft” and
“answer questions along the coast as they came in.”119
To the surprise of many, the Inch’on Landing was an exceptional success despite
being delayed by Typhoon Kezia. The North Koreans failed to guard the harbor, in spite
of warnings from Mao Zedong. Lt. Eugene Franklin Clark, an intelligence officer under
MacArthur, was sent to secure the off-shore islands on Inch’on with his Korean aides.
When he landed on Tokchok-do {do means island), he received information sent from a
Christian school master in Yonghung-do that the North Korean army had “temporarily
withdrawn all but a handful of troops from [Yonghung-do],” an island very close to
Inch’on.120 Lt. Clark felt that the report was trustworthy, partly because the messenger
was a Christian. So he decided to immediately take Yonghung-do with the help of the
Christian schoolmaster and the village headman. This earlier-than-planned capture of
Yonghung-do was fortuitous to the invasion, because the island became a crucial base for
taking the other outer islands, including Wolmi-do, right before the Inch’on Landing.121
Lt. Clark discovered that the North Koreans had placed only very limited defenses along
the Inch’on harbor.
On September 15, the X Corps first landed on W61mi-do and then proceeded to
the mainland. The landing party encountered very little resistance. Within twenty-four
hours the marines had secured the beach.
Marines occupied Kimp’o Airport.

Within four days, the 5th Regiment of the

Lt. Horace Underwood’s job was to interrogate

dozens of Koreans, including North Korean POWs and Korean civilians, collecting

119 “For His Friends,” by R. J. C., Presbyterian Life, 3 February 1951, 37.
120 Eugene Franklin Clark, The Secrets o f Inch ’on: The Untold Story o f the M ost Daring Covert Mission o f
the Korean War (New York: Berkley Book, 2002), 30.
121 Ibid., 31-58.
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information on the enemies’ defenses in Seoul.122 The Marines needed this intelligence
quickly because they were racing to capture Seoul before September 25th, the deadline set
by General MacArthur. For his part in the Inch’on landing, Horace Underwood was
awarded the Navy Commendation Medal with V (“V” indicated combat).123
The Death o f Bill Shaw
Since the Marines needed experienced guides to find the best route to Seoul, the
1st Division gladly accepted the requests of Lt. Horace Underwood and Lt. Bill Shaw to
join the march.

Both of them went with the 5th Regiment commanded by Lt. Col

Raymond L. Murray.124 They reached the Han River on September 19. Pushed by
General Almond to meet the schedule, the Marines were ordered to brave the Han River
without strong air support, not knowing that the North Koreans had moved in from Nunggok (Nung-gol) to defend the far shore (see Map 7).125 Lt. Col. Murray sent Captain
Kenneth Houghton across the Han with a small advance team, which included Lt.
Underwood and another Navy Public Information Officer. After swimming the river and
preparing for the assault craft to cross, the North Koreans attacked from the hill behind
the village, forcing the assault craft and the team to turn back. The next day, with heavy
artillery and air support, the 5th Regiment forced their way across the river.

Lt.

Underwood received the Bronze Star with V for his daring crossing the night before.126
On September 22, once across the Han, the Marines waged a pitched battle to
retake Seoul in combat street by street, block by block, and house by house.

The

122 Walt Sheldon, Hell or High Water: MacArthur’s Landing at Inch'on (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1968), 247.
123 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 187.
124 Ibid, 142.
125 Ibid., 143. See also Shelby L. Stanton, Ten Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989,
1996), 97-106.
126 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 143,187.
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casualties were not only soldiers but also innocent civilians who were “sandwiched”
between the KPA and UN forces, and “had no place to run.”127 To fight the street war,
the 5th Regiment split up into two groups.

Lt. Underwood went with one Marine

company toward Moraenae (Morinai) and Sinch’on (Shinchon), while Lt. Bill Shaw went
with the other toward Hongje-dong. Both units came under heavy fire. About five miles
outside of Seoul, Shaw’s company was ambushed on three sides, and he was killed while
“trying to assist a group of Korean civilians [who were] caught up in the skirmish.”128
He was one of five hundred American soldiers who lost their lives in the battle for Seoul.
Lt. Bill Shaw’s death was not only a great loss to his family, but also to the US
military and the Korean people. His death revealed something unique about American
missionaries in uniform. First, Shaw was not alone in his concern for Korean civilians.
Missionaries and their children in uniform all showed a similar concern for the well
being of the Korean people.
the civilians.

They would make special requests of the military to assist

Their courage and religious beliefs sometimes influenced US soldiers

around them to also volunteer to help rescue innocents in danger.
Bill Shaw’s death also showed the value of these mission workers in the war
effort. The report of Shaw’s death shocked the Marine Division Headquarters so much
that the Commander immediately ordered Lt. Underwood back to the headquarters
because they did not “want their few language officers out on the front lines.”129 This

127 Letter from Soon-Young Pai to Rev. Minsoo Pai, 23 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
128 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 144.
129 Ibid., 144.
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th
decision probably spared Underwood’s life, because the Marine 5 Regiment suffered the
highest casualties in the battle for Seoul, with losses of 85 percent in Company D.130
“Hedge Goes Home”131
Lt. Underwood, however, did not receive the order to report back to headquarters
until late in the afternoon. He was with the 5 Marines crossing the Yonhui Valley near
the Yonsei University campus. His company faced strong resistance because the KPA
had decided to make the hill (Hill #104), where the Underwood House was located, their
defense line for western Seoul. Since Lt. Underwood was very familiar with the area, he
was “to brief people on various features” and direct artillery fire to attack the enemy’s
positions.132 This battle was one of the most difficult in Seoul, requiring four all-out
assaults to take the hill.

Casualties were high on both sides.133 In the end, the

Underwood House was completely destroyed, while the rest of Yonsei campus was badly
damaged.
Lt. Horace Underwood’s participation in the Inch’on landing and the battle to
liberate Seoul was reported by TIME on October 2. The article “Hedge Goes Home”
pointed out that the Underwood family had labored for decades in Korea, and built up a
fine institution, Chosen Christian University (today’s Yonsei University), to educate
Korean young men and women. It was precious not only to Koreans, but to Americans as
well. “Perhaps more clearly than other U.S. officers,” TIME wrote, “[Underwood] knew
what he was fighting for” - to prevent “one of the most Christianized nations of the

130 Stanton, Ten Corps in Korea, 1 9 5 0 ,102.
131 “Hedge Goes Home,” TIME, 2 October 1950.
132 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 144.
133 Underwood found at least 150 dead North Koreans around the central part o f the campus. The ROK
Marine platoon had only 19 survivors after the battle.
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Orient” from falling into the hands of the Communists.134 Here TIME, which was always
sympathetic to the missionary cause, presented to the American public a religious
rationale to support UN action in Korea.135
The Liberation o f Seoul
Because Lt. Horace Underwood was with the Division Headquarters, he had the
opportunity to participate in the ceremony of the liberation of Seoul in front of the “Blue
House,” the National Assembly building in Seoul. General MacArthur was determined to
have a ceremony to mark the liberation of Seoul, despite opposition from Washington.136
It created conflict with the State Department, which objected to “any participation by the
military commander in ROK government matters.”137 Nevertheless, as usual, MacArthur
had his way; and the Joint Chiefs reluctantly authorized him to “facilitate the restoration,”
but warned him not to get involved in Korean politics.

1^ R

Because of pressure from

General MacArthur, the X Corps had to rush to fight their way into the city. Even before
the Marines had effective control, General Almond hastily declared Seoul recaptured on
September 25 in order to meet his boss’s timeline.
On September 29, General MacArthur held the handover ceremony in front of the
smoldering National Assembly building, while the Marines continued to fight only a few
blocks away. From a military view point, it was unrealistic and even dangerous to have a
ceremony in the midst of severe street fighting, but from a political perspective,

134 “Hedge Goes Home,” TIME, 2 October 1950.
135 TIME’s owner Henry Luce, the son o f American missionaries to China, favored the missionary cause
and was strongly behind Syngman Rhee. See Robert Edwin Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, Time, and the
American Crusade in Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 114-115.
136 Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing o f An American Hero (New York: The
Free Press, 2000), 152.
137 Ibid.
138 TU i A
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MacArthur was trying to establish unity between the US and ROK troops and boost
morale.
The tone of the handover ceremony was deeply religious and sentimental. The
service began at noon when General MacArthur and President Rhee stepped up to the
platform. The general announced before the UN troops, “By the grace of a merciful
Providence, our forces fighting under the standard of that greatest hope and inspiration of
mankind, the United Nations, have liberated this ancient capital city of Korea...” while
the rumble of artillery firing was still echoing outside the courtyard.139 The general
shook hands with President Syngman Rhee and told him, “[On] behalf of the United
Nations Command I am happy to restore to you, Mr. President, the seat of your
government that from it you may better fulfill your constitutional responsibilities.”140
Then, the general “sanctified” the proceedings by asking everyone to join him in the
Lord’s Prayer.141 Tears came to MacArthur’s eyes during the recitation. “If there had
been any chaplains around,” said Admiral James H. Doyle, the master of amphibious
tactics who was present at the ceremony, “they would have had to have gone back to
school again.”142 Most of the soldiers at that time, however, did not quite understand the
action of their army general. One Marine officer whispered to Lt. Horace Underwood,
“They didn’t take the city. What are they doing, giving it back?”143 Nevertheless, the
ceremony was widely reported all over the United States. Church opinion in the United
States praised MacArthur as a great Christian general in American history.144

139 Sheldon, Hell or High Water, 327-328.
140 Ibid.
141 Stanton, Ten Corps in Korea, 1 9 5 0 ,112.
142 Quote in Weintraub, MacArthur’s War, 154.
143 Sheldon, Hell or High Water, 329.
144 “Hail To The General!” The United Presbyterian 109,15 January 1951, 2.
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Some historians have interpreted this ceremony as a colonial-style imposition of
the Christian religion upon the Korean people,145 but, given that Rhee was a Christian and
that Christians dominated Korean politics and the anti-Communist movement,
MacArthur’s performance had a clear political purpose. No doubt the recapture of Seoul
did boost morale in the UN and ROK forces, but the message of God’s divine will for the
restoration of the city carried a significant message for the entire free world. MacArthur
intended to convey to the whole world that he stood as the leader of a just and righteous
army under the banner of the United Nations, returning Korea’s capital to its rightful
ruler, Syngman Rhee.
The ceremony also showed that at least for MacArthur the Korean War had
become symbolic of a religious crusade against atheistic Communism. On September 1,
1950, when President Truman reported the situation of the Korean War to the American
people, he again emphasized the idea of freedom - including religious freedom - in the
battle to save Korea:
It is your liberty and mine which is involved. What is at stake is the free way o f life-- the
right to worship as we please, the right to express our opinions, the right to raise our
children in our own way, the right to choose our jobs, the right to plan our future and to
live without fear. All these are bound up in the present action o f the United Nations to
put down aggression in Korea.... Right now the battle in Korea is the frontline in the
struggle between freedom and tyranny. But the fighting there is part o f a larger struggle
to build a world in which a just and lasting peace can be maintained.146

Truman believed that the American concept of freedom had “deep religious roots” and
that the American people were “under a divine command to be concerned about the
welfare of [their] neighbors, and to help one another.”147 He therefore saw the UN action

145 See Weintraub, MacArthur’s War, 154.
146 Harry S. Truman, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in Korea, 1
September 1950, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1950 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 610-611.
147 Harry S. Truman, Address in Independence at the Dedication o f the Liberty Bell, 6 November 1950,
ibid., 706.
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as a just and righteous response. The United States had no wish to occupy Korea or
destroy its people and property, as Communist propaganda claimed.148
War Atrocities
Following the liberation of Seoul, the UN began to investigate reports of atrocities
committed by the North against both UN troops and the Korean people. Among the
general population in the South, ROK government workers, pro-ROK politicians,
professionals, and Christian leaders were the main victims, because the North Koreans
wanted to deny South Korea any future political, social, economic, or religious leadership.
As the KPA prepared to pull back from Seoul, North Korean authorities set out to
liquidate many of the remaining ROK government officials, civic and business leaders,
and well-educated professionals. Professors, teachers, engineers, and mechanics were the
principal victims of this final round of violence. Many people could not be found once
the UN troops recaptured the city, including several political activists, such as An Chaehong who had been the American-appointed Civil Administrator of the South Korean
Interim Government, and Yo Un-hong, the brother of Yo Un-hyong.149
Communist authorities also called a meeting of all Christian pastors in Seoul. The
police sent cars around to pick them up and escort them to the meeting place. But when
the pastors arrived, they discovered that the “meeting” was a trap. They were promptly
arrested and sent marching northward.150 In the end, about fifteen Presbyterian pastors

148 Before the attack on Inch’On, General MacArthur issued to his troops a statement explaining the military
purpose o f the operation, but the Russian media translated the statement falsely: “Before you is a rich city.
In it are many sweets and wines. Take Seoul and all the girls will be yours. The property o f the inhabitants
belongs to the victors and you can send it home in packages.” See “In Package,” TIME, October 2,1950.
149 Deane, The Korean War, 95.
150 Letter from James M. Philips to John Smith, 8 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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and prominent laymen, fifteen Methodists, six Orientals,151 and one Salvation Army
worker disappeared.152 According to data collected by the World Council of Churches
(WCC), about one hundred eighty pastors and evangelists were taken by the Northern
Army (see Table 6.4). In addition, hundreds of ROK army and police personnel and
rightist youths were also involuntarily sent north.153
Many more were killed outright. According to CIA estimates, about a thousand
people in Seoul alone were executed in the days before the KPA retreated.154 But the
killing of political prisoners was by no means limited to Seoul; the KPA left atrocities
behind in every major city.

For instance, in Inch’on, on the night just before the

American landing, approximately fifty-three Korean civilians were killed and twentyeight others were wounded when three guards at the city’s police station attempted to
murder all the ROK leaders and United Nations sympathizers incarcerated in the jail.155
To be fair, the South Korean police also committed some atrocities against
civilians during the first three months of battle. For example, in order to weaken the
Communists’ power in the southern provinces, the ROK police arrested many local
leftists and suspected Communist sympathizers as the invading army drew closer.156 At
least 1,200 suspected Communists were executed without a fair trial between June 25 and
July 14.157

151 “6 Orientals” referred to the six Korean pastors supported by the Oriental Missionary Society.
152 Korea News Letter Number 3, 2 November 1950, Documents o f the WWC Library: The Korean War,
160-161.
153 Ibid.
154 Deane, The Korean War, 95.
155 Chinnery, Korean Atrocity, 42.
156 H. K. Shin, Remembering Korea 1950: A Boy Soldier’s Story (Reno & Las Vegas, NV: University of
Nevada Press, 2001), 39-40.
157 Deane, The Korean War, 96.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

387

Nevertheless, the systematic extermination of ROK supporters by the North was
more organized and on a vastly larger scale. In Taejon alone, about five thousand to
seven thousand people were murdered by North Korean authorities during the occupation,
according to the investigations of the War Crimes Division within the Judge Advocate
Generals Corps.

1 5 ft

Most were policemen, officers of the Youth Defense Army, chiefs of

the South Korean Youth Association, chiefs of local government offices, or headmen
from various villages.159 Many were Christians. Similar massacres also took place in
Chonju, Sunch’on, and other areas in the southern provinces (see Table 6.5 for the
civilian casualties of the Korean War).160 A US investigation revealed that some 14,606
or 84.6 percent of the total were killed during the last four days of September.161 Most of
those who escaped, like Pastor Kim In-Yong, did so by hiding during those critical
days.

The Christian community concluded that “another occupation of Seoul, or any

part of Korea, [would mean] the wholesale slaughter of Christians and all other
outstanding people.”163
These reports of Communist atrocities were widely circulated in the United States.
Not only were Koreans appalled, but so was the rest of the world. As firsthand witnesses,
missionaries were particularly sickened by what they saw. For example, Dr. Horace H.
158 The War Crimes Division was established by the General Headquarters, Far East Command with
Colonel James W. Hanley as its head. See Millett, Their War fo r Korea: American, Asian, and European
Combatants and Civilians 1945-1953, 226-232 and also Chinney, Korean Atrocity, 21.
159 Chinnery, Korean Atrocity, 47.
160 In these cases, formal investigations were conducted by the United Nations and therefore recorded. But,
in most o f other areas, the loss would be hard to account for. The South Korean government had too few
resources to investigate most o f the cases, leaving the actual condition inconclusive.
161 Chinnery, Korean Atrocity, 39.
162 Letter from James M. Philips to John Smith, 8 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. A similar story was also
told by Lee Hyun Sook, a housewife from Seoul, seeking refuge in Hong Song. See Richard Peters and
Xiaobing Li, Voices from the Korean War (Lexington, KY: The University o f Press o f Kentucky, 2004),
206-209.
163 Letter from Rev. Francis Kinsler to Dear Friends, 9 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Underwood, bitterly expressed his views on Communism a few days before his death, in
January 1951:
When oh when will Christians in America begin to realize that Communism is avowedly
and unchangeable [sic] ANTI-CHRIST? ... Americans are more highly educated than the
Koreans understand various theories o f politics better and of economics but the millions
o f people fleeing in abject terror before the Communists are not merely disagreeing with
an economic theory, or even because they prefer one type o f constitution to another, they
are not afraid o f the kindly old traffic cop - they have learned through massacred sons
and kidnapped daughters, through all kinds o f terrors what Communism is .... There is no
compromise possible between Christ and Anti-Christ, there is no strategy that will avail
except that o f faith in God to the death if necessary. I was about to say that I hope
America could learn what it means yet as I think back over what even I have seen I can
only say I hope she doesn’t have to learn the way Korea has learned.164

Dr. Underwood’s portrait of Communism as the Anti-Christ was confirmed by these tales
of unreasonable persecutions and the mass murder of innocent lives. The desires for
justice and victory were strong in both Korea and the United States.

Hatred and

resentment of the Communists and their supporters intensified.
Therefore, even though President Rhee emphasized “unity, understanding, and
forgiveness” in his speech at the handover ceremony, anger against accused collaborators
seriously radicalized the Southern population. Even Christians, who should theoretically
be forgiving and not seek revenge, were caught in an emotional dilemma. According to a
letter from a Presbyterian elder, Yun Yong-ch’un (Young Choon Youn), a high school
teacher who had been arrested and physically tortured by the KPA, could not forgive the
Communists for what they had done to him and his nation. Following his release, he had
hidden underground for forty days “like a rat” to escape death. In a letter, he asked his
friend, Rev. Pae Min-su (Pai Min-soo), who was living in the United States at that time:
I had redetermined [sic] to consecrate my life to the Lord and our people.... That rascal
[Choi Moon-sik] came out o f the prison (on June 28 when the Reds opened the gate) and
was very active. I saw him a few times according to the former fellowship, but when I
look back [at] what they have done, I would shoot and kill him right away. I am so rough
now. Is this a sin to kill such a fellow, Reverend? No, I have understood through the
164 Letter from Dr. Horace H. Underwood to My Dear Dr. Smith, 31 January 1951, Presbyterian Church
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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experience o f this war that it is not a sin to get rid o f such a fellow. I have lost
innumerable friends and all possessions. The Lord left me to finish the job for this
country.165

Hatred caused revenge and further loss of life after the occupied areas were retaken by
the South. Many survivors of the Communist occupation sought reprisals to revenge
themselves on those who had collaborated with the North Koreans.166
Extensive violence against leftists, therefore, haunted the liberated areas.
Investigations against Communist collaborators began as soon as Seoul was conquered,
but many accused collaborators were arrested and even shot by ROK authorities without
a fair trial. One man, Pai Sun-yong (Pai Soon-young), witnessed such an atrocity. As the
troops entered Seoul, a large crowd of young men ran up the mountain with ROK
national flags to greet them. Many people were shouting “Manseil” (a greeting of praise)
to the troops. The ROK Army shook hands “with boys and men with long hair and
whiskers on white faces,” but immediately shot those “who had clean dresses, haircuts,
and good looking people.”

1 f\1

Their reasoning was that only those who had been in hiding

could be trusted.
The discovery of signed statements of contrition or cooperation during the
northern occupation inspired further revenge on collaborators.

Some historians

suggested that the figure for innocent lives lost in these retributions could be as high as
100,000.169 When Colonel James M. Hanley, chief investigator of the War Crimes
Division within the Judge Advocate Generals Corps, “raised the issue of investigating
165 Letter from Young Choon Youn to Rev. Pai Minsoo, 10 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
166 Lee Hyun Sook, “Housewife in Seoul, Korea,” translated by her daughter, Lee Hong Im. See Peters and
Li, Voices from the Korean War, 209.
167 Letter from Soon-Young Pai to her uncle Rev. Minsoo Pai in the United States, 10 December 1950,
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 1, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society,
Philadelphia.
168 Deane, The Korean War, 96,
169 Ibid.
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war crimes committed by the South Korean army, the Korean National Police,
paramilitary and special forces under ROK control, and civilian vigilantes,” he found that
the UN command was uninterested in the issue.170 Since his initiative was dropped, the
true figure remains forever unknown.
The US military was similarly unenthusiastic over investigating misconduct by its
troops during the Korean War.

The most serious US atrocity was the use of lethal

weapons against refugees. This crime was completely neglected during and after the war.
Nor did the ROK government raise the issue either, for fear of controversy and of losing
American military support. For many years, the Nogun-ni Incident and other attacks on
refugees remained unacknowledged by the US government.
In the late 1990s, the incident was rediscovered by journalists from the Associated
Press. Based on the testimonies of victims, veterans, and declassified documents, they
published a Pulitzer Prize winning account that was later expanded into the book, The
Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare From the Korean War (2001).

The

allegations stirred controversy in South Korea as well as in the United States. Under
public pressure, the US defense department investigated the event and concluded that it
had not been a deliberate killing of Korean civilians.171 The incident, they determined,
was a tragic and regrettable event caused by the poor training of the US soldiers,
combined with fears that Communist guerrillas were pretending to be refugees. West
Point historian Robert Bateman supported this claim, arguing that the number of victims

170 Millett, Their War fo r Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians 1945-1953,
232.
171 Report o f the No Gun Ri Review. U.S. Department o f Army Inspector General, January 2001,
http://www.army.mil/nogunri/.
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was far smaller than the AP journalists had suggested and that there was no direct order
from the US Command to massacre refugees.172
In response, historian Sahr Conway-Lanz discovered a letter from Ambassador
John J. Muccio to Dean Rusk, proving that it was an existing policy within the US
Command to shoot at refugees if they did not stop running toward American defenses.
This policy was to prevent guerilla attacks. Although Conway-Lanz’s discovery did not
directly answer what specifically had happened in Nogun-ni, it did raise concerns over
the general conduct of US troops throughout the Korean War and how much violence
civilians had suffered.

This finding unmasked the ugliness of war and showed the

difficulties of upholding basic human rights or meeting the minimum humanitarian
standards set by the international community when inexperienced soldiers faced a
complicated wartime situation.

17 ^

CONCLUSION
During this early period of the war, the US military’s harsh policy on handling the
security problems posed by the massive influx of refugees into its defense lines presented
a sharp contrast to the US missionaries’ relief efforts among the refugees. It is perhaps
not surprising that the stress of fighting a losing battle and the paranoia of guerilla attacks
would override humanitarian concerns for many soldiers and US officials. It was also
natural for missionaries to champion the destitute.
American missionaries in the war zone constantly advocated the need for relief
and fought for the rights of the refugees. Yet, it would be wrong to imply that the US

172 See Bateman, No Gun Ri: A Military History o f the Korean War Incident, 123-130.
173 Conway-Lanz, “Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War,” 50.
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army showed no concern for the refugees; on many occasions, the military assisted the
missionaries’ efforts, as when officers would allow missionaries to cross the battle lines
in order to bring refugees to safer locations. Although the missionaries could only help a
limited number of people, their moral guidance perhaps saved US involvement in Korea
from becoming bogged down in atrocity scandals and a public outcry over the ignoring of
the refugee crisis. It is hard to measure the level of their success or contributions, but the
voices of the missionaries were surely heard both in the battlefield and on the home front.
Their presence in the war zone made the difference between life and death for many
Korean civilians.
As the US entered the Korean conflict, religion offered a way for Americans to
identify with the Korean cause in a decade of revival. The efforts of missionaries to
bring the war home to America through reports and food-and-clothing drives
strengthened this connection and produced a paternalistic view of the Korean people.
Then, as reports of Communist atrocities against the southern people, particularly
Christians, flooded in, America felt as a father would at the persecution of his children.
The relief work of the missionaries served a vital role, particularly in the first
critical months of the war, when need was great, supplies were limited, and no other
relief agencies had yet noticed the problem or gotten through the bureaucracy to address
it. Countless lives were saved in this brief period. Furthermore, in being the first, the
missionaries established their leading role in raising and distributing relief supplies. It
was in this period that American Christians began or expanded some of the most famous
charities of today. They became outspoken, and actively worked to promote awareness of
the war and the plight of the Korean people, thereby influencing American public opinion.
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The war also offered new opportunities for the growth of the Korean church
despite its initial losses.

Missionaries connected relief work with pastoral care by

providing pastors for each kun in the overcrowded refugee centers. People began to
identify the church as the place to find compassion and practical help, leading to an even
more positive public image than the church had enjoyed before. The phenomenal growth
of the Korean churches during and after the war is therefore understandable. In addition,
with the help of American missionaries, the Christian community emerged as the most
prominent political-moral force in consolidating South Korean nationalism against
Communist expansion.
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CHAPTER 7
Occupation and Evacuation

INTRODUCTION
The victory at Inch’on encouraged the United Nations to pursue a new goal of
unifying Korea by force. The crossing of the 38 Parallel parted the Iron Curtain for a
brief period, affording the world a rare glimpse of life under Communism.

As UN

troops marched into North Korea, missionaries, especially those who had worked in the
North before World War II, eagerly followed behind. These missionaries would lend
assistance to the brief UN occupation of North Korea. Then, in the ensuing evacuation
crisis, they pressed the UN forces to transport hundreds of thousands of refugees.
Although missionaries had no real authority, their eagerness to save civilians made an
impression on those who did have authority.

Their work was a major factor in the

military decision to lend its support to the most massive human evacuation process in
history. And though the evacuation of so many destitute human beings had no military
advantage, this decision would prove to be a great psychological weapon. To the troops
on the ground, it would give them a sense that the cause they fought for was just; and to
the eyes of observers back home, it would serve as proof that people, given a choice,
would choose freedom over Communism in droves.

394
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UN OCCUPATION OF NORTH KOREA
The UN occupation of North Korea was a unique period of the Korean War, but
no historian has carefully analyzed its impact on the development of the war. Because of
the success of the Inch’on Landing, more missionaries were allowed to return to Korea;
some even entered North Korea. Religious interests filled a special role in these events,
as the US military, in an effort to stabilize the occupied regions, enlisted the help of
missionaries and other religiously motivated people.
The Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel
The decision to cross the 38th parallel has been a controversial issue in Korean
War historiography. Historian Jongsuk Chay provided critical analysis of the debate in
the State Department, while historian William Stueck has explored the international
dimensions of the decision.1 Within the Truman administration, there was a desire to
unify Korea, so long as there was no definite sign of Chinese or Soviet intervention. The
President authorized the crossing of the 38th Parallel on August 27,1950.2 It took another
month for the United States to secure United Nations approval. On October 7, the UN
passed a resolution “to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.”

In its

ambiguity, this resolution sanctioned UN forces to cross the 38 Parallel. Public opinion
in the United States also favored a plan to “continue fighting” in pushing northward until

1 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic o f Korea and the United States, 19481953 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 210. See also William Stueck, The Korean War: An International
History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 85-126.
2 Ibid., 209-210.
3 Ibid., 210.
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the North Koreans surrendered.4
Among South Korean officials, however, there was never any debate. President
Syngman Rhee and his troops were eager to liberate the North. Rhee believed that the
ROK Army had the right to cross the parallel and unify the country even if the United
Nations refused to do so. Unification was both a personal and national crusade. Rhee’s
position was supported by a majority of the Southern population. Christians and northern
refugees were particularly vocal supporters - the refugees were eager to return home,
while the Christians wanted to liberate P’yongyang, the so-called “Christian capital of
Korea.” On October 1, without waiting for the final decision of the UN, President Rhee
(with General MacArthur’s permission) ordered the 3rd ROK Infantry Division, which
was waiting at Kangnung on the East Coast, to march north (see Map 8).5 The 26th and
23rd Infantry Regiments were sent next. They first reached KosSng, and then pushed
toward Wonsan. With the help of the Capital Division, the 3rd Division captured Wonsan
on October 10. ROK troops, however, did not stop but continued to march north and
reached Hamhung on October 17. Ten days later, the ROK 6th Division reached the
Manchurian border separating China from North Korea.
Rhee’s political ambition and autocratic rule in South Korea had alarmed
members of the United Nations, so they sought to deny him jurisdiction over the North by

4 In October 1950, the Gallup Poll did a public opinion survey on the question: “What do you, yourself,
think -- should the fighting stop when we have succeeded in pushing the NK back over the line from where
they started —or do you think we should continue the fight in their own territory until they have
surrendered?” 64% favored “continue fighting” in North Korean territory while 27% thought that the UN
should “stop fighting.” See George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, 1949-1958
(New York: Random House, 1972), 2:943.
5 Chi Op Lee, Call Me “Speedy L ee”: Memoirs o f a Korean War Soldiers (Seoul: Won Min Publishing
House, 2001), 98. The United States had already decided to cross the 38th Parallel with UN troops on
September 29. See Secretary Marshall’s directions to MacArthur, Foreign Relations o f the United States
1950, Vol. VII Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 826. Rhee’s action was
not completely on his own initiative, but he was glad to obtain permission from MacArthur.
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instructing General MacArthur to set up a military government in the North. When UN
troops marched North on October 9, the race with the ROK army was on.

General

th
MacArthur directed General Walton H. Walker’s 8 Army to take P’yongyang as soon as
possible, while General Edward M. Almond’s X Corps was to make an amphibious
landing somewhere along the North Korean east coast. MacArthur’s plan was that, if
P’yongyang fell before General Almond landed, then he should no longer strike
westward across the peninsula.6 Instead, the X Corps would continue north to catch up
with the ROK troops. This decision proved fatal, however, because a failure to secure the
P’yongyang-Sinanju-Hungnam-Wonsan quadrilateral - the “bottle-neck” and the heart
of North Korea - left UN troops vulnerable to counter-attack (see Map 8). In addition,
there was no coordination between the 8th Army and X Corps; they had poor
communication and were under different commanding generals.
The Capture o f Pyongyang and Other North Korean Cities
P’yongyang fell to the UN on October 19. Before the war began, the city had
approximately 300,000 residents. While most Communists had fled the city before UN
forces arrived, the majority of the civilian population remained. The damage from UN
bombing was not severe, and the public welcomed the troops enthusiastically. According
to TIME correspondent Dwight Martin, who had traveled with the army, “the people of
P’yongyang cheered, waving South Korean flags, British flags, Chinese Nationalist flags

6 James A. Field, Jr., History o f United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1962), 253.
7 In the P ’y6ngyang-Sinanj u-Hungnam-W5nsan quadrilateral, the axial range was low because the
mountains rarely rose above 3000 feet. It had also the best transverse communications in the entire
peninsula. Moreover, the harbors on both coasts were useful to forces sustained by sea, and that area’s
industrial towns were linked by a road net o f considerable density in Korean terms. Thus, it was easy to
defend and important to keep. See ibid., 253.
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and improvised U.N. flags, which had been designed from hearsay.”8 He described the
scene as “the most spontaneous demonstration seen in any Asiatic city since the World
War II liberation of Shanghai from the Japanese.”9 Many citizens in P’yongyang cried
out at the tops of their voices, “Chayu (Jayu) Haebong Mansei! Chayu (Jayu) Haebang
Mansei!” (“Hurrah for our freedom and our independence!”)10
It was strange that Dwight Martin did not mention the waving of American flags.
Perhaps he forgot or perhaps it was just too obvious to list. Everywhere in the north,
North Korean citizens made their own American flags, and waved them to welcome the
American troops, not only in P’yongyang, but also in other cities as well.11 Everywhere
American soldiers went, they were joyfully welcomed by local citizens. Pfc. Leonard
Korgie of G Company of the 21st Infantry wrote:
The civilians were so happy to see us. I was thrilled for them. They wanted to give us
eggs and produce, not like the South Koreans, who tried to sell them to us. They lined
the road in their villages, looking like they’d been relieved of a heavy burden - silent,
happy, meek as lambs. I guess five years o f Communist rule would do that to a people.12

The Underwood brothers also recorded how grateful the North Korean civilians were
when they entered the North. In Hamhung, Lt. Richard Underwood told his aunt Grace
Underwood about the atmosphere after the US soldiers entered Hamhung:
The entire atmosphere was one o f thanksgiving that at last, after five years o f Communist
domination, they could laugh at jokes, visit their friends, go to church and come out from
caves and holes where so many o f the young men had been hiding to avoid the necessity
o f fighting for Reds.13

8 “Substantial Citizens,” TIME, 20 October 1950.
9 Ibid.
10 Chulho Awe, Decision A t Dawn: The Underground Christian Witness in R ed Korea (New York: Harper
& Row, Publisher, 1965), 145.
11 Michael R. Skerik, “Camouflage,” in I Remember Korea: Veterans Tell Their Stories o f the Korean War,
1950-53, ed. Linda Granfield (New York: Clarion Books, 2003), 57. When Skerik saw a homemade flag
flying in WQnsan, he asked for the flag and the Koreans gave it to him. It was a flag with only forty-nine
stars by mistake.
12 Pfc. Leondard Korgie’s recollection in Donald Knox, The Korean War An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin
(San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publisher, 1985), 392.
13 Quoted in Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f Horace G.
Underwood, ed. Michael J. Devine (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 147-148.
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Like Pfc. Korgie, Lt. Richard Underwood reported that the civilians offered American
troops “their homes and their food (short as they were themselves).”14 Some, according
to Richard Underwood, were even willing to work for the UN for free.
Christians were particularly cheerful because they had just survived a month of
the most intensive anti-Christian persecution since the Communists took power. Between
the Inch’on Landing on September 15 and the fall of P’yongyang on October 19, a reign
of terror had claimed many innocent lives as the retreating North Korean authorities
sought to eradicate anyone they suspected might collaborate with the UN. The Catholic
Church in the North lost one hundred percent of its priests (the actual number was sixty
in total),15 while more than one hundred fifty Korean Protestant pastors disappeared - not
including elders, deacons, and prominent laymen.16 Communists also executed many
doctors, teachers, and skilled technicians.17 Upon entering the city, UN troops discovered
hundreds of fresh bodies in open fields, basements, and shallow mass-graves.18 The
ROK and the X Corps uncovered similar atrocities in every major city they captured,
including Wonsan, Hungnam, and Hamhung.19
The violence did not stop with the Northern retreat, however.

Communist

guerrillas in the mountains and countryside threatened to punish anyone who collaborated
14 Ibid., 148.
15 “Vatican Delegation’s Mission in North Korea: No Priests Left and No Data on Number o f Catholics,”
Information provided by the Immaculate Conception Chapel in Seoul.
16 According to Chulho Awe, a resident and an underground anti-Communist in P’ySngyang, Christian
leaders were arrested and executed prior to the fall o f P’ySngyang. Many o f the underground anti
communists in the North were Christians. Ibid., 82-85,141. See also Donald N. Clark, Living
Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2003), 387.
17 A confidential letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 29 October 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library:
The Korean War, ed. Kim Heung Soo (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 146.
18 Ibid, 147. See also Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 387.
19 For the case o f WSnsan, see Richard Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” (Unpublished Manuscripts,
2002), 84-85. For the case o f Hungnam, see Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 148. For
the case o f Hamhung, see letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 15 November 1950, Presbyterian Church
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15.
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with the UN.

These localized power struggles raised tensions and hampered the

occupation government. To root out Communist influence, ROK armies brought with
them South Korean police and rightist youth groups.

Some of them were originally

refugees from the North. These ROK supporters doled out their own brand of wartime
justice, further escalating the tensions between the pro-Communist and the antiCommunist residents. UN troops watched helplessly, with no means of controlling the
violence erupting from intense hatred, retaliation, and deep ideological conflicts.20
Missionaries Going “Home”
From October to November, missionaries returned to Korea from Japan and the
United States under the sponsorship of the American embassy in Pusan. The victory of
Inch’on and the recapture of Seoul encouraged Ambassador John J. Muccio to support
the missionaries’ return. Medical missionaries received top priority, given the great need
for medical and relief workers. Dr. George Rue, the Director of the Seoul Sanitarium and
Hospital, returned on October 15 with his wife Grace, flying with Muccio on General
MacArthur’s plane Bataan.21 Others followed, including trained nurses. Among those
sent by Presbyterian Boards were Rev. Earle J. Woodberry, who used to be a missionary
to China, Mr. James M. Phillips and Mr. Raymond C. Provost.22 The Methodists sent
back Rev. Charles A. Sauer, Mr. Donald Payne, and Dr. Fred Manget, who would take
charge of the Severance Hospital.23 The exact number of returnees was unclear because
most of them returned through different channels and it was hard to track all of them
20 See Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 388.
21 Penny Young Sook Kim and Charles Milles, Though Bombs May Fall: The Extraordinary Story o f
George Rue, M issionary D octor to Korea (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 2003), 83.
22 ‘T he One Hundred and Fourteenth Annual Report o f the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Presbyterian
Church in the United States o f America,” Presented to the General Assembly, May 1951 (New York) Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
23 “Korea News Letter Number 3,” 2 November 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church
Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
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down. Perhaps no less than twenty had returned from overseas and served either in their
own mission stations or in various relief organizations.
Following the 5th Air Force’s northward advancement, Lt. (Doctor) Howard
Moffett was the first missionary to arrive in P’yongyang City, his birthplace.

The

Commander of the 5th Air Force, Lieutenant General Earle E. Partridge, had sent Lt.
Moffett ahead to secure a suitable base to serve as their headquarters within the city,
because the lieutenant “[knew] every inch of that terrain.” 24 To the first group of
civilians that he found, he asked whether they were Christians. One of them said that he
was, and then asked the lieutenant whether he knew “Ma-Moksa” - the Korean title of
Dr. Moffett’s father, Rev. Samuel A. Moffett, the most famous and well-respected
missionary in North Korea. As soon as the Korean found out that Lt. Moffett was the son
of Ma-Moksa, he insisted on going with him into the city. Soon, fifteen more Christians
were following along, “excitedly talking.”

It was a kind of welcome that even Lt.

Moffett himself did not expect. Once inside the city, Lt. Moffett surveyed the Capitol
building of the North Korean government, which was built on a Presbyterian Mission
compound, and took a nap inside Kim H-sung’s office. During the UN occupation of
th

tTi

P’yongyang, the building became the headquarters of the 8 Army and the 5 Air Force.
A few days later, Lt. Richard Underwood, Rev. Harold Voelkel (Civilian
Chaplain), and Rev. William Shaw (Civilian Chaplain), also arrived with the UN troops.
The two Reverends were former missionaries to P’yongyang, who spoke Korean with a
strong P’yongyang accent.

Next, other civilian missionaries came, including Rev.

Edward Adams, Rev. Harry Hills, Rev. Archibald Campbell, and Rev. Francis Kinsler,
24 Letter from Howard Moffett, 30 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box
18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
25 Ibid.
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and brought with them five Korean refugee pastors, Rev. Yun Ha-yong, Rev. Han
Kyong-jik, Rev. Yi In-sik, Rev. Kim Yong-son, and Rev. Yu Hwa-jun.26
These missionaries and Korean pastors met with surviving pastors and church
elders, hearing, again and again, similar stories of life under Communism. “From all we
learn,” Chaplain Voelkel wrote, “the method of liquidation was to march them along
stretches from day to day northward until wearied and then in their exhaustion, unable to
trudge along any longer, they were shot.”

Because of what they saw and heard from

their Christian friends, these missionaries were convinced that “the Reds conducted a
systematic, apparently a fine-tooth-combed extermination of the leadership of North
Korea.”28 Voelkel’s report on the loss of the North Korean leadership was published by
Presbyterian Life on December 9, 1950, and also later by Time Magazine on April 2,
1951.
The visit of the missionaries and refugee church leaders brought hope to North
Korean Christians. A special service was held on October 29 at the Somun (West Gate)
Presbyterian Church.

For the first time since the 1945 liberation, North Korean

Christians received Gospels and New Testaments.

9Q

During the service, Rev. Han

Kyong-jik gave a sermon on Isaiah 60:1: “Arise and shine for the light is come and the
glory of the Lord is risen upon thee.” In his message to Korean Christians, Rev. Hein
“challenged the people to get to work, not to lean on America or the United Nations as

26 A confidential letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 29 October 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library:
The Korean War, 146-147.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Chaplain Voelkel brought boxes o f religious supplies with him from Seoul for distribution in
P ’ybngyang. Ibid.
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great and generous as their help might be.”30 Revival meetings were held in different
locations with the support of the US Chaplain Office.31
According to Lt. Howard Moffett, the response to the coming of these
missionaries and refugee pastors was enthusiastic. “People were packed in like sardines
[in the church] and thousands turned away,” due to a lack of room.32 Many American
soldiers and their chaplains were surprised to see that the streets in P’yongyang “were
covered with people carrying Bibles and hymnbooks” on Sunday.33 Some soldiers
invited Lt. Moffett “over to supper so as to talk about it.”34 Lt. Moffett was delighted at
the opportunity “to give them a good insight into Christian work” in P’yongyang and
North Korea. As a result, many soldiers mistook him as “Chaplain Moffett.”35 Often,
UN soldiers were invited by missionaries to churches, and participated in worship sideby-side with Korean natives.
Since they knew more about North Korea and North Koreans than anyone else,
missionaries enjoyed good publicity as the foreign press flooded into P’yongyang. Time
reporters, Life photographers, and American Broadcasting Company writers all asked
missionaries for information to conduct their reports. Religious journalists, such as the

30 A confidential letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 29 October 1950, Documents o f the WCC Library:
The Korean War, 146.
31 Awe, Decision A t Dawn, 159.
32 Letter from Howard Moffett, 30 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box
18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
33 Lt. Howard Moffett mentioned the reaction of American soldiers in his letter and Rev. Ned Adams
reported the same kind o f response to the Board published by the Presbyterian Life. See “The Church in
Korea: Slow but Sure,” Presbyterian Life, 9 December 1950, 15.
34 Ibid.
35 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 5 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Editor of Presbyterian Life, Robert J. Cadigan, also visited P’yongyang. He regarded his
visit as “one of the greatest ambitions of [his] life.”36
Most of these correspondents recognized the contribution of American
missionaries and wrote positive reports on the influence of Christian churches in North
Korea. For example, Time Magazine presented a story by Dwight Martin on the Russian
occupation of North Korea which was based entirely on an interview with Na Song-dok
(La Sung-duk), a 59-year-old elder in the P ’yongyang’s Somun Presbyterian Church.
Martin outlined Communist persecution of the Christian churches and the disappearance
of various key church leaders. Although about thirty to forty percent of the Christian
population passively collaborated with the Communist authorities, Martin recognized the
Christian population as the strongest anti-Communist force in North Korea.37 Other
journalists also shared Martin’s pro-Christian attitude as well. According to a United
Press report from P ’yongyang, North Korean authorities “suffered a severe propaganda
defeat during the control of North Korea by trying to discredit American missionaries.”38
The main reason for such a defeat, the report explained, was that the citizens in
-2Q

P’yongyang “knew them to be kind, honest, and magnificent people.”

Therefore,

“when the Russians painted them as lying, thieving scoundrels,” most of the people
recognized the general dishonesty of Communist propaganda, and as a result, refused to
take any Communist reports at their face value.40
The Christian Century was particularly interested in the development of
Christianity in Korea. This non-denominational journal urged cooperation between the
36 “The World Scene: From Hope to Snowy Death,” Presbyterian Life, 6 January 1951,15.
37 “Carrots and Radishes,” TIME, 13 November 1950.
38 “The Church in Korea: All the News Is Not Bad,” Presbyterian Life, 11 November 1950,15.
39 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

405

Presbyterians and Methodists for the reconstruction of Korean churches.41 Its editor
pointed out that the Western church had a moral obligation to provide for the families of
those who had been killed by the North Korean authorities because Communist leaders
feared that they were undercover agents working for UN forces.42 The losses of the
Korean churches, the editor argued, would “give to Christianity a new power and moral
status in its approach to the Korean people.”43
In early November, Major Alfred D. Simenski, who had just been elected to
Congress from Newark, New Jersey, paid an important political visit to North Korea.
Major Simenski’s job was to investigate Communist atrocities for the Department of
Public Information. Chaplain Voelkel invited Major Simenski, in addition to several
chaplains, including a Jewish chaplain, to attend a church meeting in Hamhung (see Map
8). Lt. Richard Underwood served as their interpreter. The Korean Christians “prepared
a statement of thanks which was read [to express their] gratitude to America for
deliverance from oppression.”44 In response, Major Simenski promised to report their
gratitude in his first speech before Congress on January 3, 1951. The Jewish chaplain
also spoke and told the Korean Christians, “I bring you greetings from Jews
everywhere.”45 “It was heartening to the Koreans to know that they had so many friends
who were anxious to help them in their time of need,” Chaplain Voelkel explained, “and
it did the visitors good to see such a crowd of ardent Korean Christians.”46

41 Garland Evans Hopkins, “Korea’s Effect - Plus and Minus” (editorial correspondence), The Christian
Century LXVII (15 November 1950): 352-353.
42 “Korea Lengthens Roll o f Christian Martyrs,” The Christian Century LXVII (29 November 1950): 1412.
43 Ibid.
44 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 19 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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By building relationships with American politicians and publicizing Korean
Christianity, US religious and secular journalists fostered an increased awareness and
interest in Korea among the American public.

Although the excitement over the

successes of the occupation period was to be short-lived, it paved the way for an
enthusiastic outpouring of American support for the relief efforts that would soon be
needed, once the Chinese Communists entered the war and turned the tables again.
Missionary Activities in the Occupied Areas
Since the Communists had purged the educated class before fleeing, the US Army
had difficulty finding natives who were qualified to run the government.47 Colonel
Archibald W. Melchior, a civil-affairs officer who was responsible for organizing a
provisional city council, could not identify the leading citizens in the city.

His initial

method was to find a well-dressed Korean and ask him to “round up some substantial
citizens.”49 Of course, the loyalty of these recruits, as well as their training, was very
questionable.

Without experienced administrators or qualified interpreters, American

civilian affairs officers faced a severe challenge.

In some areas, the search was so

desperate that some US officials wanted to reinstate the Communist government in order
to prevent a state of anarchy. By doing so, of course, the troops offended the local anti
communists, and created confusion and misunderstanding between the occupation forces
and the Korean civilians.
With such challenges, the US Army welcomed the help of missionaries and
Korean Christians in the administration of the occupied regions.

Lt. Moffett and

47 Letter from Edward Adams to John C. Smith, 12 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
48 “Substantial Citizens,” TIME, 30 October 1950.
49 Ibid.
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Chaplain Voelkel sought help from various Christian communities to locate anti
communists to work for the UN. Christians in P’yongyang proved eager and supportive;
while in some other less-Christianized cities, such as Wonsan, many feared retribution for
collaborating should the Communists return.50 Frequent guerilla attacks also led local
people to shy away from Americans. Still, according to the missionaries, the Christian
community in the North remained the most loyal supporter of the UN occupation.
As missionaries served the UN military government, they also provided materials
and protection to the Christian community. One example of material support occurred
when missionaries learned of an abandoned Communist grain stockpile in the
countryside; they secured “free passage” for two Christian youth organizations to bring
the grain to P’yongyang for relief.51
An example of the protection was the missionaries’ efforts to free Christians
mistakenly imprisoned by UN forces. Because of active Communist guerilla moments,
many North Korean civilians had been arrested as suspected Communists.

Chaplain

Voelkel’s position in the POW administration enabled him to release those he knew were
falsely imprisoned.

For instance, in Anju, eighteen Christians were mistaken for

guerrillas because they possessed several Soviet weapons. The elder of the church found
Chaplain Voelkel and explained that these men belonged to a local defense force for
security against guerrillas. Voelkel immediately went to the POW camp and arranged for
their release.52

50 Letter from Chaplain Voelkel, 19 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140,
Box 18, Folder 15. See also Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 387, 390.
51 Letter from Edward Adams to John C. Smith, 12 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
52 Letter from Chaplain Voelkel, 5 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box
18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Since the occupation period was short, missionaries in fact could do very little for
the North Korean Christian community.
problems for the Korean Christians.

Instead, their brief visits caused serious

Communist supporters blacklisted those who

collaborated with the UN forces and waited for revenge when the Communist authorities
returned. Christians were identified as traitors because of their close relationship with the
occupation troops.

Although missionaries did make some contributions to assist the

military in governing the occupied areas, their real impact would be felt during the
impending evacuation of hundreds of thousands of refugees, following the Chinese
intervention in late 1950 that quickly changed the tide of the Korean War.

MISSIONARIES AND OPERATION HEARTBREAK
On October 18, the day before UN troops captured P’yongyang, Chinese People’s
Volunteers (CPV) had secretly crossed the Yalu River. The Chinese had warned the UN
several times in late September and early October against any violation of the 38th
Parallel through the Indian Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Sardar
K. M. Panikkar. Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai told Panikkar plainly that the
Chinese would tolerate the presence of South Korean forces in the North, but that an
“American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance.”53 The State
Department received this warning through London on the same day.54 Nevertheless,

53 Quote in Priscilla Roberts, “Panikkar, Sardar K. M„” in Encyclopedia o f the Korean War: A Political,
Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002): 510.
54 Foreign Relations o f the United States 1950, Vol. VII Korea, 839.
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Washington seems to have underestimated the significance of Zhou’s warning and
thereby caused one of the worst military disasters in US history.55
China Enters the Korean War
Mao Zedong’s decision to send troops to save North Korea quickly changed the
direction of the Korean War. Historian Chen Jian argued that China entered the war
because of Chinese Communist “leaders’ perception of China’s security interests and
their judgment of to what extent and in which ways such interests had been challenged
during the Korean crisis.”56 Truman’s decision to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan
Strait had upset Mao’s plan to invade Taiwan in August 1950. The US had interfered in
what they considered to be a domestic affair. And now US troops (under a UN label)
were marching towards China’s North Korean border. Chinese Communist leaders were
initially divided over how to respond. Mao won the debate, however, by arguing that
China should reassert its historical influence over East Asia and also protect itself by
resisting foreign encroachment around its borders. Therefore, the Chinese government

55 The puzzling part o f this phase o f UN operations was that even though the United States might not have
halted its attack against the North, the Far Eastern Command in Tokyo should have exercised caution in
directing the troops’ movements in North Korea. Military historians generally attributed such failure to
General MacArthur’s arrogance and the lack o f coordination between the 8th Army and X Corps. See
Shelby L. Stanton, The Ten Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996) and Stanley
Weintraub, M acArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing o f an American Hero (New York: The Free Press,

2000).
56 Jian Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making o f the Sino-American Confrontation (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 4.
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clearly warned that China would intervene if US troops crossed the 38th Parallel.57
It was not that the US turned a deaf ear to such threats. From August 1950, the
Truman administration took actions that suggested they considered Chinese intervention
as a serious possibility. The State Department and the intelligence agencies examined
and re-examined the Chinese warning. The President later disclosed that he had flown on
October 15 to Wake Island for a meeting with General MacArthur to discuss the
possibility of Chinese intervention. But if this is all true, then why did the US army not
exercise more caution as it advanced toward the Yalu River?
Two primary reasons for America’s miscalculation were poor communication
with China and pride in US military strength. The United States had refused to recognize
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after it was established on October 1, 1949, so
there were no direct official communication channels between the two governments.
Such indirect diplomacy as existed was less effective than direct communication, helping
to breed mutual misunderstanding of the other’s intentions. In addition, the amazing
success of MacArthur’s gamble at the In’chon Landing likely clouded American leaders’
judgment.

Few were willing to challenge General MacArthur’s confidence that the

Chinese Communists would not intervene or that the UN forces would be able to defeat
them even if they did.
57 The reasons they chose India as their channel of communication instead o f other Western nations
continues to be investigated. A possible explanation is that, because o f the resentment against Western
imperialists and the new sense o f Asia’s ascent to power and influence, the Chinese chose a recently
independent Asian country as their spokesperson rather than a neutral Western state. An even more
plausible explanation involves matters o f diplomatic and military maneuvering. Mao Zedong chose to fight
the United States in Korea instead o f in Taiwan because o f the relative advantage o f “human-wave” tactics
in ground assaults. China would be at a disadvantage in naval and air warfare. He did not expect the
United States to back o ff and give up its military objectives even if China delivered its ultimatum loud and
clear. Sending his messages through India would keep the Americans in suspense, while at the same time
giving the Chinese soldiers more time to sneak through the China-Korean border for a surprise attack.
Mao, as a matter o f fact, did not want to confront the United States openly. Therefore, he never declared
war against the United States. Instead, he sent “volunteers,” so that the United States would not have an
excuse to attack the Chinese mainland.
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And yet, ironically, the Chinese Communists secretly entered North Korea on the
same day that General MacArthur was on Wake Island offering assurances to President
Truman.

The Chinese strategy was specifically designed to take advantage of

MacArthur’s north-bound movement.

From October 15 to November 25, Chinese

“volunteers” traveled by night along the ridge of Nangnim Sanmaek, taking up positions
surrounding the isolated UN units. Prior to their major offensive, China only sent a few
regiments to test the strength of the UN troops along the Chinese-Korean border, thereby
misrepresenting their actual strength and concealing their infiltration behind the UN
defenses. MacArthur took the bait when both the 8th Army and the X Corps marched
north toward the Yalu River.
“Missionary Kids” in US Intelligence Units
As the US failed to take the Communist threat seriously and continued to march
toward the border between China and North Korea, frontline soldiers began to encounter
periodic attacks from the Chinese “volunteers.” There were also additional warnings and
signs of the possibility of Chinese intervention when UN troops entered P’yongyang.
Before the North Korean Communists left the city, they threatened P’yongyang residents
that they would return with the Chinese army, and that any person collaborating with the
UN forces would certainly be punished. In late October, locals informed ROK soldiers
that Chinese troops had been spotted in the northern mountains. These rumors were
confirmed when the ROK’s 26th Infantry Regiment captured the first Chinese prisoner on
October 28. Prior to that day, UN troops near the Yalu River had already captured eleven
Chinese. Both Lt. Richard Underwood with the X Corps in the east and Captain Charles
Bemheisel with the 8th Army in the west, because of their language skills, had
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interrogated these prisoners and concluded that the Chinese forces had entered the war.
They sent their reports to the UN Command headquarters in Tokyo.
Nevertheless, US intelligence analysts in Tokyo dismissed these Chinese
prisoners as Korean-Chinese who fought with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria
during the Chinese civil war. Because of the headquarters’ refusal to accept their field
reports, Lt. Richard Underwood was “furious” and “often ranted to the X-Corps G-2
(Intelligence Unit) about it.”58 But his superiors refused to do anything to pressure
Tokyo, leaving Lt. Underwood frustrated and fearing for the safety of the UN forces.
Captain Charles Bemheisel was with the 8th Army at the frontline.

In early

November, with his superiors refusing to acknowledge the Chinese intervention, he
loaded several Chinese POWs in a vehicle from the frontline, and drove them several
hours south to the 8 Army Headquarters in P’yongyang in order to warn the commander
of the 8th Army.

Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, General Walker

immediately recalled his probing columns and formed his army up along the south bank
of the Ch’ongch’on River. Before moving his troops further north, he waited for the
logistical deficiencies of the 8th Army to be resolved by the reopening of Chinnamp’o, a
vital seaport for logistic support on the west coast (see Map 8).59
General Walker’s caution merited praise and a military fiasco could have been
avoided if MacArthur had slowed down his advance and established defenses between
Sinanju and Hungnam. But General MacArthur, commanding from Tokyo, pursued an
aggressive policy built around a desire to end the war quickly and an underestimation of
the numerical strength of the Chinese troops. When the port was finally opened on
58 Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” 88.
59 James A. Field, Jr., History o f United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington, D.C.: Naval History,
1962), 256.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

413

November 20, 40,000 tons of supplies were unloaded for the 8th Army. On November
24, in spite of confirmation that the Chinese were intervening, MacArthur ordered a new
offensive, because he considered the UN forces to be strong enough to repulse the
Chinese Army.60 In reality, the UN defensive line was stretched too thin, especially since
tli

the rugged terrain hamstrung communications between the 8 Army and the X Corps.
The competitive spirit between the two commanding generals did not help
communications and coordination. The divided and isolated UN divisions, moving into
rough, unfamiliar terrain under unfavorable weather conditions, were waiting to be
slaughtered.
This new offensive sent the UN troops straight into a Chinese ambush. After four
days of fierce battle, to MacArthur’s surprise, the fronts of both the ROK Army and the X
Corps collapsed. The Chinese used the tactic of “human sea waves” to terrorize UN
forces. They sent hundreds, or sometimes thousands, of troops in waves, screaming and
yelling in the face of the UN’s withering firepower. Some troops in the following waves
were unarmed because they were expected to find rifles on the ground as they advanced
among their fallen comrades.61 Many UN soldiers were shocked and demoralized by the
brutality of war and this massive loss of life. The Marines in the Ch’angjin (Chosin)
Reservoir were particularly hard hit and fighting for their lives. Casualties among ROK
and US Marines were high. Even though the UN had stronger firepower and enjoyed
almost unchallenged air superiority, the troops were overwhelmed by the number of the
enemy and frustrated by the malfunctioning of their weapons in the cold weather.

60 Ibid., 240.
61 Stephen E. Pease, Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 1992): 86.
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On November 28, General Walker and General Almond were summoned to
Tokyo for a conference with General MacArthur. The truth of the strength of the Chinese
offensive was finally revealed. Beijing had sent 30 divisions, totaling 250,000 men, to
Korea. United with the 180,000 North Korean new recruits, the enemy was considered
too strong for the current UN forces. In order to preserve the strength of UN troops, the
th

Commander authorized both the 8 Army and the X Corps to withdraw immediately. On
th

December 3, the 8 Army began a full retreat from P’yongyang, and the X Corps from
Hamhung.
Evacuation from Pyongyang
The sudden reversal of the Korean War disappointed many pro-American and
anti-Communist Koreans, especially those who had actively collaborated with the United
Nations. The Christian population was particularly at risk since they had worked closely
with UN occupation forces. American missionaries feared for their Christian friends.
They immediately arranged transportation for them. They organized what they called,
“Operation Heartbreak,” an attempt to evacuate Christian leaders to the south.62 Trucks
loaded with Christian leaders and their families were sent southward.63
In order to make their way southward, refugees had to find a means to cross the
Taedong River because the bridge was destroyed by Communist agents. Many risked
their lives by crawling over the broken bridge. Along the Taedong River, UN soldiers
constructed temporary pontoon bridges to allow only tanks and army vehicles to cross;
refugees were not allowed to use these bridges. Missionaries wrote each of the Korean
drivers a note declaring that the passengers were Christians, and asking UN troops to
62 ‘T he World Scene: From Hope to Snowy Death,” Presbyterian Life, 6 January 1950,15.
63 Letter from Rev. Edward Adams to Dr. John Smith, 1 January 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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assist their escape. Most of these trucks were able to cross the pontoon bridges and pass
the UN checkpoints unchallenged.64
Lt. Moffett could have left the city with Ambassador Muccio earlier when the 5th
Air Force abandoned P ’yongyang, but he decided to stay on a little longer in order to
assist the refugees. Luckily, he had requisitioned a 1939 Plymouth in P’yongyang. The
car had once belonged to his missionary neighbors. His uniform allowed him to use the
car to start ferrying carloads of Koreans on the pontoon bridge across the Taedong River
before the city fell into the hands of the Communists on December 5. He did not count
how many people he had helped, but he tried to assist as many as he could before the
troops destroyed the bridge.

His final carload included the family of a long-time

Presbyterian Mission employee. They all jammed into the car for the seventeen-hour ride
to Seoul. There exists no data on how many people left P’yongyang, or how many
Christians the missionaries evacuated, but the estimated number of all refugees on the
road to the South was more than one million.65
A Small Miracle in Chinnamp’o
Refugees who could not cross the Taedong River turned westward toward
Chinnamp’o, hoping to find luck in crossing the river or catching a boat to the South. On
December 5, Lt. Jim Lampe, a Korean-born missionary child who had participated in the
Inch’on Landing earlier, was with the Navy at the port of Chinnamp’o. His job was to
direct the evacuation of troops and materials. Having spent his high school years in
P’yongyang attending Pyeng Yang Foreign School, Lt. Lampe’s heart was bitter about

64 Awe, Decision a t Dawn, 163-164,168.
65 Gertrude Samuels, “Korea’s Refugees - Misery on the March,” New York Times, 11 February 1951, 156.
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the deterioration of the war situation and the decision to retreat from North Korea.
Nevertheless, there was very little he could do.
The situation at the dock was disorganized and chaotic. The naval units that had
already anchored at the port were: the Destroyer Foss, under Lieutenant Commander
Henry J. Ereckson which was providing the city with electric power; a small Korean
naval base command with three motor launches; and a minesweeping group at the mouth
of the Taedong River.66 Waiting for evacuation at the port were about 1,700 American
soldiers belonging to the port logistics group and roughly 6,000 Koreans, including
wounded soldiers, government workers, military and political prisoners, police and boy
scouts.67 But in addition to these people, who had an official claim for transportation,
there were also 50,000 refugees.
At the time, no officers knew exactly how many transport ships were coming or
whether the Navy could evacuate these panic-stricken refugees.

All that the South

Korean Navy could offer was one hundred sailboats. Taking 50,000 people on boats to
Pusan would be impossible, but an effort was made to transport 20,000 across the river so
that they could move southward on foot.68 Lt. Lampe worked anxiously to evacuate as
many Korean civilians as possible before the Americans abandoned the port.
Time was running out, however. By noon December 5, Lt. Lampe’s ship had
already loaded the most valuable supplies on the landing craft and the captain wanted to
be under way.

Lt. Lampe struggled to postpone the pullout while he directed local

sampans and junks to fill with refugees. He used the power craft to pull them to the other
side of the River so that they could proceed southward to Seoul. More people were
66 Field, History o f United States Naval Operations: Korea, 271-272.
67 Ibid., 273.
68 Ibid.
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flooding into the dock even at the last minute. Eventually, Lt. Lampe had to leave with
his ship, lamenting his failure to save them all.69
Nevertheless, his sincere attempt to save the refugees probably enlightened other
Naval officers too. What Lt. Lampe did not know after his departure was that a US navy
transportation ship, Bexar, which had failed to receive notice of its diversion to a safer
destination, arrived at the port unexpectedly. The Naval officers sent all the remaining
three thousand latecomers at the docks onboard before they destroyed the oil storage,
harbor cranes, and railway equipment at the port.70 Those rescued considered it a small
miracle.
A Great Disappointment in Wonsan
While the Navy was destroying Chinnamp’o, another military evacuation was
under way in Wonsan. The decision was made earlier on December 2. Chaplain Voelkel
was in Wonsan visiting churches when the evacuation command was issued. Wonsan
was his wife’s birthplace. Being the son-in-law of “So-al-lun Moksa” (Rev. William L.
Swallen), Voelkel was warmly welcomed by the Christian community in Wonsan.
Originally, he had planned to stay for a week, but the news of a full scale Chinese
intervention and the order of evacuation disrupted his plans. He could not even attend a
union service of all the Presbyterian churches on Sunday afternoon because the Army
ordered all civilian personnel to move out and proceed northward to Hungnam by air.
His sudden departure disappointed many church leaders.

Chaplain Voelkel,

however, could not tell them the details of the military situation since it was “restricted

69 Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea, 389-390.
70 Field, History o f United States Naval Operations: Korea, 273.
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information.”71 As he was leaving, the officers showed him the direction where an
estimated seven-thousand Communist guerrillas were about to attack the city.

The

inability to assist his fellow friends in Wonsan depressed the missionary, but he refused
to quit the Chaplain Corps in the midst of this crisis. He remained in the war zone in
order to find a way to minister to ROK troops, POWs, and the Christian community in
Hamhung and Hungnam, the last beachhead the UN forces were holding in North
Korea.72
The defense of the Wonsan port perimeter was conducted by one US Army
battalion and two battalions of Korean Marines. The destroyers Saint Paul, Zellars,
Hank, and Sperry were standing by offshore, firing missiles against any enemy troop
concentrations.73 Hearing the sound of gunfire and facing attack by Communist
guerrillas, refugees followed the retreating troops into the perimeter. By December 7,
except for one ROK Marine Battalion which was assigned to cover the removal of the
last pile of equipment, all UN forces were evacuated.
Meanwhile, the number of refugees at the dock had increased rapidly from
December 7 to December 9.

Since the Navy did not expect such a huge influx of

refugees to the perimeter, there was only one transport ship available.

About 7,000

jammed onboard, a total far above the normal capacity of the ship.74 Many, however, had
to be left behind. Some of them proceeded to Hungnam on foot along the coast. By
December 9, the Navy had evacuated 3,800 troops, 1,146 vehicles, and 10,000 tons of
cargo - exceeding the total amount of military equipment and personnel removed from
71 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950 (from Hungnam), Presbyterian Church
Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
72 Ibid.
73 Field, History o f United States Naval Operations: Korea, 286.
74 It was not clear whether or not the Navy left any more refugees onshore.
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Chinnamp’o.75 Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, who was in charge of the Wonsan
evacuation, was shocked to discover so many people wanting to depart North Korea.
With the lesson he learned from Wonsan, Admiral Doyle planned to take 25,000 refugees
with him in his next operation in Hungnam.76
The Hungnam Perimeter
About ten miles from Hungnam was Hamhung, another major political and
industrial center in North Korea where the Headquarters of the X Corps had been
established in late October. Hamhung was the capital of Hamgyong Province and one of
the most Westernized cities in North Korea.
people.

It had a population of around 100,000

The Canadian Presbyterian Mission had its Korean headquarters there.

Americans had been enthusiastically welcomed by many Hamhung residents.

Lt.

Richard Underwood spent most of his time with POWs and intelligence units in
Hamhung.

Chaplain Voelkel was also stationed there with the Chaplain Corps to

minister to ROK troops and POWs. A Korean Christian, Dr. Hyon Pong-hak (Hyun
Bong-hak),77 who had grown up in Hamhung and later escaped to South Korea in 1945,

75 Field, History o f United States Naval Operations: Korea, 286-287.
76 James H. Doyle and Arthur J. Mayer, “December 1950 at Hflngnam,” The U.S. Naval Institute (April
1949): 4.
77 Bom in Hamhflng, Dr. Hy6n Pong-hak was the son of an influential Presbyterian minister and educator.
His family fled from Hamhflng to Seoul in December 1945. Sponsored by the Presbyterian Missions in
Seoul, Hydn received his medical degree from Severance Union Medical College and spent two years
studying pathology at the Medical College o f Virginia. During the Korean War, he joined the ROK
Marines. Because the Marines needed interpreters more than doctors at that point, he became a civilian
interpreter for General Hyun Joon Shin, the Commanding General, and Colonel Sung Eun Kim, the Chief
o f Staff. When General Almond visited the ROK Marines in mid-October, he was particularly impressed
by Hydn’s fluency in English. After learning that he had studied in Virginia, Almond’s home state, and
that he was from Hamhflng, which would be the Headquarters o f the X Corps, General Almond arranged
for Hydn’s transfer to X Corps as his Civil Affairs Advisor. Later, Dr. Hydn became a professor of
pathology and hematology at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital in Philadelphia. See Bong Hak Hyun,
“Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hflngnam Evacuation,” Korean and Korean American
Studies Bulletin 8 (Spring/Summer 1997): 33.
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was General Almond’s civil affairs advisor.

His responsibility was to check the

credentials of local politicians who wanted to participate in the military government.78
In early December, General Almond, the Commander of the X Corps, established
Hungnam harbor as the final base of evacuation for the remaining UN Units in North
Korea. The troops up north in the Ch’angjin (Chosin) Reservoir area had to break the
Chinese encirclement and fight their way back to the Hungnam Perimeter if they wanted
to evacuate back to the South. With the support of several hundred Navy and Marine
aircraft operated from the airfield and from the ships of Task Force 77, the 1st Marine
Division, 7th Infantry Divison, 3rd Infantry Division, and the ROK I Corps all managed to
fight their way out of the frozen hills, making their way to Hungnam.
General Almond planned to clear Hungnam harbor by December 25, bringing a
total of 400,000 tons of military equipment with him. He did not want to let any supplies
or equipment be destroyed or left behind. In order to do so, the general estimated that he
would need to mobilize 75 cargo vessels, 15 troop ships, and 40 Tank landing ships
(LST’s ships). He would also want the air force to lift 500 tons of men and equipment
from December 14 to 18. There was no precedent for this daring evacuation plan, but the
general was determined to get the job done.
Pressure from Christians in Hamhung
In early December, as the retreat of the UN troops became obvious to Hamhung
residents, many of them panicked. Christians, local military government officials, and
those who had cooperated with UN forces were certain that they would be executed when
the Communists returned.79 Members of the Christian community first approached

78 Ibid.

79
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Chaplain Voelkel in tears on December 5, asking him to “secure permission from the
Army authorities to provide the Christians of [Hamhung], 3000 of them, transportation in
the event of an evacuation.”80 Although he understood their desperation and wanted to
offer his help, it was difficult for Voelkel to give them any assurance. At that point, all
Voelkel could think of was to give the Christian refugees letters asking the American
officers to assist them if room was available for them to evacuate.81
Seeing that Voelkel had made no commitment to guarantee their evacuation, the
Christian leaders turned to Dr. Hyon. Like Voelkel, Hyon initially had no confidence
about getting such a guarantee either, because his boss, Lt. Colonel Moore, chief of the
Civil Affair Section, had earlier refused to help, claiming that the army had no plan and
no room to evacuate the civilians.

R9

Hyon, however, received support from Colonel

Edward Forney, one of Almond’s able assistants, who directed the operation of Hungnam
evacuation.

Both of them petitioned their requests to the general together.

Their

argument was that both pro-American local leaders and Christians would be massacred if
the US Army turned its back on them.
Military Priority over Civilian Concern
General Almond understood their plea but was hesitant for four reasons. First, the
general did not know whether he had enough transportation for even his own troops.
Second, port facilities would not be able to support both military and civilian evacuation.
Third, he was concerned about Communist infiltration among the refugees that might
jeopardize the position of the UN forces. Fourth, he needed Tokyo’s approval. Even so,

80 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
81 Ibid.
82 Hyun, “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hungnam Evacuation,” 34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

422

Almond was sympathetic to Hyon’s plea for the Christians in Hamhung, and promised to
contact Headquarters and discuss the issue with General MacArthur.83
On December 9, any hope of a civilian evacuation seemed lost when the US
Army announced that it would not be able to evacuate even its Korean civilian
employees, because the Navy did not have enough ships for them.

R4.

The official date for

the final pullout from Hamhung was December 15. An order was given to clear the main
roads between Hamhung and Hungnam for military transportation. US troops set up road
blocks to prevent refugees from traveling from Hamhung to Hungnam on foot.
According to Chaplain Voelkel, who drove frequently between Hamhung and
Hungnam with his jeep, “great groups were held up at bridges and other check-points at
the point of a gun and bayonet.”85 In some cases, when Christian groups pleaded that
being Christians, they would be a priority target for the Communists, some sympathetic
o< r

soldiers furnished trucks and took them to Hungnam.

Nevertheless, such tactics did not

work for everyone. Most refugees were turned back. By December 15, even the most
sympathetic US officers could do nothing to help the refugees because most of the
vehicles had been transported to Hungnam, waiting for evacuation. Chaplain Voelkel
thus advised Christians to keep off the main road, traveling on back ones so that they
could get to Hungnam before it was cut off. Whenever he saw people stopped at a
checkpoint, he tried to direct them to back roads and comfort them through prayer.87

83 Ibid., 2-3.
84 Ibid., 3.
85 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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A Change o f Policy
Meanwhile, Dr. Hyon did not sit idly by. Together with Father Patrick Cleary, a
Maryknoll missionary to Korea assigned as a Catholic Chaplain to the X Corps, Hyon
approached the ROK Marines, hoping to secure boats for Christians. Because of their
pressure, Colonel Sin Chun-hyon (Shin Jun Hyun), the Commander of 1st ROK Marines,
informed Dr. Hy6n the next day that he would allow refugees to board the two ships,
Landing Ship and Tank, that were assigned to move out the ROK Marines’ equipment the
following day.88 More good news came on December 15, the last day of the Hamhung
evacuation.

General Almond finally announced that he would evacuate four to five

thousand civilians from Hamhung to Hungnam by train that night.89 One thousand
spaces in particular would be reserved for Korean Christians, but he could not guarantee
their passage to South Korea because no ship was available at that time.90
While Father Cleary was responsible for gathering the Catholics, Dr. Hyon and
Voelkel went to inform the Protestants with the help of a local Christian, Ch’ae Ch’ungmuk (Chai Chung-muk). On arriving at Hamhung, they spread the word to the local UN
employees, who had already given up any hope of being able to leave. The news revived
and mobilized them to proceed to the railroad station. When Dr. Hyon and Ch’ae heard
the report that some Christian refugees had been arrested by American military police the
day before, they insisted on stopping by the prison. According to Chaplain Voelkel, they
found out that in addition to local Christians they knew, some Christian refugees from
Paech’on were there also. One of them was so oveijoyed that he broke out and cried,

88 Hyun, “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hungnam Evacuation,” 36.
89 Ibid.
90 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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“Jesus, Jesus,” in his gratitude. Chaplain Voelkel, Dr. Hyon, and Ch’ae cleared about
thirty of them with the officer-in-charge.91 They sent them home to get ready for
evacuation.
Then they drove to all the Protestant churches in the city, telling them the good
news. The plan was for each congregation to gather at its church before eight o’clock
instead of going to the station on its own. The main reason was that UN authorities had
imposed a curfew in Hamhung City from six o’clock at night to six o’clock in the
morning in order to control potential Communist infiltration. Chaplain Voelkel went to
the Provost Marshall at Hamhung City Hall and found Colonel Hammond, who was in
charge of the Military Police (M.P.) and informed him of their plan to evacuate Christians
to Hungnam.

Colonel Hammond was very sympathetic toward the Christian cause

because his sister, who was a missionary in Africa, had been martyred only a year before.
He immediately instructed his M.P. officers not to fire at people until after eight. For
double safety, he also sent two M.P. officers to escort each congregation to the railroad
station.
By midnight, there were about 50,000 people crowded at the station, ten times
more than General Almond had promised to transport. Many people wanted to leave the
city because they were afraid of the Chinese “volunteers.” This created a huge moral
dilemma for the officers, given the limited capacity of the train. In the end, the precious
spaces were offered to those who faced certain of death when the Communists returned.

91 Ibid. See also Hyun, “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hungnam Evacuation,” 36. There
are a few small discrepancies between Voelkel’s letter and HyQn’s recollection o f the event. After careful
examination o f the two documents, Voelkel’s description is probably closer to the truth because it was
written two days after the event while HySn’s was a recollection decades later.
92 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 6 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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The majority had to be turned away. Colonel Hammond and his M.P. (Military Police)
officers were in charge of screening the refugees. It took four hours for his men to locate
all Christians at the station and put them on board.93 The exact number of refugees who
were eventually transported by the last train to Hungnam was not clear, but the way to the
harbor was not completely blocked. Some who were not able to get on the train tried to
cross by walking through frozen rice fields and mountain roads; about half of them made
it to the seashore.94 Some single men were so desperate that they even pretended to be
Communist soldiers so that the M.P. officers would take them to the South as POWs.
According to Lt. Richard Underwood, at least one individual did son successfully.
The Evacuation o f Civilians by Boats
The next day there were about one hundred-thousand refugees crowded at
Hungnam. The majority were from Hamhung, with some from Wonsan, while others had
followed the troops from the north.95 Their numbers hampered the military evacuation.
General Almond set the priorities clearly, but they were not irreversible.

Military

personnel came first, then vehicles, equipment, supplies, and, last of all, refugees.96 No
one could be sure whether there would be boats left for the refugees. The temperature
dropped rapidly overnight to -10 degrees. It was so cold that a cup of boiling water
would be covered with ice within a few minutes.

07

How to take care of these refugees

became a big problem for the Civilian Affairs officers. They distributed flour, barley,
and rice for the hungry refugees, and directed some of them to Sohojin, a suburb of
Hungnam.
93 Ibid.
94 Hyun, “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hflngnam Evacuation,” 36
95 Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at Hflngnam,” 4,
96 Ibid.
97 Underwood, “Memories and Thoughts,” 89.
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General Almond and his young aide-de-camp Lt. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., who
would later become a four-star general and eventually Secretary of State, flew over the
chaotic scene at Hungnam in two light liaison planes (L-19).

Seeing the masses of

refugees “carrying their meager belongings had intermingled with [their] troops,” the
general told his young lieutenant through the radio, “We can’t leave those people. Take
care of that, Haig.”98 It was an impossible task, but for a young lieutenant the word of
the general was absolute for him to follow. When requesting the necessary number of
ships from his senior officers, Lt. Haig spoke with authority by emphasizing the will of
the commanding general. After hearing him, other senior officers found ships for the
refugees.99
The boarding of refugees onto transport ships began on December 16, according
to Chaplain Voelkel.100 The process was difficult because it was hard for the officers to
keep 100,000 frantic people in line. Sometimes, officers on the ship needed to fire their
guns in order to stop people from climbing onto an already overcrowded boat.101 Each
day, the Navy continued to move out tens of thousands of refugees. Most of the LST’s
ships expanded their capacities to four to five times higher than usual. The LST 668 took
10,500, and Virginia Victory carried 14,500.

One average, other ships that carried

equipment had about 5,000 refugees on board. The SS Meredith Victory, which was
already loaded with jet fuel before its arrival, was the last refugee ship to depart from

98 Bill Gilbert, Ship o f Miracles: 14,000 Lives and One Miraculous Voyage (Chicago: Triumph Books,
2001), 94.
99 Ibid., 96.
100 In HySn’s account, he said it was December 19. But, Voelkel’s letter was written on December 17
while he was on his way to Pusan, and before he left HQngnam. He witnessed how many refugees
crowded on the LST’s ships. His account should be more accurate than HySn’s recollection. Letter from
Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 17 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18,
Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
101 Dwight Martin, “Like a Fire Drill,” TIME, 25 December 1950.
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Hungnam. It carried the last 14,000 refugees to Pusan on December 23. According to
General Haig, “they all got out” before the US Navy destroyed the dock facilities.102
Haig’s words were also confirmed by a warrant officer in the Third Infantry Division at
Hungnam, John Middlemas. By the time his division was evacuated, Middlemas said,
“All the refugees were gone. The only thing left was what we were blowing up.”103
There were also other smaller-scale evacuations along the eastern coast while the
X-Corps was leaving.104 Sohunbong (Suh Hun Pong), a small fishing town near
Hungnam, had about 3,600 refugees waiting for a boat to go south. On December 16,
shortly before he left on Hunter Victory for Pusan, he visited the Christians in the area.
Knowing that there was no boat for these refugees, he immediately contacted naval
officers to ensure that these refugees were not forgotten. The officers promised to help,
but the people had to wait.105 After Voelkel left, the refugees waited four more days in
cold and hunger until the arrival of a LST boat, taking all of them to Koje Island, off
Masan (see Map 4). One baby was bom onboard. Chaplain Voelkel found the refugees
later through Colonel Hammond, who had been given the new responsibility of taking
care of the 70,000 refugees on Koje Island.106
All the refugees transported by sea from North Korea to Pusan were screened by
the Eighth Army’s Logistical Command. Those refugees who were determined to be

102 Gilbert, Ship o f Miracles, 113.
103 Ibid., 118-120.
104 For the Iwon, Chaplain Harold Voelkel mentioned the event in his letter, 17 December 1950,
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15. In the case o f Songjin, a South
Korean transport, BM 501, carried 4,300 people. See Stanton, The Ten Corps in Korea 1950, 314. Data for
other cases were unavailable. Nevertheless, under President Rhee’s direction, ROK troops facilitated many
o f their resources to bring out numerous North Korean refugees. They depended mainly on private fishing
boats. For a huge evacuation like Hflngnam, they had to depend very much on the United States.
105 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 17 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
106 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 25 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Communists residing north of the 38th Parallel would be detained in POW Enclosure 1 in
Tongnae, and Communists whose residence was south of the 38th Parallel would be
turned over to local civil authorities. All non-Communist refugees would be released
through civil assistance or ROK civilian channels.

In late December, due to the

overcrowding in the city of Pusan, the ROK government decided to divert refugee ships
to Koje Island or Cheju Island for relocation.107 Among the total estimated 1,912,500
refugees from North Korea, 545,000 of them were lucky enough to find their slots in
refugee camps by February 1951.108 The rest had to camp out in the country, waiting for
the ROK government and UN relief agencies to construct more refugee camps.
The Evacuation o f Christians from Seoul
In South Korea, the shocking news of the Chinese intervention demoralized many
citizens who had just settled back into Seoul.

With the memory of the Communist

occupation and the experience of being caught between two armies still fresh in their
minds, many Seoul residents, especially Christians, wanted to evacuate immediately.
Missionaries in Seoul called for an emergency inter-denominational meeting and decided
to find means to evacuate all the Christian clergymen and their families from Seoul
quickly.
Through their political connections with top South Korean officials, missionaries
were able to obtain a refugee center. The governor of South Kyongsang Province, Yang
Song-bong, designated “a place six miles north of Pusan in a quiet country place as a
refuge for the pastors’ families.” 109 The main difficulty was getting there.

It was

107 “The Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 8-5.1 A AA.K (Military History Office:
Office o f the Assistant Chief o f Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960): 8.
108 Samuels, “Korea’s Refugees - Misery on the March,” 156.
109 Letter from Rev. Edward Adams to Dr. John Smith, 1 January 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives,
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hundreds of miles away from Seoul and the Han River bridges had been destroyed since
the onset of the war. Although an army pontoon bridge had been built, it was reserved
for military purposes. Pedestrians were not permitted to cross it. Only mission trucks
driven by American missionaries were allowed onto the bridge.110
With two trucks in their possession, the Presbyterian missionaries ran a “truck
service” between Seoul and Taegu so that the refugees could take other public
transportation to the Christian refugee camp in the designated area. Instead of using only
Korean drivers, at least one missionary had to escort the group because the ROK Army
would seize any privately owned vehicles. The Methodist Mission, due to a shortage of
missionaries, had already lost two of their precious trucks when they sent Korean drivers
on the road alone.111 In other words, truck evacuations were possible because of the
missionaries, and only the Presbyterian Missions had the missionary manpower to do so.
Presbyterian missionaries started their evacuation operation sometime in midDecember, a week earlier than the ROK government. The first trip used “two large
mission trucks, 2-Vi and 3-Vi tons, which were packed to the limit with some of [their]
most important pastors and their families and baggage,” a total of eighty people.112 Rev.
Francis Kinsler was the driver for one truck, and Ray Provost another. It was a rough and
dangerous ten-hour journey because they had to pass guerilla patrolled areas. Altogether,
more than two hundred people, mostly Christian pastors and their families, were
evacuated in three trips.

Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
110 Harry A. Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission: Presbyterian Church in the
USA, Vol. 2 1935-1959 (New York: Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, The United
Presbyterian Church in the USA, 1964), 44.
111 Letter from James Philip to his Dad, 25 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
112 Ibid.
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Meanwhile, through an inter-denominational effort to appeal to the ROK
government, missionaries also succeeded in getting several boxes on a train to Pusan.113
In this way, more than seven-hundred Christian pastors and their families were
evacuated, except for sons between the ages of eighteen to thirty-seven - since these were
subject to a mandatory draft. The Church World Service (CWS) also had a freight box for
its relief supplies. An additional one-hundred men rode on top of it.114 Before they
departed, the Presbyterian missionaries gave each pastor relief money - about US$20 the equivalent of one month’s income. A total of US$1,800 was distributed on that day
alone.115 Although no such expenditure was provided for in the Mission budget, the
Presbyterian Mission Board in New York gave its Korea Mission a great degree of
freedom. A wire from the Board, written by Rev. John C. Smith, the Secretary for Korea
and Japan, promised the missionaries, “IF YOU NEED FUNDS SPEND IT PERIOD WE
WILL FIND THE MONEY SOMEHOW.”116 Later in February 11, 1951, twenty-two
denominational groups of the American Protestant Church under the banner of the United
Appeal for Christian Services called for special money offerings for Korea and paid for
part of these cash advances.117
Chaplain William Shaw and Father George M. Carroll were the most helpful in
arranging sea transportation for Christians, through the US and ROK Navy at Inch’on.
According to Rev. Harry Rhodes and Rev. Archibald Campbell, the ROK government
allowed Christian refugees to join the government-organized evacuation program,
113 Ibid.
114 Letter from Rev. Edward Adams to Dr. John Smith, 1 January 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
115 Letter from James Philip to his Dad, 25 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia. See also Rhodes and Campbell,
History o f the Korean Mission, 44.
116 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission, 45.
117 “US Church Mission Help Korean Homeless,” The Sunday Messenger, 11 February 1951.
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because of the Communists’ hatred for Christianity. They departed on December 24.
Each denomination was given a quota to distribute among its individual churches. Since
baggage took space that people could fill, evacuees were allowed to bring only a large
bundle of bedding per family, one suitcase for each adult, and half a suitcase for each
child. They also needed to prepare enough food for about a week. Just like their brethren
in the North, these families were “leaving behind everything else in the way of worldly
goods and chattel.”118
Nevertheless, a major difference was that their passage was secure and the
evacuation process was orderly and peaceful. On the dock, there were seventy orphans
from the Yongnak Orphanage with only six women to care for them. If they had been in
Hungnam, they would have perished because of the crowds and the cold weather. But in
Inch’on, people on the dock - refugees, Korean navy men, police, missionaries and
bystanders of all sorts - were patient enough to “[form] a human chain stretching from
the place where the orphans were encamped on the pier to the loading platform.” 119
Compared to other mass evacuations, according to James Philips, it was “the finest
example of self-restraint.”120 More than one thousand Christians were evacuated on that
day, including the last group of pastors and their families, and Catholic priests and nuns.
From that point on, missionaries began to evacuate church “elders, school
workers, deacons, and lay people of all walks of life,” 121 including tired and weary
Christian refugees from North Korea. Evacuation continued on a daily basis through
Inch’on. On January 1, however, there were no more boats and about fifteen hundred
118 Letter from James Philip to his Dad, 25 December 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Christians faced the danger of being left behind. The next day, missionaries received
information that since “a section of government families had been overlooked,” high
officials secured another boat and carried the fifteen hundred Christians with them.122
Before the Han River Bridge was closed on January 3, all missionaries, together with the
remaining Christian refugees, evacuated safely to Taegu.123

IMPACT OF MISSIONARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE EVACUATION
The evacuation of Hungnam was not only a successful military operation that
brought out 105,000 troops, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of bulk cargo, but also the
biggest humanitarian evacuation of civilians ever in American military history.124 In
eight days, a total of 98,000 refugees, not including babies carried on their mother’s
backs, were shipped out by the US Navy. The real victory was not how many tons of
equipment were saved. For those who were there, it was the saving of so many refugees
that stuck in their hearts. According to the memory of Lt. J. Robert Lunney, a crewman
on the Meredith Victory, the refugees’ willingness to endure severe pain and suffering in
order to leave North Korea showed him “what it must be to live under Communist
rule.”125 When he looked back, Lunney realized how happy his captain and other fellow
crew members felt after they brought the refugees to Pusan. It was because they “had
rescued these people and they would live in freedom,” an idea that “was extremely

122 Edward Adams, ‘T he Church Met a Need in Korea,” Presbyterian Survey, August 1951,17.
123 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission, 47.
124 James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year
(Washington, D.C.: Office o f the Chief o f Military History, US Army, 1972), 304.
125 Quoted in Gilbert, Ship o f Miracles, 154.
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important to everyone in those years,” when people feared for “the growing communist
influence throughout the world.”

1 1ft

Obtaining a Psychological Victory
Focused on military objectives, the US Army initially had no plans to evacuate
civilians, not even those who had worked for them.

The winning of Colonel Forney’s

support for civilian evacuations through Dr. Hyon was a major breakthrough. According
to Admiral Doyle, the key to the evacuation's success was Forney's don't-take-no-for-ananswer management style which achieved the impossible: allowing all refugees to be
rescued without compromising his military objectives.127
The evacuation of civilians from North Korea gave the brief UN operation above
the 38th Parallel a new meaning and purpose. Although UN troops had to withdraw back
to the South due to Chinese intervention, many people believed that the United Nations
had won a psychological victory. In the words of Joseph R. Owen, a young US Marine
lieutenant and a survivor of Ch’angjin (Chosin) Reservoir withdrawal as well as author of
the book Colder Than Hell published by the Naval Institute, “If that was their
participation in a civil war, they showed what side they were on with their feet. They did
not leave their homes and come out at the point of a bayonet.” He then added, “It made
me realize that we were doing the right thing in Korea, and I’m proud to have been a part
of it.”128 A similar sentiment was also expressed by Admiral Arleigh Burke, one of the
Navy’s most fabled officers, “I remember the thousands of woebegone Koreans who
were hungry, destitute, and fearful, but who at the same time had that strong desire for

126 Ibid., 163.
127 Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at Hflngnam,” 4-7.
128 Quoted in Gilbert, Ship o f Miracles, 104.
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freedom and the willingness to make sacrifices for freedom.”129 The successful saving of
hundreds of thousands of civilians lifted the morale of the retreating army. President
Truman, hearing of the successful evacuation of Hungnam, called the operation “the best
Christmas present I’ve ever had.”130
The South Korean government was delighted by the efforts of the US Navy, not
only because they also cared about the fate of their northern countrymen, but also
because it gave a psychological and political boost to Rhee’s regime. When Admiral
Doyle later arrived at Pusan, President Rhee sent several high-ranking South Korean
officials to congratulate Admiral Doyle on his achievement. These officials wept,
according to Doyle, as they thanked him for the number of refugees that he had helped to
rescue. Honors and medals were given to General Almond and Admiral Doyle for their
contributions in evacuating 98,000 refugees.131
The evacuations at Hungnam and other locations along the coasts of North Korea
also caused many American political leaders in Washington to confront the dilemma of
upholding moral and humanitarian principles in the midst of a total war. On the one
hand, the evacuation of refugees gave a moral and psychological boost to the UN war
efforts, but on the other hand, moral and humanitarian principles imposed limits on the
choice of weapons and the military tactics that could be used against the enemy.
Securing a total victory by any means became politically difficult under the potential
objections of some religious and humanitarian groups in the United States and Europe
because of their high moral principles.
129 Quoted in ibid., 105.
130 Quoted in Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History o f the Korean War, 1950-1953 (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1962), 228.
131 Doyle and Mayer, “December 1950 at Hungnam,” 7. See also “Presidential Unit Citation” given by the
Republic o f Korea on 16 August 1951, Record Group 38, Box 4, Folder 4, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk.
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The Preservation and Expansion o f Christian Influence
Missionary efforts helped preserve the influence of the church in Korea, saving
Christians in both North and South from the retribution of the Communist armies. The
road from Seoul to Pusan was a trail of tears in the merciless Korean winter.

The

refugees were frequently harassed and driven off the roads by retreating soldiers.132
Many died, especially women and children. While the majority of these South Korean
refugees had to fend largely for themselves, church leaders received special assistance
from missionaries under government backing. No other group, except government
officials and their families, received the same level of professional help. Christians were,
in many ways, specially provided for and protected by missionaries, a privilege that often
made the difference between life and death.

133

More than that, once Christian refugees arrived in Pusan, they received donations
from American churches,134 helping them to not only survive but also to build churches,
orphanages, temporary schools, technical institutes, shelters for widows, and clinics. In
the end, these social services benefited all Korean refugees, and strengthened the church's
positive public image. Dr. Thobum T. Brumbaugh, the Secretary of the Methodist Board
of Foreign Missions (Far East), reported that the United Methodist Church in the United
States - the largest Protestant denomination in America - wanted to mobilize every
resource at its disposal to “[make] Christianity a vital and constructive force” in Korea,
especially “among all those who have been driven out of the routine course of daily

132 Russell Spurr, Enter The Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51 (New
York: Newmarket Press, 1988), 280-282.
133 For a graphic description o f the refugees’ flight from Seoul, see Spurr, Enter the Dragon, 281-282.
134 Letter from Dr. John Smith to Rev. Edward Adams, 3 January 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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living.”135 The two Presbyterian boards, and the American Catholic Church, all of which
had major interests in Korea, did the same. Therefore, the efforts of missionaries were
crucial not only to the survival of the Christian Community in Korea, but also to the
future expansion of Christian influence in South Korea.
There is no solid data available on how many Christians actually were evacuated
from North Korea.

However, judging from the cases in P’yongyang and Hamhung,

perhaps fifty percent of the Christian population within the UN-occupied areas had fled
south. The biggest and most famous refugee church, the Yongnak Church, reported that,
following the fall of P’yongyang, an average of about one thousand new Christian
refugees arrived and sought their help each day.135 In the south, North Korean Christians
clustered together and established their own congregations in Pusan, Koje Island, and
Cheju Island.
As the war developed, Christians became an even more prominent political force
in South Korea. By early 1951, a total of five million North Koreans were living in the
South, having arrived as refugees either before the war or during the evacuations
described above. Countless more had died along the road; North Korea was missing
nearly half of its population. These refugees in the South accounted for about twenty
percent of the total South Korean population. They eagerly supported Syngman Rhee’s
policy to “advance northward and achieve unification” (pukchin t ’ongil) because they all
wanted to return to their homeland.

135 Letter from Dr. Thoburn T. Brumbaugh to “Dear Korea friends,” 3 March 1951, Missionary Vol.4,
United Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
136 Harold Voelkel, Open D oor to Korea (Grand Rapids, MI: Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House,
1958), 50-60.
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The Church community, in particular, stood firmly behind Rhee because of his
pro-Christian attitude. In the 1952 presidential election, Christians set up the Korean
Church Committee for Election, which was based in some 3,500 churches with 700,000
adherents, mobilizing their resources to support Rhee’s re-election.137

Preachers

presented Rhee as the “Moses of Korea” and his running mate, Yi Ki-bung, as “Joshua.”
They defined the election as a religious battle between Christians and anti-Christians.138
Two days before the election, 3,500 churches held prayer meetings and intensified their
final effort to boost Rhee’s support. Despite charges of electoral fraud, Rhee received
about five million votes, while his three rivals received under two million.139
The influence of the religious factor was also shown in the vice-presidential
campaign.

According to the new Korean Constitution, the President and the Vice-

President were to be elected separately. Many people calculated that if Rhee died in
office, the Vice-President would become the President of South Korea. Fraud charges
were less serious in this case and therefore, reflected general public sentiment. Although
Yi Ki-bung was Rhee’s official running mate two weeks before the election, Rhee gave
his endorsement to another Vice-Presidential candidate, Ham T’ae-yong, a senior
Presbyterian minister from the North who had been a judge in the Late Choson Dynasty.
If Ham wanted to win, he had to defeat not only Yi Ki-bung, but also Yi Pom-sok
(Rhee’s ex-home minister, who assisted Rhee in undertaking the coup against the
National Assembly), Yim Yong-sin (Louise Yim) (a well-known Christian woman

137 Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle, WA: University o f Washington Press,
2003), 179.
138 Ibid.
139 Priscilla Roberts, “Syngman Rhee (1875-1965),” in Encyclopedia o f The Korean War: A Political,
Social, and M ilitary History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 627.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

438

educator),140 and six other competitors. Being both a political novice and older than Rhee
himself, Ham was an unlikely victor.141
Nevertheless, quite unexpectedly, Ham T’ae-yong received about 3 million votes,
Yi Pom-sok got only 1.8 million, and seven other candidates split the rest of the 7.1
million votes.142 Perhaps Ham attracted not only Christian votes, but also votes from the
North Korean refugees. A religious interpretation of the election did not hinder the nonChristian population from casting their support behind Rhee and Ham. The 1952 election
marked the beginning of a church-govemment partnership in the First Republic of
Korea.143
The Witnesses o f Atrocities
During the brief period when the UN occupied North Korea, missionaries not
only saw evidence of Communist atrocities against rightists, but they also witnessed
cases of UN brutality against Northerners. For instance, Chaplain Voelkel reported that
“the discipline of both American and Korean troops [was] bad.”144 “The looting and
robbing by the South Korean troops is terrible,” he wrote. One of his Christian friends,
Elder Yun Chang-no, was beaten by South Korean soldiers mercilessly at night in his
own house when they tried to rob him.145
Rape was a common crime committed by UN troops in the North.

On one

occasion, as Rev. Harry Hill and Rev. Francis Kinsler passed by McMurtrie’s house (a
140 Hakjoon Kim, “Yim, Louise (Im Yong-sin 1899-1977),” ibid., 541.
141 Edward C. Keefer, “South Korean Presidential Elections o f 1952,” in Historical Dictionary o f the
Korean War, ed. James I. Matray (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 431.
142 Ibid., 431-432.
143 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 179. Syngman Rhee’s regime was known as the First
Republic. Chang Myun’s regime was the Second Republic and Pak Jong-hi’s military government was the
Third Republic.
144 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 12 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
145 Ibid.
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former missionary) in P ’yongyang, they heard a girl's scream coming from inside the
house. An armed American G.I. was standing outside the building, so they rushed over
to him.

He refused to allow them to enter the house, so they rushed off, and were

fortunate to find an American officer nearby, who agreed to intervene. Inside the house,
they discovered an American G.I. and a Korean soldier attempting to rape a Korean girl,
the daughter of a former missionary’s helper. The victim had been on her way to a prayer
meeting that afternoon with her mother.146 According to Chaplain Voelkel, similar
events happened in other UN controlled areas as well. When missionaries witnessed or
discovered such crimes they brought them before the military authorities, but many more
probably occurred and went unreported.

Young women suffered immensely because

Korean society showed no mercy to any woman who had sexual relations with a
foreigner, regardless of whether this was voluntary or by force.147
The Demand fo r Chaplains fo r US troops
Although most of these incidents were random, individual, criminal acts, it was a
serious matter. If American soldiers did not behave morally in the eyes of the Korean
people, they would eventually jeopardize the UN's mission in Korea, the missionary
work, and Korean public opinion of America. Missionaries felt a personal obligation to
combat immorality and ignorance among US and Korean troops, particularly since it
caused so much anguish to their Korean friends.

Since the UN Command was

unenthusiastic about investigating atrocities committed by UN and ROK soldiers,148 the
missionaries were left with few options. They could not reveal these incidents to the
146 Ibid.
147 Elizabeth Kim, Ten Thousand Sorrows: The Extraordinary Journey o f a Korean War Orphan (New
York: Doubleday, 2000), 20.
148 Allan R. Millett, Their War fo r Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians 19451953 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), 232.
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press without sabotaging the war effort, so missionaries instead reported these incidents
to their own boards, in addition to the military police. They hoped that their church
leaders back home might pressure the US military to improve the moral quality of
American soldiers. From their perspective, the solution was to provide US troops with
more chaplains so that they could resist the temptations and corruptions caused by the
lonesome and often dangerous military life.
Ironically, the lack of chaplains was something that the churches had as much
control over as did the US military.

The army understood the benefits of religious

guidance for the troops, but they could not find enough candidates to fill the need.149
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the American government had already carried out
steps to expand the Chaplains’ Corps to match the needs of a large peace-time army, but
the deployment in Korea had been too rapid and extensive for the Corps to keep pace.150
Even though the military recalled all their chaplains on reserve, they still could not meet
the rising authorized ceiling.151 The overworked chaplains in Korea frequently enlisted
the help of missionaries in offering religious services for the troops. Some American
G.I.s even joined local church gatherings at the invitation of missionaries and Korean
pastors.
The missionaries' reports of atrocities helped to mobilize their home boards in the
United States. These boards encouraged more ordained ministers to join the Chaplain
Corps as early as possible; the response from church leadership was tremendous.

149 “Best Soldiers Are Religious Soldiers,” The United Presbyterian, 4 June 1951, 5.
150 See “Chaplaincy Needs Are Revealed,” The United Presbyterian, 6 November 1950, 7. See also
“Chaplains’ Corps to be Increased,” Presbyterian Life, September 2, 1950,13.
151 From June 1950 to June 1951, US Army chaplain strength rose from 706 to 1,208, but it was still below
the 1,331 authorized quota. See Rodger R. Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace: The United
States Army Chaplaincy 1945-1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 5:72.
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Seminaries gradually modified their programs to train more students for the Chaplain
Corps.

1S'?

Stories of the chaplains’ heroism were reported widely in both religious and
1 CO

secular journals so as to attract potential candidates.

Many religious groups in the

United States made “valiant and sacrificial efforts” to help encourage their members to
go to Korea.154
In the end, more chaplains were sent to serve the troops in Korea. They helped
not only American soldiers, but also Korean churches, prisoners, and ROK soldiers
because they were allowed to use their extra time to assist civilians.155 Chaplains served
as intermediaries between the troops and the civilians. Under the leadership of chaplains
in their regiments, US soldiers made offerings to support local relief programs organized
by local churches that helped to alleviate the suffering among orphans and widows.156
The Formation o f a Christian ROK Chaplain Corps
Missionaries and Korean pastors were involved in the formation of the ROK
Chaplain Corps even before the outbreak of the Korean War. Rev. Archibald Campbell
and Rev. Cha Chey-wha took the first steps by obtaining permission from the Korea
Military Advisory Group of the U.S. Army (KMAG), to work among the ROK trainees in
Taegu. The first organized Christian service was held in May 1949. About 400 Korean
soldiers and officers attended.

1^7

152 “Protestant Seminaries Setting Up Chaplaincy Training Programs,” Presbyterian Survey, December
1953,61.
153 “Six Korea Chaplains Commended For Heroism,” The United Presbyterian, 1 January 1951,14. See
also “Chaplains Courageous,” TIME, 1 December 1952. The number of recruits was gradually improving.
In September 1951, they had 1,398 while the quota was 1,464. A month later, the number increased to
1,448, coming very close to the authorized ceiling. See Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace,
5:72.
154 Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 5:73.
155 John H. Muller, Wearing the Cross in Korea (Redlands, CA: Arthur Commercial Press, 1954), 18.
156 Ibid., 57-62.
157 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission, 344-345.
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Christian leaders believed that the morale of South Korean troops suffered due to
a lack of moral guidance.

The solution was to form a ROK Chaplain Corps.

Missionaries and Korean church leaders, therefore, pressed for the establishment of a
Chaplain Corps based on the US model in the ROK Army. As early as July 1950, Rev.
Edward Adams and Rev. Campbell had approached officers of the KMAG, urging them
to formally establish a chaplain service for the ROK army forces. In order to facilitate
the process, Rev. Campbell translated the U.S. Army regulations concerning Chaplains
into Korean and modified them to include representatives of other traditional religions.
To temporarily supply the needs of the ROK troops, Rev. William Shaw and Monsignor
George M. Carroll were hired by the US Army to minister to Korean soldiers in August
1950.158
When Rev. Campbell visited Japan in September, he met with Chaplain (Colonel)
Ivan H. Bennett, Chief of Chaplains, SCAP, who was later to be promoted to Major
General, Chief of Chaplains, U.S.A., and urged him to assist in the forming of a ROK
Chaplain Corps. Chaplain Bennett took a strong interest in the plan and asked for support
from General MacArthur.159
In Korea, meanwhile, Rev. William Shaw, who was serving as a civilian Chaplain
among the ROK troops, approached President Rhee on the subject. He found that Rhee
was similarly concerned about the morale of the army. Rhee thought that Christianity
would produce better soldiers.

Nevertheless, instead of seeking to form an army-

158 Letter from Adeline H. Shaw, 14 September 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church
Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
159 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission, 345.
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controlled Chaplain Corps, Rhee favored a civilian, Christian Chaplain Corps.160 He had
three reasons. First, Rhee did not think the army could afford to pay for a Chaplain
Corps. Second, Rhee wanted the corps to be predominantly Christian. He feared that, if
he asked for funds from the National Assembly, they would push him to form a nonChristian Chaplain Corps, since most Korean soldiers were not Christian.161 Third,
traditional Korean religious groups did not have or might not be willing to supply
chaplains to the Corps because the idea was alien to them. Therefore, the requirement
that other religions participate might delay the process of the formation of the Corps.
Since the ROK government could not or would not run the sort of program that
Rhee envisioned, he instead sought a civilian solution, using funding from nongovernment sources to avoid political controversy.

1f\)

It would be a significant

undertaking. To succeed, he needed the help of missionaries, Korean clergymen, and
American churches to finance and provide workers for this civilian Christian Chaplain
Corps.163 Missionaries were delighted to hear Rhee’s plan, and were confident that many
ROK troops would become Christian if they had “a Christian Chaplaincy leadership.”164

160 Letter from Rev. William Shaw to T. T. Brumbaugh, 24 October 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United
Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
161 About 1.6% o f Korean soldiers were Confucianists, 1.2% Buddhists, 4.6% Christians (mostly
Presbyterians), and 92.6% were without any religious affiliation at all. See “Chaplains for the ROK,”
TIME, 1 July 1953.
162 “Interview between Robert Cadigan and Chaplain William Shaw in Korea,” 21 November 1950,
Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
163 As an old time Methodist missionary to Korea since 1921, Rev. William Shaw was well respected
within the missionary community and among Korean leaders. He had a very close friendship with
President Rhee and many high-ranking Korean officials. Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, the Director o f The
Commission o f the Churches on International Affairs, a non-governmental agency holding consultative
status with the Economic and Social Council o f the United Nations, was impressed with Rev. Shaw’s
credentials. See Nolde’s report on his trip to Korea, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed.
Heung Soo Kim (Seoul: Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 369-370.
164 Letter from Rev. William Shaw to T. T. Brumbaugh, 24 October 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United
Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
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After seeing the poor discipline of the Korean troops from July to November, the
missionary community -

in particular Chaplain Shaw and Chaplain Voelkel -

wholeheartedly supported the plan. They believed that it was a golden opportunity to
evangelize Korean youth, and to extend the influence of Christianity. The Director of the
Korea Church World Service, Dr. Henry Appenzeller, also fully endorsed the idea,
arguing that “to miss this opportunity [might] mean the loss of a section of the youth of
Korea.”165 While the missionaries organized Korean churches and seminaries to supply
qualified evangelists for the cause, they also labored endlessly to persuade their own
boards in the United States to fund the project.
American Protestant denominations were, however, initially skeptical of the plan.
They feared that if American churches and mission agencies threw their “influence and
finances” behind such a program, it would send a confusing signal to the world that
“Americans [were] willing to use even [their] religion to take Korea into [their] camp.”166
The idea of the separation of church and state kept them from giving their endorsement.
I /T 'J

Only the Catholics and the Presbyterians agreed to support the plan.
Pressure from missionaries in both Korea and Japan bore fruit in January 1951.
Both Chaplain Shaw and Father Carroll received orders to start a chaplains’ school in
Taegu.
February.

Thirty-nine Korean Christian pastors received training and graduated in
Initially, they had only civilian chaplain status.

Yet, when the Assembly

finally did approve a Chaplain Corps, they were all commissioned. On April 11, 1951,

165 Letter from Henry Appenzeller to T. T. Brumbaugh, 31 January 1951, Missionary Vol.4, United
Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
166 From T. T. Brumbaugh to Chaplain William Shaw, 16 October 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United
Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
167 From Chaplain William Shaw to T. T. Brumbaugh, 24 October 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United
Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey. See also Shaw’s letter to T. T. Brumbaugh,
10 February 1951, Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
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following the model of the United States, the ROK government provided a small amount
of funds for a formal military corps to replace the civilian organization.
To the delight of Rhee and the missionaries, the ROK Army was willing to
maintain the Christian nature of the Chaplain Corps. It called for 77 Christian clergymen
to fill its ranks. At first, no other religions were represented.168 Chaplain Shaw and
Chaplain Carroll continued to be responsible for recruiting and training these Korean
Chaplains. Another forty-three trainees graduated in April 1951.169 By June 1953, the
training school in Taegu had graduated a total of 113 trainees that year.170 The Corps
expanded gradually to include other religions by a decade or two later. Buddhist monks,
for example, entered the Corps in 1968. Nevertheless, Christian clergymen remained the
vast majority of the Chaplain Corps members.
Initially, since the ROK government paid these chaplains barely enough to
survive, they had nothing to send back home to support their families. This discouraged
qualified clergymen from applying.

To show their support for the Chaplain Corps,

American missionaries decided to provide for these chaplains’ families.

171

This new

project, unlike the original plan, won the support of all major Protestant denominations
and the Catholic Church in the United States, because American religious leaders

168 The quota for each Christian group was: 32 Presbyterian, 17 Methodist, 20 Catholic, 7 Holiness, and 1
Salvation Army. Letter from Chaplain William Shaw to T. T. Brumbaugh, 19 March 1951, Missionary,
Vol.4, United Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey. The same letter was also found
in the Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 39 - Presbyterian Historical
Society, Philadelphia.
169 The breakdown here was: 15 Presbyterians, 11 Catholics, 7 Methodists, 4 Holiness. The second class
graduated on April 13. There were 6 Catholics, 2 Methodists, and 1 Holiness. See “Excerpts from letters
from Chaplain William E. Shaw,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 39 Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
170 “Chaplains for ROK,” TIME, 1 June 1953.
171 Letter from Rev. Ned Adams to Dr. John C. Smith, 24 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 193, Box 1, Folder 3 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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recognized that the establishment of a Christian-dominated Chaplain Corps had become
“so vital a part of the present evangelistic program of Christianity in Korea.”172
In the end, this project was a milestone for Christianity in Korea. Not only did
hundreds of thousands of Korean soldiers encounter the Christian faith through their
chaplains during the war, but also Christianity became more firmly entrenched within the
Korean ruling class.173 Regardless of whether or not these young men would remain in
the military after the war, they would be the backbone of Korean society in the decades to
come. And the Corps definitely led many soldiers to join churches. Just before the end
of the War, the Chief of ROK Chaplains, told a graduating class at the Chaplain Training
School in Taegu, “The War has given us a spiritual revival.”174

CONCLUSION
Although missionaries were relatively few in number, they contributed
significantly to overall relief efforts. Church leaders and religious networks in the United
States helped to publicize the needs of Korea.

In collaboration, religious and non

religious groups in the United States as well as other Western countries sent hundreds of
thousands of tons of relief materials to Korea.

It marked the biggest relief effort in

American history.
Missionaries in the North were a valuable asset to the occupation forces.
Missionary chaplains served as a link both between the native population and the troops,
and between the American public and the Korean people.

Through the press, they

172 Letter from T. T. Brumbaugh to Chaplain William Shaw, 23 April 1951, Missionary Vol.4, United
Methodist Church Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
173 Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea, 175-183.
174 Quoted in Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 78.
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provided information, pictures, and commentary to audiences on the American homefront.

They collected evidence of Communist atrocities against Christians and UN

soldiers, while also witnessing (but not necessarily publicizing) UN atrocities against
North Koreans. They demanded justice and change through religious means.
The Christian community, in particular, benefited the most from the labor of
missionaries.

Christians received priority in the evacuation process, and sometimes

gained access to special refugee facilities.

With the support of American churches,

Christian influence reached into the ROK Army through the newly established Chaplain
Corps. Just as the missionaries had hoped, not only was Christianity preserved, but the
church also rose in political influence and power in South Korea.
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CHAPTER 8
The Truce Talks and POW Controversy

INTRODUCTION
The Chinese intervention entirely altered the nature and development of the
Korean War. Not only did the Chinese push back UN and South Korean forces, but the
US government also faced challenges from other quarters, both abroad and at home.
Within the United States, a major political debate erupted over what the war strategy
should be. Some believed that a larger conflict would be more winnable, so they wished
to allow the field commander in the Far East to “strike wherever military necessity
dictates, behind the Yalu River, or anywhere else.” 1 Many pressured the Truman
administration to use Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea. While there was domestic
political pressure on the President to pursue victory aggressively, international opinion
was very different. European leaders, in particular, feared that an escalation of the war
might cause it to spread to Europe, and they demanded accountability for US military
actions in Korea. By June 1951, both sides agreed to sit down and negotiate a truce, but
the process lasted for two more years.
The major question that held up the negotiation was the dispute over the POW
issue. The United States government insisted on the principle of voluntary repatriation,
whereas the Communist side demanded the repatriation of all prisoners. Why did the
United States insist on voluntary repatriation, taking a great risk to prolong the war?
1 It was the opinion o f Senator Harry Cain o f Washington. Quoted in William W. Stueck, Jr., The Korean
War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 131.
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American missionaries were active among the prisoners.

Could there have been a

religious angle to this debate?

THE PATH TO THE TRUCE TABLE
According to a Gallup Poll report on December 6, 1950, fifty-five percent of
interviewees felt that the United States was fighting a World War III in Korea.2 Another
poll around that time showed that fifty percent thought that the United States government
had done a poor job in Korea.3 Fear and discontent swept across the country. Critics
accused the government of failing both in Korea and in China.4 Although President
Truman faced strong political pressure to expand the war, public opinion remained
cautious because the poll showed that more people wanted to limit the war in Korea.5
The strongest support for a limited war strategy was from mainstream Protestant religious
organizations, especially leaders in the National Council of Churches of Christ (NCCC).
The Influence o f National Council o f Churches
The National Council of Churches of Christ (NCCC) came into official existence
on November 29,1950 at a constitutional convention in Cleveland, Ohio. Delegates from
29 Protestant denominations and 3 Eastern Orthodox churches attended the conference.
The NCCC also consisted of eight interdenominational agencies, which by their official
actions transferred their functions and responsibilities to the NCCC.

These eight

2 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 V o l.2 ,1949-1958 (New York: Random
House, 1972), 951.
3 Ibid., 953.
4 The initial “loss” o f China accusation has been discussed in Chapter 4. The military setback caused by
Chinese intervention further frustrated US public opinion on Truman’s China policy. The administration’s
inability to predict or deter Chinese entry into the Korean War aroused strong criticism o f the President and
caused a serious loss o f confidence in Truman’s ability to lead the nation to victory in Korea.
5 The Gallup Poll reported on December 4 that 46% o f the interviewees thought that the UN should restrict
the fighting to Korea while only 39% favored crossing the border and extending the war to Chinese
territory. (The other 15% had no opinion.) See ibid., 951.
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agencies were: Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCC), Foreign Missions
Conference of North America (FMC), Home Missions Council of North America (HMC),
International Council of Religious Education (ICRE), Missionary Education Movement
of the United States and Canada, National Protestant Council on Higher Education,
United Council of Church Women, and United Stewardship Council. Shortly afterward,
four more agencies decided to merge their interests in the NCCC: Church World Service
(CWS), Inter-Seminary Committee, Protestant File Commission, and Protestant Radio
Commission.
The NCCC was both a replacement for and an expansion of the FCCC.
According to a statement in the December 1950 issue of the Federal Council Bulletin, the
NCCC would continue all the work of the FCCC and expect that “the program [would]
be enlarged as the new organization gains increased support.”6 While the FCCC claimed
to have about 28,000,000 members in 1949, the NCCC reported 30,629,225 members in
1951 (see Table 8.1), a gain of two million in new members. The agglomeration of these
twelve organizations made the NCCC the most powerful inter-church agency in
American history because it had access not only to mainstream domestic churches, but
also to missionary organizations and various overseas relief agencies.

This giant

organization could effectively mobilize religious public opinion, and distribute religious
propaganda throughout the United States and Canada.7
John Foster Dulles viewed the NCCC as an unprecedented Christian organization
that could exert influence over domestic and foreign affairs through public appeal and

6 Quote in Edgar C. Bundy, Collectivism in the Churches: A Documented Account o f the Political Activities
o f the Federal, National, and World Councils o f Churches (Wheaton, IL: The Church League o f America,
1960), 49.
7 “National Council,” TIME, 11 December 1950.
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effective lobbying.8 The NCCC had the resources and manpower to conduct systematic
religious, social, and political campaigns.

Its close connections with major

denominations and various missionary organizations positioned the NCCC to present a
unified Protestant voice to the US public and policy makers. Rev. Richard M. Fagley,
Director of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill of the NCCC, the same
position that Dulles had held earlier, explained the role of NCCC in foreign affairs:
In the search for a fully responsible foreign policy and for the strong, unwavering support
it requires, our churches have a major function to perform. It is through them and them
alone that the well-springs o f the faith that sustains American life and the moral vitality
o f our society can be renewed. It is through our churches, challenging the pretensions of
national power and upholding the principle that power is a trust, that the moral
foundations o f policy can be undergirded. It is through our churches that individual
citizens can gain a new sense of their own responsibility for national policy.9

Rev. Fagley saw that partnership between churches and state as essential to establishing
long-term foreign policy objectives in the Cold War. Churches should not shy from their
responsibility, and the government should also consult the churches for moral support.
Therefore, since its birth, the NCCC had set its aim clearly: to influence the
direction of US foreign policy.

An active lobbying machine was established in the

nation’s capital. Politicians and government officials were routinely invited to NCCC
meetings and conferences.

For example, the main speaker at the Constitutional

Convention of the NCCC in November 1950 was Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The
presence of Acheson generated great interest and intense discussion on the direction of
US foreign policy in facing the crisis in East Asia. Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, Director of
the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), presented “A Christian
View on the International Crisis.” He urged the American people to guard themselves

8 John Foster Dulles’ speech on November 27, 1950, Seeley Mudd Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box
302, Folder: Speech Federal Council o f Churches, NY.
9 Richard M. Fagley, “Responsibility and Foreign Policy,” Christianity and Crisis 5 (22 January 1951): 189.
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against hysteria, self-righteousness and hatred, unilateral action, false pride and facesaving tendencies, complacency, prejudice, impatience, and making the US economy
dependent on military production.10 The NCCC and its supporters stood against the use
of the atomic bomb against China, and ruled out the justification of any “preventive war”
because both were morally wrong.11
When President Truman voiced his frustration with the Chinese and hinted at the
possibility of using atomic weapons in the Korean War, the NCCC was alarmed.
Telegrams by individual clergymen were sent to the President, urging him to consider Dr.
Nolde’s position.12 On December 7,1950, the President received a special telegram from
Dr. Henry Sherrill, the President of the NCCC. Dr. Sherrill warned against not only the
use of atomic weapons, but also “false pride and face-saving tendencies.” He advised the
President “to guard against unilateral action” and “to manifest consistent readiness to
negotiation.”

1^

Meanwhile, the NCCC also launched a nationwide campaign against the use of
atomic weapons.

Religious publications emphasized the need for “restraint.”

The

Presbyterians published Dr. Nolde’s speech in the December 11, 1950 issue of The
United Presbyterian.u

Two days later, The Christian Century and Christianity and

Crisis reprinted an old report by a commission of theologians and church leaders in the
FCCC which had been published several months earlier, “The Christian Conscience and

10 O. Frederick Nolde, “A Christian View on the International Crisis,” The United Presbyterian, 11
December 1950, 10-12.
11 “Preventive War Morally Wrong,” The United Presbyterian, 26 March 1951, 6.
12 Paul C. Payne and G. Merrill Lenox sent separate telegrams to the President. See Box 1360 o f the Papers
o f Harry S. Truman (Official File), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
13 Dr. Henry Sherrill, President o f the NCCC, telegram to the President, 7 December 1950; NCCCA Files
#5573, Truman Library.
14 Nolde, “A Christian View on the International Crisis,” 10-12.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 15 The leaders of mainstream Protestantism rejected the
call for “total war.” Protestant leaders wished to set not only geographical boundaries on
the Korean War, but also boundaries on the kinds of weapons and tactics that the United
States should employ. The report also “condemned any potential killing of prisoners,”
“the massacre of civilian populations, especially of women and children,” and “the
bombardment of ‘undefended’ towns.”16 Reinhold Niebuhr regarded the attempt of the
NCCC as “the most effective religious protest against the hysteria which [had] engulfed
the country.”17 In February 1951, a Gallup Poll survey concluded that 77 percent thought
that the US should not start an all-out war with China. A month later, another survey
reported that 56 percent of the people wanted the US government to try harder to reach an
agreement with Communist China on Korea, and 73 percent of them thought that the UN
forces should stop at the 38th Parallel if the Chinese agreed to stop fighting.18
Since the NCCC believed that the contest between Communism and democracy
would not end with Korea and a real victory would not be secured by bombs, it advocated
a humanitarian approach to foreign affairs, by injecting ideas of morality and religious
principles into US foreign policy.19 A victory over Communism could only be achieved
through a peace crusade of relief efforts, education, technical and financial assistance,

15 “The Christian Conscience and Weapons o f Mass Destruction: Report o f a Commission Appointed by
the Federal Council o f the Churches o f Christ in America,” The Christian Century 50 (13 December 1950):
1489.
16 Ibid.
17 Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘T he Church Speaks to the Nation,” Christianity and Crisis XIII (30 November 1953):
153.
18 The Gallup Poll, 668-669.
19 Paul Calvin Payne, “Editorial Comment,” Presbyterian Life, 17 March 1951,7. Payne was the vicepresident representing the division o f Christian Education in the NCCC.
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and support for human rights.20 The NCCC was particularly interested in Truman’s Point
IV Program, a new program of technical assistance for underdeveloped areas.
There were two major reasons why they were interested. First, NCCC leaders
thought that the program was “a promising pointer in the direction of a coherent longrange policy.”21 Second, Christian groups had extensive missionary works in these areas,
meaning church-state collaboration was beneficial to both. When the government asked
for the religious organizations’ assistance for the Point IV Program, the NCCC responded
positively.22
Truman’s Response to Religious Public Opinion
President Truman tried to maintain good relations with mainstream religious
groups throughout his administration. His hope to enlist the support of religious leaders
against Communism, and his interest in the ecumenical movement, drew Truman closer
to the NCCC. His idea that the social gospel was an effective answer to counteract the
growth of Communism aligned him with mainstream Protestant opinion, especially
among the “Social Gospelers.” “The menace of Communism,” Truman pointed out, “lies
in areas of American life where the promise of democracy remains unfulfilled.”23 He
referred to the exciting social problems of slums in inner cities, wage differences, lack of
medical care, unemployment, price fluctuations caused by uncontrolled inflation, and
human rights abuses. His Point IV Program was an extension to foreign policy of his
liberal view on social affairs.

His willingness to adopt a humanitarian and moral

20 Payne, “Editorial Comment,” 7. See also Nolde, “A Christian View On the International Crisis,” 12; and
‘T he Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 1491. See also ‘The Churches and Point
IV,” The Christian Century 68 (9 May 1951): 581.
21 Fagley, “Responsibility and Foreign Policy,” 187.
22 ‘T he Churches and Point IV,” The Christian Century 68 (9 May 1951): 581.
23 “Speech to the Swedish Pioneer Centennial Association, Chicago Stadium,” 4 June 1948, Public Papers
o f the Presidents: Harry S Truman, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

455

approach to foreign issues earned him support from some liberal religious leaders and the
Catholic Church.24
Truman’s decision to limit the war in Korea also satisfied the position of the
NCCC. In meeting with a group of Methodist ministers on February 7, 1951, he told
them that his foreign policy objectives were to prevent the outbreak of a third world war,
and restore peace. “We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended,” the President
explained.25 “The best way to do that,” he insisted, “is to make it plain that we and the
other free countries will continue to resist the attack.”26 He ruled out suggestions both to
bomb mainland China and to use Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces in Korea because
he wanted to minimize the risk of starting a general war. By doing so, President Truman
was hoping to find a peaceful settlement in Korea.27
In addition to his effort to gain support from the NCCC, the President also sought
means to mobilize religious public opinion on his Korea policy. Since the missionary
organization had vast interests in Korea, Truman continued to define the Korean War as a
battle for religious freedom. Speaking at the Presbyterian Church on New York Avenue

24 For example, in September 1951, Dr. John L. Peter, a professor o f religion at Oklahoma City University,
preached a sermon at St. Luke’s Methodist Church on the importance of sending out missionaries as an
effective means to combat the spread of Communism. In response, the Christian community in Oklahoma
City was so aroused that they mobilized a city-wide effort to lobby Congress to support the Point IV
program o f sending out Christian technicians, educators, and other skilled workers as missionaries to the
underdeveloped world. See Drew Pearson, “The Washington Merry-Go-Round,” Northwest Arkansas
Times, 5 October 1951,4. The President also tried to enlist the Pope’s support by expressing his desire to
select General Mark Clark, the field commander o f the 8th Army in Korea at that time, to be ambassador to
the Roman Catholic Church because he felt, according to a White House Statement, that the “purposes of
diplomacy and humanitarianism [would] be served’ and that “direct relations with the Vatican [would] help
coordinate a common fight against Communism. See “Wave o f Protest Against Appointment o f Clark to
Vatican Post Rolls Across U .S,” The Ada Weekly, 25 October 1951, 4.
25 “Remarks to a Group o f Methodist Ministers,” 7 February 1951, Public Papers o f the Presidents: Harry
S. Truman, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.
26 Ibid.
27 “Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East,” 11 April 1951,
Public Papers o f the President: Harry S. Truman, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.
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in Washington D.C. on April 3, 1951, he appealed for moral support from religious
leaders:
There has never been a cause which had a stronger moral claim on all o f us. W e are
defending the religious principles upon which our Nation and our whole way o f life are
founded. We are defending the right to worship God - each as he sees fit according to his
own conscience. We are defending the right to follow the precepts and the example
which God has set for us. We are defending the right o f people to gather together, all
across our land, in churches such as this one. For the danger that threatens us in the
world today is utterly and totally opposed to all these things. The international
Communist movement is based on a fierce and terrible fanaticism. It denies the existence
o f God and, wherever it can, it stamps out the worship o f God. Our religious faith gives
us the answer to the false beliefs o f communism. Our faith shows us the way to create a
society where man can find his greatest happiness under God. Surely, we can follow that
faith with the same devotion and determination the Communists give to their godless
creed.28

Religious freedom was an important principle in Truman’s mind because it was also a
principle shared by all religious groups in the United States and other Western countries.
Therefore, the administration began to increase the use of religious materials in radio
programs, pamphlets, and motion pictures in its propaganda campaign against
Communism.29 By April 1951, Truman wanted to make peace, but he made it very clear
that he would not compromise American principles.
General Ridgway and the Stabilization of the Front
US forces suffered a major setback when General Walton H. Walker, field
th

commander of the 8 Army, was killed in a car accident on December 23, 1950, while
visiting to American units in the vicinity of Uijongbu. The sudden death of General
Walker caused serious confusion and widespread fatalism among US and ROK troops.
Washington immediately sent General Matthew B. Ridgway, the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Administration in the Department of Army, to replace Walker.

28 “Address at the Cornerstone Laying of the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church,” 3 April 1951,
Public Papers o f the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php.
29 In July 1951, the State Department formed a religious advisory panel to counsel Assistant Secretary of
State Edward W. Barrett, who was in charge o f the “Voice o f America,” on the religious content o f their
programs. See “Religion Panel on Voice o f U.S,” Religion Today and Tomorrow, 14 July 1951, 1.
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Ridgway proved to be the right man for the job due to his knowledge of the Korean War,
and his previous war experience in China and the Philippines. As soon as he arrived,
th

General MacArthur authorized him to command both the 8 Army and the X Corps. It
was a vital change that strengthened Ridgway’s position in conducting a new war
strategy in Korea.
To lift the morale of UN troops, Ridgway first encouraged the ROK Army by
making it clear that he had come to Korea to stay. He ordered his divisional commanders
to hold their line by seizing high ground north of Taejon, abandoning Walker’s “roadbound” approach.

In February, the UN side eventually launched a major counter

offensive, Operation KILLER, taking advantage of their superior firepower to inflict
maximum damage on the enemy.

-in

A month later, UN forces retook Seoul and pushed

the Chinese back to the 38th Parallel where the battle lines began to stabilize.
The Recall o f General MacArther
Increasingly disturbed by the military stalemate along the 38th Parallel and the
military restrictions imposed by Washington, General MacArthur grew restless and
impatient with the Truman administration.

Washington wanted a limited war, but

MacArthur sought to expand the war and bring in the Chinese Nationalists. After the
Joint Chiefs rejected MacArthur’s demand to attack the North Korean electrical
installation in Najin, a harbor near Soviet territory, MacArthur became more vocal in his
criticism of the administration. In defiance of his commander in chief, he constantly
embarrassed the President, especially by discussing his plans to secure a total victory by
any means.

MacArthur pushed Truman too far when he endorsed House Minority

30 Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against the US in Korea 1950-51 (New York:
Newmarket Press, 1988), 277.
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Leader Joseph Martin’s call to open a second front in China, and when he mocked the
idea of limited warfare, declaring, “there is no substitute for victory.”

After consulting

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, General Omar
Bradley, and W. Averell Harriman, then special assistant to the President for national
security affairs, the President relieved MacArthur of his command on April 11.
US public reaction to MacArthur’s recall was extremely emotional and confused.
The Republican Party manipulated the popularity of the five-star general to turn public
sentiment into an anti-Truman campaign.

Many Americans were as frustrated as

MacArthur over the handling of the war, feeling that Truman did not have the strength to
win the war or stop the fighting. The nation was deeply divided. Even the press was split
over this controversy.

The Hearst, McCormick, and Scripps-Howard news chains

attacked Truman as a scoundrel, while the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the
Atlanta Journal supported the President.
The religious opinion in the United States was similarly divided over this
controversy.

While fundamentalist Christians and the Catholic Church supported

MacArthur, most liberals favored the President. The opinion of the NCCC and many
liberal Protestant church leaders sided with the President and supported his stand on
limited warfare.

An editorial by The Christian Century praised the President, and

denounced MacArthur’s ideas on the use of the atomic bomb and the expansion of the
war into Communist China.32 John C. Bennett, an editor of Christianity and Crisis,
regarded a large-scale war in Asia as “a momentous blunder, a blunder based upon

31 Quote in Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing o f An American Hero (New
York: The Free Press, 2000), 330.
32 “MacArthur,” The Christian Century 68 (25 April 1951): 519. See also “Peace Hopes Rise at U.N.:
Editorial Correspondence,” The Christian Century 68 (2 May 1951): 551.
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blindness to the real sources of Communist strength in Asia and upon blindness to the
need of broad international support for effective police action against Communism.”33
The editor of United Presbyterian, who had been highly pro-MacArthur, made it clear
that the President of the United States had the “legal right to relieve any military officer
of his command and turn his authority over to another.”34 Support from these religious
leaders strengthened the position of the President.
Differing from the position of their denominations, missionaries tended to support
MacArthur’s tough stance. They feared that Korea might go the way of China. In the
three years that Communists had controlled China, the number of American missionaries
had plummeted from 2,986 (2,536 Protestant and 450 Catholics) to only 193.35
Missionaries expelled from China were vocal within the religious community. Some
were staunch supporters of the China Lobby, a pro-Nationalist political lobby in
Washington.

"Xft

China’s entry into the Korean War further damaged mission enterprises in

China. With the exception of the Catholic Church, missionaries began to be recalled or
advised to return.37 From late 1950 through the end of 1951, many of those who tried to
stay in China and continue their work were arrested. It was regarded as “the worst mass
persecution of American missionaries in [US] history.”

This persecution hardened the

opinions of many ex-China missionaries. Some of them would be among those who
wanted the US government to allow Chiang Kai-shek to send his troops to Korea. While

33 John C. Bennett, “The MacArthur Controversy,” Christianity and Crisis 11 (14 May 1951): 58.
34 Henry W. Temple, ‘T h e MacArthur Affair,” The United Presbyterian, 23 April 1951, 6.
35 Ibid.
36 George E. Sokolsky, ‘T he China Lobby,” The Portsmouth Times, 13 June 1951,4.
37 “Exit,” TIME, 15 January 1951.
38 The NCCC reported that 32 American missionaries were in prison, 25 under house arrest, and 136
restricted in their movements. They were prevented from leaving China and subjected to criminal
accusations and attacks. See George Cornell, “Cite Peril to Ministers Overseas: Call Treatment of
Missionaries Worst in History,” Austin Daily Herald, 8 May 1952, 1.
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US church leaders wanted to achieve peace and prevent an expansion of war, there were
individual missionaries who wanted a firm policy to achieve a military victory.
Many of the missionaries to Korea shared the philosophy of their Chinese
missionary counterparts. And like the Chinese missionaries, they also found themselves
at odds with their denominational leaders on the idea of peace. Missionaries in the war
zone had personally witnessed Communist hostility against Christianity.

Hoping to

liberate the North, many appreciated MacArthur’s tough stance against compromise.
When MacArthur was recalled, therefore, missionaries and Korean Christians alike were
devastated and angered by Washington’s decision. Rev. William C. Kerr, a Korean
missionary who was in Japan working with the US military for the re-orientation program
of Communist prisoners of war, wrote of his great disappointment to Dr. John C. Smith,
the Secretary of the Board of Presbyterian Foreign Mission (USA):
We are stunned this evening by the news o f Gen. MacArthur being superseded. If an
awful howl does not immediately follow this action I shall be surprised. If the person
who made this decision had handed in his own resignation I should have been much
better pleased. But let some people with more authority than I have be the ones to speak
39
up.

Such frustration was common among missionaries in Korea. They sympathized with the
South Korean desire to unify the country, even though prolonging the war would cost
more lives. At the same time, however, most were amenable to a peace settlement, so
long as the United States made a clear commitment to protect the security of South Korea.
Among US allies, however, the firing of MacArthur was welcome news. They
had grown weary of MacArthur’s insubordination. Unlike the American public, who
generally disapproved of Truman’s decision to fire MacArthur, 55 percent of the British

39 Letter from Rev. William C. Kerr to Dr. John C. Smith, 11 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archive,
Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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favored his decision.40 As public emotions began to cool down and arguments from both
sides were reexamined by Congress, Truman regained his support among the elite and
those well-informed on foreign affairs. In May 1951, a Gallup Poll conducted among
people listed in Who’s Who in America found that 51 percent favored the president’s
action. Among educators on the list, 64 percent supported the president41 The public’s
anti-Truman sentiment also decreased from 66 percent disapproving his action in May, to
56 percent a month later.42 People started to recognize the danger of MacArthur’s
aggressive strategy and had to concede the wisdom of Truman’s approach, though it hurt
their pride to seek a truce instead of victory.
The Road to the Truce Talks
Following General Ridgway’s successful operations in the spring of 1951, UN
forces were in a better bargaining position for a truce.

President Truman sent US

diplomat George Kennan to contact Russian UN Ambassador Jacob Malik about Korea in
May. Malik’s response during their second meeting in early June was encouraging. The
Russians suggested that the United States negotiate directly with the North Koreans and
the Chinese. The door to talks negotiations was gradually opened. Public sentiment in
the United States also favored negotiations. A survey by the Gallup Poll in early July
showed that 51 percent approved the UN call for a truce at the 38th Parallel.43 Christian
churches also supported the call for negotiations. For example, the largest Protestant
denomination in the United States, the Methodist Church, urged the UN “to secure a
thorough-going ceasefire negotiation in Korea” and cautioned against “militarism which

40 The
41 The
42 The
43 The

Gallup
Gallup
Gallup
Gallup

Poll,
Poll,
Poll,
Poll,

21 May 1951, 984.
16 May 1951, 983.
3 May 1951, 981, and 8 June 1951, 988.
July 2, 1951, 993.
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[promoted] war as the solution of world problems.”44 Catholics also called upon US
leaders “to exert every effort to reach a settlement of [the] international problems in
harmony with Christian principles.”45
After receiving instructions from Washington, General Ridgway announced that
the United Nations Command (UNC) was willing to negotiate an armistice.

The

Communist side suggested Kaesong as the conference site, and a preliminary meeting by
liaison officers was scheduled on July 8, 1951. Formal truce talks began two days later.
The UNC chief negotiator was Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, Commander of U.S.
Naval Forces (Far East). The Republic of Korea sent Major General Paek Son-yop as an
observer. The Communist side was led by General Nam II, the Korean People’s Army
(KPA) chief of staff and vice foreign minister of North Korea. The Chinese sent Lt.
General Deng Hua, the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ Army (CPVA) Deputy Commander.
On the first day, both sides presented their positions.

The UNC wanted the

negotiations to be limited only to Korea-related military matters. Admiral Joy requested
the Communists to allow the International Red Cross to inspect the prisoner of war (POW)
camps, and suggested a joint supervisory mechanism to inspect both sides’ observance of
the armistice. The Communist side asked for an immediate ceasefire, the establishment
of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the 38th Parallel, and the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Korea.
The negotiations, however, had a rocky start because of the Communist attempt to
control Kaesong and score a propaganda victory.

After US troops withdrew from

44 See “Methodists Call for Peace But Without Appeasement,” Religion Today and Tomorrow, 14 July
1951,1.
45 “Catholic Women Want Peace With Christian Principles,” Religion Today and Tomorrow, 14 July 1951,

1.
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Kaesong to honor the pledge to keep the city a neutral zone, the Communists moved in
and completely took over the city.

According to historian Rosemary Foot, the

Communists were trying to “bolster their negotiating position” due to their weaker
military position.46 The original goal of the Communist side - to unify Korea - was
dashed by the UNC counter-offensive in June. In order to cover their weakness before
their domestic and foreign audiences, the North Koreans and the Chinese tried to
manipulate the press and radio to give a false sense of its success on the battlefield. Since
Kaesong was located south of the 38th Parallel, they could claim a clear victory by taking
over the ancient city of Korea. More than that, UN forces agreed to reduce their attacks
at the beginning of the truce talks, providing a critical breathing period for the
Communist side to dig in and consolidate their military position along the front. The
Kaesong period of the truce talks made very little progress and eventually Admiral Joy
insisted on a new negotiation site at P’anmunjom if the Communists withed to continue
the negotiations.
The Underwood Brothers as Interpreters fo r the UNC
There were many obstacles for the two sides to overcome. One of them was
language interpretation. Good interpreters in the military were hard to find. Candidates
needed not only excellent language skills, but also a security clearance for such a top
secret responsibility. Because the negotiations involved both Koreans and Chinese, a
trilingual interpretation was needed. Thus, missionary kids in the military would become
important to the peace process.

Lt. Richard Underwood and Warrant Officer Kenneth

Wu were called separately to duty in Kaesong. Every sentence had to be translated twice,

46 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory: The Politics o f Peacemaking A t the Korean Armistice Talks
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 44.
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first in Korean by Underwood and then in Chinese by Wu. Interpreting a formal military
negotiation was not easy because if they made mistakes in translation, the negotiations
would suffer. On the first day, both Officer Wu and Lt. Underwood were overwhelmed
by the difficulties of their job. “Suffice it to say that I sweat blood,” Lt. Underwood
recalled, “died of humiliation, and did a very poor job that day.”47
Nevertheless, there were good reasons for the poor performance of the interpreters
at the initial stage. First of all, UN negotiators did not appreciate the importance of
interpreters. For the opening session, Admiral Joy and his team worked hours to “polish
and sharpen their words to mean exactly what they wanted to say,” but no one bothered
to give Lt. Underwood or Officer Wu a copy of the prepared speech. As a result, they
had a hard time not just interpreting correctly, but also recalling exactly what the Admiral
had said.

Second, US military personnel were not familiar with the process of

interpretation at the negotiation table. The admiral spoke too fast and sometimes too long,
making it impossible for his interpreters to catch up. Third, as a missionary kid, Lt.
Underwood was fluent in Korean only in terms of basic, daily conversation, but the
vocabulary of the negotiations was strange to him.

4R

Although he was assigned as a

language specialist in the US Army at the beginning of the Korean War, he had never
received any formal training in Korean linguistics.
To address these problems, Underwood and Wu made three key suggestions to
the UN negotiators.
Kaesong.

First, they asked that Lt. Horace G. Underwood be brought to

Being ten years older than his brother Richard Underwood, and having

received formal Japanese language training in the Navy, Horace Underwood was better

47 Richard F. Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” (Unpublished Manuscript, 2002) 93.
48 Ibid., 94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

465

prepared for the job.

Knowledge of Chinese characters was absolutely necessary to

translate many technical terms from English into Korean, since the Korean language, like
the Japanese, uses many Chinese characters. Second, they asked for advance copies of
all “position papers” so they could translate them beforehand. Third, they requested that
each delegate learn how and when to pause for interpretation.49
Admiral Joy immediately arranged the transfer of Lt. Horace Underwood to
Kaesong to be the Chief UN Interpreter.50 He assigned Horace Underwood as the
primary interpreter for all plenary sessions, while Richard Underwood took responsibility
for sub-committees and liaison, or investigative, missions. The admiral also allowed the
three interpreters “to sit in on the staff work sessions in which the speeches were
hammered out.” 51 In this way, all interpreters were able to understand fully the
background thinking for each speech and proposal. In addition, the interpreters were also
invited to participate in policy discussions to offer insights into Korean or Chinese
thinking. The negotiation team also valued the interpreters’ comments on broader issues,
treating them with respect in spite of their low rank.52 Horace Underwood’s background
as an educator and missionary in Seoul and Richard Underwood’s experience as an
intelligence officer working with POWs in Tongnae and Hamhung perhaps enabled them
to advise the UN delegates informally on a variety of issues.

49 Ibid.
50 Harry A. Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, eds., History o f the Korean Mission: Presbyterian Church in
the USA Volume II: 1935-1959 (New York: The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1964), 59.
51 Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” 94.
52 Horace G. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f Horace G.
Underwood, ed. Michael J. Devine (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 161.
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The workload for these three interpreters was exhausting when the truce talks
were in session, even though they had a small staff of assistants to help them.53 Each
night after the staff meetings, the interpreters and their assistants had to “start the long but
necessary task of going through each paper” given by the delegates.54 They added notes,
made vocabulary reminders, and sometimes rephrased words into Korean on the margins
in order to make sure that they translated “the meaning and flavor of our delegate’s
statements, not just the words.”55 After staying up late, they would then get up early in
the morning, because the support staff had to travel by jeep, while the negotiators flew to
the negotiation site later in the day. (Only later in P’anmunjom, when more helicopters
became available, could the staff officers and interpreters fly to the negotiation site.)56
During the negotiations, interpreters had to stay alert because they needed not
only to interpret for the UN side, but also keep a close check on the interpretation done
by the other side, making sure that the Communist interpreters were interpreting exactly
what their delegates had said. On several occasions, the UN interpreters had to step in
and make corrections when the interpreters on the other side made mistakes. In one case,
the Communist interpreter spoke so poorly and incorrectly that Lt. Richard Underwood
had to inform the North Korean liaison officer, and the interpreter was fired on the spot.
The North Korean colonel asked him to take over interpretation for the Communist side
for the rest of the day.57

53 There were two typists, one Chinese-character typist and one Korean-language typist. They also
depended heavily on Colonel Lee Su-yong, the senior Korean liaison office, for assistance with the Korean
language. See ibid., 163.
54 Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” 94.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid. See also Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 171.
57 Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” 94.
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After the truce meeting concluded on day, UN interpreters had to hurry back to
the review meeting, assisting the UN delegates and other liaison officers to fully
understand what had been said. When dinner was over, they would begin the routine
again for the next day with another evening planning session followed by more late-night
translation work.

Sometimes, in the middle of the night, they were called to attend

special “investigation” meetings with Communist liaison officers.58 Many times, they
had to refute Communist allegations of UN bombings in the neutral zone.

On one

occasion while the negotiation site was still in Kaesong, they documented a case of germ
warfare that the Communists had staged to embarrass UN negotiators.
The negotiation process was made even more difficult by Communist attempts to
“twist and exploit every possible word or admission.”59 This left the interpreters with no
margin for error. Under such difficult conditions, the Underwood brothers served with
distinction. Their performance was praised by Admiral Joy in his memoirs.60 After
serving for about a year in P’anmunjom, Lt Richard Underwood chose not to reenlist
because he wanted to continue his college education and get married.

The Army

rewarded his services with a Bronze Star medal with oak leaf cluster (the equivalent of a
second Bronze Star), and promoted him to 1st Lieutenant.61
Lt. Horace Underwood also wanted to resign so that he could resume his
missionary work, but the Navy was reluctant to release him because he was probably “the
only officer in the U.S. Navy who [knew] Korean.”62 He served not only as interpreter

58 Ibid.
59 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 181.
60 Admiral C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955), 26.
61 Underwood, “Memoirs and Thoughts,” 101.
62 Letter from Horace G. Underwood to Dr. John C. Smith, 18 August 1952, Presbyterian Church Archives,
RG 140, Box 18, Folder 17 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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for the truce talks, but also as Aide, Staff Officer, and Interpreter to Admiral H. B.
Hanlon, Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Far East Command.63 He also attended
many meetings in dealing with issues concerning the South Korean government
throughout the war. In the end, Horace Underwood stayed until a few days before the
conclusion of the armistice.64 For his contribution at P’anmunjom, the US Army
rewarded him with the Legion of Merit, which was rarely given to lower ranks.65
Altogether, he received four medals for his services in Korea and served longer than most
of the American military personnel in the Korean War.

RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE POW ISSUE
Initially, no one on the UN side expected that the truce negotiations would be so
grueling and prolonged. It took fourteen days for both sides to agree to a five-point
agenda. (Item 1 was the adoption of the agenda. Item 2 was about fixing a military
demarcation line and the establishment of a demilitarized zone.

Item 3 dealt with

concrete arrangements for a cease-fire, an armistice, and a supervisory organization.
Item 4 concerned arrangements for prisoners of war.

Item 5 was the submission of

recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides). It took
another four months for both sides to agree on Item 2. By March 1952, they had resolved
the question of a supervisory organization in Item 3, and submitted their
recommendations in Item 5. The negotiations, however, had reached deadlock over the
question of voluntary repatriation in Item 4.

63 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission, Vol.2, 60.
64 He chose to leave earlier to dissociate himself from it, fearing that the unpopular truce might jeopardize
his missionary work in Korea. See Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 180.
65 Ibid., 187.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4 69

The desire for non-repatriation was nothing a new. After the end of World War II,
repatriation issues created serious difficulties for the Allied Forces, because numerous
Russian troops and civilians, who had deserted to the Germans and been captured by the
allies, refused to be repatriated. Many committed suicide when the Allies decided to send
them back.66 The legacy of this incident affected the consciences of many American
leaders and shaped their strong views on the principle of voluntary repatriation.
Capturing North Korean Prisoners
During the early stages of the Korean War, the POW administration was
extremely disorganized and confusing. UN authorities had no systematic procedures to
handle their North Korean prisoners of war.

In August 1950, when the number of

prisoners increased to about a thousand, the UN side set up a permanent POW camp
(known as Enclosure 1) in Tongnae, a town 10 miles north of Pusan.67 Due to
insufficient manpower, Americans used ROK troops under close supervision by US
Army personnel to guard the prisoners.

All UN forces were ordered to send their

prisoners to Tongnae for interrogation and imprisonment as quickly as possible.
Prisoners of war were “the best source of intelligence information” throughout the
Korean War, but qualified military personnel who could obtain this information were
essential.68 In the US military, Korean linguists were almost non-existent in the Far
Eastern Command. In the first three months of the war, only fourteen of the 158 Korean
linguists had security clearances. Even among these fourteen, only seven were fluent

66 Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971), 130.
67 “The Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 8-5.1 A AA.K (Military History Office:
Office of the Assistant Chief o f Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960): 3-5.
68 Being told o f possible death and torture by Communist authorities, most North Koreans POWs tended to
tell lies instead o f truth when they were captured. See “Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems
during the Korean conflict,” 8-5.1 A AA.G (US Army Center o f Military History): 6-7.
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enough to be usable in all situations,69 and headquarters had retained most of these for the
Inch’on Landing operation.

Therefore, at the beginning, interrogations were mainly

conducted by South Korean or Japanese interpreters.
South Korean interrogators were mostly stem anti-Communists. They followed
the ROK Army to the front and conducted interrogations on the spot. If the prisoners
were determined to be South Koreans, the ROK army would release them immediately.
If they proved cooperative, the ROK treated them well and learned information through
“soft” means. If the prisoners were found to be hard-core Communists (mostly KPA
officers), more coercive means were employed. No statistics exist today on exactly how
many prisoners were simply released or how many were tortured to death by the ROK.
No formal investigation was ever conducted. Because “of the tendency of ROK forces to
mistreat or kill [prisoners] with even slight provocation,” the US Army decided to assume
full responsibility for taking care of POWs as early as August 1950, asking the ROK
units to transfer all their POWs to US custody immediately.70
Lacking interpreters during the first two months of the war, US troops depended
heavily on the voluntary services of missionaries, who took refuge in Taegu and Pusan.
Rev. Harry Hill, who had worked in North Korea before World War II, gave valuable
help to American officers.

They invited him to check on information given by the

prisoners and verify their stories. By doing so, Rev. Hill had the privilege not only to talk
with POWs, but also to preach to them as well. “Most of them give excellent attention,”

69 Ibid., 26-27.
70 ‘The Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 5. According to Dr. Woo Jun Hong, who
worked for the ROK army to distinguish Communists from non-Communists, the South Korean Army had
the policy o f killing Communists and releasing the South Koreans during the early stage o f the war. See
Donald B. Sheley, Beggar A t the Banquet, ed. by David Esterline (San Bruno, CA: Church o f the
Highlands, 1979), 73.
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Hill recalled, because “atheism [had] not satisfied their hearts, and they [were] eager to
receive copies of the gospels.”71 Therefore, evangelism among the POWs was ongoing
from the very start of the war.
In Pusan, UN troops invited Rev. Francis Kinsler and Rev. William Linton to
provide assistance. Army chaplains asked the missionaries to preach to the POWs in
Tongnae (about a thousand inmates at that time). Rev. Linton observed that they seemed
to be merely “uneducated, country boys,” not the kind of hardcore Communists that
people had expected.
77

families.”

He also discovered that “a good many [were] from Christian

In fact, the North Korean government’s distrust of Christians was reasonable

because the number of defections among North Korean Christians to the UN side was
quite high. Some Christian parents even instructed their children who were conscripted
into the North Korean Army not to return to North Korea if they had a chance to stay in
the South.73
A Rapid Numerical Growth o f Prisoners in UN Custody
Many more North Koreans surrendered after UN troops captured Seoul, because
the X Corps blocked the retreat of half of the KPA. By the end of September, Enclosure
1 in Tongnae contained 10,829 prisoners, an increase of approximately 9,000 over the
previous thirty days. Prisoners were brought in so rapidly that facilities were not ready
for them. Because shelter, food, and water were all in short supply, approximately 1,100
71 Since Rev. Harry Hill was neither an army officer nor a chaplain, his work in the POW camp was not
recorded in any o f the military documents. At that time, the politically oriented education program had not
started yet. Missionaries were offered “a free hand” and almost “free access” to their POWs. See letter
from Rev. Harry Hill, 22 August 1950, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder
14 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
72 Letter from Mrs. (Charlotte) Linton, 28 August 1950, in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Department of
History, Montreat, North Carolina.
73 Jeong Chung-seop’s parents urged him not to return to the North. Therefore, he and his cousin, who was
a Presbyterian elder, refused to be repatriated. Interview with Jeong Chun-Seop, an ex-North Korean POW
who resided in South Korea, 18 May 2004, College Park, Maryland.
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had to be placed in compounds without shelter.74 Still, thousands were coming each day.
By November 1950, there were more than one hundred thousand prisoners in UN custody
(33,478 were in Inch’on enclosures, 62,697 at Pusan, and 20,647 at P’yongyang).75 The
total number of prisoners reached 146,135 by December 3,1950.

1f\

The changing tide of the war in December 1950 forced UN authorities to move all
the prisoners first to Pusan, and then to Koje Island, an island twenty miles southwest of
the port of Pusan. Koje Island contained a total 28 compounds. They were divided
among 4 huge enclosures: Enclosure 6 was in the Central Valley, and Enclosures 7, 8,
and 9 were in the East Valley. These compounds were severely overcrowded. Sanitation
was poor and food at first inadequate. There were about 8,000 POWs in each compound
with around 500 people in each tent or barrack. Only 4,000 US and ROK troops were
stationed in Koje Island, about one to every five hundred prisoners. It was difficult for
UN authorities to maintain effective control. Since the 8th Army could not spare more
forces to guard these camps, management of these prison compounds relied on the
prisoners’ cooperation. Each compound elected its own representatives to be responsible
for discipline, supplies distribution, and communication with the camp commanders.
As a result, some compounds fell into the control of anti-Communists, and others
into the hands of hardcore Communists. US guards rarely entered POW enclosures due
to a lack of experience and manpower.

The situation was peaceful initially, but

deteriorated rapidly when truce talks began in Kaesong. From June 1951 to May 1952,
the Koje camps became a new battlefield of the Korean War, and emerged as a key issue
74 “The Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 8-5.1 A AA.K (Military History Office:
Office of the Assistant Chief o f Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960): 6.
75 Ibid., 7.
76 Outgoing message from CINCFE Tokyo, Japan to CG Army Eight Korea, 4 December 1950, Record
Group 9, Box 37, Folder: “Army 8 - out, Dec 50”, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk.
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during the truce talks.

The battles in these prison compounds were a constant

embarrassment for the UN negotiators and the source of tension between both sides. To
understand the nature of the POW controversy, it is important to analyze the origins of
the problem accurately. There were five major factors that contributed to the polarization
of the POW camps and the controversy over the repatriation issue.
(1) US Political Indoctrination o f Communist Prisoners
General MacArthur believed that freedom was the antithesis of Communism
because Communism gained control through terrorism, subversion, and deceit.

If an

open atmosphere were allowed, Communism would lose its power over its converts.77
Communist prisoners would be the best testing subjects for MacArthur’s assumption.
Plans were made to re-educate POWs by feeding them with new information and
religious services. The Far Eastern Command hired Dr. William C. Kerr and Dr. Dexter
Lutz, both missionaries from the Presbyterian Mission (USA), to organize a program for
the reorientation of POWs. The preparation work for this program began in Tokyo.78
As early as October 1950, the 8th Army started a pilot program at Yongdung-p’o
(near Seoul) to test the possibility of changing the attitude of the prisoners, making them
receptive to Western values, and correcting their distorted ideas about Western
democracy. Five hundred North Korean inmates were selected for the study. Class
attendance was voluntary.

Participants heard daily propaganda news releases and

commentaries from the radio, read weekly United States Information Service (USIS)
translations of news releases, and watched USIS film releases that had been used
77 From MacArthur to Mr. George Djamgaroff, Chairman Organizational Committee o f the 4th AntiCommunist Convention, 22 February 1951, Record Group 16a, Box 4, Folder 7, MacArthur Archives,
Norfolk.
78 Letter from William C. Kerr to Dr. John C. Smith, 11 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record
Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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previously in Japan to explain the democratic process. In addition, Protestant and Roman
Catholic religious services were held by missionary chaplains (Rev. William Shaw and
Father George M. Carroll). ROK government officials and businessmen were invited to
explain ROK accomplishments under democracy. The full impact of the pilot program,
however, remained unclear because the experiment was cut short when Chinese
intervention forced the evacuation of Seoul. However, it did lay down the premise for a
new re-education program later on Koje Island.

7Q

As soon as the prisoners settled down on Koje Island, prison authorities began a
comprehensive education program known as “CI&E” (Civilian Information and
Education). The CI&E was responsible for political and educational programs, while the
US Chaplain Corps was responsible for religious services. The new system was designed
“to develop ... an understanding and appreciation of the political, social, and economic
objectives of the United Nations and to assist [the prisoners] in various other ways so that
they may become better citizens in their country.” 80 The CI&E section operated
independently of the camp command in carrying out its assigned mission, communicating
directly with the high command in Tokyo, instead. Religion played a major role in the
programs of the CI&E. Not only was there a specifically stated religious component to
the indoctrination program, but even the “political and educational” component was to be
run by civilian missionaries. While Dr. Kerr “[supervised] the preparation of materials”

79 “The Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 102-103.
80 Quoted in William C. Bradbury, ‘T he Political Behavior o f Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War in the
Korean Conflict: A Historical Analysis,” Mass Behavior In Battle and Captivity: The Communist Soldier in
the Korean War (Chicago IL: The University o f Chicago Press, 1968), 219.
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for the CI&E program from Tokyo,81 Dr. Lutz ran the agricultural program in Korea.82
The program began on June 1 in Compound 63 with 7,500 prisoners and
gradually extended to all compounds. Prisoners were invited to attend a minimum of
four hours of orientation on a weekly basis. Although the orientation was not a religious
service, “it [was],” according to Dr. Kerr, “closely allied to one, and immediately
[impressed] one with its importance.”83 The goal of the program was to inculcate in the
prisoners a more favorable attitude toward Western and democratic ways, and instill a
distrust of Communist ideology. Some qualified teachers were hired from South Korea,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong, but most were selected from among POWs.

They led

discussions on six major topics: the background of the war, democracy and
totalitarianism, the lives of people of the free world, Korea/China and the world, the
reconstruction of Korea/China, and developing leadership and skills in group action.84
Roughly sixty to ninety percent of the prisoners (depending on the compound)
chose to attend the orientation classes.

The classes also provided other educational

programs such as literacy and vocational training to prepare prisoners for life after
internment (see Table 8.5). Various recreational activities were also introduced in the
compounds. Among them, reading groups, literacy classes, and agricultural classes were
the most popular.

Compounds that had detained more Communists had the lowest

attendance because the Communists were very resistant.

No CI&E programs were

conducted in compounds that were firmly controlled by the Communists. To reach them,
81 Letter from the General Headquarters Supreme Commander from the Allied Powers to Dr. John
Coventry Smith, 23 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
82 Letter from William Kerr to John Smith, 17 May 1951, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 140,
Box 18, Folder 17 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
83 Letter from William Kerr to John Smith, 11 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 17 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
84 ‘T he Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 102.
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camp authorities depended on daily broadcasts of music programs, news reports, and
announcements. In the end, the CI&E section had only a modest effect, mainly among
non-Communists, the illiterate, and youths.
The impact of the CI&E programs was hard to measure, but it did generate some
degree of anti-Communist sentiment among those POWs who were not party members.
The Communist side accused some Chinese CI&E instructors of being spies for Chiang
Kai-shek’s regime. According to the memoirs of the non-repatriates, Taiwanese teachers
did encourage them to go to Taiwan, and assured them of support from Chiang Kai-shek.
Some of them served as messengers between the Taiwanese government and Nationalist
leaders in the POW camps.85 The United States initially had no plan to send prisoners to
Taiwan, but because of the secret work of these Taiwanese teachers, the confidence and
the cause of the pro-Chiang prisoners was strengthened.
In the Communist-controlled compounds, where the CI&E section was not
effectively enacted, Communist leaders set up their own political indoctrination program.
They emphasized the importance of loyalty to their fatherland. They organized singing
and drama teams, and offered literacy classes to the illiterate. Those who knew foreign
languages gave classes in Russian and English.

Politically indoctrinated Communist

agents were sent out by the “Underground Communist Party” to organize pro-Communist
prisoners to challenge prison authorities and punish traitors. An ideological war was
fought between the Communists and the anti-Communists to win the loyalty of the
prisoners.

85 Min-jin Guo, Hanzhanyiwang: Yuxue Rensheng Huarenquan
(Memoir of
the Korean War: Human Rights o f the POWs in the Contest o f Bloody Survival) (Taiwan: Shangzhi
Minhwa Shiyi Ltd., 2000), 160-162.
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(2) US Religious Indoctrination o f Prisoners
As early as August 1950, the Far Eastern Command in Tokyo began formally
enlisting the help of missionaries. Rev. William Shaw and Rev. Harold Voelkel, both of
whom had been in North Korea before World War II, were hired as liaison civilian
chaplains and assigned to minister to Korean troops and prisoners of war. As soon as
Rev. Shaw arrived at Pusan in late August, he was sent to a POW camp to inspect and
interrogate 175 inmates with Swiss International Red Cross officials.86
Chaplain Voelkel was sent to Inch’on.

When he met the inmates there, he

discovered that “there [were] many Christians among them.” These Christian prisoners
insisted that “they had been forced into bearing arms.”87 Chaplain Voelkel was popular
among these inmates. His North Korean accent and religious preaching helped to pacify
many prisoners who because of Communist propaganda feared torture or death at
American hands. Voelkel preached to hundreds or sometimes thousands of prisoners.
He usually began by asking some questions about North Korea to win their attention, and
then went on to contrast Communism with the Gospel and urging them to turn to Christ
no

to be forgiven and saved.

His message was one of comfort, but it was also one of anti

communism, constantly “reminding them of the evil of godless Communism.”89 He
found his listeners eager to participate and ready to accept. The officer in charge of the

86 Letter from Adeline H. Shaw, 4 September 1950, Missionary Vol.4, United Methodist Church Archives GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
87 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel to Dr. Decker, 13 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archive,
Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
88 Chaplain Harold Voelkel’s letter #6, 21 October 1950, Documents o f the WCC [W orld Council o f Church]
Library: The Korean War, ed. Heung Soo Kim (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 138.
89 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 9 October 1950, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group 140,
Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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prisoners at P’yongyang even specifically requested that Voelkel be transferred there.90
Rev. Shaw continued to stay in Seoul and frequently visited the POWs in Inch’on prison.
In Pusan, one of the North Korean inmates was Pastor Im Han-sang, who was
mistaken by American soldiers for a Communist fugitive and taken prisoner. Once UN
authorities determined his real identity, he was not only re-classified as a Civilian
Internee (Cl), but also offered a tent to use as a chapel for worship services and Bible
studies within the Pusan POW camp. American officers nicknamed him “The Chaplain.”
On December 25, 1950, even before the arrival of Voelkel at Pusan, Pastor Im’s
Christmas service attracted 4,000 POW attendants, including many non-believers. US
authorities and missionaries provided Pastor Im with Bibles, scripture portions, hymn
books, and tracts. His ministry inside the POW camps grew continuously.91
The success stories of both Chaplain Voelkel and Pastor Im motivated UN
authorities to implement an evangelical program in all their prison camps on Koje Island.
From March 1951 to June 1952, Chaplain Voelkel took full responsibility for organizing
religious activities in the K5je Island POW compounds. Chaplain Rev. John E. Talmage
and Chaplain Rev. Bruce A. Cumming, who were missionaries in the Cholla provinces,
were transferred to minister to the prisoners in Koje as well.

At that time, there were

only about three thousand Protestants and around a thousand Catholics among the
147,000 Korean POWs.

A church tent was set up in each Koje compound.93 The

Protestants elected deacons and elders, held dawn prayer meetings, and engaged in

90 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 5 November 1950, Presbyterian Church Archive, Record Group
140, Box 18, Folder 15 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
91 Harold Voelkel, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1953),
11-13.
92 George Thompson Brown, Mission to Korea (USA: Board o f World Missions, Presbyterian Church U.S.,
1962), 198.
93 Ibid.
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personal evangelism. Chaplains were responsible for organizing mass meetings from
compound to compound, and attendance was always voluntary. Usually hundreds, and
on some occasions thousands, of POWs would come.
Since the prisoners responded to religious services enthusiastically, Chaplain
Voelkel and Pastor Im saw the need to train new Christian leadership among these
prisoners. They decided to organize Bible institutes in the various compounds in addition
to weekly worship services and prayer gatherings. With limited resources, the first Bible
academy began with thirty-eight prisoners, but by 1953 gradually expanded to reach
3,883 prisoners per week in fifteen institutes.

The daily schedule of these institutes

consisted of four classes: the Bible, hymns, English, and calisthenics. The curriculum
improved when more civilian Korean pastors and missionaries joined the staff of
chaplains inside the POW camps. Among those who had participated in the program, a
total of 642 expressed interest in going to seminary after their release.94 One of them was
a Buddhist priest who converted to Christianity during his internment.95 These POWs
later became part of a new generation of Christian pastors and prominent laymen in
postwar South Korea.
In about a year, a total of 2,266 Korean POWs were baptized (see Tables 8.6 and
8.7). More than 1,500 more became catechumens (people who finished their doctrinal
instructional courses and waited to be baptized) and 11,000 were preparing for the
catechumenate (see Table 8.7). Overall whole, nearly 20,000 Korean POWs regularly
participated in religious services. Using private donations from the United States, Dr.
Bob Pierce, the president of World Vision, Inc., supplied Chaplain Voelkel with a new

94 Voelkel, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea, 15-16.
95 Ibid., 25-27.
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jeep (costing about US$2,500) so that the chaplain could drive around to visit different
prison compounds in Koje Island with his Korean assistants.96
The initial success of religious activities among North Korean POWs during the
early stage of the Korean War encouraged US Commanders to introduce a similar
religious program for the Chinese camps, in addition to the CI&E programs - although,
unlike the case of the North Koreans, there were actually very few Christians among the
prisoners. The 8th Army requested Rev. Earle Woodberry and Father Thomas O’Sullivan
to be chaplains for the Chinese POWs. Both had been missionaries to China for decades,
and were completely fluent in Chinese.
American churches took special interest in the conversion of Chinese prisoners.
When Rev. Woodberry accepted the position as chaplain for the Chinese POWs, the
Presbyterian Board Secretary, Dr. John C. Smith, specifically requested that he inform
them “about the experiences” and “the attitude of some of these Chinese” prisoners,
because the American people had great interest in his ministry among Chinese POWs.
The secretary promised Woodberry that his stories “[would] be given wide publicity” in
the United States.97
In March 1951, Chaplain Woodberry began his work among prisoners in Pusan
and then proceeded to Koje Island. He obtained invaluable help from two Korean pastors.
One of them was Rev. Lee Tae-yong, a Korean ex-missionary to China. At first, the
average attendance at their meetings was between 1,500 and 2,000. During the first
month of their ministry, Woodberry reported that about six hundred Chinese soldiers
came forward to “[receive] Christ as their Savior,” and among them, 75 were officers.
96 Ibid., 19.
97 Letter from John Smith to Chaplain Earle Woodberry, 18 April 1951, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 3 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Three months later, 493 more officers had joined the group of believers.

The average

worship attendance increased to six or seven thousand per gathering.

At least six

thousand of them expressed “a purpose to believe in Christ,” and some even wanted to be
baptized.98 The growth was so rapid that Chaplain Woodberry and his staff had to “hold
them back from recording their decisions in order to be sure they were genuine.”99
About a year later, in June 1952, the chaplain and his Korean staff held between
eight and twelve worship services per month (2 to 3 on each Sunday in different
compounds), and had an average attendance of more than 4,000 each.100 Even after the
Chinese prison camps moved from Koje Island to Cheju Island, the number in attendance
in the non-repatriated camp (#3) did not drop.101 Chaplain Woodberry and his fellow
American officers were “astounded at the spontaneous outburst of Christian evangelism”
among the prisoners, especially when they knew for sure that the services were conducted
on a voluntary b asis.102

The chaplain immediately saw the political value and

psychological effect of these conversion stories.

1m

Communist prisoners frequently condemned the chaplains as spies of the US
imperialists.

Wu Chuen-sang, a Chinese Communist prisoner in Compound 86,

98 Letter from Rev. Earle Woodberry to “Dear Praying Friends,” undated, received on July 10, 1952,
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder Earle Woodberry - Presbyterian Historical
Society, Philadelphia.
99 “Six Months in the Chinese POW Camps” (Resume#l - Abridged), Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 360, Folder Earle Woodberry - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
100 “Copies o f EJW’s reports for April, May, and June, 1952,” received on November 19, 1952,
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 - Presbyterian Historical Society,
Philadelphia.
101 Memo from Dr. Wysham to the Secretary Council, 29 June 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 360, Folder: Earle J. Woodberry - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
102 Six Months in the Chinese POW Camps” (Resume#l - Abridged), Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 360, Folder Earle Woodberry - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
103 Letter from Rev. Earle Woodberry to “Dear Praying Friends,” undated, received on July 10, 1952,
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder Earle Woodberry - Presbyterian Historical
Society, Philadelphia.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4 82

described how the American authorities sent Chaplain Woodberry to weaken Communist
control by empowering the pro-Nationalist elements in each compound:
This old fox [Woodberry] was very crafty. He was very alert when he came in and out of
the prison compound. I remembered that when he first came to preach, there were only a
few prisoners surrounding him. Some of them even spoke cold words against him.
Nevertheless, he was neither upset nor discouraged, but continued to perform his drama
o f sincerity before the “Lord o f Heaven.” As days went by, I was surprised that some
people were converted into Christianity. ... “Chaplain” Woodberry came more and more
often, and more and more people listened to him. The “principal” Qin Li-ren [a CI&E
teacher] did not do any formal work, but was busy in establishing “Anti-Communist and
Anti-Russian Alliances” among “converts.”... Meanwhile, a mysterious person, Zhou
Yen-da, came to be the Police Chief o f Compound 8 6 ... Soon after, people from the
“Anti-Communist and Anti-Russian Alliance” completely controlled the police force of
the compound. As a result, the CI&E School added “political lessons.” The Prison
Police forced every person to attend the reactionary lessons.104 (Quotation originally in
Chinese)

Of course, US authorities did not send Woodberry to take control of Compound 86, but
religious services did boost the influence of anti-Communists there. The large number of
conversions alarmed the Communists in the compound and caused them to fight back. In
the eyes of the Communists, religious activities were a real threat.

Therefore, they

constantly sought to “ban chaplains from preaching in the compounds.”105
As the missionary chaplains continued to visit the camps, Communist prisoners
vented their frustration and hatred of the missionaries and religion by attacking Christian
prisoners.

Many victims were faithful attendees at Voelkel’s services and Bible

classes.106 In August, a deacon of a POW church congregation returning to his tent from
a prayer meeting was stoned to death.

His death stirred up more confrontations.

Prisoners began taking sides and ganging up on each other.

On September 17, in

Compound 85, Communist prisoners staged a coup and took power by killing all the non-

104 Testimony by Wu Chuen-sang in Zhe-shi Zhang, ed., Meijuti Jizhongying Qinli Ji
(Personal Records in the American Prison Camps) (Beijing: Chinese Archives Press, 1996), 134-136.
105 This request was listed as one o f the demands submitted by Communist prisoners in Pusan Enclosure 11.
See ibid., 110.
106 Rodger R. Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace: The United States Army Chaplaincy
1945-1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 5:94.
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Communist leadership. Seventeen non-Communists were brutally murdered.107 Among
them, six were Christians, two of whom were also deacons in the prison congregation.108
In response to the incident, Christians in Compound 85 drew up a petition, and
signed it in their own blood, proclaiming that they would rather die than return to North
Korea.

This petition was entrusted to Chaplain Voelkel and brought to the camp

authorities (see pictures). Within days, Christians in every compound of North Korean
POWs had written blood petitions, asking to be put to death rather than return to
Communist control.109

These blood petitions, according to a newspaper report,

“eventually became the mightiest propaganda weapon in the peace talks.”110 Christians
became active leaders among the non-repatriated POWs, organizing anti-Communist
protests against repatriation.111
(3) A Mixture o f Different Kinds o f Prisoners
The POW controversy was further complicated by the existence of different kinds
of prisoners in UN custody. Prisoners constituted a representative cross section of the
Chinese and Koreans, Communist and non-Communist.

Some groups were strongly

against repatriation for personal reasons. The first group consisted of South Korean
citizens and soldiers who were impressed into the North Korean Army. On October 12,
1950, General Headquarters of Far Eastern Command in Tokyo sent a direction to the 8th
Army, instructing it to prepare for the possible release of these prisoners. Headquarters
wanted each prisoner to prepare a statement on his impressment in the North Korean
107 The exact number varied. Meyers and Bradbury recorded it as seventeen, but Chaplain Voelkel said it
was sixteen. The actual number I believe should be seventeen because Meyers and Bradbury’s historical
account should be more accurate than Voelkel’s data. See Meyers and Bradbury, ‘T he Political Behavior
o f Korean and Chinese Prisoners o f War in the Korean Conflict: A Historical Analysis,” 262.
108 Voelkel, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea, 28-29.
109 Ibid.
110 “Missionary Tells o f Red Brutality in War Camp,” The Post-Standard, 15 October 1953.
111 Voelkel, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea, 29.
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army. The 8th Army would investigate each case and verify the testimony of each South
Korean prisoner.112 By mid 1951, about 37,000 South Korean civilians and 10,216 exROK soldiers were in UN custody (see Table 8.9). UN authorities removed the name of
the South Korean civilians from the list, and later released them to the South Korean
government.

10,216 ex-ROK soldiers remained in UN custody until June 1953.

Nevertheless, repatriation of these two kinds of prisoners eventually became less of an
issue at the negotiating table, because in April 1952 the Communist side at P’anmunjom
agreed to allow POWs of South Korean origins to stay in the south.

The main

controversy, therefore, was over North Korean and Chinese non-repatriates.
In the case of the Chinese, UN forces had 20,344 Chinese prisoners in custody in
July 1953. 14,704, about 72 percent of the total number of Chinese prisoners, claimed
that they did not want to be repatriated. The majority of these non-repatriates were exNationalist soldiers who had surrendered to the Chinese Communists during the Chinese
civil war. Most of them expressed their unwillingness to return to Communist China as
soon as they were placed under UN custody.113 At first, they were interned together with
North Korean prisoners. Despite their anti-Communism, they were mistreated by both
Korean POWs and South Korean guards simply because they were Chinese. The Chinese
prisoners therefore petitioned for a separate Chinese unit, and their request was granted.
As the number of Chinese prisoners continued to increase in spring 1951, they were
housed in two compounds on Koje Island, completely separate from the Korean inmates.

112 Outgoing message (confidential) from CINCFE to CG Army Eight Korea, 12 October 1950, Record
Group 38, Folder: “Army 8 - out, Oct 50,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk.
113 Meyers and Bradbury, “The Political Behavior o f Korean and Chinese Prisoners o f War in the Korean
Conflict: A Historical Analysis,” 252-253.
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There were about 16,000 Chinese POWs at that time. An ex-Nationalist officer named
Ching was the unofficial leader of the anti-Communist inmates.114
There were also non-Nationalist prisoners who refused repatriation.

Some of

them were even Chinese Communist Party members. They wanted to go to Taiwan not
because they liked Chiang Kai-shek, but because they were horrified by human-wave
tactics, and disillusioned over the dictatorship of the Chinese Communists.115 The
element of fear was also at work. According to the Communist Party Code, a party
member should fight the enemy unto death.

Surrender was not an option, and thus

anyone taken prisoner was guilty of treason. Therefore, some party members did not
want to return for fear of punishment and out of distrust of the Communist
government. 116

To address this problem, both the Chinese and North Korean

governments declared an amnesty to guarantee that the prisoners would be pardoned for
their violation of the party code, but the impact of this amnesty was marginal. Due partly
to the general distrust of the Communist government, and partly to tight control by
Nationalist leaders, the number of Chinese non-repatriate prisoners remained rather stable
(compared Tables 8.4, 8.11, and 8.13a).
In the case of North Korean prisoners (excluding prisoners of South Korean
origin), of 104,024 prisoners, 33,462 refused to be repatriated. This was about 32 percent
of the total number of North Korean prisoners. There was no clear description of these
non-repatriates.

More than 10,000 of them were Christians, or newly converted

Christians. Others were pro-Rhee rightists, but their loyalty to Rhee differed from that of

114 Ibid., 253-254.
115 Jian-guo Wang, Renhai D a Beiju
Asian Press, 1955), 221.
116 Ibid., 210.
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the pro-Chiang Nationalists. Very few had a direct relationship with Rhee. According to
Lt. Horace Underwood, who was sent by Admiral Joy to investigate the situation, during
the initial screening, the number of North Korean non-repatriates was actually higher.

117

It decreased afterwards due to effective Communist infiltration and re-indoctrination.
Although the final percentage of the North Korean non-repatriates was lower than among
the Chinese, the actual number of non-repatriated North Koreans was more twice as high
as the Chinese figure (see Table 8.4).
According to the testimony of Jeong Chun-seop, a prisoner in Compound 71,
North Korean anti-Communist leaders did not use force to coerce prisoners to select
repatriation because most of the North Korean Communists and anti-Communists were
actually lived in separate compounds.118 His story was also supported by reports from
the missionary chaplains.119 In the North Korean compounds, Communist prisoners were
the ones who used excessive violence to resist screening or force prisoners to sign up for
repatriation. Therefore, the decisions of these 33,462 North Korean non-repatriates had a
more legitimate claim to represent the real defection of citizens from a Communist
country to a non-Communist one.
The existence of different groups of prisoners in the POW camps revealed the
complexity of the POW issue. A diverse set of prisoners from different backgrounds
created the potential for conflict and trouble in each compound. Prisoners who desired
repatriation were not necessarily Communists, but they usually collaborated with
Communist leaders in their actions against the non-repatriates. When the Kaesong truce

117 Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and Peace, 176.
118 Interview with Jeong Chung-seop on 17 December 2005, College Park, Maryland.
119 “Missionary Tells o f Red Brutality in War Camp,” The Post-Standard, October 15, 1953.
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talks began, the confrontation between two opposing ideological groups further
aggravated the situation.
(4) Power Struggle between Communists and Anti-Communists
A power struggle between Communists and anti-Communists began when the
Communist side sent out trained agents to be captured so that they could organize the
prisoners and stir up trouble in the camps. North Korean Communists were far better
organized than Chinese Communists, because the North Koreans enjoyed an effective
underground information network extending from P’yongyang to Koje Island. Orders
were sent directly from the Korean Communist Party and carried by messengers to Koje.
Inside the prison camps, the North Korean Communist leader was Pak Sanghyon.120 In order to wrest control of all prisoner compounds from the anti-Communists
and strengthen the position of the Communist side at the negotiation table, Pak sent
Communist agents to infiltrate each non-Communist controlled compound.121 Their
mission was to exterminate all traitors [anti-Communists and those who collaborated with
their captors], resist screening, and initiate confrontations to embarrass UN authorities.
The goal was to discredit the idea of voluntary repatriation and reduce the number of
non-repatriates. To prepare for riots and confrontations with prison camp authorities, the
Communists took advantage of the CI&E program, turning some vocational training
workshops into weapon-making centers.

All kinds of lethal weapons - hatchets, spears,

knives and flails tipped with barbed wire - were mass-produced.

19"?

120 Zhang, Meijun Zizhongying Qinliji, 56. See also Michael Hickey, The Korean War: The West Confronts
Communism (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1999), 354.
121 “Missionary Tells o f Red Brutality in War Camp,” The Post-Standard, October 15, 1953.
122 Hickey, The Korean War, 348-349.
123 Ibid., 349.
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For example, in Compound 62, where 9,000 civilian internees were kept, a small
number of hardcore Communists overthrew anti-Communist control by beating or
murdering non-Communists, including many Christians.124 The anti-Communists were
caught by surprise. Within a short period of time, Communist agents controlled all the
key posts inside the compound, and subdued most of the core anti-Communists. A reign
of terror began and the power of Communists expanded. Since the inmates were mostly
civilians, the anti-Communist organization was weak and unable to repel the assault of
the hardcore Communists. With the help of Chaplain Voelkel, some Christians were able
to be transferred to “more congenial quarters.”125
Of course, the camp commander wanted to secure compound 62 and protect all
the non-Communists. Before daybreak on February 18, screening personnel and the 3rd
Battalion of the US 27th Infantry Regiment approached the compound under the cover of
darkness. The effort not only failed, however, but backfired, triggering a riot. In the end,
55 POWs were killed, 159 severely wounded, and 22 more died of their injuries later.
Camp authorities lost one soldier, with another seriously wounded, and 22 more suffered
minor injury.126 Despite all these losses, compound 62 remained in Communist hands.
Within days, the Communist side used this event to voice their complaints about the UN
prison management, and news of the incident was widely reported in the world’s leftwing press. 127

124 ‘T he Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 24. See also Hickey, The Korean War,
349.
125 Letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel, 29 February 1952, Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean
War, 270. See also the letter from Chaplain Harold Voelkel to Chaplain (Colonel) Ivan L. Bennett, 22 Sept
1951, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder 17 - Presbyterian Historical
Society, Philadelphia.
126 ‘T he Handling o f Prisoners o f War During the Korean War,” 62-63.
127 Hickey, The Korean War, 349.
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The Communists also took full control of the POW medical center in Pusan
(Enclosure 11).

The infiltration was possible because the American staff depended

heavily on the service of North Korean prisoners.128 Anti-Communist patients were
murdered in the wards by Communist agents at night when the American staff was gone.
Since some Chinese had anti-Communist slogans tattooed on their bodies, they were the
most vulnerable. When news of mass murders reached the ears of the pro-Nationalists,
no one was willing to use the hospital.129 From then on, Enclosure 11 became the
meeting place for all Communist agents. Communist leaders pretended to be sick in
order to go to Pusan, where they received directions from Pak’s agents.130 When the
second screening was carried out in April 1952, Communists in the medical center
forcefully prevented all patients from being re-screened. As a result, many sick patients
died. Because of Pak’s efforts, many North Koreans were forced to accept repatriation
out of terror.131
In the case of the Chinese, the pro-Nationalist Chinese were influential because
most of them had surrendered earlier and established good relationships with prison
authorities. As a result, they took over leadership positions inside the prisoner camps.
They also cultivated friendships with Chaplain Woodberry and gained his trust and
support. Compound 72 in Koje Island was under the complete domination of these antiCommunists. Nationalist leaders, such as Li Da-an, used their positions in the camp to
organize other anti-Communist prisoners and build up their political support.132 Very

128 Zhang, Meijun Jizhongying Qinliji, 86-96.
129 Wang, Renhai Da Beiju, 224.
130 Zhang, Meijun Jizongying Qinliji, 54 and 62.
131 Stanley Weintraub, The War in the Wards: K orea’s Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-of-War Hospital
Camp (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), 28-38.
132 Zhang, Meijun Jizhongying Qinliji, 136.
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often, the Nationalists treated hardcore Communist party members very harshly once they
discovered their true identity and intentions.
As soon as news of the truce talks reached the ears of the pro-Nationalists on July
28, 1951, they immediately stepped up their campaign against repatriation.

Many

prisoners in Compound 72 sent blood petitions to prison authorities, because they feared
that the Americans would treat them as they had the non-repatriated Russians for the sake
of recovering their own prisoners in Communist hands. The tattoo campaign began in the
hope of gaining public sympathy. In some cases, ex-Nationalist officers forced prisoners
who had wanted repatriation to change their minds and to tattoo anti-Communist slogans
on their bodies. They believed that the larger the number of non-repatriates, the stronger
their bargaining position would be.
According to an investigation conducted by US personnel, Lts. Wu and May,
interpreters in the UN Negotiation Team whom Admiral Joy sent to observe the initial
screening of Chinese POWs, pro-Nationalist Chinese used violence against those who
wanted to be repatriated. They believed that if prisoners were left alone, the percentage
of those who would choose repatriation would increase from 15 to 85 percent.133 Their
observation was also supported by other reports from State Department officials.134 This
was the basic reason why Admiral Joy insisted on re-screening the prisoners when the
Communist side, especially the Chinese Communists, challenged the accuracy of the
number of non-repatriates. Actually, the smaller the number, the better this would have
been for both sides.

133 Allan E. Goodman, ed., Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary o f Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean
Armistice Conference (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 355.
134 Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 113.
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However, the POW Camp Commander, General Francis T. Dodd, argued that the
result of the first screening was accurate within 10 percent.135 Lt. Aoa Meisling, one of
the senior linguists handling the screening of Chinese POWs, estimated that the proNationalists suppressed about 2,000 Chinese prisoners, preventing them from freely
expressing their true will on repatriation. This was about 10 percent of the total number
of prisoners.136
Chinese Communists fought back by spreading rumors about the war and
threatening that anyone who sided with the traitors would be punished, and their family
would suffer too.137 They also formed underground Communist organizations to carry
out their political indoctrination programs. Those who wanted to go home had to find
ways not only to survive the pro-Nationalist control, but also to prove their loyalty to the
Chinese Communist Party. Their only hope was to cause serious trouble in the POW
camps to embarrass UN authorities. Their first strategy was to stir up riots and bloody
confrontations between the prisoners and their UN guards.
The most serious effort was a collaborative effort by both Chinese and North
Korean Communists to plot the abduction of General Dodd in May 1952. Dodd was held
hostage by the prisoners for four days. The Communist side scored a major victory when
both General Dodd and General Charles F. Colson, Dodd’s successor, agreed to sign
statements conceding that UN authorities had mistreated the prisoners and that they
would stop the process of screening prisoners, allowing all prisoners to return home.

1 '18

135 Goodman, Negotiating While Fighting, 356.
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In order to halt the spread of violence and assume control over all the prison
camps, UN authorities appointed Brigade General Haydon L. Boatner to take over the
command of Koje Island. General Boatner had lived in China for years and spoke fluent
Chinese.

He tackled the situation by subdividing the overcrowded compounds

(Operation BREAKUP) and bringing in other UN troops to guard the Communists.
While most of the Korean repatriates remained in Koje Island, Boatner moved all the
Chinese prisoners from Koje Island to Cheju Island and separated the repatriates from
non-repatriates. In this way, the violence between the Nationalists and the Communists
ceased and UN authorities regained control over most of the Communist compounds.
(5) President Truman’s Firm Commitment to Voluntary Repatriation
When the POW issue was first discussed among policy-makers in Washington,
the Pentagon and the State Department disliked the idea of voluntary repatriation because
the military feared that the Communists would use it to prevent US soldiers from coming
home. In other words, US interests would be better served if the government could bring
back all its soldiers as soon as possible.

1

The president, however, had strong personal

opinions on the subject.140 The experience of the Russian soldiers in 1945, who violently
refused repatriation, had a deep impact on Truman and convinced him that it was morally
wrong to send back prisoners who wanted freedom instead of slavery.141 When Secretary
of State Dean Acheson learned of the president’s position, he changed his stance and
supported voluntary repatriation for humanitarian reasons.142

139 Acheson, The Korean War, 130-131. See also Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 88.
140 Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1980), 250-251. See also Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Vol.2 Years o f
Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 460.
141 Ibid. See also Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 89.
142 Acheson, The Korean War, 131. See also Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 89.
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Meanwhile, the army’s chief of psychological warfare, General Robert McClure,
offered a strong political argument to support voluntary repatriation, pointing out that
voluntary repatriation would have positive effects upon future U.S. psychological warfare
operations and give a boost to its Asian policies.143 McClure’s analysis appealed to many
policymakers in Washington. In January 1952, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and the State Department all agreed to stand fast in support of voluntary
repatriation even though it might lead the Communists to break off armistice talks, and
prolong the war.144
On May 7, the same day when General Dodd was abducted by Communist
prisoners, President Truman gave a stem speech on the POW issue:
... [T]here shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners o f war - as the Communists
have insisted. To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable. It would be
repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our
action in Korea. To return these prisoners o f war in our hands by force would result in
misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor o f the United States and o f the United
Nations. W e will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or
slavery.145

Truman’s position was supported by General Ridgway, Admiral Joy, and Secretary
Acheson, showing the Communist side that the US government was united in its position
on voluntary repatriation.146 Truman’s firm stance left little room for compromise. The
United States was willing to continue fighting and suffering losses if the Communists
refused to accept voluntary repatriation.

143 Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 87.
144 Ibid., 91.
145 Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Vol.2 Years o f Trial and Hope, 461.
146 Grace B. Ruckh’s reply to Mrs. Howard R. Pyfy’s letter to Secretary Acheson, 5 June 1952,
695A.0024/7-1951 - 5-2825, Problem of POW’s related international issue, 1951-1952/Acheson, Dean/ US
Dept of State, Record o f the U.S. Department of State relating to Korea: International political relations,
1950-1954, National Archives.
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Public Support fo r Voluntary Repatriation
President Truman’s decision also reflected public opinion at that time. Although
the war in Korea was no longer popular and many people regarded the American
involvement as a mistake,147 the general sentiment was that the United States should not
withdraw without securing at least a symbolic victory. Public discourse over voluntary
repatriation intensified from early 1952, when the truce talks boiled down to discussions
over the POWs. There was a general fear that the United States might yield on the
voluntary repatriation issue for the sake of an armistice. Many letters and telegrams from
refugee groups, private relief agencies, and religious organizations that supported
voluntary repatriation arrived at the State Department and the White House. The China
Lobby and the Korea Lobby (a small group of Americans who were pro-Syngman-Rhee
due to religious, military, or political interests) also strengthened their pressure in
Washington. Both Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee’s publicity men in Washington
lobbied the U.S. government to take a firm stance on the POW issue. Because of the
religious factor, their appeals for the principle of voluntary repatriation made a stronger
case.
Through the National Council of Churches (NCCC), the three Presbyterian boards
in the United States, the Methodist Board, Billy Graham Evangelical Association, and
Rev. Robert Pierce’s World Vision, the missionaries’ ministry among POWs and the
mass conversions within the camps became well-known to American churchgoers. Both
religious and secular journals also reported the success of the POW ministry. The report
of Voelkel’s work among POWs appeared in The United Presbyterian on December 17,
1951. Local newspapers across the United States, such as The Fredericksburg News,
147 The Gallup Poll, 2 April 1952,1053.
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Herald-Press and Panama City News Herald, also reported on how missionaries
converted Communist POWs.148 On January 18, 1952, the New York Times ran a story
on POW conversions. When Woodberry’s wife visited the United States in February
1953, she was invited by churches to speak on her husband’s work among Chinese
Communist prisoners in Korea.149
It did not matter greatly to the American people exactly how many were
converted or whether or not they were religiously sincere. For many, the point was not
necessarily even Christian - it was the implication of this phenomenon. Droves of people
who had lived under Communist influence and even fought under its banner were
choosing the side of Christianity and the United States. This gave Americans a sense of
righteousness and provided a boost to the moral case for US intervention. Dr. Eugene
Carson Blake from the NCCC explained the arguments for voluntary repatriation:
These men who became Christians know that if they are returned or exchanged to North
Korea, they will be men marked for death, because there are Communist informers in
every POW Compound. (Ever since the truce talks began last August, commanders have
been receiving petitions - written in blood - from North Korean and Chinese Christians
pleading not to be sent back to Communist terror.) The most tremendous vote of
confidence ever given by an Asiatic people to western democracy and Christianity is
being given daily by these men, many o f whom, impressed into the Communist army,
allowed themselves to be captured at the first opportunity. The barbed-wire prayer
meeting proves one thing more. Communism hasn’t got a chance when faced with a vital,
virile, trained Christian faith. Six months ago Communist leaders were beating up
Christians and democrats in the compounds. Scores were killed. Now, after the
Communist ringleaders have been segregated, there is freedom o f religion in every one of
the compounds and the Christian Church is active in every one. Here is one place, the
last you might have expected it, where Communism is on the run.150

Based on Dr. Blake’s line of reasoning, if the people behind the Iron Curtain were given
religious freedom, they would no longer support Communism.

Communism had

148 “Korean POWs Hold Service,” The Fredericksburg News (November 8, 1951), “Some Are Converted:
Missionaries Working With Red Prisoners and Internees,” Panama City News-Herald, 8 Jan 1952); and
“Missionaries Convert POW’s: Christians Find Large Field For Work Among Reds,” The Herald-Press, 8
Jan 1952).
149 “Missionary Address Trinity Unit,” The Lima News, 10 February 1953; and “Presbyterian Aid Society
Has Program,” The Lima News, 13 February 1953.
150 Eugene Carson Blake, “Barbed-wire Prayer Meetings,” Presbyterian Life, 2 February 1952, 27.
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revealed its vulnerability. Religion proved an effective weapon to break the Communist
chains on human minds.

It also proved that the Communists were wise to seek the

eradication of Christianity because it was, among all religions, the greatest threat to their
ideology and power. Religion was critical to the ideological battle of the Cold War.
Given that President Truman cherished religious freedom and had in mind forming a
Western religious alliance to combat Communism, it was logical for the President to
support the principle of voluntary repatriation, even if this delayed the armistice
negotiations.
Religious factors also greatly increased America’s moral obligation to the POWs.
Initially, most prisoners (except for the pro-Nationalist Chinese and the Christians) would
have faced no known persecution in going back home, if the United States had not
initiated any religious or educational programs for them. But the US authorities not only
designed educational programs to influence their political views, but also allowed
missionaries to convert these POWs to the Christian faith (which was actually more
successful than the educational programs).

Once prisoners were exposed to Western

ideas and converted to Christianity, Communist authorities would treat them with
contempt. Lacking religious freedom in North Korea and China, Christians would face
almost certain religious persecution or even death - and their blood would be on
America’s hands for giving them hope and then taking it away. It would, therefore, be
unethical for the United States government to “buy an armistice by turning over human
beings for slaughter or slavery,” to borrow President Truman’s words. The sheer number
of these North Korean and Chinese non-repatriates (see Table 8.9) was too large for the
US government to overlook.
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Truman’s administration in fact explored the political value of religion in the
POW controversy. In a telegram he sent to the US Ambassador in Pusan, Secretary
Acheson reflected upon Dr. Blake’s opinion, and instructed the US embassy to
“corroborate and furnish [the State Department] enough [information] material for [a]
pamphlet.” 151 The administration took the religious interpretation of the POW issue
seriously. Both the White House and State Department received many letters from relief
organizations, political refugees’ associations, religious groups, and individuals urging
them not to compromise on this principle. Motivated by strong public support within the
United States and major political gains on the issue, the administration was fully
committed to voluntary repatriation.
According to a top-secret memo prepared by the State Department just prior to
President Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953, the free world’s opinion on
voluntary repatriation was “probably at its maximum point of unity on the question.”
Truman’s administration sought support from the new administration “to obtain Allied
agreement to, and carry out a unilateral release of non-repatriates.” 152 However,
President-elect Eisenhower refused to act upon Acheson’s suggestion because he did not
want to associate himself with Truman’s policy. The plan for a unilateral release of all
Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates before the conclusion of the truce was
therefore dropped, and the fate of these POWs and the prospects for peace rested on the

151 Telegram from Acheson (Department of State) to US Embassy in Pusan, 7 April 1952, 695A.0024/71951 - 5-2825, Problem of POW’s related international issue, 1951-1952/Acheson, Dean/ US Dept o f State,
Records o f the U.S. Department o f State relating to Korea: International political relations, 1950-1954,
National Archives.
152 Memo on Disposition o f Anti-Communist POWs (Top-Secret Security Information, 695A.0024/10-2952
- 12-2952] “International Political Relations, 1950-1954/Acheson, Dean/ US Dept o f State, Records of the
US Dept o f State relating to Korea: International political relations, 1950-1954, National Archives.
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shoulders of the new administration. Eisenhower had to create new initiatives to bring
the war to a quick end.

THE FINAL CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE
As Eisenhower entered the White House in January 1953, the war had drained US
resources, overtaxed its economy, and over-extended its military capabilities. But it was
not easy to bring the war to a close conclusively.

For four months there was little

progress, but Eisenhower and his outspoken secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, used
patience and diplomatic skill to end the war by July 1953. Under the new administration,
religious groups had an even more active role in foreign affairs.
Dulles’ New Foreign Policy Approach
Truman’s commitment to the idea of limited warfare and his unwillingness to use
the atomic bomb in Korea had caused serious handicaps in the conduct of foreign affairs.
In Dulles’ eyes, US policy in Korea had become too timid and predictable by the enemy,
ineffective, and lacking initiative to deal with the Communist bloc. The leverage of
atomic weapons had been lost since the United States had taken them off the table.
Therefore, during the presidential election, Dulles had advocated a “New Look” in US
foreign policy, emphasizing “Massive Retaliation” and the use of “brinkmanship” and the
“madman theory” so that the United States could have wider policy options in Korea. As
Secretary of State, Dulles would make bold speeches to spread fear and uncertainty in the
Communist world regarding US nuclear plans.

The administration even claimed to

regard atomic bombs much as it did conventional weapons, as a viable option in war.153

153 Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy
(Wilmington, DE: A Scholarly Resources, 1999), 69.
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If Truman and Acheson had tried such an aggressive approach, there would have
been an outcry from the Protestant churches. While Secretary Dulles was not above
criticism from his political enemies, he definitely had more maneuvering room than his
Democratic predecessors. Coming from a liberal Presbyterian background, and having
worked for many years with the Federal Council of Churches (FCCC) through chairing
the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace since 1941, Dulles
enjoyed close ties with many Protestant leaders. Although he had resigned from his
NCCC position when he became secretary of state, Dulles told Dr. Walter W. Van Kirk,
Secretary of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill (an NCCC committee),
“You may rest assured that the views of the National Council of the Churches of Christ
will continue to receive my most earnest consideration.” 154 In return, the NCCC
courteously refrained from openly criticizing Dulles’ foreign policy approach.
The Influence o f Religious Leaders upon the Eisenhower Administration
The NCCC was particularly concerned that the new Eisenhower administration
might compromise on the POW issue out of political expediency. As soon as Eisenhower
was elected, the NCCC met with Dulles and submitted a memo on Korea to the
President-elect, emphasizing the importance of Christianity in Korean life, the suffering
of the Korean churches, the evangelical work among POWs and refugees, and the
irrepressible conflict between Communism and Christianity in Korean society.155 The
NCCC requested that the President-elect meet with Christian leaders during his upcoming

154 Letter from John Foster Dulles to Dr. Walter W. Van Kirk, 30 April 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers,
Box 77, Folder: Van Kirk, Walter W - Seeley Mudd Library.
155 Memorandum Regarding Christians in Korea, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 62, Folder: National
Council o f the Churches o f Christ in America - Seeley Mudd Library
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visit to Korea in late 1952.156 Following their advice, Dulles recommended two Catholic
and two Protestant missionaries to meet with Eisenhower. Although there is no evidence
to indicate that the meeting took place during Eisenhower’s three-day visit, at the very
least an effort was made.157
Anti-American Sentiment Caused by Pang Wang-iPs Tragic Death
On December 5, 1952, the same day that Eisenhower finished his visit and
returned to the United States, an incident occurred that would produce widespread antiAmerican sentiment in South Korea. The Assistant General Secretary of the Korean
National Council of Christ (KNCC), Rev. Pang Wang-il, was brutally beaten to death by
several American soldiers. Pang was originally a Presbyterian pastor from North Korea.
He was regarded as a hero among the refugee Christians because he had “survived two
and a half years of Japanese imprisonment and torture for refusing to bow to the Shinto
shrines during World War II.”

His wife had been left mentally ill after being tortured

by both the Japanese and Korean Communists prior their escape to the South. During the
Korean War, Rev. Pang led a refugee church in Pusan.159 He spoke English fluently and
was well known by the missionaries and US chaplains. Shortly before his death, he had
received a scholarship to study in the United States.
On the evening of December 5, Pang went to visit his brother in Pyong Taek, a
small town located north of Taejon and south of Seoul. While Pang was waiting for his
brother to come home, he fell asleep. He was wakened by a loud noise outside of the
156 Letter from Rowland M. Cross to JFD, 18 November 1952, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 62, Folder:
National Council o f Churches o f Christ in America - Seeley Mudd Library.
157 No newspaper, not even religious journals, mentioned any meetings between Eisenhower and the
Christian groups in Korea. It is quite clear that although it was planned, the planned meeting never took
place.
Russell T. Hitt, “Korean Pastor Slain in Brawl: U.S. Soldiers Called Assailants,” Christian Life,
February 1953, 39.
159 Ibid.
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house, and found that his sister-in-law was being assaulted by four apparently drunken
American soldiers, according to eyewitness accounts. The soldiers seized Pang, ignoring
his protests in English that he was a Presbyterian pastor. Lt. James D. Goff, the leader of
the gang, beat Pang with his pistol until Pang was unconscious. They then took Pang to a
military post, where he was charged as a thief that they had caught in the streets. Pang’s
sister-in-law found an Army chaplain who was able to identify Pang, however, and have
him flown by helicopter to a hospital ship in In’chon Harbor on December 6. Pang died
four days later.160
The death of Rev. Pang was a critical moment in Korean-American relations
during the Korean War. American atrocities were generally overlooked by the ROK
government and the media, but Pang’s death prompted an outcry, not only because of
who Pang was, but also because of how his attackers were treated. On the day after the
assault, instead of being taken into custody, the commander of the army post placed Lt.
Goff in charge of all Korean laborers. Many Koreans and missionaries interpreted the
commander’s action as an assertion of his authority without any regard for Korean
sensibilities.161 While other incidents could be forgiven as the result of either the
inexperience of the American soldiers involved or communication difficulties with
civilians, Pang’s case blatantly revealed the poor discipline of US troops and the
command structure’s indifference towards investigating crimes committed by its soldiers.
Even after Pang died from his injuries, the military police took no action against
the suspects until the incident was reported, in January 1953, by Donald E. Hoke, chief
editor of Christian Life. His article caught the attention of the American public and put
160 “Memorandum on the Reverend Pang Wha-il Case,” 18 March 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 4 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
161 Ibid.
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pressure on the military to take action. A court martial was held almost two months after
the incident. Lt. Goff was found “not guilty of murder, but guilty of aggravated assault in
which grievous bodily harm was intentionally inflicted.”

t AO

In the end, he was

“sentenced to be dismissed from the Service, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and to
be confined at hard labor for two years.”163
The relative lightness of the sentence disappointed many Koreans and led them to
think that “a Korean’s life is worth two years of an American’s freedom.”164 Although
individual soldiers and officers collected relief money for Pang’s family, no official
concern was shown for Pang’s psychologically-impaired widow and four young
children.165 Although the incident had little effect on the relationship between the two
governments, extensive anti-American sentiment was reported by the missionaries.
In response, American churches launched a nationwide special relief effort for
Pang’s family.

The yearly “One Great Time of Sharing” church-sponsored,

humanitarian-relief fundraising campaign included money for the Pang family. Private
donations were also sent by sympathetic individuals and organizations across the country
to the Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian Korea Mission Station in the field. The
NCCC also took up the case and petitioned the Eisenhower administration to compensate
the family for death of Pang. The petition letter emphasized that this incident had caused
so much distrust among the Korean people that it merited the President’s attention either
to initiate new legal procedures to satisfy the claims, or else to take administrative action

162 Letter from Colonel George Patrick Welch, Chief Public Information Division o f the Department o f the
Army to Dr. Earl F. Adams, 16 February 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 197, Box 4,
Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
163 Ibid.
164 “Memorandum on the Reverend Pang Wha-il Case,” 18 March 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 197, Box 1, Folder 4 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
165 Ibid.
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to assist the family. Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) took an interest in the case and
introduced a bill to reimburse Pang’s family.166 The President signed the bill in October
1954, awarding $10,000 (US) to the family.167
The Pang case sheds light on the influence of religious institutions and
publications on US public opinion and government actions. Missionaries and religious
leaders were sensitive to Korean opinion and sentiment. Throughout the Korean War the
missionaries served not only as liaisons between the US military and Korean civilians,
but also as self-appointed goodwill ambassadors between the US government and the
Korean people. The impact of their efforts was seen in both Korea and America. They
helped the American people to care about Korean suffering, and they helped the Korean
people to support the American military presence. Religious groups showed an ability to
arouse public interest and to even shape US policy in Korea.

The most historically

significant use of that ability would be seen when the truce talks derailed over the issue of
voluntary repatriation.
Billy Graham’s Visit to Korea
The Rev. Billy Graham, a popular evangelist, also took a trip to Korea in
December 1952, shortly after Eisenhower had returned from the Far East. He was a
personal friend of the newly-elected president.

General Mark W. Clark in Tokyo

welcomed Graham and his companions (Rev. Grady Wilson, Rev. Bob Pierce, and Ray
Provost, a Presbyterian missionary to Korea who served as the professional photographer
for the journey team). Clark gave Graham the rank of field general so that he could have
166 Letter from John C. Smith to Rev. E. Otto DeCamp, 26 March 1953, Presbyterian Church Archives,
Record Group 197, Box 4, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
167 Letter from Wallace C. Merwin to J. Calvitt Clarke o f Christian Children’s Fund, Inc., 18 October 1954,
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 197, Box 4, Folder 19 - Presbyterian Historical Society,
Philadelphia.
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full access to all military facilities and the frontline. He arrived in Pusan four days after
Rev. Pang’s death.

During his three weeks in Korea, Graham met with many

missionaries; political leaders, including President Syngman Rhee; Korean church leaders;
and field generals. He also spoke to soldiers, visited POW camps, and attended the
funeral of Rev. Pang.
Rev. Billy Graham’s trip was heavily reported in the United States, and he
recorded two special Hour o f Decision radio shows from Korea with testimonies from
American soldiers and Korean pastors. His journey diary, I Saw Your Sons At War, was
published by the Billy Graham Evangelical Association in 1953 and widely circulated in
the United States. When Graham returned to the United States three weeks later, he
presented to President Eisenhower one of the North Korean Christians’ blood-signed
petitions that he had been given.168 The President ordered the petition book to be
preserved, and wrote back to Graham, “I am enormously touched by the book which you
brought me containing the names and finger prints of the prisoners of war in some of the
camps in South Korea. For me, as I am sure you know, it has a very special meaning.”169
Religious groups were encouraged to see that the Eisenhower administration had
no intention of yielding on the POW issue. Dulles was firmly committed to voluntary
repatriation because it might encourage defections, thus making Soviet leaders more
cautious in initiating military operations outside Russia.170 When Representative Walter
Judd, a major leader of the “China Bloc” in the House of Representatives, a group of proChiang Kai-shek Congressmen, asked the President for his opinion on voluntary

168 Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 95.
169 Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Billy Graham, 3 November 1953, Billy Graham Files, Box 996,
Papers o f Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-1961, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
170 Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 161.
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repatriation, Eisenhower told him, “Walter, this is one you don’t need to worry about. I
had the job of putting thousands of anti-Communists in Eastern Europe, including
refugees from Russia who had fled to escape it, in box cars like cattle and sending them
back to Soviet concentration camps or slaughter. You’ll never find me yielding on this
one.”171 In his message to Congress in February 1953, Eisenhower declared, “We shall
never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for
ourselves.”172 Eisenhower’s plan was not to yield, but to pressure the Communists to
concede.
In February 1953, the administration seriously considered using atomic weapons
against Communist positions in Korea. Since Manchuria and the Kaesong sanctuaries
provided cover from UN bombings, atomic weapons were examined as a way to bring the
enemies out of hiding at once, and break the deadlock by destroying their war-making
capacity.173 In order to put more pressure on the Communist side, Dulles informed
Beijing, through India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi and other foreign
intermediaries, that the United States would extend the war to mainland China and use
atomic weapons if the armistice negotiations collapsed.174
Eisenhower’s nuclear preparations coincided with the death of Stalin in March
1953.

The new leadership in Moscow favored an armistice in Korea.

Beijing also

needed to re-deploy its resources for national reconstruction and was eager to make
peace.175 The Communist side showed their change of attitude by accepting a UN

171 Quote in Oral History Interview with Walter Judd #1, by Paul Hopper on 29 August 1968, Columbia
University Oral History Project (Oral History Research Office, Bulter Library, Columbia University, New
York, NY 10027).
172 A report on Eisenhower, Austin Daily Herald, 11 February 1953.
173 Immerman, John Foster Dulles, 69.
174 Immerman, John Foster Dulles, 70-71.
175 Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, 325-330.
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proposal for the exchange of sick and wounded POWs in April. Shortly after Dulles
delivered his warning, the Communist side agreed to the principle of non-forceful
repatriation (a toned-down version of voluntary repatriation). The United States agreed
to transfer the non-repatriates to the custody of neutral nations in the DMZ.
The Objection from South Korea
With a possible armistice in sight, South Korean president Syngman Rhee
dropped a bombshell on the negotiating table by unilaterally releasing all North Korean
non-repatriates on June 18.

This operation was executed by Rhee’s loyal Christian

General Won Yong-d6k, the commander of the Military Police Command, which was
established under the direct order of Rhee in early 1953. General Won’s troops seized
the camp guards on June 18. At the predetermined hour, they cut the barbed wire and
extinguished the camps’ lights so that the prisoners could escape under cover of
darkness.176 In the end, about 27,451 North Korean prisoners escaped (see Table 8.10),
and the UN troops could only catch about one thousand of them.
Rhee’s action also signaled that he would withdraw ROK forces from the UNC if
the United States continued to ignore his views. Certainly, this action was Syngman
Rhee’s attempt to sabotage the truce, but it was more a failure of US diplomacy. Since
the beginning of the truce talks, the ROK government had been excluded from the
negotiations.

A superpower sought to dictate the fate of a weaker nation.

Many

Americans might have viewed Rhee as their most ungrateful client in East Asia, but,
objectively speaking, if the armistice had been concluded at that point, it would have left
the South Korean government with no security guarantees should the Communists
reinvade after UN forces left the peninsula. Many South Koreans viewed the outbreak of
176 Sun Yup Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1992), 229-230.
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the Korean War as the avoidable consequence of the US’s noncommittal stance on the
defense of South Korea. Therefore, as the president of South Korea, Rhee was compelled
to protect the interests of his country.

His decision to release the prisoners actually

earned him great praise from his people. His popularity rose to “intoxicating heights,” in
the words of Dean Acheson.177
From a position of weakness, Rhee showed himself to be a skillful practitioner of
the “madman theory.” An act of such rashness was almost an attempt at committing
national suicide - angering his superpower protector and threatening to withdraw his own
troops from the alliance defending his country. Nonetheless, Rhee’s gamble was wellcalculated; he put the United States into such a position that it had to choose between a
complete withdrawal or a full commitment to the security of South Korea.178
Most South Koreans sided with Rhee.

According to Marion L. Conrow, a

Methodist missionary in Ewha University, the whole country felt the same way: that “the
truce was a mistake,” that it was not to the advantage of the Korean people, and that they
were being treated unfairly by the United States.

170

Lt. Horace G. Underwood at

P’anmunjom also recognized the unpopularity of the US policy among the South
Koreans.180 Korean Christians were mostly against the truce, even though they were
usually divided among themselves on other religious issues. On June 15, three days
before the mass escape, Korean Christian leaders released a statement protesting the

177 Acheson, The Korean War, 150.
178 Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, M aster o f Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance
1953-1960 (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), 89.
179 By Marion L. Conrow, 26 September 1953,1461-4-1:05, Church & Society, United Methodist Church
Archives - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
180 Horace G. Underwood resigned his position as interpreter because he did not desire to be seen at the
signing ceremonies. He sought to dissociate himself from the unpopular armistice fearing that it might
have a negative affect on his future missionary work in Korea. Underwood, Korea in War, Revolution and
Peace, 180.
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armistice. They were against “any attempt at compromise” with the Communist side,
appealed to the US to “[make] provision against another aggression,” and asked for
support from churches all over the world.181

Together with other residents in South

Korea, Christian families, churches, and refugees were mobilized to assist and house
these runaway prisoners. General Won’s operation was a remarkable success.
President Eisenhower was so upset at Rhee’s action that he threatened to
withdraw US troops from South Korea and remove Rhee from power. A military coup
against President Rhee, known as Operation EVERYDAY, was seriously considered by
the US government.

Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles and his advisers in the National

Security Council were able to convince the President to change his mind and push
forward with an armistice to justify U.S. sacrifices and safeguard America’s political
position in East Asia.182 A three-track campaign to win Rhee over began immediately.
The President sent a private letter with some strong words to Rhee, threatening to
withdraw US troops from Korea. The administration mobilized Rhee’s friends in the
United States, such as Senator William Knowland and General James Alward Van Fleet,
to persuade the old man to make concessions. Secretary Dulles dispatched Walter S.
Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to negotiate with Rhee.
Since Rhee had long played his religious card to mobilize Christian opinion to
support him, Secretary Dulles also thought to use international religious opinion to quash
Rhee’s attempt. He first planned to ask a missionary, Rev. Archibald Campbell, to speak
with Rhee.

But when Dulles’s friend, Dr. O. Frederick Nolde, Director of the

181 A Statement o f Korea Christians to Dr. Frederick Nolde, 15 June 1953, Documents o f the WCC Library:
The Korean War, 346-347.
182 Edward C. Keefer, “President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End o f the Korean War,” Diplomatic
History 10 (Summer 1986): 285-286.
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Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), a sub-organization of the
World Council of Churches (WCC), volunteered to bring word to Rhee during his visit to
Korea, Dulles gladly accepted.183 Although Dr. Nolde’s mission from Dulles was secret,
many observers speculated that he was sent as a special envoy.
Dr. Nolde met with Rhee on July 3. His job was to inform the South Korean
President that the opinion of Western churches favored an armistice. Rhee responded
that his foreign policy approach relied upon divine guidance. In analyzing the current
political situation, Rhee regarded Korea as “Joseph” in the Bible, who was betrayed and
sold into slavery by his older brothers - the United States and other Western countries.
Nolde saw Rhee’s attitude as “messianic” and believed his mindset was “undergirded by
religious conviction.”

1 Rd

To make sure that Rhee got the correct idea of opinions in the

Christian world, he wrote Rhee a letter after the meeting, telling him frankly that
“Christian opinion around the world, as expressed in formal statements of the Christian
agencies which our Commission represents, strongly [supported] the effort promptly to
seek a truce on honorable terms and [considered] the present conditions favorable for a
step of this kind.”185 Rhee realized that American Christians were at odds with Korean
Christians over the truce issue. Rhee’s opinion of liberal Christian institutions, such as
the NCCC and the WCC, turned sour.

He began to denounce the WCC as a pro-

Communist religious organization and mobilized Korean Christians to support his stance
in defiance of the opinion of WCC leaders.

183 See Telephone Conversation with Dr. Fred Nolde, 23 June 1953, John Foster Dulles Files, Box 10,
Papers o f Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-1961, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
184 A Statement o f Korean Christians to Dr. Frederick Nolde, 15 June 1953, Documents o f the WCC Library:
The Korean War, 372.
185 Ibid., 378.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

510

It is hard to measure the effect of Dr. Nolde’s mission, but it demonstrates that
Dulles attempted to use American religious leaders to nullify the religious pressure from
Rhee. Rhee had long been sensitive to US public opinion, particularly church opinion.
Many times, Rhee had instructed his ambassador in Washington D.C. to recruit support
from American church leaders. With American and Western churches calling for a truce,
Rhee’s bargaining position was undoubtedly weakened. As soon as Dr. Nolde returned
to Washington, he reported to Secretary Dulles and told him that the Korean situation
was one in which religious factors needed to be emphasized in Rhee’s mind.

The

Secretary said that he thought that Dr. Nolde had helped the situation.186
Eventually, Rhee agreed not to obstruct the truce once the United States promised
him a security pact and an economic and military aid package. The Korean Armistice
was finally signed at P’anmunjom on July 27. In Operation BIG SWITCH, the United
Nations received back their 12,773 UNC POWs (see Table 8.12b), while 70,183 North
Koreans and 5,640 Chinese were sent back to the Communist side (see Table 8.12a). In
September 1953, non-repatriates from both sides (359 UN prisoners, 22,604 North
Korean and Chinese prisoners) were sent to the Demilitarized Zone under Indian custody,
and a few hundred changed their minds (see Tables 13a and 13b). After the 90-day
interview period, the remaining non-repatriates were released. 14,227 Chinese went to
Taiwan and 7,593 Koreans stayed in South Korea.

186 Telephone Conversation with Dr. Nolde, 17 July 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 10, Eisenhower
Library.
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Obtaining a Psychological Victory in the Korean War
As soon as the Armistice was signed, the Eisenhower administration began to
explore the existence of 22,604 non-repatriates in UN custody.187 Allen Dulles, the
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, described the POW exchange as “one of the
greatest psychological

victories

so far

achieved by the

free

world

against

Communism.”188 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also agreed with his brother’s
statement. In an address on September 2, 1953 to the American Legion Convention, he
declared that “a new and healthy principle [had] been established” because “this time, no
Red Army prisoners who [wanted] freedom [would] be sent back to captivity.” He
believed that “the Red Army [would] be less dependable as tools of aggression” and
therefore, the United States had “increased the prospect of peace and added to [the
nation’s] security.”189
Echoes of winning a psychological victory in the Korean War were heard across
the country. In North Carolina, Colonel Gordon Singles, the chief of the psychological
warfare center at Fort Bragg, told a group of enrolled officers on September 11, 1953,
that evidence of a psychological victory in Korea was supported by the refusal of almost
half the captured Communists, “the equivalent of eight divisions,” to be repatriated.190
Again and again, American officials emphasized the number of non-repatriates. The idea

187 This figure (22,604) was the final number o f prisoners in UN custody in August 1953. The UN
authorities had released 27,000 North Korean non-repatriated civilian internees earlier in September 1952
(Operation HOMECOMING & Operation THANKSGIVING) and the South Korean government had
unilaterally released another 26,000 North Korean non-repatriated soldiers in June 1953. Therefore, the
total number o f non-repatriates had been reduced to only 22,604.
188 Quoted in Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory, 190.
189 Quoted in “CCB Staff Proposal for Exploiting Chinese and North Korean POWs Refusal to be
Repatriated,” 29 December 1953, NSCS Files, Box 117, Eisenhower Library.
190 “Great Psychological Victory for U.S. in Korea Acclaimed,” The Daily Courier, 12 September 1953.
See also “Psychological Victory Hailed in Korea; More Trouble for Reds Seen,” The Coshocton Ohio
Tribune, 11 September 1953.
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of winning a psychological victory was vital, because after suffering 140,000 US and
15,431 UN casualties, the US government and the United Nations needed to have a
legitimate claim of achievement in order to maintain its credibility as a peace-keeping
body.191
The decision of 33,462 North Koreans (soldiers and civilians), and 14,227
Chinese not to return to the Iron Curtain resonated with all Americans. Comparisons
between the 47,689 enemy troops who chose to stay free, and the 347 UN and ROK
troops that preferred Communism, spoke volumes, corroborating what people had heard
from the millions of northern refugees, and the reports of Communist atrocities
uncovered in the North and the South. All these facts were seen as proof to Americans
that their system of government was better, and that given the choice, people would
choose it.
According to C. H. Peake of the Far Eastern Division in the State Department, the
struggle in Korea had gone beyond its initial objective of stopping aggression.

The

aggression had been stopped and new meaning had been found in the Korean War.192
Korea became a major symbol in the Cold War struggle.

The Korean War was

commemorated in Washington, D.C. with a monument proclaiming that “freedom is not
free,” to signify the sacrifices the American people and government made from July 1950
to July 1953.

191 See also Callum A. MacDonald, ‘“Horeos Behind Barbed Wire’ - The United States, Britain and the
POW issue in the Korean War,” The Korean War in History, eds. James Cotton and Ian Neary (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), 144.
192 Memo from Mr. Peake to Allison and Johnson, 1 December 1952, 695A.0024/10-2952 - 12-2952]
“International Political Relations, 1950-1954/Acheson, Dean/ US Dept of State, Records of the US Dept of
State relating to Korea: International political relations, 1950-1954, National Archives.
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By upholding the humanitarian principle of voluntary repatriation, Peake
observed, the struggle of the free world had shifted “to maintain the principle of
individual human rights against the totalitarian state and the assertion of the rulers of such
states that the individual lives only to serve the state.” 193

The case of Korea was

universalized, Peake explained, “raising it above a local tactical effort to stop aggression
and merely ‘contain’ the Communist world, and [provided] as the foundation for a
continuing long-term struggle against totalitarianism as well as against aggression,
fundamental principles which respect human dignity and rights.”194
In American churches, POW camps were perceived as being of great religious
significance due to the success of missionary activities. The American Bible Society sent
150.000 Scripture portions to the prisoners. The Moody Bible Institute of Chicago sent
500.000 Korean tracts. Bob Pierce’s World Vision, Inc. supplied musical instruments,
such as portable organs, trumpets, trombones, accordions, flutes, and harmonicas, for use
in the worship services held in prison camps. American churches also sent stationery,
clocks, and athletic equipment for the Bible Institutes inside the prison camps.
Chaplain Voelkel’s ministry received the most recognition and praise. In 1952,
the US Army awarded Voelkel the Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian
decoration. The South Korean government presented him with its Welfare Medal to
recognize his contribution to the conversion of many prisoners. A school in Inch’on built
by released prisoners was named after him. His book, Behind Barbed Wire in Korea
(1953), which told the POW story, with an introduction by Billy Graham, sold 50,000

193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
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copies.195 Rodger R. Venzke, US Chaplain Corps historian, praised Voelkel’s ministry as
“one of the most remarkable in history.”196 Venzke also considered his work “one of the
influences that ultimately convinced some 60,000 North Korean prisoners not to return to
the Communist state following the war.”197
Chaplain Woodberry also received a lot of attention. In three separate memoirs
written by Chinese non-repatriate prisoners, Chaplain Woodberry was well respected by
many anti-Communist prisoners.198 They described him as their most trust worthy friend,
who constantly gave them comfort and encouragement.

On the other hand, most

memoirs by Chinese Communist prisoners reflected a hatred of Woodberry, calling him a
fox or a spy.199 They distrusted his work and questioned the sincerity of his faith.
UN prison authorities, however, praised Woodberry for his work. According to
reports submitted by Woodberry’s superior officers, the Chaplain was “of inestimable
value to the military authorities.”200 “His friendship and the deep respect in which he was
held by the majority of the prisoners,” Colonel William B. Estes, Chief of Chaplains,
KCOMZ, testified, “were the decisive factors in averting riot and revolt.”201 For his

195 Rhodes and Campbell, History o f the Korea Mission Vol.2, 51.
196 Venzke, Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace, 78.
197 Venzke’s figure included the ROK troops and civilians as well. See ibid., 79. See also Brown, Mission
to Korea, 198.
198 Jian-guo Wang, Renhai D a Beiju A 'M A fM lif (The Tragedy o f human-wave tactics); Lang Liu, Liuxie
Dao Mingtian fi& lM SIA ftyf (Bleeding till tomorrow). See also Min-jin Guo, Hanzhanyiwang: Yuxue
Rensheng Huarenquan
'MlMMfkE~£A:f S (Memoir o f the Korean War: Human Rights o f the
POWs in the Contest o f Bloody Survival).
199 Zhe-shi Zhang, ed., Meijun Jizhongying Qinli Ji M M M tp E ifA M E B (Personal records in the American
prison camps).
200 A summary o f reports on Chaplain Woodberry by Colonel William B. Estes, Chief o f Chaplains,
KCOMZ, Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 360, Folder: Earle J. Woodberry - Presbyterian
Historical Society, Philadelphia.
201 Ibid.
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contributions he was awarded the U.S. Medal of Freedom in 1955.202 The Nationalist
Government in Taiwan gave him another medal and invited him to continue his ministry
in Taiwan.
Church leaders in the United States also praised the influence of Christianity on
the conversions of these prisoners and claimed a victory over Communism by
Christianity. “Liberation comes through the Christian faith,” Harold E. Fey, Managing
Editor of The Christian Century proclaimed, “brought to this place by missionaries and
Korean pastors.... Under these circumstances Communists are being converted by tens of
thousands. Here where the ideological struggle is conducted fairly, truth triumphs as it
has always done, as it will always do.”

Although his observations on the actual

situation in the camp might not be fair or even accurate, they reflected a popular
contemporary religious opinion, that Christianity had a key role to play in the ideological
battle against Communism.

CONCLUSION
A limited war was hard to fight and difficult to win. General MacArthur pushed
to expand the war and pursue a complete victory, but President Truman wanted to limit
the war to Korea and pursue peace. Although the country was sharply divided, most
Americans and most religious leaders favored a truce.

Despite the desire for peace,

negotiations became deadlocked because over half of the prisoners refused to be

202 According to both statistics and the testimony o f prisoners and the UN authorities, the influence o f
Chaplain Woodberry on the Chinese POWs was undeniable. He was very popular among the antiCommunist POWs. After they went to Taiwan, Woodberry was invited by the Taiwanese government to
continue his ministry in Taiwan. After he retired, when he visited Taiwan again, ex-POWs gathered
together to host his trip during his visit. Guo, Hanzhanyiwang:, 169.
i Harold E. Fey, “Korea Must Live!” The Christian Century 75 (20 February 1952): 217.
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repatriated. UN authorities faced a moral dilemma that caused the war to drag on for
another two years.
Religion was an important factor in this controversy. To many Americans, the
conversion of 20,000 prisoners to the Christian faith added appeal to the idea of non
repatriation. Church leaders lobbied the government and helped shape public opinion to
support voluntary repatriation on humanitarian principles. That the final 22,604 non
repatriated prisoners, not including those who escaped earlier, could enjoy a real choice
of freedom was perceived as a significant achievement by many who had participated in
the war. While the United States government claimed a psychological victory over the
non-repatriated prisoners, church leaders also claimed a victory of Christianity over
Communism in the prison camps.
Missionary activities in the POW camps highlighted the power of religion in the
battle against Communism. Their success made many US officials realize that Christian
workers and Christian institutions were useful allies in conducting US policy.

For

example, in the aftermath of Rev. Pang’s death, the efforts of missionaries and church
leaders to obtain compensation for the family helped to dissipate some of the antiAmerican feelings that tragedy had aroused. Christian relief efforts also proved effective
not only in healing the destruction of war, but also, in the process, in projecting a
benevolent image of America that would impact U.S.-Korean relations for decades to
come.

American policy-makers therefore became more willing to recognize the

usefulness of Christian beliefs, actors, and institutions in fighting the Cold War. In the
end, the Korean War not only established a firm military alliance between the United
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States and South Korea, but also brought forth a solid partnership between political and
religious actors in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CONCLUSION

In order to appreciate the religious factors at work during the years of the Korean
War, a great deal of background material was presented in this dissertation. During the
Late Choson period, Korea was surrounded by stronger neighbors. Could Korea remain
independent if it was not modernized? Initially, Korean rulers wanted Korea to remain a
Hermit Kingdom, but that was not a viable option when many foreign powers and their
gunboats came knocking on its door. Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 showed that,
without building a strong country, Korea could not survive as an independent nation.
Many forward-thinking men looked to the Western model. A young Syngman Rhee, who
later became the first president of South Korea, for example, envisioned a modernized
and Christianized Korea.

Perhaps his ideas were influenced by the American

missionaries who were working to develop the country.

By their works, these

missionaries earned themselves a good reputation among members of the royal family
and many in the general population.
In some quarters of academia, the work of missionaries around the world has been
viewed with skepticism. Their efforts to Westernize native peoples have been criticized
as culturally destructive and racist.

Missionaries are sometimes considered tools or

promoters of imperialism. Korea serves as a good contrast. Western imperialism was not
a major issue in the case of Korea because it was Japanese colonialism that threatened
Korean independence and that sought to replace Korean culture.

On the contrary,

518
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Christianity and American missionaries were important influences in the rise of Korean
nationalism and anti-colonialism.

They were a significant factor in Korea’s path to

modernity. In fact, the case can be made that, in the context of Japanese imperialism,
Christian institutions served to preserve Korean heritage - for example, through the
mission schools’ teaching of the Korean language and history.
These religious factors grew in significance during the years of national rebirth
that followed World War II.

By 1945, most of Korea’s well-known patriots shared

similar Christian backgrounds. The influence of Christianity reached an unprecedented
level during the Korean War, due to the humanitarian crisis that the war produced. The
legacy of these religious activities continues to be felt today, fifty-seven years later, as
South Korea has now become one of the most Christianized nations in the world. And
yet, because the influence of religion is so subtle, its role in the Korean War has until
now been poorly understood and insufficiently documented.
The following sections review Christian influences present in Korea from 1884 to
1950, as developed in the dissertation. The purpose here is to remind the reader of the
most essential lessons from the decades leading up to and through the Korean War, so as
to recognize the big picture of religious developments over this 66-year period.
The Influence o f American Missionaries in the Early Period
Since the beginning of the arrival of the first Protestant missionary to Korea in
1884, by 1905, Americans comprised the majority of the foreign missionaries residing in
Korea. Although Jesuit priests had arrived earlier, it was American missionaries who had
the strongest influence within the Korean Christian community.

Unlike the case of

China, where foreign missionaries were generally distrusted and condemned as
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collaborators with Western imperialists, many Koreans regarded missionaries as their
allies and friends. Even as the United States pursued a pro-Japanese policy, American
missionaries remained well-liked and respected. When the US government withdrew its
minister from Korea in 1905, American missionaries stayed behind. Over the next four
decades of harsh Japanese colonial rule, missionaries kept watch over the survival of the
Korean churches, and yet working within the limits set by the Japanese authorities. Many
of their children later inherited their passion and love for Korea. Some chose to become
missionaries themselves, while others returned as reporters, educators, or diplomats when
the US government liberated the southern part of Korea in 1945.
Part of the reason for the positive image of American missionaries was that their
efforts brought many positive benefits to the Korean people. They established hospitals,
mission schools, churches, seminaries, and publication companies.

Their activities

brought important changes to traditional Korean society. By 1910, a third of all schools
in Korea were run by foreign missionaries.
The Western education offered by these missionaries and their mission schools
introduced American ideals of liberalism, freedom, and democracy. These principles
provided essential guidance for the development of modem Korea.

Yet, even as

missionaries and their mission schools sought to transform Korean society, their use of
han’giil and their teaching of Korean history and culture contributed to the rediscovery of
a national identity. This awakening nationalism would prove a significant obstacle to
Japanese imperialistic ambitions. Christianity became Korea’s fastest growing religion
during the colonial period. Despite Japan’s efforts to nullify the influence of Christianity
in Korea and its deportation of all foreign missionaries in 1941, the churches survived
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and Christianity’s influence expanded rapidly in the postwar period under American
occupation.
Missionaries had a great influence on a number of important Korean leaders.
Missionaries assisted Yun Chi-ho and Philip Jaisohn, progressive reformers of the late
Choson period, in receiving a Western education in the United States. Upon their return
to Korea, Yun and Jaisohn organized the Independence Club to advocate Western
democratic ideals and to call for reforms and modernization. Meanwhile, the mission
schools were graduating many of the young patriots who would later lead the
independence movement, both at home and abroad, such as Syngman Rhee, An Changho, Yo Un-hyong and Kim Kyu-sik. Through their contact with the West at the mission
schools, many of these leaders believed that the best hope for Korea's future lay in
following the Western model, even in the embracing of Christianity. Looking to the
future, they foresaw a radically transformed Korea: Westernized and Christianized, but
also strong and independent.1 In the end, the South Korea of today has many similarities
to their vision.
The Growth o f Christian Churches and their Role in Korean Nationalism
As the twentieth century dawned, Christianity was beginning to experience
exceptional growth throughout Korea but particularly in the north. By 1930, P’yongyang

1 For a significant period o f time, these four men all conducted their nationalist efforts from overseas, each
pursuing a different approach to Korean independence. An Ch’ang-ho, a leader o f the Korean Provisional
Government (KPG), focused on Christian education for Koreans around the world. Pak Yong-man sought
a military solution to independence through training nationalist fighters both in the United States and later
in China. Syngman Rhee, the first Premier o f the KPG, looked to diplomacy and led the diplomatic
mission in Washington. Kim K yu-sik, another leader o f the KPG, also pursued diplomacy until,
disillusioned with American racism, he went to China to join the KPG. Korean-Americans in Hawaii and
the continental United States provided most o f the financial support for exile nationalist activities,
including the KPG in Shanghai and the Korean Commission, a diplomatic office of the KPG in Washington
—and the great majority o f Korean Americans were churchgoers. Korean churches in Manchuria also
contributed to these efforts.
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had become the “Christian Capital of Korea.”2 The P’yongyang Presbyterian Mission
Station was the largest Presbyterian mission station in the world, ministering to more than
100,000 native believers. The northern provinces not only had the highest per capita
Christian population, but also some of the largest churches, mission schools, and
seminaries.
Religious motivations aside, another significant factor in Christianity’s rapid
expansion was the churches’ involvement in the rise of Korean nationalism. Confronted
with the loss of independence and the harsh policies of Japanese colonial rule, a number
of prominent Protestant clergymen developed a form of “liberation theology.”3 They
found hope in the pages of the Bible, by reading of Israel's deliverance from slavery and
from oppression by its more-powerful neighbors.4 Ministers preached the promise of a
national deliverance with true conviction and great persuasive power. Their message
attracted many nationalists, who found refuge and comfort in the church.

Churches

became convenient places for secret meetings of the anti-Japanese and anti-colonial
underground.

Christian nationalists were involved in organizing and supporting the

March First Independence Movement of 1919.

When March 1st came, missionaries

2 This was a term commonly used by missionaries and Korea Christian in referring to P ’ydngyang. See
Chapter 1, the section on Christianity and Korea’s Struggle for Independence.
3 Liberation theology focuses on the earthly Christian life. Jesus Christ is seen as the redeemer of the
oppressed in this life and not just as the redeemer of Christians at the resurrection. As such, the teaching of
these Korean pastors is a form o f liberation theology, but it should not be confused with the more familiar
form of liberation theology that much later came to have a significant influence in Latin America, and
which contained elements of Communist ideology.
4 See Chapter 1 o f this dissertation.
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assisted the participants.5 When the colonial government brutally suppressed the
movement, churches suffered great losses of both property and personnel - especially
church leaders. In the years that followed, the church’s losses continued mounting, as
some of its most influential clergy were arrested for opposing the forced establishment of
Shinto worship.

Yet, for all of their losses, Christian churches gained a positive

reputation in the independence movement, and those clergymen who survived
imprisonment earned such fame that many would go on to become famous church leaders
following Japan's defeat in World War H
The importance of Christianity to the Korean nationalist movement can be seen in
Kim Il-sung’s autobiography. Although it is a biased account, one would expect that any
such bias would seek to downplay the importance of Christian churches.

Kim’s

concessions, therefore, of the churches' importance to the independence movement must
carry significance. Kim's autobiography provided details of his Christian upbringing and
his family’s connections to several churches and to Christian education. One can also see
the influence of Kim's church background in his co-opting of Christian themes in
developing his personality cult. In his book, Kim states that many nationalists, including
Communists, took advantage of church gatherings and drew support from churchgoers
for their anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria and Korea. These claims are consistent
with the developments of 1945, when, for a brief period following Japan's surrender,

5 Although Korean churches were active organizers o f the March First Independence Movement (1919),
there is no evidence that American missionaries helped in this planning. Perhaps certain missionaries had
prior knowledge o f the movement, but most were caught by surprise when March 1st came. Missionaries
performed an important role in the movement, nonetheless, by sheltering student demonstrators, by
allowing organizers to use their facilities, by documenting the atrocities with photographs, and by publicly
condemning Japanese brutality. See Donald N. Clark, ‘“Surely God Will Work Out Their Salvation:’
Protestant Missionaries in the March First Movement,” Korean Studies 13 (1989): 41-42.
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Communists, leftists, and Christians all worked together to form the People’s Republic
under the leadership of Yo Un-hyong, a famous Christian socialist.
Growing Conflicts between Communism and Christianity
The division of Korea following the conclusion of World War II set the stage for
a national tragedy greater than any that had come before. When the Russians took over
the north, they had to contend with a strong Christian presence in all the major northern
cities. These Christians were politically active and supported Cho Man-sik's bid for
leadership. Many rightists, especially intellectuals and landowners, also rallied around
Cho, hoping that he would protect their interests.

Because Cho’s popularity far

overshadowed that of the local Communists, the Russians agreed to put Cho in charge of
a coalition government in P’yongyang.

When Cho refused to support the Moscow

Agreement, however, the Soviets put him under house arrest. Into Cho’s place stepped
Kim Il-sung, as the new political leader in the north.
Communists in the north sought to increase their control over the churches by
gradual steps. Over the next year, as the noose began to tighten around the Church’s
neck, increasing conflict was inevitable. Christian students rioted when their leaders
were arrested by the police. Seeing little hope of religious freedom and liberty, some
Christian clergymen and a large number of laymen followed the capitalists, landowners
and ex-collaborators in marching south.
These refugees brought with them news of Communist persecutions and the lack
of religious freedom in the north. Their reports frightened many Christian leaders of the
south. P’yongyang had once been called the “Christian Capital of Korea,” but it was now
lost. The political battlefield had moved to the south. Christian leaders began to rethink
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their initial policy of seeking cooperation with leftists.

Some switched to the

conservative camp and allied themselves with the ex-collaborators and landowners.
American occupation forces were challenged by leftists who supported the
People’s Republic organized by Y6 Un-hyong and his supporters. The situation was
further complicated by the fact that many political factions competed for popular support
and political domination. Rightists took the upper hand when they gained the trust of
Commander George Z. Williams, who was in charge of hiring officials for the American
Military Government (AMG). Song Chin-u, leader of the Korean Democratic Party, was
Williams’ favorite because he believed Song to be sternly anti-Communist and pro
democracy. Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku were also helped by Williams. As the son of a
missionary, Williams was understandably sympathetic towards Korean Christians. He
hired many of them to work for the AMG. Christian clergymen and laymen who could
speak English were in high demand because only a very small number of American
officers spoke Korean.
As rightists were gaining power in the AMG, leftists sought support from urban
workers and the landless masses.

In Seoul, violence, terrorism, and political

assassination were the order of the day. Communists not only succeeded in infiltrating
Yo Un-hyong’s People’s Party, but also established strongholds in the mountains of the
Cholla provinces. When the AMG finally outlawed the Communist Party, most of its
leaders fled north, but the fight between the left and the right had already spilled into the
streets and countryside. Christians and churches were a common target of Communist
attacks. Seeking revenge for their losses in the north, some refugees joined rightist terror
groups that launched reprisal attacks against the Communists.

The rift between
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Communists and Christians grew deeper as violence on both sides of the 38th parallel
intensified in the form of religious persecutions in the north and guerilla attacks in the
south.
Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee represented two different kinds of Korean
nationalists, and they embraced two different visions of a modem Korea. A political
competition between the two groups was inevitable. While Communists saw Christianity
as a political threat and began persecuting the Church in the north, Christians in the south
allied themselves with other rightists in order to contain the spread of Communism. By
1948, two separate regimes had arisen in Korea, each competing for national domination.
The Role o f Missionaries in the Inter-War Years
The role of missionaries was essential in the political development of South Korea
during the inter-war years. From 1945 to 1948, missionaries and their children played a
critical role in assisting the Christian community in the south gain political power and
social influence.

Some of these missionaries were hired by the AMG as advisors,

because of their valuable language skills and local connections.

Others, particularly

children of missionaries, like Commander Williams, were still enlisted following the end
of World War II. They returned to Korea through military transfers because of the need
for language experts. Because the missionaries enjoyed the support of the AMG, they
exercised greater influence than they ever had before, even though their numbers were
initially small.

As conditions stabilized, more civilian missionaries were allowed to

return by late 1946.
Missionary activities promoted positive relations between the United States and
the American-occupied southern part of Korea. Though difficult to definitively measure,
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missionaries’ service for the AMG and their assistance to Korean churches strengthened
the general influence of Christianity in postwar South Korea. They not only re-connected
Korean churches with their American supporters, but also laid the foundation for the later
development of many Christian institutions, including schools, universities, hospitals, and
health care centers.
Better educated than most of those in the general population, Korean Christians
had an unprecedented opportunity to gain political influence.

Many Christians were

elected into the First National Assembly, thereby marking 1948 as the beginning of a new
era of Christian political power in South Korea. After establishing the Constitution of the
Republic of Korea (ROK), the National Assembly members elected Syngman Rhee as the
first president. Rhee’s political fortunes depended heavily on the loyalty of Christians
and refugees from the north. Most of Rhee’s closest advisors and trusted generals were
well-known Christian laymen.
towards missionaries.

At the same time, Rhee was exceptionally friendly

His own experiences in the United States had shown him the

influence of the church in American society.
During the early period of his presidency, and with very limited funds, Rhee’s
publicity team in Washington depended on the support of church leaders and Christian
journalists to lobby the American government and to publish information about Korea.
For example, as part of his efforts to obtain a defense commitment from the US prior to
the outbreak of the Korean War, Rhee specifically mobilized the Korean Church to
demonstrate and write petitions, knowing that their message and the missionaries’ reports
of church activities would resonate with American Christians. The effort temporarily
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failed when US troops withdrew in 1949 and when South Korea was excluded from the
American vision of a Pacific defense perimeter
Nevertheless, American missionaries continued to work tirelessly to raise
American interest in the defense of South Korea. Although they had no direct access to
the State Department, they used whatever resources and religious connections that they
had.

When John Foster Dulles visited Seoul in his capacity as President Truman’s

special envoy to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan, American missionaries invited him
to dinner and tried to impress upon him the achievements of Christianity in Korea.
Deeply influenced by their efforts, Dulles later became the most pro-Korean diplomat in
the State Department and remained so throughout the Korean War. He recognized Korea
as a model of the “Asiatic experiment in democracy” 6 and argued strongly for US
intervention through the United Nations, when war broke out on June 25, 1950. In his
public speeches during the early months of the war, Dulles even defined the Korean War
as a battle for religious freedom.
The Rise o f Religious Anti-Communism in the Early Cold War
Ever since the Bolsheviks took power in Russia in 1917, many Americans had
harbored anti-Communist sentiments. Yet, in religious circles, anti-Communism did not
become a strong influence until the Cold War began. During the 1930s and early 1940s,
there had been no great outcry against Communism in the United States —except from
the Catholic Church - even though it was known that the Soviets were persecuting
Christians and promoting atheism. Instead, Communism was gaining ground in America,
among labor workers and the Protestant elite. Even some Christian socialists and liberal

6 “Speech: Re. Korea and Japan, CBS Broadcast,” dated July 1, 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers, Speech,
Statement, Press Conference, etc: 1950 January to August, Box 301, Seeley Mudd Library.
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theologians, such as Harry F. Ward, praised the Soviets and embraced certain elements of
socialist principles.7
Things began to change when World War II came to an end in 1945. The SovietAmerican rivalry in Europe and the ideological competition between Communism and
capitalism began to intensify.

In his 1946 Long Telegram to the State Department,

George F. Kennan, a Russian specialist in the US Foreign Service, warned against the
potential Soviet threat and argued that the best strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union
would be to strengthen Western institutions and an American commitment to assist
endangered nations.

His ideas became the backbone of the Truman Doctrine, the

Marshall Plan, and later the containment strategy during the Cold War.
In response to Kennan’s warning, many policymakers began work on promoting
Western institutions. From the point of view of public relations, espousing the virtues of
capitalism as an economic model did not have great marketing appeal. Instead, leaders
pointed to freedom, including religious freedom.
institutions had their origins in Christianity.

They also argued that Western

To confront and contain the spread of

Communism, Christian beliefs were brought back to the center of American society.
President Truman described the American way of life as being “based upon the will of
the majority, and distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free
elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom
o

from political oppression.” Freedom, especially the freedom of religion, would emerge
as a key theme of American Cold War ideology. In his 1947 State of the Union Address,
7 See David Nelson Duke, In the Trenches with Jesus and Marx: Harry F. Ward and the Struggle fo r Social
Justice (Tuscaloosa, AL: University o f Alabama Press, 2003).
8 Harry Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, 12 March
1947, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman 1947 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1963), 178.
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President Truman envisioned that the American people would spread their freedom and
democracy to the whole earth so that “free men everywhere will share our devotion to
those ideals.” 9 American Christians in particular frequently viewed the competition
between Communism and democracy as a competition between Communism and
Christianity, because many leaders argued that democracy was built upon the foundation
of Christian principles.
The Impact o f Atomic Fear
During these interwar years, religion continued to capture public interest because
of the invention of atomic weapons. The discovery and use of atomic bombs against
Japan caused much controversy in the United States. Americans felt pride, but also guilt
and fear.

For some people, the horrifying pictures of suffering in Hiroshima and

Nagasaki brought to mind the Biblical prophecies concerning the end of the world.
When the Soviet Union then detonated its own atomic device in September 1949, the
nation became gripped with fear of a possible nuclear war. Led by preachers such as
Rev. Billy Graham, a revival built up steam in late 1949, perhaps in response to the
uncertainties of the era.
With the outbreak of the Korean War and later the entrance of China into the
conflict, many people worried that the Korean War would escalate into another world war
with atomic weapons.

Mainstream religious leaders from the National Council of

Churches of Christ (NCCC) began to warn against adopting an aggressive policy of
punishing enemies with atomic bombs, whereas military leaders were favoring such
tactics as a means of achieving a quick victory. With public opinion divided over the

9 Harry Truman, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 6 January 1947, ibid., 12.
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proper strategy for ending the war, the opinion of the NCCC had a strong influence on
President Truman, who decided to seek peace instead of expanding the war to China.
Ideological Battles o f the Korean War
The Korean War was more than merely a physical war; it was also an ideological
war, as the battle between the ideologies of Communism and Freedom was being fought
in the minds of millions of Koreans. Despite propaganda promising a Communist utopia,
an estimated 1,500,000 people from the North had made the painful decision to leave
everything and migrate south prior to the outbreak of the war. This was a startling 18
percent of the entire northern population.10 They had voted with their feet for freedom.
And whereas many of them were persecuted Christians, they were particularly voting for
religious freedom. The refugees kept coming throughout the war. In a mass exodus,
hundreds of thousands of northerners fled south with the retreating UN forces, risking the
harrowing journey across the battle lines and a life of destitution once they arrived in the
South. Perhaps the most dramatic decisions were not made by the refugees, but by North
Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who adamantly refused to be repatriated to their
homelands. Their decision shocked both their own governments and their captors.
Although the repatriation issue developed out of the presence of a large number of
ex-Nationalist soldiers in the Chinese Volunteers’ Army and ex-ROK soldiers and
civilians in the North Korean People’s Army, the US government and American
missionaries were also partially responsible for the decision of these prisoners.

The

CI&E (Civilian Information and Education) programs and the religious activities,
organized by prison camp authorities but operated by missionaries serving as civilian
10 Another estimated 1,000,000 fled south during the war. An additional 50,000 prisoners o f war refused to
be repatriated. By war’s end nearly a third o f the northern population lived in the south, and another 20
percent had died.
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chaplains, intensified the existing ideological conflicts between Communists and anti
communists. Many prisoners embraced the democratic ideals and religious messages
that they heard at these meetings.

Once a man accepted Christianity or embraced

Western ideas, however, he often found himself the target of Communist attacks.
Soldiers from the same regiment and ex-comrades in arms became deadly enemies.
Prison camps became a new battlefield, and each compound a new war zone.

The

ideological pressure on each prisoner was so strong that there was no middle ground.
With the help of missionary chaplains, Christian converts petitioned UN authorities with
blood petitions for non-repatriation. Their requests generated a great deal of sympathy
from religious groups in the United States.
Religious Ideology in the Cold War
The suffering caused by the brutal war and the violence in the prison camps
hardened the ice of the Cold War. In particular, many American religious and political
leaders were awakened by the conditions in Korea and began to take a tougher stand
against Communism. The war weakened the political power of liberals and strengthened
conservatives. Religious rhetoric by politicians and public sentiment against atheistic
Communism made things more black and white, connecting moral justification and
religious righteousness to America’s democracy, freedom, and capitalistic market
economy.
From the very beginning of the Korean War, President Truman had regarded the
war as a battle for freedom, and therefore, despite the long delay for peace caused by the
deadlock over POWs, he refused to yield on the principle of voluntary repatriation. His
firm commitment to humanitarian principles reflected his deep religious convictions. His
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stand on the POW issue can be interpreted as a measure of his resolve to support freedom
of religion and choice. Although the development of the Korean War was disappointing
to many Americans, the actions of President Truman, with the exception of firing General
MacArthur, were consistent with the general public sentiment, especially the opinion of
mainstream Protestant groups.
The Legacy o f the Religious Factors in the Korean War
The Korean War was the period when religious factors in Korea took on
international significance.

These religious factors traced their roots primarily to the

arrival of the first American missionaries sixty-six years before the war. In the years
following the war, these religious factors, having been brought into prominence by the
conflict, continued to impact history. It is worthwhile, in these final pages, to analyze the
influence of these religious factors on later historical events. Two follow-up questions
should be considered in assessing the significance of these factors. First, what effect did
these religious factors have on developments after the Korean War? Second, what effect
did the Korean War itself have on the development of Christianity in both Korea and the
United States?

In answer to these questions, four areas of impact can be identified: 1)

the development of the Cold War and religious revival, 2) the development of US-Korean
relations, 3) the development of South Korea, and 4) the development of Christianity in
South Korea.
1) The Impact on the Cold War and Religious Revival in the United States
John Lewis Gaddis, who has long stressed the importance of geopolitics and
power balances, has pointed out that historians failed to grasp what was a simple fact for
those living in the Cold War - people, from the top to the bottom, saw the Cold War as a
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straggle between good and evil.11 America was able to sustain the Cold War over so
many years, at such a high expense, through two psychological motivations: the sense of
moral rightness and the fear of the spread of Communism. Such fear was particularly
intensified by the war in Korea.
On November 27, 1950, Time Magazine reported that “a growing interest in
religion [was] evident all over the U.S.” 12 For example, Billy Graham’s Portland,
Oregon Crusade in September was attended by 520,000,13 doubling the attendance of his
Columbia, South Carolina Crusade in July, before the war began (see Table 4.1). On one
evening of the Portland Crusade, Rev. Bob Pierce was invited to report on his travels in
East Asia, especially Korea and Japan, before an audience of 17,000.14 On the last day of
the crusade, September 4 (Labor Day), at the “Crusade for Freedom” Rally in Multnomah
Stadium, the governors of both Washington and Oregon joined a crowd of 22,000.15
When Graham led another crusade in Atlanta, Georgia, from November to December,
another half million attended (see Table 4.1).
Churches all over the United States were reporting a significant increase in
regular worship attendance as well. The response to the Army Church Program was also
unexpectedly high. Chaplain Clauda R. Ingram (Lt. Colonel), 45th Division Chaplain,
reported from Camp Polk, Louisiana: “During my twenty years’ experience I have never
had church attendance as large or as enthusiastic as I find it here.” His experience
paralleled that of Chaplain Leonard A. Ellis (Captain), from Camp Custer in Michigan
11 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 286287.
12 ‘Trend,” TIME, 27 November 1950.
13 According to data provided by the Billy Graham Evangelical Association, TIME at that time reported a
higher number: 632,000. See “Revival” TIME, 18 September 1950.
14 Billy Graham, Just as I am: The Autobiography o f Billy Graham (New York: Harper Collins Publisher,
1997), 178.
15 Ibid., 174.
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where “94 percent of the soldiers attended services regularly each Sunday.” 16 In
particular, dispensational Christian sects, such as the Seventh-Day Adventists and the
Jehovah Witnesses, which advocated the end of the world and the second coming of
Christ, enjoyed the largest percentage gain in church membership.17
While most editors in the press attributed this growth to the “psychological
insecurity” of the American people, some credited the trend to the improved promotional
efforts of religious groups.18 Even the US government became involved in promoting
religion. In late November, as soon as the Chinese intervention in Korea was public
knowledge, President Truman called attention to the fundamental place of religion and
religious institutions in American life. He gave a statement in support of the nonsectarian
Religion in American Life Movement, urging “all Americans to attend and support the
church, chapel, or synagogue of their individual choice.”19 Thousands of giant outdoor
posters were displayed, saying, “Take your problems to Church this week - millions
leave them there!” It was the first time in American history that a nationwide campaign
had employed mass advertising facilities in support of religion.

00

According to the prominent theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, mass evangelism and
the increased intellectual interest in religion were undeniable proof of a shift in American
culture toward religiosity.21

“There is scarcely a college or university,” Niebuhr

explained, “which has not recently either created a department of religious studies or

16 “Response Unusually Good to Army Church Program,” Presbyterian Life, 20 January 1951, 23.
17 For the Adventists, see “Signs o f the Times,” TIME, 31 July 1950; and for the Jehovah’s Witnesses, see
“Waiting for Armageddon,” TIME, 14 August 1950.
18 ‘Trend,” TIME, 27 November 1950. See also “Religion in 1950,” Presbyterian Life, 20 January 1951,

21 .
19 “Religion in American Life,” The United Presbyterian, 20 November 1950, 9.
20 Ibid.
21 ‘Trend,” TIME, 27 November 1950.
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substantially enlarged existing departments.”

99

With more Americans turning to religion

not only for answers to their personal problems but also for answers to international
crises, religious public opinion became a stronger influence upon foreign policy.
The religious revival that started during the late 1940s and which was accelerated
by the outbreak of the Korean War persisted throughout the war and postwar years (see
Table 4.1). Through both the secular press and also religious publications, especially the
reports of missionaries, the situation in Korea shocked millions of Americans with the
horror and suffering of war. The public arose to provide humanitarian relief for those
ravaged by the war, and turned to a more determined and aggressive diplomatic and
military effort against further Communist expansion in other parts of the globe.

In

addition, both religious and political leaders advocated a deeper commitment to the cause
of religion as a part of the battle against Communist influence, both at home and abroad.
This was the decade in which the words "under God" were added to the Pledge of
Allegiance. Taking the advice of Rev. Billy Graham, President Eisenhower, who had not
been a church member, joined the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A) after he entered the
White House in order to show his commitment to organized religion. He expressed his
idea of the importance of religion this way: "Our government makes no sense unless it is
founded on a deeply felt religious belief —and I don't care what it is."23 Coincidentally,
both the President and the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, belonged to the
Protestant denomination, which had a close relationship with the Korean Protestant
churches and financed the largest share of Christian reconstruction programs in South
Korea.
22 Quote in ibid.
23 James M. Wall, “Changes in Attitude: the Lost World o f the 1950s,” The Christian Century, 18 October
1995,947-948.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

537

2) The Impact on the Development o f Korean-American Relations
Although there was no missionary-diplomat like Dr. Horace Allen during the
Korean War, missionaries remained a strong force in facilitating the development of
Korean-American relations.

Dr. Harold Noble, son of American missionaries in

P’yongyang before World War n, served as the political attache and first secretary at the
US embassy in Seoul from 1948 to 1951. He was an important official who acted as
liaison between the American embassy and President Syngman Rhee. During the initial
stages of the war, he was sent by Ambassador John J. Muccio to stay with Rhee and
advise him on the policy of the United States.24 Noble’s missionary background also
made him a useful go-between for the missionary community and the embassy.
Missionaries in the war zone needed such a helper as they sought embassy permission to
allow their missionary colleagues, who had evacuated to Japan, to return to Korea.
When John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State in 1953, American religious
interests had direct access to the State Department. Dulles handled Rhee’s efforts to
sabotage the truce talks with great care, utilizing the influence of American church
leaders to convince Rhee to cooperate. A military alliance between the two countries was
finally established with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953.
Since then, the bilateral relationship between the two countries has often been described
as “an alliance forged in blood.”

South Korea has grown to be one of the closest US

allies in East Asia. During the Vietnam War, South Korea was the only Asian country to
send two divisions to fight on the US side. In the recent war against Iraq, South Korea is

24 Harold Joyce Noble, Embassy a t War edited with introduction by Frank Baldwin (Seattle, WA:
University o f Washington Press, 1975), 104-122.
25 Quoted in William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 186.
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again a strong US ally. Even though the United States government closed most of its
military bases in Philippines and Japan, those in South Korea remain open.
Apart from the strong official ties between the two governments, KoreanAmerican relations also grew at the non-state level throughout the 1950s. Every year
since the war, while the best brains in Korea came to receive their education in the United
States, more American missionaries left for South Korea.

The social, cultural, and

religious ties between the two nations were tightening. American churches continued
sending relief packages and also money to rebuild the Christian social and religious
institutions that had been destroyed by the war. Dr. Bob Pierce, who produced two wellknown documentary films on Korea and the suffering of the war, started America’s first
international adoption agency, World Vision, Inc., in September 1950. Three times in the
1960s, Dr. Pierce’s Korean Orphans Choir toured the United States to give concerts to
raise money for orphanages in Korea.26 Wherever they went, they attracted huge crowds
and received wide publicity among television and radio audiences.

Many American

families answered the call to adopt Korean War orphans. Another source of Korean
immigration into the United States was the many marriages between American soldiers
and Korean women. And since the US maintained a military presence in Korea after the
war, such marriages continued.

The Korean-American community, with an eighty

percent Christian population, has become a prominent minority in American society
today.

26 Bob Pierce, The Korean Orphan Choir: They Sing Their Thanks (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1965), 12. On the first tour (1961-1962), they sang in 62 cities in the United States and
Canada over 90 days. On their second tour (1962-1963), they visited 15 countries in the Orient and Europe
and then sang in 70 cities in the United States and in leading Canadian cities. On their third tour (19651966), they visited 23 states and 4 Canadian provinces in a period o f seven and a half months.
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Americans and South Koreans continue to work closely on issues involving North
Korea. Although there are differences between the two governments in terms of how to
approach unification and how to handle the North Korean nuclear threat, there is
cooperation at the non-state level. Since the 1990s, Christian churches in South Korea
have been at the forefront of re-unification efforts. In addition to prayer, religious relief
agencies in both South Korea and the United States sent food and relief packages to
North Korea during the devastating famine of the 1990s.

Church leaders, perhaps

recalling P’yongyang’s Christian heritage, are looking for ways to re-enter North
Korea.27
According to Professor Thomas Hong-soon Han of the Hankuk University of
Foreign Studies in Seoul, the religious factor will continue to be an essential part of
efforts to open a dialogue with North Korea, and, ultimately, of efforts to achieve the
peaceful reunification of the country.28 Korean churches in the northeastern part of China,
for example, have established a modern-day underground railroad that has cared for and
transported thousands of North Korean refugees into South Korea via China. At the
present time, just as during the inter-war period, churches remain the major source of
information on conditions inside North Korea. Their reports and information continue to
affect American public opinion and US policy on the Korean peninsula.

27 For example, in 2003, Dr. James Jin-Kyung Kim, a famous South Korean Christian educator who built a
private university in Yanji known as Yanbian University o f Science and Technology (YUST), was given
permission to build a new university in P’yOngyang, P’ySngyang University o f Science and Technology
(PUST). The project was funded by private sources, especially Christian churches and institutions from all
over the world. Educators will soon be allowed to enter P’ybngyang to teach in PUST. If the North
Korean government does not alter the schedule, PUST should be opened in the Fall o f 2007.
28 Thomas Hong-soon Han, “The Role o f the Church in South-North Dialogue,”
http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/corea/proc/022.pdf.
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3) The Impact on the Political Development o f South Korea
The power and influence of the Christian community in South Korea continued to
grow during the Korean War, even though a significant number of clergymen and lay
workers were executed or carried off by North Korean authorities when the Communists
overran and later evacuated the South.

The number of Christians increased rapidly

because of the influx of about 100,000 new Christian refugees during the war. Their
arrival strengthened not only the Christian community, but also Rhee’s political power
base as well.

Refugees, Christian and otherwise, were the backbone supporters for

Rhee’s policy of pukchin t ’ongil (advance northward and achieve unification).
Christianity’s influence on Korean politics continued even after Syngman Rhee’s
regime ended in 1960. Rhee’s shortlived successor, Chang Myon (John M. Chang), was
a devout Catholic. Following Chang Myon, the Second Republic was established under
the new president Yun Po-son, a Presbyterian elder. Dr. Paek Nak-chun (George Paik),
President of the at that time still religious Yonsei University, became President of the
House of Councilors. The cabinet was also filled with Christian laymen.

Over the next

four decades, the power and influence of Christians continued to grow in Korean politics,
despite military dictatorships.

The Christian community was one of the principal

opposition groups to General Park Chung-hee’s military government, and one of the
leading forces in the movement to democratize the nation, which finally occurred in
1992.
Since democracy was reestablished, all of Korea’s presidents have been Christian:
Kim Young-sam (1992-1998), Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-

29 Alan Carter Covell, “Korean Conversion to Christianity,” Asian & Pacific Quarterly o f Cultural and
Social Affairs 19 (1987): 36.
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present). Today, of the 299 representatives of the Korean National Assembly, 103 are
Protestants and 70 are Catholics, which is about 58 percent of the whole legislative
body.30 In addition to its earlier growth, the Christian population in South Korea doubled
every decade from 1960 to 1980.31 By 2005, about one third of South Korea’s 45 million
people were Christians (11 million Protestants and 3 million Roman Catholics).32
Christianity is currently the leading political and religious force in South Korea.
4) The Impact on the Development o f Christianity in South Korea
Following the Communist takeover of China in 1949, missionary-sending
churches in America looked to Korea as the hope for reaching Asia with the gospel. In
1950, keeping South Korea free from Communism was a key interest of the American
churches. When war broke out and the US government entered the fray, they began to
appreciate that Korea did, in fact, hold a key strategic value in holding back
Communism’s advance.

Having reached this conclusion, the American government

found its interests coincided with those of the American churches.
Some Korean church leaders perceive the Korean War as a negative influence on
the development of Korean Christianity. Korean Protestant churches had begun as self30 Data is taken from the web page o f JoongAng Daily, a member o f Korea’s leading newspaper group,
http://news.joins.com/et/200502/25/200502251850590931 aOOOalOOal 20.html.
31 Table: Comparative Church Growth Statistics __________ ____________________________________
Year

Population Size

Size o f Protestant
Church

% of
Population

Size o f Catholic
Church

% of Population

% of Christians
in Population

3.7
1.2
1957
22,949,000
844,000
285,000
4.9
2.4
1968
6.0
8.4
31,093,000
1,873,000
751,000
10.1
2.5
1970
3,193,000
788,000
12.6
31,569,000
10.6
1972
804,000
2.5
13.1
32,459,000
3,452,000
1974
11.9
3.0
33,450,000
4,019,000
1,012,000
14.9
13.0
2.9
1976
35,860,000
4,659,000
1,053,000
15.9
14.3
3.1
17.4
1978
37,019,000
5,294,000
1,144,000
1981
19.8
3.7
23.5
38,723,000
7,637,000
1,439,000
See James Huntley Grayson, Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea: A Study in the Emplantation o f
Religion (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), 126.
32 Andrew E. Kim, “History o f Christianity in Korea: From Its Troubled Beginning to Its Contemporary
Success,” http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/xhist.htm].
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governing and self-reliant, but they became, after the outbreak of the war, more strongly
dependent upon America. Many Korean Pastors depended on foreign support during the
Korean War and during the postwar period. Much of the church leadership had been
killed by the Communists; missionaries were needed to lead and to train new leaders.
Much of the churches’ infrastructure and institutions had been destroyed by the war;
American money was needed to rebuild them. After years of war, the Korean people
were left destitute; American supplies were needed to help people get back on their feet.
During the 1950s many new American missionaries arrived in Korea, and found their
services in high demand, particularly in addressing poverty. Even many non-believers
looked to churches for food and medicine.
This new dependency of the Korean Church upon America can be interpreted
more positively, however, as the forging of a stronger partnership between churches in
America and Korea.

Even though Korean churches became dependent on American

support, there was no lack because American churches were eager to provide help to the
war-torn country. Much of the money that was sent to rebuild this impoverished country
flowed through churches and Christian institutions. If even non-Christians looked to
churches for help, then this underscores the growing importance of churches in Korean
social life. The result, after five decades of American support, is not a dependent and
weak church, but a vibrant and growing one. The financial power and the missionary
zeal of the Korean churches have out-grown many Western churches. According to the
latest statistics, South Korea is now the second largest missionary sending country in the
world.33 Each year since 2000, South Korea has sent out an average of 1,100
missionaries. This was more than the number sent by all European countries combined
33 Rob Moll, “Mission Incredible,” Christianity Today 50 (March 2006): 28.
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(Protestant or Catholic). It has also taken the lead in sending out mission workers to
Asia, Africa, and many Muslim countries in the Middle East. It may well turn out that
the early missionaries were right, and Korea will become the key to Christianity’s growth
in Asia.
In fact, rather than lamenting the temporary loss of church independence caused
by the war, the war can be recognized as ultimately strengthening churches in Korea.
The ravages of war further weakened the Confucian structure of traditional Korean
society because most young men were either killed in combat or were at least separated
from their families for several years.34 Women and children depended more on
government or private relief for survival.

As a result, Christian humanitarian relief

efforts enhanced the prestige of Christianity and its influence in Korea society. Without
the Korean War, Christianity would not have grown as rapidly as it did and Korean
churches would not have received as much financial support from American churches.
American overseas missions would have continued to focus on Japan, the Philippines,
India, and various countries in Africa, with Korea as only a secondary interest.
Final Thoughts
To appreciate the fundamental importance of religious - particularly Christian factors in the growth of modem Korea and in Korean-American relations, perhaps it is
helpful to consider a world without them. If missionaries had never come to Korea, the
development of modem Korea would have been different - whether better or worse,

34 The Korean War significantly weakened the structure o f traditional Korean life. The breakdown o f the
self-sufficient farm economy, the loosening o f the bonds o f the old family system, and the rise o f women
and youth as breadwinners all eroded the foundations of the long-established Confucian society. The war
created a vacuum that would be filled, in time, by Christianity. The same stresses were at work on
Confucianism in the North. In this case, however, the central government would fill the vacuum with its
personality cult and more controlled economic and social programs. The religious transformation o f the
North is perhaps more startling than that in the South, although few tangible facts are available..
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certainly very different. There would have been no Syngman Rhee (nor his book, Spirit
o f Independence, the most well-known nationalist writing) - nor any other Christian
patriots, no “non-violent” March First Independence Movement (1919), no Cho Man-sik,
no George Z. Williams, no Underwood family, no Christian schools and institutions, and
no churches. The resistance to a Communist- controlled North and a leftist dominated
South would have been significantly weakened during the interwar years. Perhaps the
war in Korea would not even have been necessary if the Communists had succeeded in
sabotaging the American-sponsored South Korean government.
But if the war had come and the United States had still intervened without a
Christian connection to America, perhaps the “police action” in Korea would not have
aroused as much interest and support from the American public. Without a clear moral
justification for American intervention, a war in distant Korea, bogged down in a bloody
conflict with China, and coming right on the heels of World War II, could have become
as unpopular as Vietnam. The United States might have been eager to extricate itself and
shortened the war by yielding on the POW controversy. Indeed, the POW controversy
might have been smaller scale and have captured less public attention without camp
conversions and blood letters given to Billy Graham. Also, without moral guidance, the
United States could have adopted a more aggressive position, expanding the war to China
or using the atomic bomb as General Douglas MacArthur and his supporters demanded.
Nor, following the war (if one imagines the war progressing along the same course even
in the absence of religious factors), would America and Korea have developed such close
ties at the non-state level. Moreover, the development of modem Korea would probably
have taken along a different path.
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The religious factors of the Korean War are important components in the study of
the rise of modem Korea. Therefore, through understanding the religious factors at work
prior to and during the Korean War, historians can better appreciate later historical
events, namely the unfolding of the Cold War and the development of the modem ties
that still persist between America and South Korea.
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APPENDIX 1.1: Tables for CHAPTER 1
Table 1.1: Funding for Foreign Missionary work in E ast and S o u th east Asia (Methodist
Episcopal Church)____________________ _____ ________ __________________________
1894
1897
Country N ame
1891
1900
1903
1906
1907
1908*
108,519
118,711
114,011
119,376
126,630
142,750
150,550
C hina
157,550
144,241
India
114,000
117,537
133,058
149,589
175,200
182,900
188,806
Ja p a n
61,666
54,408
48,576
49,739
54,000
59,300
62,500
62,500
15,924
K orea
15,967
14,285
16,911
23,000
26,940
28,465
28,465
7,250
8,889
9,378
10,500
11,981
16,580
Malaysia
21,380
21,380
Philippine Islands
14,000
21,350
23,650
25,630
566,347
592,940
586,800
629,625
683,942
Foreign M ission
777,275
820,000
missing**
* Data for 1909 not available.
** Incomplete materials.
Source: Annual Report o f the Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul:
The Institute for Korean Church History, 2001).

Table 1.2: Com parison of the num ber of overall Christian converts in Korea an d in Jap an
Country
Name

Japan
Korea

1887

1898

20,000
20

41,000
5,000

% increase from
1887 to 1898

105%
24900%

1907
50,000
41,000

% increase from
1898 to 1907

22%
720%

Source: Data quoted by Jongsuk Chay, Diplomacy o f Asymmetry: Korean American Relations to 1910 (Honolulu, HI: University of
Hawaii Press, 1990), 5.

Table 1.3: The Growth of Protestant Christianity, 1905-1907

Year
1905
1907
% Increase

Churches Stations
321
470
642
1,047
200% 222.3%

Baptized Adherents

Probationers
9,761
30,136
18,964
99,300
194.2%
329.5%

Source: Horace G. Underwood, The Call o/K orea (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1908), 146-48, Quoted by Chung-shin Park,
Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003): 29.

1.4: Com parison of the Method ist Ministry in Korea (1912' and in Japan
1912 in
1903 in
1907 in
1918 in
Korea
Korea
Korea*
Japan
Missionaries
42
64
39
113
Ordained Preachers
4
6
30
145
Evangelists (Un-ordained
111
15
*29
269

Table

Preachers in Korea)
Bible Women

Churches (Churches and

Unknown Unknown
67
219

26
437

85
298

Chapels in Korea)

Membership
Resident Members
Probationers
Other adherents

1,616
3,885
10,507
15,852
Unknown Unknown Unknown
8,608
5,299
19,570
15,618 Unknown
Unknown
16,158
21,119 Unknown

* Data in 1918 is not available.
Source: For the data of the Korean Methodist Church, see “Foreign Missions Report: Korea Conference (1912),” Annual Report o f the
Board o f Foreign Missions o f the Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul:
The
Institute for Korean Church History, 2001): 430-433. For the data of the Japanese Methodist Church, see Bishop Herbert Welch,
“Seoul Area - Japan and Korea,” (1921), ibid., 655.
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Table 1.5: Number of Presbyterian Churches in 1910

Province
Seoul (Capital city)
Hamgyong (NK)
P’yong’an (NK)
Hwanghae (NK)
Kyonggi (SK)
Ch’ungch’ong (SK)
Cholla (SK)
Kyongsang (SK)
Total

# o f churches
11
31
260
103
56
25
76
125
687

%
1.6
4.5
37.8
15.0
8.2
3.7
11.0
18.2
100

Main city
-

Hamhung
Pyongyang
Haeju
Seoul
Taegu
Kwangju
Pusan
-

Source: Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003): 33.

Table 1.6: Christianity in Korea: Basic Statistics in 1941
Denominations
Roman Catholic
Greek Orthodox
Korea Presbyterian
Methodist Episcopal
Episcopal
Seventh-Day Adventist
Holiness
Salvation Army
Korean Missionary Society
Pentecostal
Christian Church
Japan Christian Church
Plymouth Brethren
Korean Christian Church
Korean Congregational
Church o f God
Church o f Christ
Korean Christian Church
Church o f Jesus
Korean Evangelical Church
Church o f Christ
Japan Union Church
Nazarene
Pure Evangelical Church
East Asia Christian Church
Total

# o f Churches
499
6
3,348
876
136
185
205
140
15
4
6
53
2
30
26
14
13
8
8
19
19
1
3
1
30
5,640

# o f workers
320
5
3,075
295
104
80
221
156
14
4
6
63
3
8
26
14
5
5
5
7
19
Unknown
3
1
32
4,471

M embership
109,210
115
262,075
50,286
7,738
4,510
9,169
4,876
518
80
285
5,381
98
1,415
550
968
140
Unknown
Unknown
422
Unknown
Unknown
86
106
1,311
459,339

(Source: “The List of Worship & Religions in Korea” By the Training Dept., Education Bureau o f the Governor General of Chosen,
December, 1941, pp.55-57 recorded in “Statistics - Japan & Korea” / General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allies
Powers, Box#5780, RG331 GHQ/SCAP records, CIE ©, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington National
Records Center.)
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Table 1.7: Number of Modern Schools, 1910

Category
Public School
Semipublic School
Subtotal
Private School
Religious related Private School
Subtotal
Total

Numbers
80
73
153
*1,325
755
2,080
2,233

Percentage
3.6%
3.3%
6.9%
59.3%
33.8%
93.1%
100%

Source: Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003), 122.
* According to Professor Park, “many of the non-church affiliated private schools were founded by native Christians on the model of,
and with stimulation from, successful church-related schools.”

Table 1.8: Num ber of W esterners in 1894

Occupation
Diplomatic service
Business
Missionaries
Total

Number Percentage
14
12%
58%
69
35
30%
118
100%

Source: Samuel H. Moffett, “The Westerner,” in First Encounters: Korea 1880-1910 ed. by Peter A. Underwood (Seoul: Dragan’s
Eye Graphics, 1982), 36.

Table 1.9: Sic ners of the Declaration of Independence (March 1,1919)
Religious
Groups

N um ber o f
Signers

Examples

Chondoists
Christians
Buddhists

15
16
2

Choe Nam-son, Son Pyong-hui
Yi Sunghun, Kil Son-ju, Kim Pyong-jo, Yu Yo-dae
Han Yong-un, Paek Yong-ong

Sources: Wanne J. Joe, A Cultural History o f M odem Korea: A History o f Korean Civilization (Elizabeth, NJ & Seoul: Hollyn, 2000),
808.
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Table 1.10: Religious Affiliation of People Arrested During the March First Independence
M ovement 1919

Denomination
Ch’ondogyo
Shich’ongyon
Buddhist
Confucianist
Methodist
Presbyterian
Congregational
Other Protestants
Catholics
Other Religions
No religious affiliation
Unknown
Total:

Male
Female
2,268
15
14
0
0
220
346
0
42
518
2,254
232
7
0
34
286
54
1
21
0
9,255
49
98
3,809
19,054
471

Total
2,283
14
220
346
560
2,486
7
320
55
21
9,304
3,907
19,525

Percentage
11.69
0.07
1.13
1.77
2.87
12.74
0.04
1.64
0.28
0.11
47.65
20.01
100

(Source: Korean Government-General, Governor’s Office, Chosen no dokuritsu shiso oyobi undo [The Korean Independence Thought
and Movement] (Seoul, 1924), pp.98-106.) See also Chong-sik Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
CA: University o f California Press, 1963): 115-118.

Table 1.11: The Growth of the Presbyterian Church before and after the 1919 Uprising

Year
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921

Churches
1,648
1,778
1,705
1,738
1,879

Newly Established Churches

52
102
115
184
267

Adherents
149,526
160,919
144,062
153,915
179,158

Source: Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003): 36.

Table 1.12: Korean Church M embership

Year
1937
1939
1941
1943

Adherents
374,085
370,462
332,607*
208,758

Notes
Sino-Japanese War
Shinto Shrine worship enforced
Missionaries were imprisoned and forced to leave

Source: Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2003): 36.
* Compared to Table 1.6, the figure is much lower here because o f the different sources. The Japanese data might reflect the inactive
members while the church data here might reflect the actual attendant. In other words, some Christians, who refused to bow down to
the Shinto Shrine, chose to leave o r forced to leave their churches.
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APPENDIX 1.2: Tables for CHAPTER 2:
Table 2.1: Reported Membership in Religious Organization, 1911-1944

Religion
Buddhists
Christians
Chondokyo
Others
Total
% of population

1911
340,000
201,000
109,000
119,000
769,000
5.7%

1928
270,000
340,000
111,000
83,000
804,000
4.3%

1939
194,000
500,000
80,000
50,000
824,000
3.8%

1944
187,000
621,000
72,000
52,000
932,000
3.7%

% in 1944
20.1
66.6
7.7
5.6
100%

Source: Data for 1911,1928, and 1939, from Office of the Overseas Minister, Takumu tokei, 1939; for 1944 from Annual Report on
the Administration o f Chosen 1944. See Joungwon Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics o f Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1976), 21.

Table 2.2: The Provincial Distribution of the Young Friends’ Party

Southern Provinces
Kyonggi
North Chungchong
South Chungchong
North Cholla
South Cholla
North Kyongsang
South Kyongsang
Total

103
0
15
23
0
21
56
218

Northern Provinces
Kangwon
13
Hwanghae
79
South Pyongan
815
North Pyongan
1,668
South Hamgyong
1,400
North Hamyong
54
Total

4,017

Source: Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution 1945-1950 (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2003),
15.

Table 2.3: Religious M embership in Korea in betw een 1939-1941

Religion

ChurchesI
Temples
5,640
Christianity
1,560
Japanese Buddhism
324
Sectarian Shinto
73
State Shinto
1,727
Korean Buddhism
973
Togaku
1,091
Hunchi
26
Buddhistic
29
Shamanism
missing
Confucianism
Total
11,443

Workers

4,471
1,733
710
157
6,639
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
missing
13,710

Overall
Membership
459,339**
339,512*
93,110*

33.5
24.8
6.8

No register membership

n.a.

196,135
117,585
137,807
23,054
4,707
Missing
1,371,249

14.3
8.6
10.0
1.7
0.3
n.a.
100

%

* The membership was mostly Japanese population in Korea. If these two groups were deducted from the total, it would become
938,627, which is similar to the total in Table 2.2.
**The percentage of Christian could be as high as 49% of the overall religious population if the Japanese groups are taken out of the
calculation.
Source: ‘T h e List o f Worship & Religions in Korea” By the Training Dept., Education Bureau of the Governor General of Chosen,
December, 1941, pp.55-57 recorded in “Statistics - Japan & Korea” / General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allies
Powers, Box#5780, RG331 GHQ/SCAP records, CIE ©, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington National
Records Center.
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Table 2.4a: Percentage of Foreign Population in Korea

1941
717,011
73,823
23,913,063
24,703,897

Japanese
Foreigners
Koreans
Total Population

%
2.9%
0.3%
96.8%
100%

♦not exact data, but approximate amount
Source:
CIC (<$-% $) M J Z * f 1 9 4 5 .9 - 1 9 4 9 .1 ,1:213.

Table 2.4b: Distribution of Nort h and South Korean Population (1

Southern
Northern
Total Korean population
♦not exact data, but approximate amount
Source: 0 ? ¥ & K 9 1 ffm jg W M CIC

15,408,237*
9,295,659*
23,913,063

62.4%
37.6%
100%

1 9 4 5 . 9 - 1 9 4 9 .1 ,1:213.

Table 2.5: Major Christian C hurches in Korea i 1941)
Denominations
Roman Catholic*
Korea Presbyterian*
Methodist Episcopal
Episcopal
Seventh-Day Adventist
Holiness
Total

# o f Churches
499
3,348
876
136
185
205
5,249

# o f workers
320
3,075
295
104
80
221
4,094

Membership
109,210
262,075
50,286
7,738
4,510
9,169
442,988

♦ Majority of its membership were in North Korea.
Source: “The List of Worship & Religions in Korea” By the Training Dept., Education Bureau of the Governor General of Chosen,
December, 1941, pp.55-57 recorded in “Statistics - Japan & Korea” / General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allies
Powers, Box#5780, RG331 GHQ/SCAP records, CIE ©, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington National
Records Center.

Table 2,6: Survey of Presbyterian Stations** in 1940

Station

Ratio o f Presbyterian Population to
the total population in the area

Syenchun (N)*
Chairyung (N)
Pyongyang (N)
Kangkei (N)
Pusan (S)
Manchuria (Korean)
Andong (S)
Taegu (S)*
Chungju (S)
Seoul(S)*

1:13
1:28
1:28
1:34
1:38
1:60
1:68
1:77
1:100
d.n.a.

♦ These stations had a significant amount of Catholic population as well. If Catholics were added, the ratio in Taegu, for example,
was 1:13.
♦♦ These stations were run by Presbyterian Church (USA).
Sources: H. A. Rhodes’ presentation “Survey of the Stations” during the Korean Consultative Conference (September 20-22,1944),
Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 16, Folder 30 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Table 2.7a: Proportion of Population R eached by the Church in Villages with C hurches by
R egions i n ' 925* (25 sam ples)

Region

Total Village
Population

Resident ChurchMembership

North
Center
South

2 ,3 7 0

817

34.5

5 ,5 9 9

1,120

2 0 .0

1 0,226

1,278

12.5

% o f Population in
Church

* Data not available in 1945.
Source: Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner, Ph.D. “The Christian Mission in Relation to Rural Problems,” The Jerusalem Meeting o f the
International Missionary Council (March 2 4 - April 8,1928), 52. Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to internal affairs
of Korea (Chosen), 1910-1929, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration.

Table 2.7b: Landownership by G eneral Farming Population and by Church Membership
Com pared by R egions (35 villages) in 1925

Region

Number
of
Village

North
Central
South

10
12
13

Non Christian Families
Number
% Owning
Land Tilled
1336

Christian Families
Number
% Owning Land
Tilled

3 3 .4

120

1085

2 4 .9

211

11.0

1487

16.5

281

18.8

3 7 .5

Source: Edmund deSchweinitz Brunner, Ph.D. “The Christian Mission in Relation to Rural Problems,” The Jerusalem Meeting o f the
International Missionary Council (March 2 4 -A p r il 8,1928), 24. Records of the U.S. Department o f State relating to internal affairs
of Korea (Chosen), 1910-1929, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration.

Table 2.8: Population Growth in the Southern Zone (1946-1948)

Origins
Existing Population (May 1944)
Repatriation from Japan
Repatriation from other areas
Migration from NK (recorded)
Natural increase (approximate)
Subtotal
Unprocessed entries (estimated)**
Total
Total unnatural population increase*

1946

1948

1 5 ,8 7 9 ,1 1 0

1 9 ,3 6 9 ,2 7 0

8 9 8 ,2 1 9

2 1 2 ,9 8 0

8 5 ,5 2 9

2 1 ,3 1 8

4 0 1 ,6 8 5

4 6 8 ,5 8 9

6 5 0 ,0 0 0

4 0 0 ,0 0 0

17,914,543
1,454,727
19,369,270
2,840,160

20,472,152
430,000
20,902,152
1,132,887

* Total unnatural population increase fro m 1946 to 1948 is 3,973,042.
** These probably were the unprocessed refugees from North Korea and Japan.
Source: “Food Report for South Korea as of March 1948,” Food Supplies, Korea 1945-1948, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State
relating to internal affairs of Korea, 1945-1949, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
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Table 2.9: The S tate of Christianity in Korea at the Time of Annexation

Presbyterian Methodists
1,211
402
Missionary
Premises
(Church hall)
456
131
Missionaries
125
69
(Americans)
64
86
Korean
1,317
625
Pastors
Members
115,072
37,620
Japanese
39
0
School
1,193
430
Students
102,113
29,285
Hospitals
6
3

New Sects

Catholics Orthodox
168
149
4

Total
1,934

101
13
7
179

47
46
1
197

3
1
0
8

738
254
158
2,326

7,897
108
42
782
2

38,197
192
73
778
1

188
0
0
0
0

198,974
339
1,738
132,958
12

Source: Takakyoshi Matsuo, “The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The Missionary Activity of the Japan Congregational
Church in Korea,” translated by S. Takiguchu, M odem Asian Studies 13 (1979), 419.

2.10:1939 Statistics for various Missions ( r ederal Council of Missionary Bodies)
Mission
Total
Total
Missionaries
Membership
Church o f Christ Mission
4
330
English Church Mission
14
6,102
Methodist Missionary Society
108
28,439
Oriental Missionary Society
4
7,195
Australian Presbyterian Mission
29
19,435
Presbyterian Church in U.S.A. Mission
118
120,560
Presbyterian Church in U.S. Mission
66
21,980
United Church of Canada Mission
38
17,508
Salvation Army
16
18,002
Seventh Day Adventist Mission
19
7,288
278
Roman Catholic Totals (Four Mission)
141,243
Grant Totals
694
388,082
Table

Source: Rev. Edward Adam, “Information of Christian Work in Korea, October 12, 1945,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record
Group 140, Folder 29 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
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Table 3.1 : P ercentage of Christians in the AMG and First Republic (19416-1948)

Position

Total
50

Christians
35

70.0%

Advisory Council

11

Korean Interim Legislative Assembly*

90

6
21

5 4 .5 %
2 3 .3 %

Korean Legislative Assembly**

190

38

2 0 .0 %

Am erican M ilitary Government (high position)

%

* Half by election and half by appointment.
** 100% election.
Source: For the data on Advisory Council, see Chung-shin Park, Protestantism and Politics in Korea (Seattle and London: University
of Washington Press, 2003), 168. For the others, see Harry A. Rhodes and Archibald Campbell, History o f the Korean Mission:
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., V ol.2,1939-1959 (New York: Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, The
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1964), 380-381.

Table 3.2: Population Growth in the Southern Zone (1946-1948)

Origins
Existing Population (May 1944)
Repatriation from Japan
Repatriation from other areas
Migration from NK (recorded)
Natural increase (approximate)
Subtotal
Unprocessed entries (estimated)**
Total
Total unnatural population increase*

1946

1948

1 5 ,8 7 9 ,1 1 0

1 9 ,3 6 9 ,2 7 0

8 9 8 ,2 1 9

2 1 2 ,9 8 0

8 5 ,5 2 9

2 1 ,3 1 8

4 0 1 ,6 8 5

4 6 8 ,5 8 9

6 5 0 ,0 0 0

4 0 0 ,0 0 0

17,914,543
1,454,727
19,369,270
2,840,160

20,472,152
430,000
20,902,152
1,132,887

* Total unnatural population increase fro m 1946 to 1948 is 3,973,042.
** These probably were the unprocessed refugees from North Korea and Japan.
Source: “Food Report for South Korea as o f March 1948,” Food Supplies, Korea 1945-1948, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State
relating to internal affairs of Korea, 1945-1949, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Table 3.3: Population Growth in Major Southern Cities and S e ected Ration Store Data in 1947

City

Population
in 1941

Seoul
Pusan
Taegu
Inchon
Kwangju
Taejon
Kaesong
Chonju
Pohang
Suwon

935,464
249,734
178,923
171,165
64,520
45,541
72,062
47,230
n.a.
n.a.

Population
in 1947
1,141,766
400,156
269,113
215,784
100,451
96,207
87,173
83,333
45,147
42,173

N et Population
Growth fro m 1941
to 1947

Num ber o f
Ration
Stores

Average
num ber o f
persons served
by store each
ration period

206,302*
150,422*
90,190
44,619
35,931
50,666
15,111
36,103
n.a.
n.a.

194
59
45
54
8
40
22
11
8
50

5,885
6,782
5,980
3,996
12,556
2,405
3,962
7,576
5,643
843

Percentage
of
Population
growth

22%
60%
50%
26%
56%
111%
21%
76%
n.a.
n.a.

* Seoul got most of its net increase from the northern refugees while Pusan got its share from Japan.
Source: Data for 1941 is taken from f S W j & f f l l l f f C I C ( Hf f j t f l ) M J 2 Ai 1 9 4 5 .9 - 1 9 4 9 .1 ,1:218 and data for 1947 is
taken from “Food Distribution In South Korea,” Food Supplies, Korea 1945-1948, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State relating to
internal affairs of Korea, 1945-1949, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
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Table 3.4: Statistical Summary of Civil D isturbances in South Korea during the election
month (May 1-15,1948)_______________________ _______________
Rightists killed
Leftists killed
Police killed

59
43
6
162
25
10
15
50
211

Total
Rightist wounded
Leftists wounded
Police wounded
Total
Rioters Apprehended
Rightist home Burned
Rightist home Bombed
Rightist home Attacked
Leftists homes Attacked

20
6
13
39
3

Attacks on police boxes
Attacks on polling places
Myun offices o f city halls attacked
Christian churches Attacked*
M issionary home**
US Army Bus***

22
36
4
2
1
1

Total

* one in Kaesong and one in Kanggyong
** one Catholic Missionary’s home was in Chunchon
*** one U.S. Army Bus in Seoul
Source: Report by Lt Col. Joseph Huckins,

CIC C g -g iff)

1 9 4 5 .9 - 1949.1, 3:424.
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Table 4.1 Data of Billy G raham C ru sad es (1947-1954)
Crusade’s Name

YFC Evangelistic Campaign
Charlotte Revival
Augusta Crusade
Christ for Greater lais
Boston Crusade
Columbia Crusade
New Enoland Tour
t, I r P 111 Ul(
1 Ai
im j h
S ftiitlip m

Location

Date

Grand Rapids, M I

09/17/1947-09/21/1947

Charlotte, NC
Augusta. GA
Los Angeles. CA
Boston, MA
Columbia, SC

11/09/1947-11/23/1947
10/03/1947-10/19/1948
09/25/t949-l 1/20/1949
12/31/1949-01/16/1950
02/19/1950-03/12/1950
03/27/1950-04/23/1950

Attendance
30,000
42,000
65,000
350,000
105,000
190,000
160,000

h i W m u i.

6000

1

Cincinnati, OH

05/12/1951-05/13/1951

21.000

Christ for Hollywood
Greensboro Crusade
_____
Raleigh rallies
Washington D.C. Crusade

Hollywood, CA

09/19/1951-10/06/1951
10/14/ 1951-01/26/1951
11/16/1951-11/18/1951

135,000

Jackson Crusade
US cities tour
Pittsburgh Crusade
Albuquerque Crusade
Florida cities tour
Chattanooga Crusade
St. Louis Revival

lat-kM'l, MS

Givcnshui.i. NC
Raliegh. NC

Pittsburgh, PA
Albuquerque, NM
Chattanooga, TN
.Si L m i s

M CI

'34,000

1,450

. 06/15/1952-07/11/1952
Aug 1952
09/07/1952-10/07/1952
11/02/1952-12/02/1952
Jan-Feb 1953
03/15/1953-04/14/1953
/16/1953-05/16/1953

362,300
126,000
263,500
133,030
120,000
283,300
318,400

3,011

June-July 1953
06/30/1953
08/02/1953-08/31/1953

77,000

5,986

4.406
3 06

3W

:

Amarillo, TX
Syracuse, NY
Detroit, M l
A shesill NC

European tour
Nashville Oiisade
New Orleans Crusade

3 9 1 .0 5 0

13/1952

Washington. IX

EU&'X*
West Texas tour
Amarillo rally
Syracuse Crusade
Detroit Crusade_
Asheville Crusade

12,000

125,000

S ta tp c tA iif

T lr t Word
Great hhrevc^
Cincmnati rallies

Inquirers
500
1,200
1,400
3,000*
3,000

Nashville, TN
New Orleans, LA
Source: The History of the Billy Graham Evangelical Association.
* Some other data suggest a higher figure from 4,200 to 6,000.

600-800
2.630

20,000

09/ 27/ 1953- 11/ 01/1933

105,200
363,030

11/08/1953-11/22/1953

112,100

2.653

303,800
652 000
1 19. too

9 067
4,932

06/16/1954-06/30/1954
08/22/! 914-09'19/1954
" l(V3/1954-10/31/1954

____

6 men

Table 4.2a: Religious Bodies - C hurch Membership* (1926-1956)
All Protestant bodies
The Roman Catholic Church
Other
Total number of members
Percent o f total population
Average number per local church

1926
31,511,701
18,605,003
4,459,642
54,576,346
47%
235

1940
37,814,606
21,284,455
5,402,533
64,501,594
49%
265

1950
51,079,578
28,634,878
7,116,034
86,830,490
57%
304

1955
58,448,567
33,396,647
8,317,315
100,162,529
61%
328

1956
60,148,980
34,563,851
8,512,123
103,224,954
62%
334

S o u rce: N a tio n a l C o u n cil o f C h u rc h es o f C h ris t in th e U n ite d S ta te s o f A m e ric a ; Y e a rb o o k o f A m e rica n C h u rc h e s.

* Membership 13 years of age and over
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Table 4.2b: Religious Bodies - Num ber of C hurches and Membership^
Y ear

1947
Religious Bodies
M ember
Roman Catholic Church
25,286,178
Eastern Orthodox Churches
600,000
Jewish Congregations
4,641,000
“Protestant” bodies over 50,000
44,571,486
Other bodies
2,287,524
Total
77,386,188
Source: Yearbook o f American Churches, 1949,1951,1954.
* Membership 13 years of age and over

Church
14,523
586
3,728
224,479
22,267
265,583

1950
M ember
28,635,000
1,650,000
5,000,000
49,969,000
1,576,000
86,830,000

Church
15,533
882
3,728
257,640
19,153
281,511

1947-1953)
1953
M ember
31,476,261
2,021,000
5,000,000
54,654,814
1,690,770
94,842,845

Table 4.2c: Growth R ates (1947-1953)
Year
Religious Bodies
Roman Catholic Church
Eastern Orthodox Churches
Jewish Congregations
“Protestant” bodies over 50,000
Other bodies
Total

1950
M ember Church
13.2%
7.0%
175%
50.5%
7.7%
0%
12.1%
14.8%
-31.1%
-14.0%
12.2%
6.0%

1953
M em ber
Church
32.7%
9.9%
22.5%
29.0%
0%
7.0%
9.3%
-3.1%
7.3%
-1.1%
9.2%
4.6%

Source: Yearbook o f American Churches 1949,1951,1954.
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20,618
1,138
3,990
249,668
18,945
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Table 5.1: Population of Major Cities in South Korea (1941-1947)

City
Seoul
Pusan
Taegu
Inchon
Kwangju
Taejon
Kaesong
Chonju
Pohang
Suwon

1941
935,464
249,734
178,923
171,165
64,520
45,541
72,062
47,230
n.a.
n.a.

1947
1,141,766
400,156
269,113
215,784
100,451
96,207
87,173
83,333
45,147
42,173

Growth Rate

22%
60%
50%
26%
56%
111%
21%
76%
n.a.
n.a.

Source: Data for 1941 is taken from j iW M c M W M X f f M CIC (%hJ^
1 9 4 5 . 9 - 1 9 4 9 .1 , 1:218 and data for 1947 is
taken from “Food Distribution In South Korea,” Food Supplies, Korea 1945-1948, RG 59, Records of the US Dept of State relating to
internal affairs of Korea, 1945-1949, File 895, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Table 5.2: Statistics of the “S av e the Nation Evangelistic C rusade” (April-May 1950)

City
Taegu

Venue
Town Hall

Natural
Capacity

d.n.a.

60,000

11
1

d.n.a.

d.n.a.
30,000

5
1

3000
2000
1,200

20,000
6,000
20,000

10
d.n.a.

Gil Dodd’s Exhibition Race
in the City stadium

Seoul Presbyterian Church
Taejon High School Hall
Inchon Methodist Church

Numbers
o f Days

2000

Gil Dodd’s Exhibition Race
in the City stadium

Pusan

Expanded
Max. Capacity

1
“d.n.a.” means data not available.
Source: Bob Pierce, The Untold Korean Story (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1951).

Table 5.3: Southern Presbyterian Missionaries who Stayed Behind

Kwangju Station
Chonju Station
Dr. Ovid B. Bush,
Dr. Herbert Codington
Rev. H. Petrie Mitchel and his wife (Mary Dr. Paul S. Crane and his wife (Mariella)
Rev. William A. Linton and his wife
Belle)
(Charlotte)
Miss Florence Root
Miss Gene N. Lindler
Miss Margaret Pritchard
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Table 5.4: Foreign Civilians Held Captive by the North Koreans, 1950-1953

Diplomats
Catholic Priests
Catholic Nuns
Catholic Laymen
Male Missionaries
Female Missionaries
Foreign officials
Business persons
Journalists
USA Engineers
White Russians
Turkish
Civilians
Children below 18
Total

Died in Captivity
0
7
4
1
2
1
0
1
0
2
5
0
0
0
23

Survived Captivity
6
4
5
0
4
3
1
1
2
0
4
5
2
8
45

Total
6
11
9
1
6
4
1
2
2
2
9
5
2
8
68

Source: Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2003), 381383.
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Table 6.1: Foreign Civilians Held Captive by the North Koreas, 1950-53

Diplomats
Catholic Priests
Catholic Nuns
Catholic Laymen
Male Missionaries
Female Missionaries
Foreign officials
Business persons
Journalists
USA Engineers
White Russians
Turkish
Civilians
Children below 18
Total

Died in Captivity
0
7
4
1
2
1
0
1
0
2
5
0
0
0
23

Survived Captivity
6
4
5
0
4
3
1
1
2
0
4
5
2
8
45

Total
6
11
9
1
6
4
1
2
2
2
9
5
2
8
68

Source: Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2003), 381-383.

Table 6.2: Materials donated by American C hurches distributed through the UN

American Friends Service Committee
Church World Services
General Conference of Seventh Day Adventist
Lutheran World Relief
Oriental Missionary Society
Religious Denominations of Fort Devens, Mass
War Relief Service-National Catholic Welfare Conference
Total

$ worth of Supplies
$234,153
$700,663
$10,000
$184,265
$102,883
$1,000
$3,623,492
$4,856,446

The total amount of contributions by all US voluntary agencies was US$10,952,657. Church donations were about 44 percent o f the
total.
Source: Heung-soo Kim,
A171
2) ^1 cfs)] °]
(Relief Activities of Foreign Christian Voluntary
Agencies during the Korean War), £ 7 ^ . 7 / Of*)- History o f Korean Christianity 23 (2005): 107.
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Table 6.3: The Executive Committee of Korea Church World Service

Position
President
Vice President
Secretary
Treasurer
Executive Director
Executive Assistant
Field Supervisor
Secretary for Child Welfare
Training Midwives

Name
Dr. Edward Adams
Mr. Chang
Rev. Kim Sa Keun
Dr, EJ.O . Fraser
Dr. Henry D. Appenzeller
Mr. Gregory B. Votaw
Mr. James Atkinson
Miss Anne Davison
Miss Edith J. Galt

Organization
Presbyterian, USA
Salvation Army
United Church of Canada
Methodist

Source: Ibid., 109-110.

Table 6.4: Num ber of Christian P astors and Evangelists Arrested by Com munist in South Korea
(1950-1951)___________ ________________ __________________ ___________ __________________

Denomination
Methodist
Presbyterian
Holiness

Ministers

Families members

35

8

43

156

111

9

120

488

8

3

11

51

6

6

42

26

180

737

Salvation Army
Total:

Total

Evangelists

154

Source: Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Heung Soo Kim (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History,
2003), 312-317.
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Table 6.5: The Civilian Calamity of W ar (June 1952)

Civilian Calamity

Number

Total

(1) Broken residence

600,000

Entirely broken or burned down

380,000

Partially broken

220,000

(2) Victims

938,761
captured

42,732

slaughtered

122,799

The deceased

236,475

The wounded

228,580

missing

298,175

(3) Refugees

4,000,000

Sources: “The situation of Calamity of War in Korea as at June 1952,” Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Heung
Soo Kim (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003), 309-310.

Table 6.6: Church Destruction after the Communist Invasion (June 20,1 9 5 2 )

Denomination

Methodist
Presbyterian

Area (pyung)

Destroy by fire

Area (pyung)

84

4,800

155

152

8,850

468

Holiness

27

Salvation

4
Total

Broke down

267

26,480

79
455

4
706

Source: Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War, ed. Heung Soo Kim (Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History,
2003), 311.
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APPENDIX 1.7: Tables for CHAPTER 8
Table 8.1: Official List of m em bership denom inations of the National Council of Churches of Christ

Denominations
African Methodist Episcopal Church
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church
American Baptist Convention
Augustan Evangelical Lutheran Church
Church of the Brethren
Colored Methodist Episcopal Church
Congregational-Christian Churches
Czech-Moravian Brethren Church
Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church
Evangelical and Reformed Church
Evangelical United Brethren Church
Friends - Five Year Meeting
Friends of Philadelphia and Vicinity
International Convention of Disciples of Christ
Methodist Church
Moravian
National Baptist Conventions
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
Protestant Episcopal Church
Reformed Church in America
Roumanian Orthodox Church of America
Russian Orthodox Church
Seventh Day Baptist
Syrian Antiochan Orthodox Church
United Lutheran Church
United Presbyterian Church
Total:

Membership
1,166,301
530,116
1,561,073
440,244
186,201
381,000
1,204,789
5,000
19,404
726,361
717,531
68,612
5,509
1,767,964
8,935,647
47,271
4,445,605
678,206
2,318,615
2,540,548
183,178
390
400,000
6,430
40,061
1,954,342
213,810
30,629,225

Source: “Ministry of Disruption: A brief study of the activities of Carl Mclntire and the American Council of Christian Churches,”
Presbyterian Church Archives, RG197, Box 6, Folder 34 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Table 8.2a: US C asual ty Figures of the Korean War

Killed
Wounded
Missing or capture
Total

June 1950 - June 1951
21,300
53,100
4,400
78,800

July 1951 - July 1953
12,300
50,200
700
63,200

Source: Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969,1971), 129.
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Table 8.2b: War-re ated Korean W ar C asualties

South Korea
North Korea
China
USA
Other UNC

KIA
187,712

MIA
WIN
30,000
429,000
1.5 million
152,400
238,000
33,741 (+ 2,827)
103,284
3,063
11,817

Civilian
500,000>
n/a
n/a
n/a

Source: Allan R. Millett, Their War For Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and civilians 1945-1953 (Washington,
D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002), 266.

Table 8.2c: United Nations Forces (Non-ROK, Non-U.S.)

Force
2,282
944
6,146
1,068
1,271
1,119
1,263
ON
00

Australia
Belgium and Luxembourg
Canada
Colombia
Ethiopia
France
Greece
Netherlands
New Zealand
Philippines
South Africa
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
Total

1,389
1,496
826
1,294
5,455
14,198
39,570

Deaths
272
104
309
210
122
271
194
120
22
128
34
136
889
1,078
3,925

Wounded
1,034
350
1,202
610
566
1,008
459
645
79
299
0
469
2,111
2,674
11,506

Source: Data on the amount of force taken from “The Forgotten War: Three Long Years in Korea,” National Geographic Maps fo r
National Geographic Magazine (Washington, D.C., 2003). Data on deaths and wounds taken from the table “Casualties, United
Nations Forces (Non-ROK, Non-U.S.)” Encyclopedia o f the Korean War ed. by Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books,

2002), 100.

Table 8.3: Distribution of POW s

Location
Enclosure 1
Enclosure 2
Enclosure 3
Enclosure 4
Enclosure 5
14th Field Hospital
Labor force
Chinese POWs
Koje-do
Total

Dec. 1950
9,539
34,703
39,518
12,715
31,800
7,237
1,663
616
137,791

Feb. 1951
5,787
38,395
31,880
10,146

53,588
139,196

Mar 1951
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
98,799
d.n.a

May 1951
38,850

Jun 1951
7,00010,000

115,884
154,734

140,000
d.n.a.

Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office o f the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 9 ,1 3 ,1 4 ,
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Table 8.4: Result of Second Screening of Prisoners (April 13,1952)

Togo
To stay
Total screened
Unscreened
Total

%
15
69
84
16

NKs
% CCF
21,102 22
3,075
30,389 32 14,126
51,491 54 17,201
*44,345 46
3,193
20,394
95,836

SKs
3,559
11,057
14,616
1,284
15,900

%
22
69
91
9

CIs
2,628
18,675
21,303
18,015
39,318

%
1
47
54
46

Total
30,364
74,247
104,611
66,837
171,448

*Includes 37,872 Communists who refuse to be screened.
Source: Allan E. Goodman, ed. Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary o f Admiral C. Turner Joy and the Korean Armistice
Conference (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 356.

Table 8.5: Prisoners in CI&E-sponsored Educational Activities (July 4 ,1 9 5 2 )

# o f participants
69,998
11,307
3,525
3,958
42,000
13,674
15,007
2,577
1,994

Activities
Orientation classes
Literacy classes
Juvenile classes
Adult continuation classes
Reading groups
Agriculture classes
Health classes
Vocational classes
Vocational production

Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 117.

Table 8.6: Num ber of POW s Receiving Baptism and adm issions to the catechum enate during
Communion Services

May 6,1951
Number Baptized
New Catechumens
Total Communicants

84
111
500

October 7,1951
202
465
1,712

April 13,1952
614
1,397
2,317

Source: “Chaplain’s Report: Kojedo Prisoner of War Camp, March 1951 - April 1952,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 16, Folder 40 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Table 8.7: Num ber of Protestant North Korean POW s in Kojedo

Baptized
Catechumens
Preparing for the Catechumenate
Total

March 1951
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
d.n.a.
4,261 *

April 1952
2,266
1,571
11,225
15,062

* Data provided by Chaplain Harold Voelkel. Christians already existed in the POW Camps prior to their relocation to Kojedo.
Source: “Chaplain’s Report: Kojedo Prisoner of War Camp, March 1951 - April 1952,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group
140, Box 16, Folder 40 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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Table 8.8: Num ber of C hinese POW s Attending Worship Services in Chejudo (May 1952)

# o f Service
Sunday Worship
Weekday Worship

# o f Attendance
Average # per meeting
34,800
4,350
32,195
1,533

8
21

Source: “Copies of EJW’s reports for April, May, and June 1952,” Presbyterian Church Archives, Record Group 140, Box 18, Folder
7 - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Table 8.9: POW s in UN Custody

ROK soldiers
ROK civilians
NK soldiers
NK civilians
Chinese Soldiers
Total

Non-repatriates
10,216
37,000
25,452
8,010
14,704*
95,382

Repatriates
6,027
Unknown
61,411
9,151
5,650
82,239

* Estimate number given by the UNC negotiators.
** Data taken from Table 8.12.
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners o f War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 37,40-41.

8.10: The Prison O utbreak in Non-Repatria te C am ps
Camp
Population
Escaped
Injured
2
3,033
158
0
4
1,140
869
0
4a
489
16
0
10,614
5
9,906
8
10,998
8,374
2
6
3,836
2,814
7
7
2
9
3,885
3,883
1,477
400
107
10
35,472
Total
26,420
126

Table

Dead
0
1
0
6
2
3
0
30
42

Recaptured
0
0
0
236
505
178
37
75
1,031

Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 69.

Table 8.11: Disposition of the 98,714 POW s and Cl’s on July 3 1 ,1 9 5 3

Camp
1
la
lb
lc
8
Munsan-ni
Yondong-po
Total

Repatriate
POW’s
45,475
11,320
2,421
14
4,328
600
1,799
65,957

C l’s
806
3

Non-Repatriate
Camp
POW’s
2
4,611
3
14,273
6
4,383

C l’s
85
167

8,429

9,238

23,267

252

Source: “The Handling o f Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 85.
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Table 8.12a: Prisoners Returned to Communist Control under Operation BIG SWITCH (Septem ber
1953)

Korean
Male
60,788
Female
473
Children
23
Cl’s
8,899
Total 70,183

Chinese
5,639
1
0
0
5,640

Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office o f the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 89.

Table 8.12b: Prisoners Returned to UNC C ontrol under Operation BIG SWITCH (S eptem ber 1953)

Countries
South Koreans
Americans
British
Turks
Filipinos
Canadians
Columbians
Australians
Frenchmen
South Africans
Greeks
Dutch
Belgium
New Zealand
Japan
Total

Number o f POWs
7,862
3,597
945
229
40
30
22
21
12
8
2
2
1
1
1
12,773

Source: Clayton D. Laurie, “Big Switch/Little Switch, Operation,” Encyclopedia o f the Korean War ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New
York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 76.

Table 8.13a: Disposition of Non-repatriate Prisoners (Communist) in January 1954

Chinese
Returned to Communist Control
Escaped and missing
Died in custody of CFI
Remaining in custody *
Returned to UNC control
Total

441
2
15
19
14,227
14,704

Korean
188
11
23
85
7,593
7,900

Total
629
13
38
104
21,820
22,604

*Of those remaining in the DMZ, 12 Chinese and 74 Koreans desired to go to neutral countries, 7 Chinese and 10 Koreans were being
held for disciplinary action, and 1 Korean was being held as a witness.
Source: “The Handling of Prisoners of War During the Korean War (U),” (Military History Office: Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G3 Headquarters, United States Army, Pacific, June 1960), 97.
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Table 8.13b: Disposition of Non-repatriate Prisoners (UNC) in January 1954

Prisoners
Returned to UNC Control
Escaped
Shipped to India
Returned to Communist control
Total

9
1
2
347
359

Source: Rosemary Foot, A Substitute fo r Victory: The Politics o f Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY and London:
Cornell University Press, 1990), 191.
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APPENDIX 2.1
Map 1: Allocation of Territory among Major Protestant Denominations
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Administration.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

570
APPENDIX 2.2
Map 2: Map of North Korea
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APPENDIX 2.3
Map 3: The Population Density of the Korean Peninsula (1936)

Source: Hermann Lautensach, Korea: A Geography Based on the Author's Travels and
Literature, trans. and ed. Katherine Dege and Eckart Dege (Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
1988; originally published in German, 1945).
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APPENDIX 2.4
Map 4: Map of the Korean Peninsula

s o v ie t

UNIO N

CHINA

Daiti&Hg

Sea o f Japan
K orea Bay

S O l'T H

CH'VNG

fCH'O.XG

• O t'w w f w

T&$$n

<€*%*»*'

JAPAN
K orea
Strait

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

573

APPENDIX 2.5
Map 5: The Evacuation of the American Protestant Missionaries (June-July 1950)
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APPENDIX 2.6
Map 6: Major Korean Cities (June 1950)
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APPENDIX 2.7
Map 7: South Korea Under the Attack of the North Korean Army
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APPENDIX 2.8
Map 8: UN Forces in North Korea

CHINA

NORTH
RAMGYONG

C a’oogjia

ROK!

CCFK
ARMY GROCF

so cm
HiMGfdXG

ROK I

MAR

i}H

ROK I T _T
„
Cfaangjiii-Bp

|CCF 661 C C F x ra
\ttr
ARMY g r o w
NORTH
\
iCCF <0{PT&VG.j.V

/

.**'*• ***^ROK0» /

13

l.S.IX*
U.S. IX^

(S o u » j.)\

Ywigwanf

^HanjHSag

9 OCT (STARTL>Gf

7 MAR

Sk

'■-y*

/

re ilS O K II

*Pskdt'aag .v*- £

^Snck'M
P V oagsfing

X

Sea o f Japan

U.S. X

EIG H T H

[ § | im a E

/rt^>
■

Y aagdok

AVdssaa

:6-31 O C l

H

T&VGAA
KAXGW&S

O nsaaxp
(Nausp’e}

North K o reai forces
concentration area
Q a te s e Comnamist forcer.
U N forces

U N forces position, cvetnig, 24 O ct
U N forces advance, date indfcated

SOUTH
HW .UXGHiE

Ske o f (Battle or)
Engagement date indicated
Qjtnese Conannrast IrReneotion,
25 O ct - 1 N ov

K a esd ag
S P *3B B B q d«

Saim-ife

^

U N forces fine, evetaog, 20 O ct

NORTH
m ’A SC M AE

Paegnyotig-do

-

□
ES3

SOUTH

P ’y d a g r a n g p

"•

v»

C V oadrfiii

'

K im p’o

Yellow Sea

Source: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and
Direction: The First Year (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

577

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ENGLISH M ATERIALS
ARCHIVES AND MUSEUM COLLECTIONS
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri.
John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey.
Korean Christian Museum, Soongsil University, Seoul.
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Department of History, Montreat, North Carolina.
Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Syngman Rhee Collection, Yonsei University, Seoul.
The MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia.
The National Assembly Library of Korea, Seoul.
United Methodist Church Archives, Drew University - GCAH, Madison, New Jersey.
United States National Archives and Record Service, College Park.

REFERENCE W ORKS
Brune, Lester H., ed. The Korean War: Handbook o f the Literature and Research.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.
Calkin, Homer L., comp. Catalog o f Methodist Archival and Manuscript Collections.
(Part II: Asia) N.P.: World Methodist Historical Society, 1982.
Clark, Allen D., comp. Protestant Missionaries in Korea, 1893-1983. Seoul: Christian
Literature Society of Korea, 1987.
Edwards, Paul M. The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary. Lanham, MD: The
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2003.
Gallup, George H. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, Vol.2, 1949-1958. New
York: Random House, 1972.
Hoare, James E., and Susan Pares. Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barabara,
CA: ABC-Clio, 1999.
Matray, James I., ed. Historical Dictionary o f the Korean War. New York: Greenwood
Press, 1991.
Nahm, Andrew C. Historical Dictionary o f the Republic o f Korea. Metuchen, NJ: The
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1993.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

578

Pratt, Keith, and Richard Rutt. Korea: A Historical and Cultural Dictionary. United
Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1999.
Tucker, Spencer C., ed. Encyclopedia o f the Korean War: A Political, Social, and
Military History. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.

PRIVATELY PRINTED, UNPUBLISHED, AND NON-PRINT MATERIALS, AND
PRIVATE COLLECTIONS
Clark, Allen D. History o f the Korean Church. Unpublished manuscript. Presbyterian
Church Archive - Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia.
Kim, Songbo, “The Decision and Development Process of North Korean Land Reform”
(unpublished manuscript).
Robinson, Richard D. “Korea - Betrayal of a Nation” Unpublished manuscript (1947).
Underwood, Richard F. “Memories and Thought.” Unpublished personal memoir, 2002.
Yun, Chi-ho. Yun Chi-ho’s letters. Yonsei University Press, Seoul.
Yun, Chi-ho. Yun Chi-ho’s Diary (Vol.9 & 10). National Assembly Library of Korea,
Seoul.

INTERVIEWS AND CORRESPONDENCE
Clifford, Clark M. Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford by Jerry N. Hess, 3
April 1971 in Washington, D.C., 97-98, Truman Library.
[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/koreasub.htm]. February 2007.
Chung, Hwak-sil. Interview by the author, 29 June 2004, Seoul, Korea.
Davidson, C. Girard Oral History Interview with C. Girard Davidson by Jerry N. Hess,
17 July 1972 in Washington, D.C.: 65-66, Truman Library.
[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/koreasub.htm]. February 2007.
Elson, Edward. Interview by Paul Hooper, 8 February 1968 and 1 March 1968,
Washington, D.C. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene,
Kansas.
Jeong, Chun-Seop. Interview by the author, 18 May 2004, College Park, Maryland.
Judd, Walter. Oral History Interview with Walter Judd #1, by Paul Hopper on 29 August

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

579

1968, Columbia University Oral History Project. Oral History Research Office,
Bulter Library, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.

AUDIO M ATERIALS
Graham, Billy. “Graham’s Historic Meeting On the Steps of the Capitol.” Minneapolis,
MN: Billy Graham Evangelical Association, Inc., 1952.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND DOCUMENTARY COLLECTIONS
Published in the US:
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars:
Cold War International History Project Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993).
Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995).
Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996).
Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997).
Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10 (March 1998).
Cold War International History Project Bulletin 14-15 (Winter 2003-Spring 2004).
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1953. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.
Truman, Harry S. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman,
1945. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.
______________ . Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman,
1946. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.
_________. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman,
1947. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.
_________. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman,
1948. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
_________. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman,
1949. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
_________. Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Harry S. Truman,
1950. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
U.S. Department of State. Treaties and Conventions Concluded Between the USA and
Other Powers. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1889.
. Foreign Relations o f the United States 1948, Vol. VI Korea.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

580

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974.
_______________. Foreign Relations o f the United States 1950, Vol. VII Korea.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.
_______________. North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Takeover.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.
_______________. United States Policy in the Korean Crisis. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

Published in South Korea:
Personal Reports o f the Southern Missionaries in Korea Vol. 8, 10, 15, 19. Seoul: The
Archive for Korean Church History.
(Ja, Ryo Chong), ed. Annual Report of the Board of Foreign Missions of the
Methodist Episcopal Church: Korea Mission 1884-1943 (Seoul: The Institute for
Korean Church History. 2001).
_____________________, ed. The Korean Situation 1,2 (Seoul: The Institute for Korean
Church History, 2003).
'Q -f-^r (Kim, Heung Soo), ed. Documents o f the WCC Library: The Korean War.
Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 2003.
£7/ e Z;§^7/ -ffM.
fj
Migunjeonggi jeongbo
jaryojip siminsoyo (Documents Collections of the Period of the US Military
Government in Korea) CIC ( ty f) r fi) M J ! Ai 1 9 4 5 .9 - 1 9 4 9 .1 (Vol.l,2,&3).
Korea: Hallym University, Institute of Asian Culture Studies, 1995.
v]
7] ffM. xjjUL f j
Migunjeonggi jeongbo
jaryojip siminsoyo (Documents Collections of the Period of the US Military
Government in Korea) -§; f//J= (F. E. G illette) MJZAj.
1 9 4 6 - 1 9 4 8 (Vol. 1 & 2). Korea: Hallym University, Institute of Asian Culture
Studies, 1996.
> v] 55 f f 7 ) JjH.
Migunjeonggi jeongbo
jaryojip siminsoyo (Documents Collections of the Period of the US Military
Government in Korea) $f-xj (John R. H o d g e ) ( r Aj Jj 1 9 4 5 .6 -1 9 4 8 .8 (Vol.
1, 2 & 3). Korea: Hallym University, Institute of Asian Culture Studies, 1995.
Taehanmingoksa jaryojip 29
YiSungMan gwangyeseohan jaryojip (Documents of the History of the Republic
of Korea Vol. 29: Syngman Rhee Collection) (1949-1950). Seoul:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

581

I t Hr Guksapyeonchan wiwonhoe (The Committee of National History
Compilation).
I
Taehanmingoksa jaryojip 30
YiSungMan gwangyeseohan jaryojip (Documents of the History of the Republic
of Korea Vol. 30: Syngman Rhee Collection) (1951-1952). Seoul: [lS3£fIJSSI
M # Guksapyeonchan wiwonhoe (The Committee of National History
Compilation).
I
Taehanmingoksa jaryojip 31
YiSungMan gwangyeseohan jaryojip (Documents of the History of the Republic
of Korea Vol. 31: Syngman Rhee Collection) (1953-1954). Seoul:
I t Ilf Guksapyeonchan wiwonhoe (The Committee of National History
Compilation).
Public Relations Association of Korea. The Truth Behind the Korean War: Vol.l A
Review o f Worldwide News Reports and Editorials. Seoul: The Public Relations
Association of Korea, 1973.
Syngman Rhee Through Western Eyes. Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1954.
Korea Flaming High: Excerpts from Statements by President Syngman Rhee in 1954-55.
Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1956.

BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS
Allen, Horace N. Things Korea: A Collection o f Sketches and Anecdotes, Missionary and
Diplomatic. New York: Fleming and H. Revell, 1890.
Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969.
Acheson, Dean. The Korean War. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971.
Anstey, Brigadier Sir John, Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Min-Yeh
Rawnsley, eds. The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence,
Propaganda and Special Operations. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.
Armstrong, Charles K. The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2003.
Awe, Chulho. Decision A t Dawn: The Underground Christian Witness in Red Korea.
New York: Harper & Row, Publisher, 1965.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5 82

Bainton, Roland H. Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace. Nashville, TN:
Abingdon Press, 1960.
Barnett, A. Doak. Communist China and Asia. New York: Harper, 1961.
Barson, Michael and Steve Heller. Red Scared! The Coming Menace in Propaganda
and Popular Culture. San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books, 2001.
Bateman, Robert L. No Gun Ri: A Military History o f the Korean War Incident.
Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002.
Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn o f
the Atomic Age. New York: Pantheon, 1985.
Brands, H. W. The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Breuer, William B. Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1996.
Brown, George Thompson. Mission to Korea. USA: Board of World Missions,
Presbyterian Church U.S., 1962.
Bundy, Edgar C. Collectivism in the Churches: A Documented Account o f the Political
Activities o f the Federal, National, and World Councils o f Churches. Wheaton,
IL: The Church League of America, 1960.
Burchett, Wilfred and Alan Winnington. Koje Unscreened. Peking: Wifred Burchett,
1953.
Butterfield, Herbert. Christianity, Diplomacy and War. New York: AbingdonCokesbury Press, 1953.
Buzo, Adrian. The Making o f Modern Korea. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.
Caldwell, John Cope. The Korea Story: in Collaboration with Lesley Frost. Chicago, EL:
Henry Regnery Company, 1952.
Campbell, Archibald. The Christ o f the Korean Heart. Columbus, OH: Falco
Publishers, 1954.
Caridi, Ronald J. The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a
Case Study. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968.
Chapin, Captain John C. Fire Brigade: U.S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter.
Washington, D.C.: Marine Corps Historical Center, 2000.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

583

Chay, Jongsuk. Unequal Partners In Peace and War: The Republic o f Korea and the
United States, 1948-1953. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
Chen, Jian. China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making o f the Sino-American
Confrontation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
Cheong, Sung-hwa. The Political o f Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea. New York:
Greenwood Press, 1991.
Chinnery, Philip D. Korean Atrocity! Forgotten War Crimes 1950-1953. Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
Chu, Kwang-jo. More Than Conquerors. Seoul: Daesung.com, 2006.
Chung, David. Syncretism: The Religious Context o f Christian Beginnings in Korea.
New York: State University of New York Press, 2001.
Chung, Henry, ed. 6 Insides From the Korean War. Seoul: Dae-Dong Moon Hwa Sa,
1958.
Chung, Henry. Korea and the United States Through War and Peace: 1943-1960. Seoul:
Yonsei University Press, 2000.
___________ . The Russians Came to Korea. Seoul: The Korean Pacific Press, 1947.
Clark, Allen D. A History o f the Church in Korea. Seoul: The Christian Literature
Society of Korea, 1971.
Clark, Donald N. Christianity in Modem Korea. Lanham, MD: The University Press of
America, 1986.
. Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950.
Norwalk, CT: East Bridge, 2003.
Clark, Eugene Franklin. The Secrets o f Inch’on: The Untold Story o f the Most Daring
Covert Mission o f the Korean War. New York: Berkley Book, 2002.
Cohen, Warren I. East Asia A t the Center: Four Thousand Years o f Engagement with the
World. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
_____________ , ed. New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays
Presented to Dorothy Borg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
_____________ , ed. Pacific Passage: The Study o f American-East Asian Relations on
the Eve o f the Twenty-First Century. New York: Columbia University Press,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

584

1996.

Cornell, Patricia Daniels. A Time For Remembering: The Story o f Ruth Bell Graham.
San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983.
Cotton, Janies and Ian Neary, eds. The Korean War in History. Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989.
Cromartie, Michael. Religion, Culture, and International Conflict: A Conversation.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005.
Cumings, Bruce, ed. Child o f Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship 1943-1953.
Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1983.
_____________ . Parallax Visions: Making Sense o f American-East Asian Relations at
the End o f the Century. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999.
_____________ . The Origins o f the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence o f
Separate Regimes 1945-1947. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
_____________ . The Origins o f the Korean War Volume II: The Roaring o f the Cataract
1947-1950. Seoul: Yuksabipyungsa, 2002.
Deane, Hugh. The Korean War: 1945-1953. San Francisco, CA: China Books &
Periodicals, Inc., 1999.
De Santis, Hugh. The Diplomacy o f Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet
Union, the Cold War, 1933-1947. Chicago, IL and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1983.
Dudden, Alexis. Japan’s Colonization o f Korea. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii
Press, 2005.
Duke, David Nelson. In the Trenches with Jesus and Marx: Harry F. Ward and the
Struggle fo r Social Justice. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2003.
Dunar, Andrew J. The Truman Scandals and the Politics o f Morality. Columbia, MO:
University of Missouri Press, 1984.
Dunn, Charles W., ed. Religion in American Politics. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, 1989.
Ebersole, Luke Eugene. Church Lobbying in the Nation’s Capital. New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1951.
Ebrey, Patricia Buckley, Anne Walthall, and James B. Palais. East Asia: A Cultural,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

585

Social, and Political History. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006.
Eckert, Carter J., et al. Korea Old and New: A History. Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990.
Edwards, Paul M. The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1998.
______________ . To Acknowledge A War: The Korean War in American Memory.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000.
Ellwood, Robert S. Fifties Spiritual Marketplace. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1997.
Ferrell, Robert H. ed. O ff the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. Truman. New
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980).
Field, James A., Jr. History o f United States Naval Operations: Korea. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.
Foot, Rosemary. A Substitute fo r Victory: The Politics o f Peacemaking At the Korean
Armistice Talks. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Fousek, John. To Lead the Free World. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2000.
Fox, Richard Wightman. Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography. New York: Pantheon Books,
1985.
Frady, Marshall. Billy Graham: A Parable o f American Righteousness. Boston, MA:
Little Brown and Company, 1979.
Friedman, Edward and Mark Selden, eds. America’s Asia: Dissenting Essays on AsianAmerican Relations. New York: Pantheon, 1971.
Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997.
Gale, James Scarth. History o f the Korean People. Seoul: Taewon Publishing Company,
1972.
Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. New York: Praeger, 1965.
George, Alexander L. The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its
Aftermath. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.
Gilbert, Bill. Ship o f Miracles: 14,000 Lives and One Miraculous Voyage. Chicago IL:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

586
Triumph Books, 2001.

Gilbert, Dan. Is President Truman “America’s Man o f Destiny”? Bible Prophecy
Answers the Question. Washington, D.C.: Christian Press Bureau, 1945.
Goff, Philip and Paul Harvey, eds. Themes in Religion and American Culture. Chapel
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
Goldstein, Donald M. and Harry J. Maihafer. The Korean War: The Story and
Photographs. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000.
Goldstein, Norm, ed. The Associated Press Stylebook and Briefing on Media Law. New
York: The Associated Press, 2004.
Goodman, Allan E., ed. Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary o f Admiral C. Turner
Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,
1978.
Goodrich, Leland M. Korea: A Study o f U.S. Policy in the United Nations. New York:
Council of Foreign Relations, 1956.
Goulden, Joseph C. Korea: The Untold Story o f the War. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1982.
Graham, Billy. Just as I am: The Autobiography o f Billy Graham. New York: Harper
Collins Publisher, 1997.
___________ . Peace In Our Time. Minneapolis, MN: The Billy Graham Evangelistic
Association, 1952.
___________ . Revival o f Our Time: The Story o f Billy Graham Evangelistic Campaigns.
Wheaton, IL: Van Kampen Press, 1950.
Graham, Franklin. Bob Pierce: This One Thing I Do. USA: Samaritan’s Purse, 1983.
Granfield, Linda, ed. I Remember Korea: Veterans Tell Their Stories o f the Korean War,
1950-53. New York: Clarion Books, 2003.
Grayson, James Huntley. Early Buddhism and Christianity in Korea: A Study in the
Emplantation o f Religion. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985.
____________________ . Korea: A Religious History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
Haas, Michaels E. In the Devil’s Shadow: U.S. Special Operations During the Korean
War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

587

Han, Chaedok, Kim Ilsong changgun kaeson ’gi (Record of the Triumphant Return of
General Kim II Sung), 10. Quoted in Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean
Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 223.
Hanley, Charles J., Sang-hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza. The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A
Hidden Nightmare From the Korean War. New York: Henry Holt and Company,
2001 .
Harrington, Fred Harvey. God, Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and
Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905. Madison, WI: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1944.
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender o f Japan.
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.
Hermes, Walter G. United States Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting
Front. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.
Herzstein, Robert Edwin. Henry R. Luce, Time, and the American Crusade in Asia. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Hickey, Michael. The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism. Woodstock, NY:
The Overlook Press, 1999.
Higgins, Marguerite. War in Korea: The Report o f a Woman Combat Correspondent.
Garden City, NJ: Doubled & Company, Inc., 1951.
Hinton, Harold. Communist China in World Politics. New York: Houghton Mifflin,
1966.
Hixson, Walter L. Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War 19451961. New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997.
Hulbert, Homer B. The Passing o f Korea. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1969.
Hunt, Michael. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1987.
Huntley, Martha. Caring, Growing, Changing. New York: Friendship Press, 1984.
Immerman, Richard H. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S.
Foreign Policy. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999.
Isaacson, Walter and Evan Thomas. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They
Made. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

588

Jo, Yung-Hwan, ed. Korea’s Response to the West. Kalamazoo, MI: The Korea
Research and Publication, Inc., 1971.
Joe, Wanne J. A Cultural History o f Modern Korea: A History o f Korean Civilization.
Elizabeth, NJ & Seoul: Hollym, 2000.
Johnston, Douglas, ed. Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003.
Joy, Admiral C. Turner. How Communists Negotiate. New York: Macmillan Company,
1955.
Jung, Walter. Nation Building: The Geopolitical History o f Korea. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, Inc., 1998.
Kahn, E. J., Jr. The Peculiar War: Impressions o f a Reporter in Korea. New York:
Randon House, 1951.
Kang, Hildi. Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea, 1910-1945.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Kang, Man-Gil. A History o f Contemporary Korea. United Kingdom: Global Oriental,
2005.
Kang, Wi Jo. Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History o f Christianity and Politics.
New York: State University of New York Press, 1997.
Kaplan, Lawrence S. The United States and NATO: The Formative Years. Lexington,
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984.
Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986.
Kendall, Carlton Waldo. The Truth About Korea. San Francisco, CA: The Korean
National Association, 1919.
Keys, Donald. God and the H- Bomb. New York: Macfadden Book, 1961.
Kim, Choong Soon. A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur: A Life History o f Kim Songsu,
1891-1955. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998.
Kim, Chull Baum and James I. Matray, eds. Korea & the Cold War: Division,
Destruction, and Disarmament. Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1993.
Kim, Elizabeth. Ten Thousand Sorrows: The Extraordinary Journey o f a Korean War
Orphan. New York: Doubleday, 2000.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

589

Kim, Helen. Grace Sufficient. Nashville, TN: The Upper Room, 1962.
Kim, Hyung-chan & Wayne Patterson. The Koreans in America 1882-1974: A
Chronology & Fact Book. New York: Oceania Publications, Inc., 1974.
Kim, In Soo. Protestants and the Formation o f Modem Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920.
New York: Peter Lang, 1996.
Kim, Joungwon. Divided Korea: The Politics o f Development, 1945-1972. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.
Kim, Ku. Paekpom Ilchi: The Autobiography o f Kim Ku. Translated, annotated and
introduced by Jongsoo Lee. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000.
Kim, Penny Young Sook and Charles Milles. Though Bombs May Fall: The
Extraordinary Story o f George Rue, Missionary Doctor to Korea. Nampa, ID:
Pacific Press Publishing Association, 2003.
Kim, Se-jin, ed. Documents on Korean-American Relations 1943-1976. Seoul: Research
Center for Peace and Unification, 1976.
Kim, Stephen Jin-Woo. Master o f Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the SeoulWashington Alliance 1953-1960. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001.
Kirby, Dianne, ed. Religion and the Cold War. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Kirkendall, Richard S., ed. Harry’s Farewell: Interpreting and Teaching the Truman
Presidency. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004.
Klein, Christina. Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 19451961. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003.
Knox, Donald. The Korean War An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin. San Diego, CA:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publisher, 1985.
Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel. The Limits o f Power: The World and United States Foreign
Policy, 1945-1954. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Koo, Youngnok and Dae-Sook Suh, eds. Korea and the United States. Honolulu, HI:
University of Hawaii Press, 1984.
Kuznick, Peter J. and James Gilbert, eds. Rethinking Cold War Culture. Washington,
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001.
Ku, Dae-yeol. Korea Under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

590

Japanese Relations. Seoul: Seoul Computer Press, 1985.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan, ed. U.S.-Korean Relations 1882-1982. Seoul: The Institute for Far
Eastern Studies, Kyungham University, 1982.
Kwak, Tae-Hwan and Seong Hyong Lee, eds. Forty Years o f Korea-U.S. Relations,
1948-1988. Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press, 1990.
LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002. New York: McGrawHill, 2004.
Lankov, Andrei. From Stalin to Kim II Sung: The Formation o f North Korea 1945-1960.
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002.
Lech, Raymond B. Broken Soldiers. Chicago, IL: Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois, 2000.
Leckie, Robert. Conflict: The History o f the Korean War, 1950-1953. New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1962.
Lee, Chi Op. Call Me “Speedy Lee”: Memoirs o f a Korean War Soldier. As told to
Stephen Main Tharp. Seoul: War Min Publishing House, 2001.
Lee, Chong-sik. The Politics o f Korean Nationalism. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1963.
Lee, Kenneth B. Korea and East Asia: The Story o f a Phoenix. Westport, CT: Praeger,
1997.
Lee, Sang Taek. Religion and Social Formation in Korea: Minjing and Millenarianism.
Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1996.
Lee, Yur-Bok. Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Korea, 1866-1887.
New York: Humanities Press, 1970.
Leeke, Ada E. When Americans Came to Korea. Freeman, SD: Pine Hill Press, Inc.,
1991.
Levantrosser, William F., ed. Harry S. Truman: The Man From Independence. New
York: Greenwood Press, 1986.
Lockard, David. The Unheard Billy Graham. Waco, TX: Word Books Publisher, 1971.
Lyons, Gene M. Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953.
Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1961.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

591

MacDonald, Donald Stone. The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.
Malcom, Ben S. White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea. Washington, D.C.:
Brassey’s, 1996.
Marsden, George M. Religion and American Culture. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Publishers, 1990.
Martin, Bradley K. Under the Loving Care o f the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the
Kim Dynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004.
May, Lary, ed. Recasting America: Cultural and Politics in the Age o f Cold War.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1989.
McNamara, Patrick H. A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics o f
American Anticommunism. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005.
Merrill, John. Korea: The Peninsular Origins o f the War. Newark, DE: University of
Delaware Press, 1989.
Meyers, Samuel M. and Albert D. Biderman, eds. Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity:
The Communist Soldier in the Korean War. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press, 1968.
Millett, Allan R. Their War fo r Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and
Civilians 1945-1953. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002.
_____________ . The War fo r Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2005.
Moore, Arthur J. The Church Cradled in Conflict: A Report o f an Episcopal Visit to
Korea in 1946. New York: The Methodist Church, 1946.
Mueller, John E. War, Presidents and Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1973.
Muller, John H. Wearing the Cross in Korea. Redlands, CA: John M. Muller, 1954.
Nahm, Andrew C., ed. Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule: Studies o f the Policy and
Techniques o f Japanese Colonialism. Kalamazoo, MI: Western Michigan
University, 1973.
Natsios, Andrew S. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen o f the Apocalypse.
Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

592

Neils, Patricia, ed. United States Attitudes and Policies toward China: The Impact o f
American Missionaries. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990.
Nelson, Frederick. Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia. Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1946.
Neusner, Jacob, ed. God’s Rule: The Politics o f World Religions. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2003.
No, Kum-sok. A MiG-15 to Freedom: Memoir o f the Wartime North Korean Defector
Who First Delivered the Secret Fighter Jet to the Americans in 1953. Jefferson,
NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1996.
Noble, Harold Joyce. Embassy at War. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press,
1975.
Ockenga, Harold J., ed. America’s Hour o f Decision: Featuring a Life Story o f Billy
Graham. Wheaton, IL: Van Kampen Press, 1951.
Oh, Bonnie B. C. Korea Under the American Military Government 1945-1948.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publisher, 2002.
Oh, Se Eung. Dr. Philip Jaisohn’s Reform Movement 1896-1898: A Critical Appraisal o f
the Independence Club. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1995.
Oliver, Robert T. A History o f the Korean People in Modern Times: 1800 to the Present.
Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1993.
_____________ . Korea: Forgotten Nation. Washington, D.C.: Monumental Printing
Company, 1944.
_____________ . Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth. New York: Dodd Mead
and Company, 1954
_____________ . Syngman Rhee And American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960. Seoul:
Panmun Book Company, 1978.
_____________ . Why War Came in Korea. New York: Fordham University Press, 1950.
Osmer, Harold H. U.S. Religious Journalism and the Korean War (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, Inc., 1980.
Paik, Sun-yup. From Pusan to Panmunjom: Wartime Memoirs o f the Republic o f
Korea’s First Four-Star General. Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1992.
Park, Chung-shin. Protestantism and Politics in Korea. Seattle, WA: University of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

593

Washington Press, 2003.
Park, Jae Kyu, and Jung Gun Kim, eds. The Politics o f North Korea. Seoul: ^
'Sj-Ul
Gyeongnamtehakkyo geukdongmunjeyeonguso (Institute for
Far Eastern Studies), 1979.
Park, Therese. When a Rooster Crows at Night: A Child’s Experience o f the Korean War.
New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2004.
Parlos, Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds. Religion in International Relations: The
Return from Exile. New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003.
Paterson, Thomas G., J. Gary Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan. American Foreign Policy:
A History. 3rd ed. Lexington, MA: D.C. Health and Company, 1991.
Pease, Stephen E. Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953. Harrisburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 1992.
Peters, Richard and Xiaobing Li. Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories o f
American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers. Lexington, KY: The University Press
of Kentucky, 2004.
Pierard, Richard V. The Unequal Yoke: Evangelical Christianity and Political
Conservatism. Philadelphia, PA and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1970.
Pierce, Bob. The Korean Orphan Choir: They Sing Their Thanks. Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1965.
. The Untold Korean Story. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,
1951
Pierpaoli, Paul G., Jr. Truman and Korea: The Political Culture o f the Early Cold War.
Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999.
Poen, Monte M., ed. Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman
Never Mailed. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999.
Pollock, John. Billy Graham: An Authorized Biography. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1966.
___________ . Billy Graham: Evangelist to the World. New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1979.
Reichley, A. James. Faith in Politics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2002.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

594

Rhee, Syngman. The Spirit o f Independence: A Primer o f Korean Modernization and
Reform. Translated by Han-kyo Kim. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press,
2001.
Rhodes, Harry A. History o f the Korean Mission Presbyterian Church, 1884-1934.
Seoul: Chosen Mission Presbyterian Church U.S.A., 1934.
Rhodes, Harry A. and Archibald Campbell, eds. History o f the Korean Mission
Presbyterian Church in the USA. Vol. 2 1935-1959. New York: The United
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. 1964.
Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge; How All-Out Asian
War Was Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today’s War Objectives
Must Be Limited. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967.
Riley, John W., Jr. and Wilbur Schramm. The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation o f Seoul with Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, NY: Rutgers
University Press, 1951.
Robin, Ron. The Making o f the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the MilitaryIntellectual Complex. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Ross, Robert S. East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order. Armonk, NY:
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995.
Sawyer, Major Robert. Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War. Ed.
Walter G. Hermes. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.
Schnabel, James F. United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The
First Year. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
Schrecker, Ellen, ed. Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse o f History after the Fall o f
Communism. New York & London: The New Press, 2004.
Scott, Alison M. and Christopher D. Geist, eds. The Writing on the Cloud: America
Culture Confronts the Atomic Bomb. Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
Inc., 1997.
Shaw, William E. Korea A t the Crossroads. New York: The Methodist Church Editorial
Department, 1950.
Sheldon, Walt. Hell or High Water: MacArthur’s Landing at Inch’on. New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1968.
Sheley, Donald B. Beggar At the Banquet. San Bruno, CA: Donald B. Sheley, 1979.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

595

Sherwin, Martin J. A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins o f the Arms Race.
New York: Vintage Books, 1987.
Shin, Gi-Wook and Michael Robinson, eds. Colonial Modernity in Korea. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Shin, Gi-Wook. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.
Shin, H. K. Remembering Korea 1950: A Boy Soldier’s Story. Reno, NV: University of
Nevada Press, 2001.
Shin, Yong-ha. Modern Korean History and Nationalism. Seoul: Jimoondang
Publishing Company, 2000.
Shinn, Bill. The Forgotten War Remembered Korea: 1950-1953: A War
Correspondent’s Notebook And Today’s Danger in Korea. Elizabeth, NJ: Hollyn
International Corp, 1996.
Simmons, Robert R. The Strained Alliance: Peking, P ’ydngyang, Moscow, and the
Politics o f the Korean Civil War. New York: The Free Press, 1975.
Smith, D. Frank Herron. The Other Side o f the Korean Question. Seoul: Seoul Press,
1920.
Soman, Appu K. Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The
United States and China, 1950-1958. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.
Song, Hyo-soon. The Fight For Freedom. Seoul: Korean Library Association, 1980.
Spanier, John W. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1959.
Spurr, Russell. Enter The Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea,
1950-51. New York: Newmarket Press, 1988.
Stanton, Shelby L. Ten Corps in Korea, 1950. Novato: Presidio Press, 1989,1996.
Steinberg, David I., ed. Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics.
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.
Stevenson, Adlai E. Korea in Perspective. Stamford, CT: The Overbook Press, 1952.
Stueck, William W., Jr., ed. The Korean War in World History. Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

596

__________________ . Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic
History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
___________________. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995.
Suh, Dae-sook. Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988.
Swift, Donald C. Religion and the American Experience. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1998.
Thornton, Richard C. Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins o f the
Korean War. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000.
Toulouse, Mark G. The Transformation o f John F. Dulles: From Prophet o f Realism to
Priest o f Nationalism. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year o f Decisions. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday & Company, 1955.
_____________ . Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Vol.2 Years o f Trial and Hope. Garden
City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956.
_____________ . Mr. Citizen. New York: Popular Library, 1960.
Tucker, Nancy B. Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition
Controversy, 1949-1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
Tucker, Spencer C., ed. Encyclopedia o f The Korean War: A Political, Social, and
Military History. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.
Ulam, Adam B. The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II. New York: The
Viking Press, 1971.
Underwood, Lillias H. Underwood o f Korea. Seoul: Yonsei University, 1983.
Underwood, Horace G. Korea in War, Revolution and Peace: The Recollections o f
Horace G. Underwood. Ed. Michael J. Devine. Seoul: Yonsei University Press,
2001 .
Underwood, Peter A, ed. First Encounters: Korea 1880-1910. Seoul: Dragan’s Eye
Graphics, 1982.
Van Ree, Erik. Socialism in One Zone: Stalin’s Policy in Korea, 1945-1947. Oxford:
Berg Publishers Limited, 1989.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

597

Yenzke, Rodger R. Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace: The United States Army
Chaplaincy 1945-1975, Vol.5. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1977.
Voelkel, Harold. Behind Barbed Wire in Korea. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1953.
_____________ . Open Door to Korea. Grand Rapids, MI: Grand Rapids, Zondervan
Publishing House, 1958.
Weintraub, Stanley. MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing o f An American Hero.
New York: The Free Press, 2000.
Weintraub, Stanley. The War in the Wards: Korea’s Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-ofWar Hospital Camp. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964.
Wells, Kenneth M. New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction
Nationalism in Korea 1896-1937. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press,
1990.
Whan, Major Vorin E., Jr. A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches o f General o f
the Army Douglas MacArthur. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965.
White, William Lindsay. The Captives o f Korea: An Unofficial White Paper o f the
Treatment o f War Prisoners. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957.
Whitfield, Stephen J. The Culture o f the Cold War. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996.
Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War. New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1960.
Williams, Phil, Donald M. Goldstein and Henry L. Andrews, Jr., eds. Security in Korea:
War, Stalemate and Negotiation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
Winkler, Allan. Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993.
Yim, Louise. My Forty Year Fight fo r Korea. Seoul: Chungang University Press, 1951.
Yu, Chai-Shin, ed. Korea and Christianity. Seoul: Korean Scholar Press, 1996.
Zellers, Larry. In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea. Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1991.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

598

Zhu, Pingchao. Americans and Chinese at the Korean War Cease-Fire Negotiations
1950-1953. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001.

ARTICLES
Abelmann, Nancy. “Women’s Class Mobility and Identities in South Korea: A Gendered,
Transnational, Narrative Approach.” The Journal o f Asian Studies 56 (May 1997):
398-420.
Aid, Matthew M. “US Humint and Comint in the Korean War: From the Approach of the
War to the Chinese Intervention.” Intelligence and National Security 14, no.4
(1999): 17-63.
Allen, Thomas. “No Winners, Many Losers: The End of the Korean War.” Security in
Korea: War, Stalemate and Negotiation. Edited by Phil Williams, Donald M.
Goldstein, and Henry L. Andrews, Jr. Boulder: Westviews Press, 1994.
Anders, Roger M. “The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and the Issue
of Civilian Control.” Military Affairs 52 (January 1988): 1-6.
Bajanov, Evgueni. “Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51.” Cold War
International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 54.
Battistini, Lawrence H. “The Korean Problem in the Nineteenth Century.” Monumenta
Nipponica 8 (1952): 47-66.
Beaver, R. Pierce. “Chondogyo and Korea.” Journal o f Bible and Religion 30 (April
1962): 115-122.
Beaver, R. Pierce. “Nationalism and Missions.” Church History 26 (March 1957): 22-42.
Benben, John S. “Education of Prisoners of War on Koje Island, Korea.” The
Educational Record 36 (April 1955): 157-173.
Beisner, Robert T. “SHAFR Presidential Address: The Secretary, the Spy, and the Sage
Dean Acheson, Alger Hiss, and George Kennan.” Diplomatic History 27 (January
2003): 1-14.
Bernstein, Barton J. “New Light on the Korean War.” The International History Review
3 (April 1981): 256-277.
Blechman, Barry M. and Robert Powell. “What in the Name of God Is Strategic
Superiority?” Political Science Quarterly 97 (Winter 1982-83): 589-602.
Boose, Donald W., Jr. “Fighting While Talking: The Korean War Truce Talks.” OAH

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

599

Magazine o f History 14 (Spring 2000): 25-29.
Brackenridge, R. Douglas. “The Presbyterian Historical Society: One Hundred Forty
Years.” Journal o f Presbyterian History 70 (Spring 1992): 3-9.
Bradbury, John. “Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea.” The China Quarterly 6
(April-June, 1961): 15-28.
Brodie, Bernard. “The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker.” Foreign Affairs 27 (October
1948): 17-33.
Brooks, Jerrold Lee. “In Search of Peace: Presbyterians in the Early Cold War Period,
1945-1953.” Journal o f Presbyterian History 70 (Winter 1992): 259-271.
Brown, JoAnne. “ ‘A Is for Atom, B is for Bomb’: Civil Defense in American Public
Education, 1948-1963.” Journal o f American History 15 (June 1988): 68-90.
Brown, G. Thompson. “Overseas Mission Program and Policies of the Presbyterian
Church in the U.S., 1891-1983.” Journal o f Presbyterian History 65 (Summer
1987): 157-170.
Brudnoy, David. “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” Monumenta Nipponica 25, nol/2
(1970): 155-195.
Brune, Lester H. “Guns and Butter: The Pre-Korean War Dispute Over Budget
Allocations: Nourse’s Conservative Keynesianism Loses Favor Against
Keyserling’s Economic Expansion Plan.” American Journal o f Economic and
Sociology 48 (July 1989): 357-371.
Buchanan, Tom. “The Courage of Galileo: Joseph Needham and the ‘Germ Warfare’
Allegations in the Korean War.” The Historical Association (2001): 503-522.
Bulman, Raymond F. ‘“Myth of Origin’, Civil Religion and Presidential Politics.”
Journal o f Church and State 33 (Summer 1991): 525-539.
Bunce, Arthur C. “The Future of Korea: Part I.” Far Eastern Survey 13 (19 April 1944):
67-70.
Bunce, Arthur C. “The Future of Korea: Part II.” Far Eastern Survey 13 (19 May 1944):
85-88.
Butler, Sir Paul. “A Korean Survey.” International Affairs (Royal Institute o f
International Affairs) 22 (July 1946): 361-375.
Buzzanco, Robert. “Commentary: Where’s the Beef? Culture without Power in the
Study of U.S. Foreign Relations.” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 623-632.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6 00

Bynum, William B., ed. “Journey to the Land of the Morning Calm: The Early PCUS
Mission to Korea: A Pictorial Essay.” Journal o f Presbyterian History 73
(Summer 1995): 71-82.
Campbell, James W. “What the Russians Have Learned in Korea.” The Yale Review 42
(December 1952): 226-235.
Canipe, Lee. “Under God and Anti-Communist: How the Pledge of Allegiance Got
Religion in Cold War America.” Journal o f Church and State 45 (March 2003):
305-323.
Campana, G. Andrea. “The Korean War (1950-1953); Conflicting Cross-Atlantic
Historical Perspectives?” The Journal o f Asiatic Studies 37 (July 1994): 107-137.
Carruthers, Susan L. “Redeeming the captives.” Film History 10, no.3 (1998): 275-294.
Carruthers, Susan L. “‘The Manchurian Candidate’ (1962) and the Cold War
Brainwashing Scare.” Historical Journal o f Film, Radio, and Television 18,
(March 1998): 75-94.
Casey, Steven. “White House Publicity Operations During the Korean War, June 1950 June 1951.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (December 2005): 691-717.
Chafee, Wilbur. “Two Hypotheses of Sino-Soviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation
of the Korean War.” Journal o f Korean Affairs 4 (October 1976-January 1977): 113.
Chamberlain, William. “The Chaplain of Company C.” In Courage in Korea, selected by
Albert B. Tibbets. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1959.
Chamberlain, William. “The Enemy Beach.” In Courage in Korea, selected by Albert B.
Tibbets. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1959.
Chang, Yun-shik. “The Progressive Christian Church and Democracy in South Korea.”
Journal o f Church and State 40 (Spring 1998):437-465.
Chin, Carol C. “Beneficent Imperialists: American Women Missionaries in China at the
Turn of the Twentieth Century.” Diplomatic History 27 (June 2003): 327-352.
Cho, Songgu. “New Perspectives on the Modem History of Korea.” Asian Research
Trends, no. 9 (1999): 64-80.
Cho, Soon Sung. “The Politics of North Korea’s Unification Policies 1950-1965.” World
Politics 19 (January 1967): 218-241.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

601

Ch’oe, Yong-ho. “Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim 11-Song.” Asian Survey
26 (October 1986): 1082-1091.
Christensen, Thomas J. “A ‘Lost Chance’ for What? Rethinking the Origins of U.S.PRC Confrontation.” Journal o f American-East Asian Relations 4 (Fall 1995):
249-278.
__________________ . “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The
Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams.” International Security 17 (Summer
1992): 122-154.
Chung, David. “Christianity in Modem Korea.” Koreana Quarterly 5 (Summer 1963):
130-139.
Chung, Kiwon. “The North Korean People’s Army and the Party.” The China Quarterly
14 (April-June 1963): 105-124.
Clark, Allen D. “Protestant Work in Korea.” Korea Journal 2 (1962): 9-10.
Clark, Donald N. “ ‘Surely God Will Work Out Their Salvation:’ Protestant Missionaries
in the March First Movement.” Korean Studies 13 (1989): 42-75.
Clemens, Peter. “Captain James Hausman, US Army Military Advisor to Korea, 1946-48:
The Intelligent Man on the Spot.” The Journal o f Strategic Studies 25 (March
2002): 163-198.
Cohen, Eliot A. “‘Only Half the Battle’: American Intelligence and the Chinese
Intervention in Korea, 1950.” Intelligence and National Security 5 (1990): 129149.
Conde, David. “The Korean Minority in Japan.” Far Eastern Survey 16 (26 February
1947): 41-45.
Conway-Lanz, Sahr. “Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the
Korean War.” Diplomatic History 29 (January 2005): 49-81.
Covell, Alan Carter. “Korean Conversion to Christianity.” Asian & Pacific Quarterly o f
Cultural and Social Affairs 19 (1987): 31-42.
Crane, Conrad C. “‘No Practical Capabilities’: American biological and chemical
warfare programs during the Korean War.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
45 (Spring 2002): 241-249.
Curry, Dean C. “Where Have All the Niebuhrs Gone? Evangelicals and the
Marginalization of Religious Influence in American Public Life.” Journal o f
Church and State 36 (Winter 1994): 97-114.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

602

Cumings, Bruce. “Occurrence at Nogun-ri Bridge: An Inquiry into the History and
Memory of a Civil War.” Critical Asian Studies 33, no.4 (2001): 509-526.
_____________ . “On the Strategy and Morality of American Nuclear Policy in Korea,
1950 to the Present.” Social Science Japan Journal 1, no.l (1998): 57-70.
Danielson, Leilah. “Christianity, Dissent, and the Cold War: A. J. Muste’s Challenge to
Realism and U.S. Empire.” Diplomatic History 30 (September 2006): 645-669.
Darken, Arthur H. “The National Council of Churches and Our Foreign Policy.”
Religion in Life XXIV (Winter 1954-55): 113-126.
Davis, Daniel M. “Building a City on a Hill in Korea: The Work of Henry G.
Appenzeller.” Church History 61 (1992): 422-435.
_____________ . “Henry Gerhard Appenzeller: His Contribution to Korean
Independence, Democracy, and Modernization,”
^ Tongbang hakchi
(Eastern Studies) 57 (March 1988): 197-230.
_____________ . “The Impact of Christianity upon Korea, 1884-1910: Six Key
American and Korean Figures.” Journal o f Church and State 36 (1994): 795-820.
Dean, Robert. “Commentary: Tradition, Cause and Effect, and the Cultural History of
International Relations.” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 615-622.
Devine, Richard. “Japanese Rule in Korea after the March First Uprising: Governor
General Hasegawa’s Recommendations.” Monumenta Nipponica 52 (Winter
1997): 523-540.
DeWeerd, H. A. “Lessons of the Korean War.” The Yale Review 40 (June 1951): 592603.
Dingman, Roger. “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War.” International Security
13 (Winter 1988-1989): 50-91.
Domenico, Roy Palmer. ‘“For the Cause of Christ Here in Italy’: America’s Protestant
Challenge in Italy and the Cultural Ambiguity of the Cold War.” Diplomatic
History 29 (September 2005): 625-654.
Donnelly, William M. “Thunderbirds in Korea: The U.S. 45th Infantry Division, 19501952.” The Journal o f Military History 64 (October 2000): 1113-1139.
Endicott, Stephen L. “Germ Warfare and ‘Plausible Denial’: The Korean War, 19521953.” Modern China 5 (January 1979): 79-103.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

603

Fautua, David T. “The ‘Long Puli’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of
the Cold War U.S. Army.” The Journal o f Military History 61 (January 1997):
93-120.
Fairbank, John K. “The Problem of Revolutionary Asia.” Foreign Affairs 29
(October 1950): 101-113.
Fehrenbach, T. R. “This Kind of War: Classic Korean War History.” Korean Observer
31 (Autumn 2000): 491-495.
Fendler, Karoly. “Count Peter Vay, Bishop (1863-1948) - An Forgotten Hungarian
Traveller in and about Korea at the Beginning of the 20th Century.” Korean
Journal 40 (Autumn 2000): 299-307.
Fisher, Charles A. “The Role of Korea in the Far East.” The Geographical Journal 120
(September 1954): 282-298.
Fisher, J. Earnest. “Korea Today.” The Far Eastern Quarterly 5 (May 1946): 261-271.
Fisher, Louis. “The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?” The American
Journal o f International Law 89 (January 1995): 21-39.
Fleming, D. F. “What Is Our Role in East Asia?” The Western Political Quarterly 18
(March 1965): 7-86.
Fletcher, William C. “Reductive Containment: Soviet Religious Policy.” Journal o f
Church and State 22 (Autumn 1980): 487-504.
Fogleman, General Ronald R. “Korea, A War Worth Fighting.” Air Power History 40,
no.4 (1993): 39-42.
Foot, Rosemary J. “Historiography: Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis
of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade.” Diplomatic History 15 (Summer
1991): 411-431.
______________ . “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict.”
International Security 13 (Winter 1988-1989): 92-112.
______________ . “The Eisenhower Administration’s Fear of Empowering the Chinese.”
Political Science Quarterly 111 (Autumn 1996): 505-521.
Frank, Robert L. “Prelude to Cold War: American Catholics and Communism.” Journal
o f Church and State 34 (Winter 1992): 39-56.
Friedman, Edward. “Why America Fights in Asia.” Pacific Affairs 43 (Summer 1970):
258-267.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

604

Gartner, Scott Sigmund and Gary M. Segura. “War, Casualties, and Public Opinion.”
The Journal o f Conflict Resolution 42 (June 1998): 278-300.
George, Alexander L. “American Policy-Making and the North Korean Aggression.”
World Politics 7 (January 1955): 209-232.
Gilmore, George. “The Equipment of the Modern Foreign Missionary.” The American
Journal o f Theology 3 (July 1898): 561-573.
Gittings, John. “Talks, Bombs and Germs: Another Look at the Korean War.” Journal
o f Contemporary Asia 15, no.2 (1975): 205-217.
Gordenker, Leon. “The United Nations, the United States Occupation and the 1948
Election in Korea.” Political Science Quarterly 73 (September 1958): 426-450.
Graham, S. E. “The (Real)politiks of Culture: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in Unesco, 19461954.” Diplomatic History 30 (April 2006): 231-251.
Grajdanzev, Andrew J. “Korea under Changing Orders.” Far Eastern Survey 8
(20 December 1939): 291-297.
Grayson, J. H. ‘T he Manchurian Connection: The Life and Work of the Rev. Dr. John
Ross.” Korean Observer 15 (Autumn 1984): 345-351.
Guins, George C. “The Korean Plans of Russian Imperialism.” American Journal o f
Economics and Sociology 6 (October 1946): 71-86.
Gustafson, Merlin. “Church, State, and the Cold War, 1945-1952.” Journal o f Church
and State 8 (Winter 1966): 49-63.
______________ . “The Religion of a President.” Journal o f Church and State 5
(Autumn 1968): 708-722.
Hahn, Bae-Ho and Kyu-Taik Kim. “Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social
Origins and Skills.” Asian Survey 3 (July 1963): 305-323.
Halperin, Morton H. “The Limiting Process in the Korean War.” Political Science
Quarterly 78 (March 1963): 13-39.
Hao, Yufan and Zhihai Zhai. “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History
Revisited.” The China Quarterly No. 121 (March 1990): 94-115.
Hara, Takemichi. “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early
Nineteenth-Century Korea.” Modem Asian Studies 32 (May 1998): 389-430.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

605

Hill Patricia R. “Commentary: Religion as a Category of Diplomatic Analysis.”
Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 633-640.
Hoffmann, Frank. “The Muo Declaration: History in the Making (Translation and
Commentary).” Korean Studies 13 (1989): 22-41.
Holsti, K J.
^
■^ 7 ]
^ 1 Gukjehaksulbalpyohoe
han migwangye: gwaga gyeonjae mirae (The Ambiguous Conflict: The Korean
War in American Strategic Policies).” < ^*1]f f G u k j e j e o n g n o n c h o n g
(Collections of International Politics) 22 (1982): 241-258.
Holsti, Ole R. “The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders.” The
Journal o f Conflict Resolution 32 (June 1988): 248-294.
Hong, Kyong-man. “Formation of Korean Protestantism and Its Political Nature.”
Korean Journal 23 (December 1983): 18-29.
Hunt, Michael H. “East Asia in Henry Luce’s ‘American Century.’” Diplomatic History
23 (Spring 1999): 321-353.
Huntley, Martha. “Presbyterian Women’s Work and Rights in the Korean Mission.”
Journal o f Presbyterian History 65 (Spring 1987): 37-48.
Hurh, Won Moo and Kwang Chung Kim. “Religious Participation of Korean Immigrants
in the United States.” Journal o f the Scientific Study o f Religion 29 (March 1990):
19-34.
Hwang, In Kwang. “The 1953 U.S. Initiative for Korean Neutralization.” Korea &
World Affairs 10 (Winter 1986): 798-86.
Hwang, In Soo. “Syngman Rhee’s Authoritarian Rule and the Dispute with the U.S.”
Korean Observer 32 (Winter 2001): 603-626.
Hyun, Bong Hak. “Christmas Cargo: A Civilian Remembers The Hungnam Evacuation.”
Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin 8 (Spring/Summer 1997): 33-44.
Jacobs, Seth. “‘Our System Demands the Supreme Being’: The U.S. Religious Revival
and the ‘Diem Experiment,’ 1954-1955.” Diplomatic History 25 (Fall 2000):
589-624.
Jones, F. C. “The Tragedy of Korea.” Pacific Affairs 41 (Spring 1968): 86-89.
Jones, Geo. Heber. “The Growth of the Church in the Mission Field 111. Presbyterian and
Methodist Missions in Korea.” International Review o f Missions 1 (July 1912):
412-434.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

606

Kang, Jeong-Koo. “A Critical Evaluation of the U.S. Role in the Division of Korea and
the Korean War.” Korean Social Science Journal XXVII, no.l (2000): 77-111.
Kang, Sung-Hack. “Korea-U.S.S.R. Relations in the 20th Century.” The Journal o f
Asiatic Studies 34 (January 1991): 32-44.
Kang, Wi Jo. “The First Protestant Missionary in Korea and Early U.S.-Korean
Relations.” Missiology: An International Review 11 (October 1983): 403-417.
Keefer, Edward C. “President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War.”
Diplomatic History 10 (Summer 1986): 267-289.
______________ . “The Truman Administration and the South Korean Political Crisis of
1952: Democracy’s Failure?” Pacific Historical Review 60 (May 1991): 145-168.
Kim, Andrew Eungi. “Characteristics of Religious Life in South Korea: A Sociological
Survey.” Review o f Religious Research 43 (June 2002): 291-310.
Kim, C. I. Eugene. “Japanese Rule in Korea (1905-1910): A Case Study.” Proceedings
o f the American Philosophical Society 106 (15 February 1962): 53-59.
Kim, Choong Soon. “Attribute of ‘Asexuality’ in Korean Kinship and Sundered Koreans
during the Korean War.” Journal o f Comparative Family Studies 20, no.3 (1989):
309-322.
Kim, Chull Baum. “U.S. Policy on the Eve of the Korean War: Abandonment or
Safeguard?” Security in Korea: War, Stalemate and Negotiation. Ed. Phil
Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Henry L. Andrews, Jr. Boulder: Westviews
Press, 1994.
Kim, Han-Kyo. “The Declaration of Independence, March 1,1919: A New Translation.”
Korean Studies 13 (1989): 1-4.
Kim, Hak-joon. “A Comparative Study of the North-South Koreas’ Unification Policy in
the Korean War Period.” Social Science Journal 3 (1975): 107-134.
Kim, Hyung-chan. “Portrait of a Troubled Korean Patriot: Yun Ch’i-ho’s Views of the
March First Independence Movement and World War II.” Korean Studies 13
(1989): 76-91.
Kim, Il-pyong J. “The Judicial and Administrative Structure in North Korea.” The China
Quarterly 14 (April-June 1963): 94-104.
Kim, Joungwon Alexander. ‘T he ‘Peak of Socialism’ in North Korea: The Five and
Seven Year Plans.” Asian Survey 5 (May 1965): 255-269.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

607

Kim, Kwan Sik. ‘T he Christian Church in Korea.” The International Review o f
Missions 36 (1947): 125-140.
Kim, Kyong-Dong. “Social Change and Societal Development in Korea since 1945.”
Korea & World Affairs 9 (Winter 1985): 756-787.
Kim, Seung-Young. “American Elites’ Strategic Thinking Towards Korea: From
Kennan to Brzezinski.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 12 (March 2001): 185-212.
Kim, Yongjeung. “The Cold War: Korean Elections.” Far Eastern Survey 17 (May 5,
1948): 101-102.
Kim, Youngho. “International Dimensions of the Korean War.” Korean Journal 38
(Winter 1998): 130-146.
Kim, Young-Shik. “A Retrospective on the Korean War in the Context of International
Relations.” Korea & World Affairs 10 (Winter 1986): 827-843.
Kirby, Dianne. “Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the
Defense of Western Civilization and Christianity, 1945-48.” Journal o f
Contemporary History 35, no.3 (2000): 385-412.
___________ . “Response Within the Anglican Church to Nuclear Weapons: 19451961.” Journal o f Church and State 37 (Summer 1995): 599-622.
Koh, B. C. “The War’s Impact on the Korean Peninsula.” The Journal o f American-East
Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1993): 57-76.
Krishman, R. R. “Early History of U.S. Imperialism in Korea.” Social Scientist 12
(November 1984): 3-18.
Latourette, Kenneth Scott. “Missionaries Abroad.” Annals o f the American Academy o f
Political and Social Science 368 (November 1966): 21-30.
Lacy, Creighton. “The Missionary Exodus from China.” Pacific Affairs 28 (December
1955): 301-314.
Latourette, Kenneth Scott. “Problems Confronting Christian Missions in the Far East.”
Pacific Affairs 21 (June 1948): 176-185.
Leary, William M., Jr. “Aircraft and Anti-Communists: CAT in Action, 1949-52.” The
China Quarterly 52 (October-December 1972): 654-669.
Lee, Chong-Sik. “Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage.” The China Quarterly
14 (April-June 1963): 3-16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

608

_____________ . “The Korean War: A Second Comment.” The China Quarterly 54
(April-June 1973): 361-362.
Lee, Jung Young. “The American Missionary Movement in Korea, 1882-1945: Its
Contributions and American Diplomacy.” Missiology: An International Review
11 (October 1983): 387-402.
Lee, Raymond S. H. “Early Korean War Coverage.” Journalism Quarterly 55, no.4
(1978): 789-792.
Lee, Seong H. “Attitude of The New York Times and Washington Post Editorials
Relative to the Armistice in the Final Stage of the Korean War.” < $ $ S
$$.> H an’gukeonronhakbo (Korean Public Opinion Studies) 15 (1982): 39-47.
Lee, Sungho. “The Emergence of the Modem University in Korea.” Higher Education
18, no. 1 (1989): 87-116.
Lee, Timothy S. “A Political Factor in the Rise of Protestantism in Korea: Protestantism
and the 1919 March First Movement.” Church History 69 (March 2000): 116142.
Leffler, Melvyn P. “The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?” American Historical
Review 104 (April 1999): 501-524.
Lienesch, Michael. “Right-Wing Religion: Christian Conservatism as a Political
Movement.” Political Science Quarterly 97 (Fall 1982): 403-425.
Ling, Stuart J. “Singing in Korea.” Music Educators Journal 39 (November-December
1952): 24-26.
Lo, Clarence Y. H. “Military Spending as Crisis Management: The U.S. Response to the
Berlin Blockade and the Korean War.” Berkeley Journal o f Sociology 20 (1975/1976):
147-181.
Lowe Peter. “An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and
the Korean War 1950-1.” The English Historical Review 105 (July 1990): 624653.
Lowenfels, Walter. “Korean War Letters.” Mainstream 13 (September 1960): 11-23.
MacDonald, Donald S. “American Imperialism: Myth or Reality?” Korea & World
Affairs 10 (Fall 1986): 575-597.
MacDonald, Douglas J. “Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War:
Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism.” International Security 20 (Winter
1995-1996): 152-188.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

609

Malkasian, Carter. ‘Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and
Vietnam Wars.” The Journal o f Military History 68 (July 2004): 911-942.
Marmur, Jacland. ‘T he Bloodstained Beach.” In Courage in Korea, 266-291. Selected
by Albert B. Tibbets. Boston: Little Borwn & Co., 1959.
Matray, James I. “America’s Reluctant Crusade: Truman’s Commitment of Combat
Troops in the Korean War.” The Historian 42 (May 1980): 437-455.
. “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948.”
Korean Studies 19 (1995): 17-38.
_____________ . “Revisiting Korea: Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War, Part 1.”
Prologue Magazine 34 (Summer 2002), http://www.archives.gov/publications
/prologue/2002/summer/korean-myths-l.html (accessed 10 April 2006).
_____________ . “Revisiting Korea: Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War, Part 2.”
Prologue Magazine 34 (Summer 2002), http://www.archives.gov/publications/
prologue/2002/summer/korean-myths-2.html (accessed 10 April 2006).
Matsuo, Takayoshi and S. Takiguchi. “The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part One: The
Missionary Activity of the Japan Congregational Church in Korea.” Modem
Asian Studies 13 (1979): 401-429.
______________________________ . “The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part Two: The
1st March Movement and the Japanese Protestants.” Modern Asian Studies 14
(1979): 581-615.
McCune, George M. “Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia.” The American
Historical Review 51 (October 1945): 122-123.
________________ . “Korea: The First Year of Liberation.” Pacific Affairs 20 (March
1947): 3-17.
________________ . “Occupation Politics in Korea.” Far Eastern Survey 15(13
February 1946): 33-37.
________________ . “Post-War Government and Politics of Korea.” The Journal o f
Politics 9 (November 1947): 605-623.
________________ . “Russian Policy in Korea: 1895-1898.” Far Eastern Survey 14
(26 September 1945): 272-274.
________________ . “The Korean Situation.” Far Eastern Survey 17 (8 September
1948): 197-202.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

610

McFadden, W. Robert. “The Ethical Aspects of Limited War.” Journal o f Church and
State 13 (Winter 1971): 113-127.
McNamara, Dennis L. “State and Concentration in Korea’s First Republic, 1948-60.”
M odem Asian Studies 26 (October 1992): 701-718.
McLellan, David S. “Dean Acheson and the Korean War.” Political Science Quarterly
83 (March 1968): 16-39.
Medhurst, Martin J. “Text and Context in the 1952 Presidential Campaign: Eisenhower’s
‘I shall Go to Korea’ Speech.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 30 (September
2000): 464-484.
Meemik, James. “Presidential Support in Congress: Conflict and Consensus on Foreign
and Defense Policy.” The Journal o f Politics 55 (August 1993): 569-587.
Mehl, Roger. “Is Political Action by the World Council of Churches Possible?”
Ecumenical Review 3 (1951): 137-145.
Min, Kyong Bae. “On the Question of Understanding Korean Churches.” The Northeast
Asia Journal o f Theology 24-25 (1980): 121-128.
Miller, William Lee. “Religion and Americanism.” Journal o f Church and State 5 (May
1963): 15-26.
Millett, Allan R. “A Reader’s Guide to the Korean War.” The Journal o f Military
History 61 (July 1997): 583-597.
Moffett, Samuel H. “The Church of The East.” < ^ W f % &
Sahakyeongu (Historical Studies) 20 (1968): 425-441.
Moffett, Samuel H. “Missionaries Contributed to Korea,” In D.R.P.: The Official
Bulletin o f the Democratic Republican Party 10-11 (November 1975): 19-20, 72.
Moon, Chung-in. “Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea
in the United States.” International Studies Quarterly 32 (March 1988): 67-89.
Nakajima, Mineo. “The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots in the International
Background of the Korean War.” The Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs 1
(January 1979): 19-47.
Natsios, Andrew. “The Politics of Famine in North Korea,” United States Institute o f
Peace Special Report 51 (2 August 1999): 1,
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990802.html (accessed 5 February
2007).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

611

Needell, Allan A. ‘“ Truth Is Our Weapon’: Project TROY, Political Warfare, and
Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State.” Diplomatic
History 17 (Summer 1993): 399-420.
Noah, Max. “Mission to Korea.” Music Educators Journal 35 (May-June 1949): 14-16.
Nutt, Rick. “Toward Peacemaking - Changing Perspectives in the Presbyterian Church
in the United States, 1946-1981.” Journal o f Presbyterian History 68 (Summer
1990): 109-119.
Oh, John Kie-chiang. “Role of the United States in South Korea’s Democratization.”
Pacific Affairs 42 (Summer 1969): 164-177.
________________ . “The Evolution of U.S.- Korean Relations in the Cold War Era.”
<
Gukjejeongchinonchong (Collections of International Politics)
22 (1982): 177-192.
Oh, Kang-nam. “Sagehood and Metanoia: The Confucian-Christian Encounter in
Korea.” Journal o f the American Academy o f Religion 61 (Summer 1993): 303320.
Ohanian, Lee E. “The Macroeconomic Effects of War Finance in the United States:
World War II and the Korea War.” The American Economic Review 87 (March
1997): 23-40.
Oliver, Robert T. “A Brief for Korea.” Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and
Social Science 294 (July 1954): 33-41.
_____________ . “The Korean Election.” Far Eastern Survey 17 (June 12,1948): 131132.
O’Neill, Mark. “Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Sovietera Archives.” OAH Magazine o f History 14 (Spring 2000): 20-24.
Ostermann, Christian F. and Kathryn Weathersby. “New Evidence on North Korea:
Introduction.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 14/15 (Winter
2003-Spring 2004): 5-7.
Pai, Margaret K. “The Tragic Split.” Manoa 14, No.2 (2002-2003): 77-83.
Paige, Glenn D. and Dong Jun Lee. “The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea.” The
China Quarterly 14 (April-June 1963): 17-29.
Palmer, Spencer J. “Christianity in China and Korea Revolutionary Versus
Traditionalistic Change.” Soochow Journal o f Humanities

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(Tung

612

Wu Wen Shih Hseueh Pad) 1, no.3 (1976): 36-58.
Park, Hong-Kyu. “American Involvement in the Korean War.” The History Teacher 16,
(February 1983): 249-263.
Park, Kyung Ae. “Women and Revolution in North Korea.” Pacific Affairs 65 (Winter
1992-1993): 527-545.
Park, Myung-lim. “The Internalization of the Cold War in Korea: Entangling the
Domestic Politics with the Global Cold War in 1946.” International Journal o f
Korean History 2 (December 2001): 309-350.
Park, Tae-Gyun Park. “U.S. Policy Change toward South Korea in the 1940s and the
1950s.” Journal o f International and Area Studies 7, no.2 (2000): 89-104.
Paschall, Colonel Rod. “Special Operations in Korea.” Conflict 7, no.2 (1987): 155-178.
Pierard, Richard V. “Billy Graham and the U.S. Presidency.” Journal o f Church and
State 22 (Winter 1980): 107-127.
Pierpaoli, Paul G., Jr. “Beyond Collective Amnesia: A Korean War Retrospective.”
International Social Science Review 76 (Fall-Winter 2001): 92-102.
_________________ . “Truman’s Other War: The Battle for the American Homefront,
1950-1953.” OAH Magazine o f History 14 (Spring 2000): 15-19
Poitras, Edward W. “How Korean Is the Methodist ‘Korean Creed’?” Methodist History
36 (October 1997): 3-16.
Pollack, Jonathan D. “U.S.-Korea Relations: The China Factor.” Journal o f Northeast
Asian Studies 4 (Fall 1985): 12-28.
Rankin, Henry William. “Political Values of the American Missionary.” The American
Journal o f Sociology 13 (September 1907): 145-182.
Redstone, Victoria. “Tales and Visions of the Korean War: A Guide to Internet
Resources.” OAH Magazine o f History 14 (Spring 2000): 42-43.
Ribuffo, Leo P. “God and Contemporary Politics,” Journal o f American History 80
(March 1993): 1515-1533.
Richardson, Beth. “Canadian Missionaries: A Part Of Our Heritage.”
Bukmijuhakyongu (American-Canadian studies) 1 (1992): 191-208.

f2

Riggs, Fred W. “Is a ‘Christian Foreign Policy’ Possible?” Religion in Life 20 (Summer
1951): 338-349.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

613

Robert, Dana L. “The Influence of American Missionary Women on the World Back
Home.” Religion and American Culture 12 (Winter 2002): 59-89.
Roberts, Priscilla. “New Light on a ‘Forgotten War’: The Diplomacy of the Korean
Conflict.” OAH Magazine o f History 14 (Spring 2000): 10-14.
Robin, Ron. “Behavioral Codes and Truce Talks: Images of the Enemy and Expert
Knowledge in the Korean Armistice Negotiation.” Diplomatic History 25 (Fall
2000): 625-646.
Rothstein, Jules M. “Journeys Beyond the Horizon.” Physical Therapy 81 (November
2001): 1817-1828.
Rotter, Andrew J. “Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian
Relations, 1947-1954.” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 593-613.
Rudolph, Philip. “North Korea and the Path to Socialism.” Pacific Affairs 32 (June 1959):
131-143.
Ryan, Mark A. “Early Chinese Attitudes Toward Civil Defense Against Nuclear
Attack.” The Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs No.21 (January 1989): 81109.
Sanders, Jerry. “Shaping the Cold War Consensus: The Soviet Threat, Interelite Conflict,
and Mass Politics in the Korean War Era.” Berkeley Journal o f Sociology 24/25
(1980): 67-136.
Sandler, Stanley. “Select Bibliography of the Korean War.” OAH Magazine o f History
14 (Spring 2000): 6-9.
Saunders, Kenneth. “The Passing of Paternalism in Mission.” The Journal o f Religion 2
(September 1922): 466-475.
Schurmacher, Emile C. “Spy Mission to Inchon.” In Courage in Korea, 140-162.
Selected by Albert B. Tibbets. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1959.
Shapiro, Robert Y. and Benjamin I. Page. “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public.” The
Journal o f Conflict Resolution 32 (June 1988): 211-247.
Shearer, Roy E. “The Evangelical Missionary's Role in Church Growth in Korea.”
International Review o f Missions 54 (1965): 462-470.
Simmons, Robert R. “Some Myths about June 1950.” The China Quarterly No.54
(April-June 1973): 354-361.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

614

Smith, Gaddis. “Reconsiderations the Shadow of John Foster Dulles.” Foreign Affairs
52 (January 1974): 403-408.
Smith, Howard. “The BBC Television Newsreel and the Korean War.” Historical
Journal o f Film, Radio, and Television 8, no.3 (1988): 227-252.
Smith, Tony. “Making the World Safe for Democracy in the American Century.”
Diplomatic History 23 (Spring 1999): 173-188.
Smith, Tony. “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the
Cold War.” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 567-591.
Smylie, Robert F. “A Presbyterian Witness on War and Peace: An Historical
Interpretation.” Journal o f Presbyterian History 59 (Winter 1981): 498-516.
______________ . “The Presbyterian Church and the United Nations: An Overview.”
Journal o f Presbyterian History 68 (Summer 1990): 74-86.
Soh, Jin-chull. “A Review on the Causes of Korean War In the Light of ‘New
Document.’” Korean Observer 31 (Autumn 2000): 345-377.
Soustelle, Jacques. “Indo-China and Korea: One Front.” Foreign Affairs 29 (October
1950): 56-66.
Spanier, John S. ‘T he Politics of the Korean War.” Security in Korea: War, Stalemate
and Negotiation. Edited by Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Henry L.
Andrews, Jr. Boulder: Westviews Press, 1994.
Stevenson, Adlai E. “Korea in Perspective.” Foreign Affairs 30 (April 1952): 349-360.
Stueck, William. “The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War.” World Politics
28 (July 1976): 622-635.
Suchman, Edward A. Rose K. Goldsen, and Robin M. Williams, Jr. “Attitudes Toward
the Korean War.” Public Opinion Quarterly 17 (Summer 1953): 171-184.
Suh, David Kwang-Sun. “Forty Years of Korean Protestant Churches.” Korea & World
Affairs 9 (Winter 1985): 789-891.
Swartout, Robert R. Jr. “Harry S. Truman and the Korean War: An Analysis of Some
Recent American Texts,”
p/ 'S /t2 ftZ tJ Z Bukmiyeongu changganho (North
American Studies) 1 (1995): 147-164.
Toulouse, Mark G. “The Development of a Cold Warrior: John Foster Dulles and the
Soviet Union, 1945-1952.” Journal o f Presbyterian History 63 (Fall 1985): 309322.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

615

Trachtenberg, Marc. “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear
Balance, 1 9 4 9 -1 9 5 4 International Security 13 (Winter 1988-1989): 5-49.
Tucker, Nancy Bemkopf. “An Unlikely Peace: American Missionaries and the Chinese
Communists, 1948-1950.” Pacific Historical Review 45, no.l (1976): 97-116.
Tucker, Spencer C. “Why Study the Korean War?” OAH Magazine o f History 14
(Spring 2000): 3-4.
Ulam, Adam B. “Letters: Stalin, Kim, and Korean War Origins,” Cold War International
History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994): 21
Vinz, Warren L. “The Politics of Protestant Fundamentalism in the 1950s and 1960s.”
Journal o f Church and State 14 (Winter 1972): 235-260.
Wald, Kenneth D. “The Religious Dimension of American Anti-Communism.” Journal
o f Church and State 36 (Summer 1994): 483-506.
Walsh, Edmund S. “The Spiritual Aspect of Foreign Policy.” Catholic Mind 50
(November 1952): 641-646.
Weathersby, Kathryn. “New Findings on the Korean War,” Cold War International
History Project Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993): 1, 14-15.
_________________ . “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 19451950: New Evidence from Russian Archives.” Cold War International History
Project Working Paper#8.
_________________ . “The Cold War in Asia: New Russian Documents on the Korean
War,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996):
30-35.
_________________ . “The Korean War Revisited.” Wilson Quarterly 23 (June 1, 1999):
91-95.
Weber, Paul J. “The First Amendment and the Military Chaplaincy: The Process of
Reform.” Journal o f Church and State 22 (Autumn 1980): 459-474.
Webster, John C. B. “American Presbyterian Global Mission Policy: An Overview of
150 Years.” Journal o f Presbyterian History 65 (Summer 1987): 71-84.
Weems, Benjamin. “Behind the Korean Election.” Far Eastern Survey 17 (June 23,
1948): 142-147.
Wells, Kenneth M. “Background to the March First Movement: Koreans in Japan, 1905-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

616

1919.” Korean Studies 13 (1989): 5-21.
Wells, Samuel F., Jr. “The Origins of Massive Retaliation.” Political Science Quarterly
96 (Spring 1981): 31-52.
West, Philip. “Interpreting the Korean War.” American Historical Review 94 (Feb
1989): 80-96.
Westad, Odd Arne. “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible)
Paradigms.” Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 551-565.
Whelan, John B. “The Anglican Church in Korea.” The International Review o f Mission
49 (April 1960): 157-166.
Whitfield, Stephen J. “The 1950’s: The Era of No Hard Feelings.” The South Atlantic
Quarterly 74 (Summer 1975): 289-307.
Wilbur, C. Martin. “George McAfee McCune (June 16,1908 - November 5,1948).”
The Far Eastern Quarterly 9 (February 1950): 185-191.
Williams, Robert E. “Christian Realism and ‘The Bomb’: Reinhold Niebuhr on the
Dilemma of the Nuclear Age.” Journal o f Church and State 28 (Spring 1986):
289-304.
Wingrove, Paul. “Who started Korea?” History Today 50 (July 2000): 44-46.
Wiltz, John Edward. “Did the United States Betray Korea in 1905?” Pacific Historical
Review LIV (August 1985): 243-265.
________________ . “The MacArthur Hearings of 1951: The Secret Testimony.”
Military Affairs 39 (December 1975): 167-173.
________________ . “Truman and MacArthur: The Wake Island Meeting.” Military
Affairs 42 (December 1978): 169-176.
Wingrove, Paul. “Who started Korea?” History Today 50 (July 2000): 44-46.
Wolfers, Arnold. “Collective Security and the War in Korea.” The Yale Review XLIII
(June 1954): 481-496.
Wood, James E., Jr. “Editorial: Religion, Revolution, and Nationalism in Asia.” Journal
o f Church and State 14 (Winter 1972): 5-17.
_________________ . “Editorial: The Nuclear Arms Race and the Churches.” Journal o f
Church and State 25 (Spring 1983): 219-229.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

617

Worland, Rick. “The Korean War Film as Family Melodrama: ‘The Bridges at TokoRi.’” Historical Journal o f Film, Radio and Television 19, no.3 (1999): 359-377.
Wubeen, H. H. “American Prisoners of War in Korea: A Second Look at the ‘Something
New in History’ Theme.” American Quarterly 22 (Spring 1970): 3-19.
Yang, Key P. and Chang-Boh Chee. “North Korean Educational System: 1945 to
Present.” China Quarterly 14 (April-June 1963): 125-140.
Yong, Charles S. “Missing Action: POW films, brainwashing and the Korean War,
1954-1968.” Historical Journal o f Film, Radio, and Television 18 (March 1998):
49-74.

THESES AND DISSERTATIONS
Cha, Sang-Chul. “The Search for a ‘Graceful exit’: General John Reed Hodge &
American Occupation.” Ph.D. diss., Miami University, 1986.
Fraser, Benson P. “The Broadcast Coverage of the Korean War.” M.A. Thesis,
California State University, 1981.
Fowler, Miok Lee. “Korean War and Korean Consciousness: An Anthology of Korean
War Literature with Critique.” Ph.D. diss., University of Northern Colorado,
1974.
Gardner, Patrick D. “Prerequisites of Power in Liberated Korea: The Political
Relationship between Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku.” MA Thesis, Yonsei
University, 2000.
Gietschier, Steve Philip. “Limited War and the Home Front: Ohio During the Korean
War.” Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1977.
Hong, Francesca Minah. “Syngman Rhee’s Changing Perceptions of Japan.” M.A.
Thesis,Yonsei University, 2002.
Kim, Chang-Shig. “Causes of the Korean War: Review of the Previous Studies.” M.A.
Thesis, Yonsei University, 1990.
Kim, Chung G. “Small States and Great Powers: The Case of Relations Between South
Korea and the United States.” Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at
Albany, 1985.
Kim, Hansuk (Hans). “The Impact of Famine on Kim Jong-Il’s Control Over Social and
Political Forces in North-Korea.” M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2000.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

618

Kim, Myong Whai. “Prisoners of War as a Major Problem of the Korean Armistice,
1953.” Ph.D. diss., New York University, October 1960.
Kim, Seok Ho. “The Influence of the Power Elite over United States Foreign Policy: The
Case of Involvement Decision on the Korean War.” M.A. Thesis, Hankuk
University, 1997.
Koh, Kwang II. “In Quest of National Unity and Power: Political Ideas and Practices of
Syngman Rhee.” Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ, 1962.
Kuk, Jungmin. “Helping Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea: Robert T. Oliver’s
Publicity and Lobbying Efforts in the United States, 1942-1960.” M.A. Thesis,
Yonsei University, 2000.
Lee, Chuhyon Angie. “Syngman Rhee as Secretary of the Seoul YMCA, 1910-1912:
With Emphasis on the Possible Impact of His Activities on the Korean
Conspiracy Case (1911-1912).” M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2002.
Lee, Ha Woo. “The Korean Polity Under Syngman Rhee.” Ph.D. diss., The American
University, 1975.
Lee, Jong Hyeong. “Samuel Austin Moffett: His Life and Work in the Development of
the Presbyterian Church of Korea 1890-1936.” Ph.D.diss., Union Theological
Seminary in Virginia, 1983.
Lee, Myoung Sop. “Comparative Study of the Political Legitimacy of North and South
Korea.” M.A. Thesis, Kyung Hee University, 2001.
Lee, Tae-kyu. “The Legacy of the Korean War Armistice Negotiations on North Korea’s
Negotiating Behavior.” M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 2000.
Min, Linda J. “Kilsoo K. Haan versus Syngman Rhee: A Competition for Leadership in
the Korean Independence Movement in the United States, 1938-1945.” M.A.
Thesis, Yonsei University, 1996.
Okuyama, Yoko. “Helen Kim’s Life and Thought Under the Japanese Colonialism,
1918-1945.” M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 1989.
Osmer, Harold Henry. “United States Religious Press Response to the Containment
Policy During the Period of the Korean War.” Ph.D. diss., New York University,
1970.
Paik, Hak Soon. “North Korean State Formation, 1945-1950.” Ph.D. diss., University of
Pennsylvania, 1993.
Pang, Tae-Seop. “The Korean Factor in Sino-American Relations.” M.A. Thesis, Yonsei

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

619
University, 1996.

Park, James Y. “Scholastic Accomplishments of Syngman Rhee in the United States With Special Reference to His Doctoral Dissertation, Neutrality as Influenced by
the United States.” MA Thesis: Yonsei University, 1999.
Renick, Jr. Roderick Dhu. “Political Communication: A Case Study of US Propaganda
in North and South Korea.” Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1971.
Riggs, James Richards. “Congress and the Conduct of the Korean War.” Ph.D. diss.,
Purdue University, 1972.
Seiler, Sydney A. “Kim Il-song 1941-1948: The Creation of a Legend, The Creation of a
Regime.” M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 1992.
Song, Baek-Seok. “A Study on Trusteeship Plan Discords Among Korean Domestic
Political Forces.” M.A. Thesis, Kyung Hee University, 1995.
Spear, Brian L. “Syngman Rhee’s Rise to Power in Post World War II Korea.” M.A.
Thesis, Yonsei University, 1990.
Taufiq, Tauahsaldy. “Business relations under authoritarian regimes in South Korea: a
comparative study of the Syngman Rhee and Chung-Hee Park regimes (19481972).” M.A. Thesis: Korea University, 1997.
Toner, James Hugh. “Candidate as Constable: The American Way of War and Peace in
Korea, 1950-1953.” Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, May 1976.

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
American Magazine
Austin Daily Herald
Bralaerd Daily Dispatch
Christian Life
Christianity and Crisis
Christianity Today
Mansfield O. News-Joumal
Motive
New York Times
Newsweek
Northwest Arkansas Times
Panama City News-Herald
Presbyterian Life
Presbyterian Survey
Religion Today and Tomorrow
The Ada Weekly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

620

The Christian Century
The Coshocton Ohio Tribune
The Daily Courier
The Gettysburg Times
The Fredericksburg News
The Herald-Press
The Lima News
The Messengers
The Portsmouth Times
The Post-Standard
The United Presbyterian
The U.S. Naval Institute
TIME
U.S. News & World Report
Walla Walla, Wash.

WEB MATERIALS
Letter from Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, November 2, 1917.
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm (accessed 7 February
2007).
Report of the No Gun Ri Review. U.S. Department o f Army Inspector General, January
2001. http://www.army.mil/nogunri/ (accessed 2 January 2007).
Han, Thomas Hong-soon. “The Role of the Church in South-North Dialogue.”
http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/corea/proc/022.pdf (accessed 10 April 2006).
Kim, Andrew E. “History of Christianity in Korea: From Its Troubled Beginning to Its
Contemporary Success.” http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/xhist.htm (accessed 10
April 2006).
Kim, Il-sung. With the Century. Korean Friendship Association (KFA). Juche 92 (2003).
http://www.korea-dpr.com/library/202.pdf (accessed 10 April 2006).
The Legacy of Korea: A 50th Anniversary Conference, Truman Presidential Museum &
Library and the University of Missouri-Kansas City.
http://www.trumanlibrary.Org/korea/nadel.htm#nadel (accessed 9 February 2007).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

621

NON-ENGLISH MATERIALS
Materials in Chinese
Da Ying (AJR)- Zhiyuanjun Zhanfu Jishi
Volunteers). Beijing: Kun lun chu ban she

(Memoirs of the Chinese
1987.

Guo, Min-jin (tWjAf^i)- Hanzhanyiwang: Yuxue Rensheng Huarenquan ffU 'flttii::
l&f£A!SAIi (Memoir of the Korean War: Human Rights of the POWs in the
Contest of Bloody Survival). Taiwan: Shangzhi Minhwa Shiyi
2000.

m&n,

Liu, Lang (§PJJt9)- Liuxie Dao Mingtian jm.ffnffilTcflfl (Bleeding till tomorrow). Hong
Kong: Asian Press
lAftMltWRKA 3], 1955.
Wang, Jian-guo (AHH!). Renhai Da Beiju
Tactics). Hong Kong: Asian Press

A'iSA^M (The Tragedy of Human-wave
1955.

Zhang, Zhe-shi OA'IPA), e(l- Meijun Jizhongying Qinli Ji
B(Personal
Records in the American Prison Camps). Beijing: Chinese Archives Press
1996.

Books in Korean
^

A A
7]-^-^l°c}: S)-A <3
Han’gukjeonjeonggua giboksinyang
hawksan yeongu (A Study of the Korean War and This-Worldly Blessings in
the Christian Church). Seoul: The Institute for Korean Church History, 1999.

s f e j ■ < f t H £ A > H an’guk kidokkyosa (A History of the Korean Churches).
Seoul: The Institute of the Church Education, 1980.
^

(Min, Kyong-bae).
?A§fA> H an’guk kidokkyohoesa (A History
of the Christianity in Korea). Seoul: tflt}- 7]^-j2.
Taehan Kidokkyo
Ch’ulp’ansa, 1982.
A e I (Yi, Man-yol).
Han’guk kidokkyo minjok uishik
(Christianity in Korea and National Consciousness). Seoul:
A tl A -Chishik
Sanopsa, 1991.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

622

Articles in Korean
(Paik, HakSoon).
o] ^ o z f ^ . ^ 7 } ^ ^ .
Bukhaneseoui ‘Daniljeok jidoryeok’ ui hwakripgwa dang gukgageonseol (The
Party, The State, and the Rivals in Early North Korea).
^ - j I->
Hyeontaebukhanyeongu (North Korean Studies Review) Vol.2, N o.l (1999.6.30).
(Kim,Heung-soo). “^ * 1 * 3 7] 7 } 7 ) ^ 3 .
Han ’gukjeonjeong sigi gidokkyo oewondancheui guhohwaldong ” (Relief
Activities of Foreign Christian Voluntary Agencies during the Korean War).
JZ-3} 73A} Hangukkidokgyo yeoksa History o f Korean Christianity ()
23 (2005): 97-124.

M.A. Theses in Korean
^ 5 - (Kim, Hun). “^U}^-ufl£-*jl7l- ^
lE S H l 77}% ^
<3 ^Sinsachambaemunjega hangok gyohoee kkichin yeonghwang yeongu” (A
Study on the Influence of Shinto Shrine Worship Issue on the Korean Church).
M.A. Thesis, Yonsei Univerity, 2002.
(Lee, Seong-Jae).
t-fl
Haebangihu buk’hankidokkyohoe gongsanjeonggwongwaui gwangyee
tehanyeongu (Study on the Relation Between North Korea Government and
North Korean Church since Liberation).” M.A. Thesis, Yonsei University, 1992.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

VITA

Kai Yin Allison Li Haea

Kai Yin Allison Li was bom in Guangzhou, China, on January 29, 1972. She
emigrated to Honk Kong in 1977.
Secondary School in May 1992.

She graduated from Shau Kei Wan Government
In 1995, she received a B.A. degree in American

Studies from the University of Hong Kong. She was then awarded a Fulbright Exchange
Scholarship for graduate study in the United States and completed a M.A. degree in
American Studies at the College of William and Mary in May 1997. Her Master’s thesis
was titled: “Lost Chances in Sino-American Relations: The Burden of Myth, Culture, and
Ideology, 1949-1953.”
In August 1996, the author entered the history doctoral program at the College of
William and Mary with a concentration in U.S. diplomatic relations and passed her
doctoral examinations in 1998. She married in January 1999 and changed her name to
Kai Yin Allison Haga. She became a U.S. citizen in December 2006. Her dissertation
was successfully defended on May 21, 2007.

623

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

